From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

Age v. Mission Bank

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jun 17, 2024
No. F086552 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 17, 2024)

Opinion

F086552

06-17-2024

TRAVIS AGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MISSION BANK, Defendant and Respondent.

Wyatt Law and Andrew M. Wyatt for Plaintiff and Appellant. Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &Hampton, Hayley S. Grunvald, and Matthew G. Halgren for Defendant and Respondent.


NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County, No. BCV-22-100952 David R. Zulfa, Judge.

Wyatt Law and Andrew M. Wyatt for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Sheppard, Mullin, Richter &Hampton, Hayley S. Grunvald, and Matthew G. Halgren for Defendant and Respondent.

OPINION

POOCHIGIAN, Acting P. J.

This matter stems from a refusal by respondent Mission Bank (Mission) to provide banking services to appellant Travis Age (Age). Age brought a single cause of action for racial discrimination under California's Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, §§ 51-53, et seq.) (the Unruh Act) against Mission. The trial court granted Mission's demurrer without leave to amend. Appellant contends the trial court erred by concluding that the operative complaint failed to properly allege an Unruh Act racial discrimination claim. We reverse.

All further undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code unless otherwise stated.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The factual background is derived from the allegations in the complaint, which we accept as true for purposes of evaluating the demurrer in this case. (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1034, 1041; Miklosy v. Regents of University of California (2008) 44 Cal.4th 876, 883.)

Age is an African American taxi driver who had bank accounts at Mission. Age asserted he often recommended Mission to his clients since he had never had any problems with Mission's local branch, and the staff had always been professional and delightful to him. Age recommended Mission to two of his elderly clients, Thea (Thea) and Barbara Harmon (Barbara). Thea is the aunt of Age's wife.

On November 23, 2021, Age took Barabara to Mission. On that day, Carmen Roberts (Roberts) was a manager at Mission, and Age had never interacted with Roberts before. Age was standing at the counter while Barbara was conducting her business because she had requested Age's assistance. In front of everyone, a teller loudly told Age to step away from the counter. Age thought the teller's behavior odd, and he stepped away as directed. Age heard the teller ask Barbara if she was in trouble, if anyone was making her withdraw money, and for what and why did she need so much money. Age felt embarrassed because he felt he was being treated as some sort of suspect. When Barbara finished her business, she asked Age why the teller had been so rude to him.

Age returned to Mission later that day to complain about the teller's conduct. Age began speaking with a second teller about the previous teller's behavior. Roberts then interrupted the conversation and asked if there was a problem. Age explained he did not like how he was treated by the previous teller in front of his client and other bank patrons. Roberts told Age that he could not be at the counter with Barbara because he was not on the account, Barbara was not Age's aunt, and that Age was merely Barabara's taxi driver. Age responded that Roberts was merely Barbara's banker and that he would help her if she asked for his help. Roberts then became angry, started shouting, pacing, and pointing her finger, and ordered that all of Age's accounts be closed. Age said that Roberts could not do that and that if she closed his accounts, Mission would hear from his lawyer. Age asked to speak with another manager who knew Age and with whom he had a good relationship, but Roberts said the other manager was unavailable. Age then left.

Before Age got home, Mission notified his wife that all accounts would be closed in one week. Unbeknownst to Age, Roberts had also deactivated his debit cards.

Still on November 23, 2021, Age's wife and Thea went to Mission so that Age's wife could be added as a beneficiary on Thea's bank account. It was Thea's request that Age's wife be added as a beneficiary. After adding Age's wife as a beneficiary, Age's wife received a call from Mission wanting to know what her relationship was to Thea. Age's wife responded that Thea was her aunt. Thea signed a sworn declaration that she was not being manipulated by Age for money. Thea, who is white, believed that Mission's employees behaved in a racist manner since she believed that she was treated far better than African American customers.

On November 24, 2021, Age called Mission and spoke to Roberts about an account closure letter. Instead of providing an explanation, Roberts merely read the letter back to Age and hung up. Age went to Mission and again asked Roberts about the closure of his accounts. Roberts said the closure was because of what happened the previous day and mentioned Age's last transactions. When Age questioned Roberts about his last transactions, Roberts could provide no detail and stated that she did not need a reason to close his account and could do whatever she wanted.

