Moreover, it is worth noting that Fibertec collected and analyzed clearance air samples in the tunnel following discovery of the asbestos-containing insulation debris on the floor of the tunnel and found the airborne fiber concentration below state imposed levels. This case is similar to Agee v Ford Motor Co, 208 Mich App 363; 528 NW2d 768 (1995). The plaintiffs in Agee "claim[ed] damages from alleged exposure to asbestos during the manufacturing processes at a Ford plant."
An employer's knowledge of general risks is insufficient to establish an intentional tort. Cf. Bock, supra at 711-712; Agee v. Ford Motor Co., 208 Mich. App. 363, 366-367; 528 N.W.2d 768 (1995). A thorough review of the deposition testimony and all other documentary evidence submitted by the parties makes it clear that defendant's actions did not constitute an intentional tort.
Gray v Morley (After Remand), 460 Mich. 738, 742; 596 N.W.2d 922 (1999). In Agee v Ford Motor Co, 208 Mich. App. 363, 364; 528 N.W.2d 768 (1995), the plaintiffs, former employees of the defendant, alleged damage as a result of exposure to asbestos during manufacturing processes at one of the defendant's plants. The plaintiffs' complaint alleged that the defendant had actual knowledge that an injury was certain to occur because asbestos dust and fibers were allowed to circulate throughout the plant.
In Beauchamp, our Supreme Court held that the exclusive remedy provision of the WDCA did not bar an action by an employee against an employer for an intentional tort, and recognized the "substantial certainty" test to determine whether an employer had committed an intentional tort within the meaning of the WDCA. Agee v Ford Motor Co, 208 Mich. App. 363; 528 N.W.2d 768 (1995); Schefsky v Evening News Ass'n, 169 Mich. App. 223, 226; 425 N.W.2d 768 (1988). 1987 PA 28 (effective May 14, 1987).
The intentional tort exception requires a plaintiff to show that the defendant had actual knowledge that the plaintiff would suffer a specific injury and that the defendant disregarded that knowledge. Agee v Ford Motor Co, 208 Mich. App. 363; 528 N.W.2d 768 (1995); Smith v Mirror Lite Co, 196 Mich. App. 190, 192-193; 492 N.W.2d 744 (1992). It is not enough to show that a risk of injury existed or that someone, but not necessarily the plaintiff, was certain to suffer an injury.
Id. at 144-45. See also Agee v. Ford Motor Co., 208 Mich. App. 363, 528 N.W.2d 768 (1995); Brown v. Drake-Willock International, 209 Mich. App. 136, 530 N.W.2d 510 (1995). It is useful here to clarify the court's analysis by briefly discussing the facts of Travis, as compared with the facts in Golec v. Metal Exchange Corp., 208 Mich. App. 380, 528 N.W.2d 756 (1995), aff'd, 453 Mich. 149, 551 N.W.2d 132 (1996), a companion case decided by the Michigan Supreme Court at the same time as Travis.