Opinion
No. CV06-5004605 S
July 6, 2011
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON ATTORNEYS FEES
The plaintiff has filed a motion for attorneys fees. Several counts were asserted against the defendants, (1) Breach of the Duty of Loyalty (2) Breach of Operating Agreement and Employment Agreement (3) Violation of Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (4) Violation of § 53a-251 of the general statutes. The court found in the plaintiff's favor on all counts but did not make a damage award under § 52-570b which is the private cause of action that may be brought for a violation of § 53a-251 only because it could not calculate the "actual damages" for a violation of the latter statute and despite the violation that it found had been proven.
As to the claim for attorneys fees, the employment agreement provided for them upon breach and CUTPA allows an award of attorneys fees. The breach of fiduciary finding was intertwined with and central to the factors the court relied upon to find a violation of CUTPA. The court has indicated that in determining the amount of attorneys fees it would rely on the so-called lodestar test set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 174 (CA 5, 1984). The Johnson factors are set out on pages 717-19 of that opinion. The twelve factors are (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorneys; (10) the "undesirability" of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
This lodestar test has not just been applied to civil rights, environmental statutes, and similar type statutes. It has been applied to CUTPA claims, see Steiger v. J.S. Builders, 39 Conn.App. 32, 39 (1995). Florida courts for example apply the lodestar federal test whenever there is a need to determine reasonable attorney fees, Florida Patient's Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So.2d 1145, 1150 (Fla., 1985). Also see generally discussion in 7 Am.Jur.2d "Attorneys at Law." §§ 286 et seq. Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., supra has been cited sixty-five times (Loislaw) by trial courts. Many of the cases involved attorney fee awards pursuant to statutory (state and federal) authorization. But Judge Brazzel-Mazzaro used the Johnson test in a contract action, Bhargava v. Arnold, CV08-5007068 (2010), and to set attorneys fees where the court had decided to impose them for violation of the subpoena power, Farren v. Farren, CV10-5013320 (2010).
The Johnson tests in many respects mirrors the test set forth in Rule 1.5 of the Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The rule states:
"Rule 1.5 Fees
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
In Rodriguez v. Ancona, 88 Conn.App. 193 (2005), the court reviewed the award for attorneys fees under § 47-18a of the general statutes but spoke in very general terms about the factors that must be considered by a trial court in determining the amount of attorneys fees citing specifically Rule 1.5a of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
The following quote from Judge Stevens's opinion in Bridgeport Harbor Place v. Ganim, CV04-0184523 (10/31/08), discusses the practical way in which the Johnson test is to be applied.
The initial estimate of a reasonable attorneys fee is properly calculated by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate. The courts may then adjust this lodestar calculation by other factors. (Internal quotation marks omitted; citations omitted.) Laudano v. New Haven, supra, 58 Conn.App. 822. In adjusting the lodestar calculation, the court should "exclude from this initial fee calculation hours that were not `reasonably expended'" (citation omitted); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983); and the court should also increase or decrease the fee calculation by considering the full panoply of the criteria set forth in Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 488 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1974). See Laudano v. New Haven, supra, 58 Conn.App. 822-23.
An interesting thing to note is that the lodestar figure for attorneys fees must be determined to be "reasonable" then Laudano says the Johnson test must be applied. But the difficulty with this is that if we start with a figure based on hours spent times a reasonable hourly rate, the Johnson test must factor in as an analysis applied to what might otherwise be considered a simple mathematical equation — hours x hourly rate. In some respects the lodestar "figure" is itself subject to a Johnson analysis.
Before the court examines the Johnson factors it should also note that it seems to have always been assumed that staff such as paralegals assisting counsel are part of the total cost of litigation which can be charged against a defendant and to which the Johnson test applies, see Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 288 fn 10 (1989); U.S. Leather, Inc. v. H W Partnership. 60 F.3d 222, 229 (CA5, 1995).
The court will now examine the amount of fees actually claimed and what has been submitted in support of that claim.
The plaintiff hired the firm of Day, Pitney, LLP to represent its interest.