On November 26, 2021, Age contacted Mission's district manager about Roberts's conduct and treatment. The district manager explained that he was returning from vacation and that he would look into the matter.

On November 29, 2021, Age, his wife, and Thea went to Mission to speak to the district manager. The district manager had not yet looked into Age's complaint. As Age was speaking with the district manager, Roberts ran over, began screaming at Age, and accused him of fraud. Age's wife argued with Roberts. Roberts threatened to call the police and said that she did not need a reason to close accounts. Age, his wife, and Thea were yelling, and Thea's aunt decided to close her accounts because of how Mission was treating her, her niece, and Age. Age's accounts were closed that day. Age alleges that Roberts was the agent of Mission and discriminated against him because of his race by closing all of his accounts without explanation.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 21, 2022, Appellant filed his original complaint, which contained a single cause of action for racial discrimination under the Unruh Act.

On January 6, 2023, Mission filed a demurrer.

On January 31, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Mission's demurrer. The court granted the demurrer with leave to amend.

On February 6, 2023, Appellant filed his first amended complaint (FAC), which again contained a single cause of action for racial discrimination under the Unruh Act.

On April 7, 2023, Mission filed a demurrer to the FAC.

On May 16, 2023, the trial court held a hearing. Appellant's counsel argued that an Unruh Act claim had been properly pled for purposes of the demurrer and indicated that there were no further facts he could add to the FAC. The court granted Mission's demurrer without leave to amend because Appellant had failed to allege facts sufficient to state an Unruh Act racial discrimination claim.

Appellant's counsel did not expressly state that there were no further facts that he could allege. Nevertheless, counsel stated if the court "still finds that there is insufficient facts, I don't know what else I could tell you." Counsel then proceeded to argue that there was sufficient factual allegation. In context, we detect no other way of reading counsel's comments other than counsel had no further facts to allege.

On May 31, 2023, an order granting the demurrer and dismissing the FAC without leave to amend was filed.

On July 13, 2023, Appellant filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

Parties' Arguments

Age argues the FAC alleges that Mission refused to keep his bank accounts open because of his race. Age argues that the FAC's allegations show that he had never before been treated like he had been on November 23, 2021. Roberts was abusive and unprofessional to Age in front of others and said that she could do whatever she wanted. The only explanation for Roberts's conduct against Age is that she is biased against African Americans. Age argues that the trial court erroneously found that Mission was justified in reporting Age and closing his accounts due to suspected financial elder abuse.

Mission argues that the FAC contains only speculative and conclusory allegations of racial discrimination. Mission contends that no facts actually link adverse conduct to racial discrimination. That is, no facts actually demonstrate that any of the negative treatment that Age experienced had anything to do with race. Because Age conceded that there were no other facts that could be alleged, the trial court properly dismissed the FAC without leave to amend. Alternatively, and even though the trial court did not expressly address the issue, Mission argues that the demurrer can be sustained because Mission is entitled to immunity liability under the Welfare &Institutions Code for reporting suspected financial elder abuse.

Legal Standards

Demurrers

In reviewing a demurrer, appellate courts make a de novo determination of whether the complaint alleges facts that are sufficient to state a cause of action. (Martinez v. City of Clovis (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 193, 253; Galeotti v. International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 3 (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 850, 856.)"' "[A] plaintiff is required only to set forth the essential facts of his case with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint a defendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.'" '" (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) Less particularity is required when a matter is presumptively within the defendant's knowledge, such as the defendant's intent. (Thomas v. Regents of the University of California (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 587, 611 (Thomas).) The reviewing court gives" 'the complaint a reasonable interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their context.'" (County of Santa Clara v. Superior Court, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 1041; Martinez, at p. 253.) The complaint's factual allegations are assumed to be true, as are the reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts. (Miklosy v. Regents of University of California, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 883; Galeotti, at p. 856.) Complaints that allege ultimate facts rather than evidentiary facts are generally sufficient. (See Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 438-439; Thomas, at p. 610; Foster v Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1019.) The appellate courts" 'treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded, but do not assume the truth of contentions, deductions or conclusions of law.'" (County of Santa Clara, at p. 1041; Martinez, at p. 253.)

