All but the last page, however, are an essentially verbatim adoption of the requests for findings of fact and conclusions of law the department submitted at the close of trial, even down to typographical errors the department's submission contained. We have criticized in the past wholesale adoption of findings proposed by one party to the litigation, and we do so again. See Adoption of Hank, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 691-692 (2001). Proceedings aimed at dispensing with parental consent to adoption involve high stakes and deeply important personal rights.

November 28, 2001. Further appellate review denied: Reported below: 52 Mass. App. Ct. 689 (2001).

The motion of the Department of Children and Families (department) to present additional evidence can be analogized to a motion for relief from judgment under Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(3), which allows relief from judgment on the basis of "fraud . . . misrepresentation, or other misconduct." Adoption of Hank, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 692 n.8 (2001) ("[A]lthough the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to proceedings to dispense with consent to adoption, we rely on those rules by analogy as a cogent standard"). Adoption of Rory, 80 Mass. App. Ct. 454, 455 n.3 (2011) (court "look[s] to rule 60(b) by analogy and as a cogent standard").

We have commented on the need to look at the findings and the evidence with special care when this occurs. See Adoption of Hank, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 692-693 (2001) (clearly erroneous standard still applies where trial court adopts party's proposed findings verbatim, but findings are subjected to stricter scrutiny); Care Protection of Olga, 57 Mass. App. Ct. at 823-824. We have done so and are satisfied that the findings are supported by the evidence and are clear and convincing despite the alarm caused by such a practice.

That said, when a judge relies on adopted findings, the standard of review does not change, but we subject the findings to "stricter scrutiny." Adoption of Hank, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 693 (2001), quoting from Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234, 237 (1980). 1. Facts.

Our cases indicate that it is appropriate to use the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure as a standard. See Adoption of Hank, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 692 n. 8 (2001). For purposes of this opinion, we do not consider whether the change in plan is newly discovered evidence, whether the December 11 motion was timely, or whether other requirements, if any, of Mass.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(2), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), were satisfied.

Paragraph ( c) of the statute further provides a series of thirteen factors that are to be considered in determining parental fitness for purposes of dispensing with consent to adoption. See, e.g., Adoption of Hank, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 691 (2001). In making his required findings pursuant to G.L.c. 210, § 3, the judge concluded that four of the thirteen factors to be considered in determining best interest apply to the mother (a number of others also apply to the father), including factors set forth in subsections (ii), (v), (vii), and (xii).

We continue to review such findings under the clearly erroneous standard, but they are "subjected to stricter scrutiny." Adoption of Hank, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 693 (2001), quoting Cormier v. Carty, 381 Mass. 234, 237 (1980). 2.

We review those findings under the clearly erroneous standard, but they are subjected to stricter scrutiny. Adoption of Hank, 52 Mass. App. Ct. 689, 693 (2001). A finding is "clearly erroneous" when there is no evidence to support it, or when, although there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.