The plaintiff's claim for fees is $557,000. An affidavit was filed by an attorney, Attorney Rydell of Day Pitney, heavily involved in the litigation of this case who attested to the validity and truthfulness of exhibits attached to the motion. Attorney Greenspan conducted most of the trial and depositions and helped prepare the post-trial briefs. He and Attorney Rydell, according to the latter's affidavit performed most of the work involved in pre-trial preparation. Rydell and another attorney also helped with motion and discovery practice, see affidavit. In fact defense counsel does not question the amount of hours spent by the lawyers for the plaintiff on this case or that the work they did was not relevant or necessary to the litigation. Nor does he question that the work listed as being done in the timesheets was in fact not done.
The court will summarize the objections to the fees in the three briefs filed by the defendant and state the major objections to the claim for attorneys fees in this case. In the first December 17, 2010 brief defense counsel that the fees charged for proceedings in bankruptcy court were collateral and elective and should not be figured into any award for attorneys fees. In this case the court awarded $220,000 in damages, $20,000 in punitive damages under CUTPA and attorneys fees. The defendant argues in the December brief that the claim for attorneys fees is "grossly disproportionate" to the amount of the award of compensatory damages. This is not what the legislature had in mind in passing CUTPA it is argued. It is also said that the issues raised in this case while contested "were not so novel" to justify the attorney fees claimed. Also "the plaintiff has failed to make a showing of awards in similar cases so how can the court make a finding that the request for attorneys fees is "reasonable."
In the defendant's February 1, 2011 brief it is argued that this is not complex litigation, what was involved is a "claim for breach of fiduciary duty with a touch of CUTPA." The plaintiff had three partners, other lawyers and paralegals work on the case who charged excessive hourly rates. A "levée en masse" was chosen to fight the battle "when a single brigade would have been sufficient" — why should the defendant have to pay for this choice.
In the final March 8, 2011 brief the defendant criticizes the blending of the hourly rates of attorneys and paralegals just to "avoid the appearance of overcharging." No evidence has been offered to show the paralegal's hourly rates were reasonable — one was paid as much as $190 to $210 per hour. The defendant also denies, as the plaintiff claims, that significant costs were incurred as a result of the defendants' request for continuances. The time requested was necessitated by the fact that the defendants' newly retained lawyer had to familiarize himself with the case, amend pleadings and conduct discovery. How that would affect the plaintiff's claim is unclear. More to the point the July and October continuances were necessitated by Mr. Miguelez's, plaintiff's chief executive officer, resistance to having his deposition taken. All of this caused hundreds of thousands of dollars in additional attorneys fees — how this is so, given the records submitted is not clear, see Exhibit B with its detailed notes on work being done by each listed attorney and paralegal.
The defendant points out that the plaintiffs' highly paid lawyers chose to have conference calls and meetings together — continuing the levée en masse theme — but that does not render the calls and meetings "reasonable and necessary." These two words imply a "judicious use of legal resources" which the plaintiff, who has the burden thereon, has not proven.
Much of the foregoing can be addressed in the seriatim discussion of the Johnson factors, which the court will attempt to do now.
(1) Time and Labor Required
The plaintiffs have submitted a 47-page small-type document substantiating in some detail the work done on particular days by each of the "timekeepers," attorneys and paralegals. To the side of each entry is the amount of time spent by each individual and their rate of compensation. The defendants state that in this document there are some 973 entries setting forth almost 1700 billable hours. Work on the file began August 11, 2007. There were six days of trial reflected in hundreds of pages of transcripts and 17 separate depositions prior to trial attended by counsel. At trial fifty-five exhibits were offered by the plaintiff. There were numerous motions filed addressing various discovery disputes. The file is contained in two boxes. Eighty-seven motions and pleadings were filed from the date plaintiff's present counsel entered an appearance to the date of the court's February 23, 2011 decision. Two motions for attorneys fees were filed post-trial three briefs were filed in opposition. Attorney Rydell for the plaintiff filed a thirty-five page post-trial brief. Over ten other memorandums, some in the form of objections were also filed by plaintiff's counsel. Prior to trial there were, by the court's count, seven court appearances on discovery disputes. The two briefs filed by the plaintiffs' attorney for attorneys fees were 21 pages in length all together; both briefs had affidavits attached to them. The court would also refer to the detailed affidavit filed by Attorney Rydell, see especially paragraph 9 which indicates over half of the fees involved time spent on the discovery issues on the case.
