A contract, including a settlement agreement, that has been procured through the use of fraudulent representations is voidable. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., Inc., v. Jacobs , 51 Idaho 160, 168, 4 P.2d 657, 659 (1931). In its ruling, the district court acknowledged that fraud in the inducement is a ground to rescind a contract, even one that has been fully integrated.
Where the evidence is stated to be introduced for a certain purpose, it should be restricted to that purpose. For it is manifest that any other rule would result in surprise and injustice." Advance-Rumely Thrasher Co., Inc. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160, pg. 169, 4 P.2d 657. The court should refrain from saying anything in the presence of the jury which may improperly influence them, and it is highly improper for a trial judge to comment upon the evidence when said exhibit was offered and admitted into evidence for illustrative purposes only, and purporting to reflect accurately distances.
The clause in the contract that purchaser has examined the premises before purchase and waives any misrepresentations is against public policy and ineffective. Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160, 168, 4 P.2d 657; J.I. Case Co. v. Bird, 51 Idaho 725, 728, 11 P.2d 966; Utilities Engineering Institute v. Criddle, 65 Idaho 201, 208, 141 P.2d 981; Jordan v. Nelson, Iowa, 178 N.W. 544, 10 A.L.R. 1472. Appellants cannot avoid their representations as to the irrigated acreage and the inclusion of the canyon in the deal merely because respondents might have ascertained the falsity of such representations by reference to public records, if that was possible.
Liability for misrepresentation may be based on DuPont's statements to others that were intended by DuPont to reach the bellwether plaintiffs. See Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 4 P.2d 657, 660 (Id.Sup.Ct. 1931) ("recovery can be had for representations made to another with the intent or knowledge that they should or would be repeated to complainant"); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 533 (liability for misrepresentation arises if "the maker intends or has reason to expect that its terms will be repeated or its substance communicated to the other and that it will influence his conduct in the transaction . . . involved"). The testimony of bellwether plaintiff Gary Hansen also addresses these issues.
Hines v. Riverside Chevrolet-Olds, Inc., 655 So.2d 909, 920 (Ala. 1994) (holding that a defendant may be liable for fraud to anyone the defendant specially expected would rely on his misrepresentation); Gulf Oil Corp. v. Newton, 31 A.2d 462, 463 (Conn. 1943) (noting that the principle of indirect reliance "also applies where it is within the contemplation of the person making the representation that it will be communicated to and induce action by anyone of a group or class"); Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 4 P.2d 657, 660 (Id. 1931) (applying a "reason to expect" standard); Highland Motor Transfer Co. v. Heyburn Bldg. Co., 35 S.W.2d 521, 523-24 (Ky.Ct.App. 1931) (same); Oppenhuizen v. Wennersten, 139 N.W.2d 765, 768 (Mich.App. 1966) (same); Freeman v. Myers, 774 S.W.2d 892, 893-94 (Mo.Ct.App. 1989) (same); Epperson v. Roloff, 719 P.2d 799, 803 (Nev. 1986) (holding that liability for fraud can rest on communication of misinformation to an agent, with reason to expect that the agent will communicate that misinformation to third parties); Kaufman v. i-Stat Corp., 754 A.2d 1188, 1196-97 (N.J. 2000) (distinguishing "indirect reliance," when the plaintiff relies on statements the defendant had reason to expect would reach her, from a "fraud-on-the-market" theory); Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 444 (N.Y. 1931) ("To creditors and investors to whom the employer exhibited the certificate, the defendants owed a like duty to make it without fraud, since there was notice in the circumstances of its making that the
Where the evidence is stated to be introduced for a certain purpose, it should be restricted to that purpose, for it is manifest that any other rule would result in surprise and injustice.Advance-Rumley [Rumely] Thresher Co., Inc. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160, 169, 4 P.2d 657 (1931). * * * * * *
When seller has specialized knowledge, training and skill unequal to that of buyer, such attempted disclaimers may violate public policy. Heningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69, 95. See also: 36 Notre Dame Law Review 233 ('61); Sutter v. St. Clair Motors, Inc., 44 Ill.App.2d 318, 194 N.E.2d 674, 676 ('63); Advance Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160, 4 P.2d 657; J.I. Case Co. v. Bird, 51 Idaho 725, 730, 731, 11 P.2d 966. Disclaimers are ineffective where the product delivered was not the product represented and ordered.
State v. White, 7 Idaho 150, 61 P. 517; State v. Dunn, 44 Idaho 636, 258 P. 553; State v. Scott, 72 Idaho 202, 239 P.2d 258. "If a party desires other instructions than those given by the court, the same must be requested or no error can be predicated thereon." Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160, 4 P.2d 657, 661; Mitchell v. Atwood, 55 Idaho 772, 47 P.2d 680; Pittman v. Sather, 68 Idaho 29, 188 P.2d 600. We deem it advisable to clear the confusion which has arisen as to included offenses.
Hurt v. Monumental Mercury Mining Co., 35 Idaho 295, 206 P. 184; Milner v. Earl Fruit Co., 40 Idaho 339, 232 P. 581; Larsen v. Buys, 49 Idaho 615, 292 P. 239; Fidelity Trust Co. v. State, 72 Idaho 137, 237 P.2d 1058. Fraud or mistake may be shown, in any case, to void or reform a contract. Udelavitz v. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029; Gould v. Frazier, 48 Idaho 798, 285 P. 673; Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160, 4 P.2d 657; Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n, 56 Idaho 529, 56 P.2d 762; Utilities Engineering Institute v. Criddle, 65 Idaho 201, 141 P.2d 981. Although burdened and commingled with much that is sham and redundant, we think defendants' imperfect pleading of fraud or mistake was sufficient for the admission of the evidence offered, and should not have been stricken.
No request was made by appellants for amplification of Instruction No. 9 and, therefore, under the doctrine of the above-cited case, which has been consistently and continuously announced and adhered to, there is no error of which they may now take advantage. In addition to the authorities cited in Abbs v. Redmond, 64 Idaho 369 at page 375, 132 P.2d 1044, are: Advance-Rumely Thresher Co., Inc., v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160 at page 173, 4 P.2d 657; Crystal Dome Oil Gas Co. v. Savic, 51 Idaho 409 at page 412, 6 P.2d 155; Weed v. Idaho Copper Co., 51 Idaho 737 at page 760, 10 P.2d 613; Evans v. Davidson, 58 Idaho 600 at page 615, 77 P.2d 661; Klam v. Koppel, 63 Idaho 171 at page 184, 118 P.2d 729; Pittman v. Sather, 68 Idaho 29 at page 66, 188 P.2d 600. The four errors assigned by appellants being thus disposed of, the judgment is affirmed.