See, e.g., AFL Telecomms. LLC v. SurplusEQ.com Inc., No. CV11-1086 PHX DGC, 2012 WL 2590557, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 5, 2012) (relying on a Third Circuit case cited by the Ninth Circuit in In re Citric to adopt a more expansive definition of "control"); see also Thales Avionics Inc. v. Matsushita Avionics Sys. Corp., No. SACV 04-454-JVS(MLGx), 2006 WL 6534230, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2006) (relying on case law outside the Ninth Circuit to consider the "nature of the relationship" between a subsidiary and its parent corporation to determine "control"); Choice-Intersil Microsystems, Inc. v. Agere Sys., Inc., 224 F.R.D. 471, 472-73 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (same). However, as duly noted by district courts within the Ninth Circuit, the Ninth Circuit has not expanded the definition of "control" to include a practical ability to obtain documents.

In so concluding, the court noted that the United States Supreme Court recently held that Mercedes-Benz USA is Daimler's exclusive importer and distributor in the United States. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 752 (2014). Plaintiffs' citation to AFL Telecommunications LLC v. SurplusEQ.com Inc., No. 11-1086, 2012 WL 2590557, at *2 (D. Ariz. July 5, 2012), is likewise unpersuasive. (Dkt. No. 92-4 at 3:6-4:3.) Although the AFL court noted the Ninth Circuit's Citric Acid legal control test, it applied a "more expansive" definition of legal control, relying on the Third Circuit's decision in Gerling International Insurance Co. v. Commissioner, 839 F.2d 131, 140-41 (3rd Cir. 1988).