As noted in exhibit B attached to the motion for attorneys fees and supplemental to Attorney Rydell's affidavit there is a 47-page timesheet which lists on the left hand side the attorney or paralegal who worked on the case, a synopsis of what each person did and how long it took them to accomplish the work referred to and the standard hourly rate for each of these individuals. The court did not examine each and every entry but did review many of them. From the nature of the objections made by the defendant to the fees, such an examination would not appear to be necessary. They list activities directly related to the preparation and pursuit of this litigation. The defendant does not appear to contest in his briefs opposing attorneys fees that the work listed as being done was not actually done or was unnecessary. The court could find no indication of overlapping work — in other words one attorney doing the same thing already done by another attorney. In a factually complicated case raising some difficult legal issues the court cannot conclude that the fact that two or three attorneys work on a case raises the specter of overcharging. The levée en masse argument cannot apply to separate work done by each of the three attorneys working for the plaintiff; if only one attorney were engaged he or she would have to do exactly the same work now claimed to have been done, and not disputed, by the other two attorneys assigned to the case. It is true that having more than one attorney work on a case does often necessitate that they have conference calls or meetings where each could charge for the time they spent in a particular conference call or meeting attended by the other attorneys — that expense would not be incurred if one attorney was working on the case. Interestingly enough on occasion the attorneys talked to each other but there was apparently only one billing — see 8/14/07 entry by Attorney Scordo and 8/15/07 conference calls by that attorney with Attorney Greenspan who did not himself separately bill for the call. On some occasions multiple type of billing did occur — see 9/20/07 work by Attorney Rydell and Attorney Scordo as an example.
But where does this lead us? Is it to be held that in trying to enforce ameliorative acts like CUTPA and in trying, through fiduciary duty law, to prevent companies and individuals in the free market system from turning that system into one espousing a red in tooth and claw modus operandi, plaintiffs cannot hire more than one lawyer or if they hire a firm only one lawyer in the firm can work on the case? To ask the question provides the answer for the court. Besides lawyers in firms and judges often talk about difficult cases between themselves, developing strategies and ideas that very often save time and wasted effort in pursuing pointless or unproductive theories on how to handle a particular case. As Attorney Rydell concedes in his affidavit there is some overlap involved in the sense that, for example, everyone coming into a conference call agrees with conclusions reached and approaches to be taken. But it is extremely difficult to determine the amount of any overlap in lengthy litigation unless people are to worry more about their timesheets than representing their clients.
(2) Novelty and Difficulty of the Questions Involved in the Case
The court found this to be a difficult case. It needed 65 pages to decide it. More to the point the duty of loyalty issue especially as it relates to encouraging or arranging for fellow employees to work for a competitor or rival business while still working for a company that will be subject to the competition presents difficult problems and nuances. This introduced an element of novelty into the case in the sense that the court had to rely on several cases from other jurisdictions. True, the court did rely on a Connecticut case, Electronic Assoc. v. Automated Equipment, 185 Conn. 31 but that was thirty years old and a federal district court opinion from Connecticut it discussed was forty-seven years old, see opinion pages 11 et. seq. Furthermore, although there are many appellate cases in our state discussing fiduciary duty and the duty of loyalty, the difficulty with these cases results from having to apply their general statements to the particular factual situations presented by the case before the court.
(3) The Skill Requisite to Represent a Client in a Particular Case
The skill of the attorneys and staff is confirmed by Exhibit B, the timesheet previously referred to. The thoroughness evidenced by these worksheets underlines the skill of the lawyers involved who had to define the ambit of the work to be done by them and staff that worked on the case with them. The skill of attorneys on both sides of this case was obvious and established for the court in their handling of discovery issues, the trial, and post-trial proceedings as well as by the briefs filed at various stages in the proceeding. In Johnson the trial judge's observation of the lawyers and their handling of the case, preparation and work product is determinative of this factor, 488 F.2d at p. 718.
