The trial judge found that she was in default and, based on its findings of facts, found that there was no just reason for delaying the entry of a judgment pending the determination of the case against Vietch. Robinson argues that the judgment against her is not in fact final and will not become final until the claims against William Vietch are disposed of, because the two are codefendants. Robinson cites Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552 (1872), claiming that where the theory of recovery is one of joint liability, a recovery is not effective unless it is granted against all defendants. Robinson also relies on Aetna Casualty Surety Co. v. McIntyre, 555 So.2d 87 (Ala. 1989), in which this Court held that a default judgment could not be entered against one defendant for failure to appear, where that defendant's liability was based on a codefendant's liability. This Court stated:
In its opinion, the Court of Civil Appeals said the record contained no evidence that this case involved true joint liability, because the record contained no transcript of the husband's trial and no statement of the evidence such as is provided for in Rule 10(d), Ala.R.App.P. In Aetna Cas. Sur. Co. v. McIntyre, 555 So.2d 87 (Ala. 1989), considering the facts of the case, we applied the rule that " 'a default judgment may not be entered against one of several defendants (1) where the theory of recovery is one of true joint liability, such that, as a matter of law, no one defendant may be liable unless all defendants are liable, or (2) where the nature of the relief demanded is such that, in order to be effective, it must be granted against each and every defendant.' " 555 So.2d at 88 (quoting 6 J. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice, § 55.06 (2d ed 1988), citing Frow v. De LaVega, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552, 21 L.Ed. 60 (1872)).
The appellant's motion for relief under Rule 60(b)(6) was denied, and she appeals to this court. In support of her motion for relief from the default judgment and the order of garnishment which followed from that judgment, the appellant cites Aetna Casualty SuretyCo. v. McIntyre, 555 So.2d 87 (Ala. 1989), and Frow v. De La Vega, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 552, 21 L.Ed. 60 (1872), for the proposition that " 'a default judgment may not be entered against one of several defendants (1) where the theory of recovery is one of true joint liability, such that, as a matter of law, no one defendant may be liable unless all defendants are liable, or (2) where the nature of the relief demanded is such that, in order to be effective, it must be granted against each and every defendant.' " Aetna Casualty Surety at 88 (quoting 6 J. Moore's Federal Practice ¶ 55.06 (2d ed. 1988)).