The Unruh Act

The Unruh Act prohibits business establishments from discriminating against individuals in the provision of "accommodations, advantages, facilities, privileges, or services" based on, among other things, the individual's race. (§ 51, subd. (b).) The Unruh Act was "intended as an active measure that would create and preserve a nondiscriminatory environment in California business establishments by 'banishing' or 'eradicating' arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such establishments." (Angelucci v. Century Supper Club (2007) 41 Cal.4th 160, 167.) The Unruh Act is to be liberally construed to carry out its purpose. (Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 666.) Generally, a person suffers discrimination when the person presents himself to a business with the intent to use its services but encounters an exclusionary policy or practice that prevents him or her from using those services. (White v. Square, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1019, 1023.) The critical question in Unruh Act racial discrimination cases is whether the plaintiff faced unequal treatment on account of his or her race. (Smith v. BP Lubricants USA Inc. (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 138, 154.) Therefore, to appropriately plead an Unruh Act racial discrimination claim, a complaint must include contain allegations that reflect willful and affirmative misconduct with the specific intent" 'to accomplish discrimination on the basis of [race].'" (Martinez v. Cot'n Wash, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1026, 1036.)

Analysis

Factual Sufficiency

Mission does not dispute that it is a "business establishment" under the Unruh Act. Nor does Mission contend that Age was denied services at Mission, particularly since the FAC clearly alleges that Roberts closed all of Age's bank accounts. The dispute is whether the FAC alleges that Mission acted with a racial animus in denying Age banking services.

The First District Court of Appeal has confronted a similar issue. In Jackson v. Superior Court (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 936, 939, the complaint alleged that an African American male investment advisor (Jackson) accompanied his two white elderly female clients to a bank in order to help the clients obtain a cashier's check to be invested in a mutual fund. (Ibid.) Because of the size of the transaction, the teller informed the bank manager. (Ibid.) The complaint alleged that the manager was suspicious of Jackson because of her prejudice against African Americans. (Ibid.) The manager incorrectly informed the clients that they would suffer an interest penalty through the transaction, she believed that Jackson was attempting to scam them, and urged the clients not to undertake the transaction. (Ibid.) The manager called the police to report a forgery in progress. (Ibid.) When the police arrived, one of the officers recognized Jackson and said that there was nothing wrong or suspicious about him. (Ibid.) The manager also called the bank's investment department and discovered that the mutual fund that Jackson was recommending to his clients was offered through the bank. (Ibid.) Despite the assessment of the police officer and the discovery about the mutual fund, the manager persisted in attacking Jackson in front of his clients until the clients stopped the transaction and went home. (Ibid.) Confronted with these allegations, the trial court sustained a demurrer for failure to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action for race discrimination under the Unruh Act. (Jackson, at pp. 939-940.)

In part, the Jackson court addressed an argument that an Unruh Act claim had not been pled because there were no allegations of discrimination occurring pursuant to a policy or practice, and the allegation of the manager acting against Jackson because of his race was not an allegation of ultimate fact but merely an improper legal conclusion. (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at pp. 941-942.) The First District rejected these arguments and explained:

" 'The test for allegations of fact or conclusions of law is not absolute; the question is whether the pleading as a whole apprises the adversary of the factual basis of the claim. [Citation.] And particularity of facts depends on the extent to which the defendant needs detailed information. [Citation.]' (4 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Pleading, § 332, p. 383.) The plain language of [Civil Code] section 51 does not prohibit only those acts of discrimination which are routinely committed or are a matter of policy. Obviously, a plaintiff will have an easier burden of persuasion if he can
provide evidence that the defendant routinely discriminates against the class to which he belongs. Such an allegation is not necessary, however, to plead a violation of section 51. Whether real parties did discriminate in this case is a factual question and it cannot be determined as a question of law from the facts pleaded.
"We conclude that petitioner was pursuing an accommodation, advantage or privilege of the bank within the meaning of the Unruh Civil Rights Act when he accompanied his clients to the bank to aid them in transacting their business and that he has stated a cause of action under the Unruh Civil Rights Act by alleging that he was discriminated against in the exercise of this accommodation because of his race. It follows that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to this cause of action." (Id. at p. 942.)