(4) Preclusion of Other Employment
This was a fairly lengthy trial and that factor plus the time consumed in dealing with and preparing for discovery disputes and post-trial matters must have detracted from counsel's ability to work on other cases. Attorney Rydell's affidavit indicates he worked exclusively on the plaintiff's case since it came into the office in 2007.
(5) Customary Fee for Similar Work
This is a difficult concept to deal with in that a case like this one is sui generis, presenting unique factual issues and varied possibilities for discovery disputes and disagreements.
Attorney Greenspan's affidavit is instructive. In paragraph 3 he lists his varied background and experience, his teaching role at the University of Connecticut Law School, admissions to practice several federal courts and bar association involvement. The plaintiff's firm is well respected and the hourly rates charged for work by its attorneys, set forth by Attorney Greenspan, are of course uniform and the fee demanded here for the various attorneys were of course not invented for this case. Attorney Greenspan also states that the fees charged by attorneys in his firm are "consistent with and comparable to fees customarily charged (in central and southern Connecticut) for similar legal services on similar cases." No contrary affidavits or evidence was submitted by the defendant.
Interestingly the plaintiff offered no similar statement about comparable rates of hourly fees charged as to paralegal work. Also the court has some difficulty with a "melding" argument — if you lump the attorney fees and paralegal fees together the hourly rate is $341 for the work done here. This is an adjunct to the observation that if the paralegals did not do the work actually performed by them, a lawyer at a higher rate would have had to do it. The point is that in fact a paralegal did do the work and fees paid to the paralegal have to be examined on a reasonable basis test. The court will deal with that issue at the end of its review of the Johnson factors.
Finally on this topic, the court did issue an opinion in Murtha v. City of Hartford, CV 07-501195 (2010), and attorney fees there involved work in a criminal case. But it should be noted that the two attorneys in that case were prominent criminal defense lawyers, one of whom had a fee rate of over $400 an hour in cases of the type he handled and the other one $350 an hour. This is only offered to show that the fees claimed in this case cannot be considered in the abstract but must be viewed in light of what experienced lawyers receive in civil or criminal litigation circumstances.
(6) Fixed or Contingency Fee
This was not a contingent fee case.
(7) Time Limitations
The full rendition of this factor in Johnson is the "time limitations imposed by the client or circumstances." This concept, standing alone, is somewhat difficult to interpret. In Johnson at 488 F.2d page 718 further described this test; the court said: "Priority work that delays the lawyer's other legal work is entitled to some premium." Unless these three lawyers planned or were instructed by managing partners to handle only this case it is clear that the factual preparation and numerous discovery issues which had to be attended to if the case were to be readied for trial created their own time consuming priorities and ongoing deadlines given the structure of the court case flow system that assigns trial dates which can only be continued with the permission of the presiding civil judge
(8) The Amount Involved and the Results Obtained
The court made an award of $220,000 and indicated that it would award attorneys fees. This figure is much lower than the amount the plaintiff maintained it was entitled to at trial but it was still substantial. Also there is another intangible the court must discuss. Mr. Miguelez, the chief operating officer of Advanced Arms, did not confine his operations to the Zenie operation he set up in Connecticut. He has other prosthetic offices which preexisted the formation of Advanced Arm Dynamics of New England. As the court remembers one of Mr. Zenie's real problems with continuing the relationship with Miguelez was the fact that he learned another office manager in another part of the country had received a more favorable compensation package. When Zenie did leave to form his own company, people from another Miguelez operation were sent in to try to salvage what they could. There was thus a national community of people delivering these kind of prosthetic services; it seemed to the court to be a close knit group of experts. One can rationally speculate that the award, although not as high as hoped for by the plaintiff, was substantial enough to let other operatives in other offices know that Miguelez would actively pursue serious and unjustified violations of the duty of loyalty and trade acts common to many other states and, if the facts warranted, substantial sums could be awarded for such violations. Miguelez would have to consider this a positive result if he had an interest in preserving the integrity of his national operations in this industry.
