Opinion
No. 1D21-204
06-08-2022
AGENCY FOR PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES, Appellant, v. MEADOWVIEW PROGRESSIVE CARE GROUP HOME, Owned and Operated By Meadowview Progressive Care Corporation, Appellee.
Francis Carbone II, General Counsel, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, Tallahassee, for Appellant. G. Barrington Lewis, Law Office of George B. Lewis, Boynton Beach, for Appellee.
Francis Carbone II, General Counsel, Agency for Persons with Disabilities, Tallahassee, for Appellant.
G. Barrington Lewis, Law Office of George B. Lewis, Boynton Beach, for Appellee.
Per Curiam.
Appellant, Agency for Person with Disabilities (APD), challenges two orders of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) sanctioning APD with attorney's fees under section 57.105(5), Florida Statutes (2018), as a penalty for APD's administrative licensing action in a previous case. Because the ALJ lacked jurisdiction in the latter case in which the orders were entered, we quash the orders and remand for dismissal.
The orders are subject to judicial review under section 120.68, Florida Statutes. § 57.105(5), Fla. Stat.
DOAH Case No. 19-1812FL
APD began disciplinary action against Meadowview Progressive Care's license to operate a group home by filing a three-count administrative complaint seeking to revoke Meadowview's license.See § 120.60(5), Fla. Stat.; Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.2015. APD sought revocation of Meadowview's license based on two statutory violations by an officer and manager of Meadowview, and one employee background check violation. Following Meadowview's request for hearing, the case proceeded in the Division of Administrative Hearings (DOAH) in case number 19-1812FL. See §§ 120.569, 120.57, Fla. Stat.
After a hearing, the ALJ's recommended order included findings of fact, conclusions of law, and a recommended disposition to deny APD's request to revoke Meadowview's license. See § 120.57(1)(k), Fla. Stat. In the recommended order, the ALJ reserved jurisdiction "to award a reasonable attorney's fee against Petitioner [APD], pursuant to section 57.105(5)." While the record contains no motion for attorney's fees by Meadowview under section 57.105 or any other provision, the statute can be applied upon a court's or an ALJ's "initiative" without a motion. § 57.105(1), (5), Fla. Stat. The recommended order provided the parties with an anticipated time frame, informing them that "[a]fter the issuance of the final order, the administrative law judge will issue a notice of hearing to address Petitioner's liability under section 57.105 and, if established, the amount of fees."
In January 2020, APD entered its final order, adopting all the pertinent recommendations and conclusions submitted by the ALJ. See § 120.57(1)(l). In its final order, APD denied any disciplinary action against Meadowview's license. While attorney's fees were not specifically mentioned, APD's general adoption included the paragraph reserving the ALJ's jurisdiction to determine APD's liability for fees as a sanction under section 57.105.
The recommended order, as adopted by APD's final order, did not determine APD's liability for attorney's fees under section 57.105. The ALJ's reservation of jurisdiction did not state that APD "knew or should have known" that its licensing action against Meadowview on any of the three counts "[w]as not supported by the material facts" or "[w]ould not be supported by the application" of the law to the material facts. See § 57.105(1)(a)–(b). No other findings in the recommended order, as adopted, showed that APD's licensing action against Meadowview was so lacking in merit that it was knowingly frivolous, tantamount to bad faith litigation or litigation brought for an improper purpose such as harassment, unreasonable delay, or needless increase in costs.
The administrative action did not involve section 120.595, Florida Statutes, or the procedures in it.
No appeal was taken of the agency's final order in case number 19-1812FL. The time for such appeal expired in February 2020. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.110(c).
DOAH Case No. 20-2087F .
The next activity in the appellate record is a notice filed by the ALJ in May 2020, informing the parties that case number 20-2087F was now before DOAH and the same ALJ was assigned. The lack of any motion or request by a party in the record reveals that case number 20-2087F commenced upon the ALJ's initiative. The orders on appeal were entered in DOAH case number 20-2087F, not case number 19-1812FL.
APD moved for summary final order on the new case, arguing that there were no genuine issues of material fact to support any finding that APD knew or should have known its action was not supported by the facts or law applicable to the facts. See § 120.57(1)(h), Fla. Stat. The ALJ granted APD's motion for summary order in part based on the ALJ finding the evidence sufficient to raise a fact question on count three of APD's administrative complaint in case number 19-1812FL. Thus, count three was removed from consideration in the attorney's fee sanction proceeding, case number 20-2087F, and is not a consideration here.
