Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Weaver

2 Citing cases

  1. Johnson v. Terminal Railroad Assn. of St. Louis

    191 S.W.2d 676 (Mo. 1946)   Cited 11 times

    Beitling v. S.S. Kresge Co., 232 Mo. App. 1195, 116 S.W.2d 522; Brown v. Adams Transfer Storage Co., 31 S.W.2d 117. (19) The trial court erred in permitting respondent, over appellant's objection, to state his conclusion and pass upon a jury question, that while on the ladder, he depended for his safety on appellant's servants' sounding a bell or whistle, or shouting a warning to him. Unrein v. Oklahoma Hide Co., 295 Mo. 353, 244 S.W. 924; Marshall v. Taylor, 168 Mo. App. 240; Jackson v. City of Malden, 72 803 S.W.2d 850. (20) Again respondent was permitted, and again over appellant's objection, to state his conclusion that he did not realize there was any danger that his ladder might be struck. This was a conclusion directly contrary to the remainder of his testimony, and invaded the province of the jury.

  2. Natl Union Fire v. Macias

    864 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. App. 1993)

    To prove her wage rate under the old compensation law, the worker must use one of three methods, and each prior method must be shown inapplicable before the next may be utilized. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 8309 (Vernon 1967); Aetna Ins. Co. v. Giddens, 476 S.W.2d 664, 665 (Tex. 1972); Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. Weaver, 803 S.W.2d 850, 851 (Tex.App. — Corpus Christi 1991, no writ). Thus, the law required that Ms. Macias show she had worked at least 210 days of the year preceding her injury, or that she had not worked that many days. If she proved the negative, she was then required to prove up the wages of another employee doing the same or similar work in the same community who had worked 210 days, or that there was no such employee. If she proved the negative again, only then could she resort to the catch-all method of proving a wage rate that would be just and fair to both parties.