(9) The Experience, Reputation and Ability of the Attorneys
The court would refer to the comments to criteria 3, supra. Attorney Greenspan's affidavit indicates at the time of filing in November 2010 and while he handled this case he had been a partner in Day Pitney, LLP (formerly Day, Berry Howard, LLP) since 1993. He was also a member of the firm's Commercial Litigation Department. Attorneys Rydell and Scordo are associates. The reputation and skill of practice of that firm are well established in this state and the court itself has been made aware of that through its handling of two cases involving that firm which entailed major litigation, Linemaster v. Aetna Insurance Company, CV 91 03964325, 1995, and more recently Tagliarini v. Yale School of Management, CV 10 6010699, 2011.
(10) Undesirability of The Case
Johnson talks of this test in terms of the hardships faced by civil rights attorneys because of their efforts to help civil rights litigants. Such efforts are "often times" not "pleasantly received." This can have "an economic impact on (the lawyer's) practice which can be considered by the court." Id. 488 F.2d at page 719. This is not a factor in this case — handling cases like this is what these particular plaintiff's lawyers do for a living and no adverse impact in the Johnson sense has been offered.
If the word "undesirable" is given a more expansive meaning the enormous amount of time spent by the lawyers and staff can arguably be considered since it took away time from handling other cases. But there is no indication they would not be paid for their services even if the court did not grant attorneys fees.
(11) The Nature and Length of the Professional Relationship with the Client
The plaintiff's February 23, 2011 memo in support of this motion represents this matter is the first matter in which the plaintiff has been represented by Day Pitney. But that firm is now representing the plaintiff in connection with Mr. Zenie's bankruptcy case.
In other words the Day Pitney relationship with the plaintiff or Mr. Miguelez is not such as one would expect the firm to vary its fees because of having to represent a client of longstanding, see Johnson at 488 F.2d page 719.
(12) Awards in Similar Cases
What is meant by "similar" in this context? Does it mean awards in CUTPA cases in general or awards under Federal Civil Rights Statutes like § 1983? Johnson provided reference to a list of Title VII cases from the Seventh Circuit and other federal circuits at footnote 5. But the court's experience is that duty of loyalty cases are very fact specific dictating varying degrees of difficulty in conducting discovery and trials. To the court's memory the cases it previously wrote and relied upon, Custard Insurance Adjusters v. Nardi, 2000 Ct. Sup. 5085, and CT RE LLC v. Thora Colmam, 2008 Ct.Sup. 10477, did not involve the degree of factual complexity as this case.
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The court will now address the lodestar figure here and whether it should be adjusted in light of the foregoing Johnson considerations or other factors. The plaintiff's claim for fees is $557,000.
The Johnson test was not meant to be a straight jacket; other considerations can be taken into account which the court will now address.
(1) There is a claim for fees associated with the bankruptcy proceedings initiated by Mr. Zenie. It is argued that this proceeding is purely collateral. The court cannot accept this narrow view of the word "collateral." Any lawyer worth his salt (to coin a phrase) would have an obligation to protect his or her client's interests secured in this litigation in a proceeding that might be independent of this litigation and thus collateral to it but would affect those interests. Or to put it another way, there would be no reason for the plaintiff's attorneys to be involved in the bankruptcy proceeding but for the interests that might be or have been secured in the litigation now before the court. (2) As to the position that it would never have occurred to the legislature to award attorneys fees two and a half times the award arrived at by the court, Judge Stevens did not adopt such a comparative analysis in Bridgeport Harbor Place v. Ganim, CV 04-0184523 (2008); he found damages in the amount of $10,000 under § 42-110g(d) but awarded $650,000 in attorneys under the CUTPA statute.
The court agrees that it would not have been appropriate to too harshly punish Mr. Zenie even though it found serious and intentional breaches of the duty of loyalty. It awarded in this regard only $20,000 in punitive damages. This was in the context of a case where the court rejected the plaintiff's claim for hundreds of thousands of dollars in damages beyond the $220,000 that the court awarded.