The ALJ then conducted an evidentiary hearing in case number 20-2087F. The ALJ sought to determine whether APD "knew or should have known" that counts one and two of the administrative complaint in case number 19-1812FL were not supported by material facts to establish the violations or would not be supported by application of the law to those material facts. § 57.105(1), (5). In July 2020, the ALJ entered the amended partial final order finding APD liable for Meadowview's attorney's fees. In that order, the ALJ found that APD "knew or should have known" that its allegations in count one of the administrative complaint were "legally groundless" and the allegations for count two were "factually groundless." Relying on section 57.105(1)(a) and (5), the ALJ concluded that APD was liable for the attorney's fees Meadowview incurred defending against these counts. The ALJ then advised that the reasonable amount of fees for purposes of the sanction would be decided at a subsequent hearing and a "second final order" would be entered setting this amount.
APD appealed this order but the appeal was dismissed because the order was not a final, appealable order or an appealable non-final order. See Agency for Persons with Disabilities v. Meadowview Progressive Care Corp. , Case No. 1D20-2044.
After the second evidentiary hearing to determine a reasonable amount of attorney's fees and the submission of proposed orders by the parties, the ALJ entered the "second final order" in January 2021. In that order, the ALJ directed APD to pay Meadowview $16,000 in attorney's fees.
This Appeal
APD timely appealed both the order finding entitlement to fees and the order awarding fees, raising multiple grounds. We address only APD's position that the ALJ's jurisdiction was limited and that these orders exceeded the bounds of that jurisdiction. APD argues that the ALJ's reservation of jurisdiction in DOAH case number 19-1812FL did not create authority to initiate a new DOAH case sua sponte and self-assign that case for further fact finding under section 57.105. We agree that the orders on appeal must be quashed as beyond the ALJ's jurisdiction.
As an alternative argument, APD asserts that the ALJ's power to act on his own initiative under section 57.105(1) had expired by the time the ALJ started the separate, new DOAH case — more than ninety days after the filing of APD's final order on the merits of the chapter 120 administrative proceeding. We do not address this contention.
An "order on attorney's fees pursuant to section 57.105(1), Florida Statutes, is generally reviewed for an abuse of discretion; however, such an order is reviewed de novo to the extent it is based on an issue of law." Hall v. Lopez , 213 So. 3d 1003, 1005 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016). Whether an ALJ has subject matter jurisdiction over a matter is a question of law, reviewed de novo. Dep't of Revenue v. Vanamburg , 174 So. 3d 640, 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015).
The ALJ's ability to award fees is set forth in section 57.105(5). Likewise, the ALJ's authority to begin attorney's fee sanctions independently from any motion by a party is provided by section 57.105(1). But an ALJ's reservation of jurisdiction for an award of attorney's fees does not expand the scope of that jurisdiction beyond statutory authority. "The Division of Administrative Hearings is no exception to the rule that ‘administrative agencies are creatures of statute and have only such powers as statutes confer.’ " Fla. Elections Comm'n v. Davis , 44 So. 3d 1211, 1215 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (quoting State ex rel. Greenberg v. Fla. State Bd. of Dentistry , 297 So. 2d 628, 634 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974) ). It is also established law that attorney's fee statutes and rules are "in derogation of the common law rule that parties are responsible for their own attorney's fees" and must therefore "be strictly construed." Campbell v. Goldman , 959 So. 2d 223, 226 (Fla. 2007).
The scope of the ALJ's jurisdiction is defined by the statutes and rules governing administrative actions. Davis , 44 So. 3d at 1215. "An administrative agency has only such power as granted by the Legislature and may not expand its own jurisdiction." Dep't of Revenue v. Graczyk , 206 So. 3d 157, 160 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016).
Section 57.105(1) authorizes an ALJ to award reasonable attorney's fees on its own initiative, but sections 120.569 and 120.57 govern the initiation of DOAH cases and assignment of ALJs. We find no statutory provision for initiation of a new DOAH case by an ALJ absent a petition or request by the agency or a party. Without such, the ALJ lacked statutory authority to open the new case. See State ex rel. Greenberg , 297 So. 2d at 634 ; Davis , 44 So. 3d at 1215.
The administrative rules governing DOAH proceedings provide that a case is begun "by written petition to the agency responsible for rendering final agency action," or by "service of the administrative complaint on the respondent." Fla. Admin. Code R. 28-106.301(1), 28-106.2015(3). ALJs are assigned by DOAH upon a request by the agency, after a request for hearing by a party. § 120.569(2), Fla. Stat. As a result, the orders on appeal from DOAH case number 20-2087F exceeded the scope of the ALJ's jurisdiction because that case was begun and assigned to the ALJ contrary to the governing statutes and administrative rules of procedure.
Based on the above, we quash the orders on appeal and remand case number 20-2087F for dismissal.
QUASHED and REMANDED .
Rowe, C.J., and Bilbrey and Long, JJ., concur.