" The Connecticut Supreme Court has interpreted "immediate hazard" to mean that the oncoming vehicle is "so close thereto that a reasonably prudent person, in the [left turner's] situation and intending to make a left turn, would believe that if he did make and complete the left turn, there would be an immediate danger or risk of collision, even though it might not be a certainty." Pinto v. Spigner, 163 Conn. 191, 196, 302 A.2d 266, 269 (1972) (quoting Kronish v. Provasoli, 149 Conn. 368, 372, 179 A.2d 823, 825 (1962)); see Affinito v. Daniels, 179 Conn. 388, 389-90, 426 A.2d 782, 783 (1979). If the oncoming vehicle is not an "immediate hazard," the vehicle making the left turn has the right of way. Affinito v. Daniels, supra, 179 Conn. at 389, 426 A.2d at 783; Pinto v. Spigner, supra, 163 Conn. at 196, 302 A.2d at 269.
The trial court then proceeded to instruct the jury that the state had to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was driving while intoxicated and that the injury caused by the defendant was a consequence of that intoxication. The defendant alternatively claims that if the trial court was correct in including reference to 14-242 in its jury instructions, then it improperly failed to give a "complete" instruction as that approved in Affinito v. Daniels, 179 Conn. 388, 389, 426 A.2d 782 (1979). He claims that the trial court failed to provide adequate guidance to the jury on his theory of defense by failing to give the second half of the Affinito instruction, that is, that if the jury found that the victim's car was not so close to the intersection when the defendant's car was about to turn left, a reasonably prudent person would believe that if the turn was made, no real immediate danger of collision existed, then the defendant had the right-of-way.
The court's charge did not adequately cover the claim of law based on her testimony, namely, that she had the right of way when she made a left turn into Sullivan Road, because the defendant was neither in the intersection nor so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard. See Affinito v. Daniels, 179 Conn. 388, 389-90, 426 A.2d 782 (1979). Although the court's charge was suited to the defendant's version of the collision, namely, that he had the right of way because his car was either within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard, the charge did not suit the evidence the plaintiff presented.
In determining whether the trial court erred in its charge to the jury, the charge must be read as a whole and the instructions claimed to be in error read in that context. Matthews v. E.M.C. Corporation, 190 Conn. 700, 704, 462 A.2d 376 (1983); Affinito v. Daniels, 179 Conn. 388, 390, 426 A.2d 782 (1979). The test of a court charge is whether it fairly presents the case to the jury In such a way that injustice is not done to either party under well established principles of law.
The court can only repeat its ruling in the memorandum on the motion to set aside the verdict, dated October 18, 1994. The instruction given by the court was in accord with that expressed and established in cases such as Pinto v. Spigner, 163 Conn. 191, 196 and Affinito v. Daniels, 179 Conn. 388, 89. The court is not required to charge in the exact language requested. Hanson v. Comm. of Transportation, 176 Conn. 383, 391.
Was Mr. Batson (defendant) so close? Was he in that common area? Or was he so close to it that if Mr. Kogellis continued on his same path, same direction, if the vehicles continued in the same direction they were going at the same rate of speed they were going, there was a risk of collision," this instruction was in accord with the existing law. Pinto v. Spigner, 163 Conn. 191, 196; Fafinito v. Daniels, 179 Conn. 388, 389. The plaintiff next assigns error in the failure of the court tg charge, under C.G.S. § 14-230, that the defendant (Batson) had a duty to drive in the right hand lane available for traffic. Apart from the fact that the plaintiff's complaint does not allege a violation of C.G.S. § 230, the plaintiff's request to charge concerns itself solely with the plaintiff's obligation to drive in the right hand lane.