We recognize that there are factual distinctions that exist between this case and Jackson. Nevertheless, the key allegation of racial prejudice/motivation, supported by allegations of arguably unreasonable and unprofessional behavior, are common to both cases, and it was the presence of such allegations that led Jackson to conclude that an Unruh Act claim had been properly alleged. We therefore conclude that the FAC sets forth the essential facts of Age's Unruh Act racial discrimination claim with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint Mission with" '" 'the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.'"' " (Doe v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 550.) Accordingly, the trial court erred by granting Mission's demurrer. (Jackson v. Superior Court, supra, 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 942; cf. Thomas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 614 [explaining at the demurrer stage that allegations of pervasive harassment, combined with the general allegation that gender was a substantial motivating reason for the conduct, was sufficient to plead Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code, § 12941 claim].)

We note that Mission has cited federal district court cases in which no viable Unruh Act claims were found. However, those cases involved rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.) (Rule 12(b)(6)) motions to dismiss. (See Jones v. Dollar Tree Stores (C.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2021), 2021 WL 6496822, at *2, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 250737, at *5-*7; Dallas & Lashmi, Inc. v. 7-Eleven, Inc. (C.D. Cal. 2015) 112 F.Supp.3d 1048, 1056.) The plausibility standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not the same notice standard that applies to a demurrer. (Thomas, supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 618, fn. 12.)

We acknowledge that some of the facts alleged could be read as indicating a non-discriminatory motive for some of the conduct at issue. Nevertheless, to the extent that conflicting inferences can be made, the conflict cannot be resolved through a demurrer. (Planning & Conservation League v. Castaic Lake Water Agency (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 210, 232 [holding that conflicting inferences from allegations and judicially noticed documents regarding motive for a dismissal could not be resolved through a demurrer].)

Immunity

The Welfare and Institutions Code requires that officers and employees of financial institutions report instances of suspected financial abuse of elders (those 65 years or older). (Welf. &Inst. Code, § 15630.1.) Mandated reporters of financial elder abuse receive immunity under section 47, subdivision (b) and Welfare and Institutions Code section 15634, subdivision (a). (Welf &Inst. Code, §§ 15630.1, subd. (i), 15634, subd. (a).) The immunity provided by Welfare and Institutions Code section 15634, subdivision (a) has been described as "absolute." (Santos v. Kisco Senior Living, LLC (2016) 1 Cal.App.5th 862, 871.) It applies even to reports that are fabricated, knowingly false, or maliciously made. (Valero v. Spread Your Wings, LLC (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 243, 266.) The statutory immunity of Welfare and Institutions Code section 15634, subdivision (a) applies to the act of reporting and to acts integrally related to reports of suspected abuse. (Valero, at p. 260.)

We recognize that the mandatory reporting requirements of Welfare &Institutions Code section 15630.1 can potentially place financial institutions in difficult situations and result in reports of conduct that turn out to be benign. However, the Legislature's broad grant of immunity through Welfare &Institutions Code section 15634 provides protection and an incentive for financial institutions to err on the side of reporting. In this case, the FAC clearly alleges racial discrimination, but the discrimination alleged is not based on the act of reporting financial elder abuse, rather it is based at a minimum on the act of closing Age's bank accounts. Despite the absolute nature of section 15634 immunity, it is unclear how closing the banking accounts of Age can be considered an act that is integrally related to reporting financial elder abuse. Rather, in the absence of other allegations, the act of closing all of Age's accounts simply prevents Age from depositing or withdrawing money from or into his own Mission bank accounts. It does not further any reports to be made or appear to further the purpose of the reporting requirement to protect Barbara Harmon from financial abuse. Therefore, the allegations in the FAC are not sufficient for us to conclude that Welfare and Institutions Code immunity extends to the act of closing all of Age's bank accounts.

We express no opinion regarding the application of the Welfare and Institutions Code immunity provisions in this case. We conclude only that the FAC's allegations are insufficient to show as a matter of law that any immunity provision defeats the FAC at the demurrer stage.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed. This matter is remanded to the trial court for proceedings consistent with this order. Appellant is awarded his costs on appeal.

WE CONCUR: FRANSON, J., DE SANTOS, J.


Summaries of

Age v. Mission Bank

California Court of Appeals, Fifth District
Jun 17, 2024
No. F086552 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 17, 2024)
Case details for

Age v. Mission Bank

Case Details

Full title:TRAVIS AGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MISSION BANK, Defendant and…

Court:California Court of Appeals, Fifth District

Date published: Jun 17, 2024

Citations

No. F086552 (Cal. Ct. App. Jun. 17, 2024)