But in fact a substantial award was still made and to somehow permit a reduction in the lodestar figure based on the foregoing argument would, in the court's opinion, ignore the ameliorative purposes of CUTPA and ignore the private attorney general role given to litigants to enforce the important public policy arms of that act. It simply ignores the finding by the court that serious and substantial violations of the duty of loyalty were found intrinsically tied to the basis for the CUTPA violation. Under these circumstances, if the goals of CUTPA are to be met, how is it reasonable to reduce the amount of attorneys fees otherwise established as fair and warranted by a factor having nothing to do with that calculation — the effect of the judgment and award on the defendant. Should the effect of a failure to award such fees on the plaintiff qua client or on its attorneys not be considered? Should it be ignored? What criteria should a court use to reduce the otherwise reasonable fee by 20%, 50%, 75%? These observations lead the court to reject this argument as a method of affecting the lodestar figure.
(3) There are two factors that the court believes should more seriously be considered regarding a reduction of the lodestar figure.
(a) The first problem the court has is the expert testimony of Mr. Kramer and the damage claims made in conjunction with that testimony. He has extensive credentials and has been a CPA for thirty-five years. He testified that the value of AAD New England was destroyed by Mr. Zenie and the value of the business just prior to Mr. Zenie's conduct was $1,570,000. As an alternative theory Mr. Kramer testified that the company's remedies terminated at the end of June 2005 and AAD New England incurred $502,352.43 in expenses to keep the business operating until it closed in May 2007. The court rejected these arguments and on a different basis awarded $200,000 in actual damages under the various counts. Related to the "Results Obtained" test the court has difficulty in awarding counsel fees for pursuing a damage claim that was in large part unsuccessful. Mr. Kramer testified the morning of February 27, 2010, the court determines from the fees for that day $2,000 can be attributed to Mr. Kramer's time in court. The court has reviewed the entries in Exhibit B and it appears approximately $8,000 was spent regarding Mr. Kramer's preparation for trial and testimony. It is difficult to determine this exactly since, in many of the entries where Kramer is referred to, other aspects of the case are mentioned having nothing to do with Kramer. It is also true that there are generic entries talking about trial preparation, preparation for depositions or preparation of post-trial briefs where Kramer and his prospective testimony and actual testimony must have figured. The court only very roughly determines on the basis of the foregoing the lodestar figure should be adjusted downward by $25,000.
The plaintiff's brief in support of attorneys fees noted that even though CUTPA only authorizes a fee award if the plaintiff prevails on such a claim "there is no automatic or per se rule that attorneys fees must be reduced if the plaintiff fails to prevail on the entirety of its complaint," quoting Judge Stevens in the Bridgeport Harbor case. Here the plaintiff prevailed on all its claims which were interconnected. But to the court there must be a distinction between interconnected substantive claims as opposed to theories of damages advanced on the basis of prevailing on those claims. True, CUTPA has an ameliorative purpose but that should not somehow carryover to the determination of what damages are fair and reasonable given proof of the substantive claims. Why should a defendant have to pay for efforts expended to pursue a damage claim that a court, rightly or wrongly concludes is not justified under the act?
(b) The court would also note that the pay for timekeepers — paralegals and secretarial staff seems high. The court examined Exhibit B again. It appears approximately $30,000 was paid to staff listed as paralegals and staff. The highest paid individual charging $190 to $210 an hour only appeared a few times in the timesheets. The most appearing individuals, Chavez and Ezenekive charged $160 — $165 and $125 an hour respectively.
The defendant offers nothing in the way of evidence or affidavits to indicate what prevailing rates for paralegals and staff are or should be. But the plaintiff has the burden of proof on fees. On the other hand two reputable attorneys from a reputable and well known firm state this is what their paralegals charge. Is there a general mass market for these type of workers; would not a high powered firm pay premium rates for people, no matter what the average salary is, to attract highly skilled people. The defendant does not challenge the work actually done and the two primary paralegals Chavez and Ezenekive did fairly detailed and seemingly complicated work. How much is the court to cut back on these charges, 10%, 25%, 50%, surely something is owed which the defendant does not contest. It would have been helpful if the plaintiff had submitted an affidavit concerning going rates for paralegals or what was the reason for the rates paid — the persons' educational background, experience, years with the firm, or commented on these issues. But all things considered the court will not reduce the lodestar amount on this basis.
The court does reduce the lodestar figure by $25,000 so that the court awards $532,000 under CUTPA § 42-110g(d).