Subsequently the committee recommended that House Bills 644 and 645, which were introduced by the committee, be substituted for House Bill 338, and the substitute bills were passed (Senate and House Journal, 1951, pp 725 and 771). House Bill 644 replaced the second portion of House Bill 338 and became ch 591, Oregon Laws 1951 (now ORS 108.140); and House Bill 645 replaced the first portion of House Bill 338 and became ch 386, Oregon Laws 1951 (now incorporated in subd (2) of ORS 113.050). We are impressed by the suggestion that the division of House Bill 338 into two separate bills was prompted by the decision of this court in Adm'r of Veteran's Affairs v. U.S. Nat. Bank of Portland, 191 Or. 203, 229 P.2d 276, which held that under the Oregon Constitution, as it then stood, an amendatory act could not introduce matters outside the scope of the title to the original act. The decision in that case was handed down March 20, 1951, while House Bill 338 was in committee, and the substitute bills were introduced April 3, 1951.
Consistent with that established Indiana case law, the Oregon case law through the generations agrees, not merely by implication but by express statement, that this court has authority to adjudicate a one-subject challenge under Article IV, section 20, and to remedy a violation if one is found. E.g., Nielson v. Bryson, 257 Or. 179, 186-87, 477 P.2d 714 (1970); Adm. Vets. Affairs v. U.S. Nat. Bank, 191 Or. 203, 212, 229 P.2d 276 (1951); Lovejoy v. Portland, 95 Or. 459, 466, 188 P. 207 (1920); Gantenbein v. West, 74 Or. 334, 339-40, 144 P. 1171 (1914); State of Oregon v. Shaw, 22 Or. 287, 289, 29 P. 1028 (1892); David v. Portland Water Committee, 14 Or. 98, 109, 12 P. 174 (1886). Indeed, on several occasions, this court has exercised that authority and declared all or part of an act to be void for violation of Article IV, section 20.
* * In such proceedings as that now before us, such regulations should be sympathetically considered by the courts, and the spirit thereof followed where rulings in accordance therewith will work no injustice. * * *" In line with this, also is the statement in the case of Administrator of Veterans' Affairs v. United States Nat. Bank of Portland, 191 Or. 203, 229 P.2d 276, 284, which is: "Both the state, and in many instances, the federal government, have a special interest in the care and support of incompetent persons who are receiving support from the United States government out of public funds, and the legislature violates no rule of equal protection in singling out that class of persons for special treatment.
Our cases repeatedly state that Article IV, § 20 must be liberally construed; the insufficiency of the title must be "plain and manifest," "palpable and clear." Foeller v. Housing Authority of Portland, 198 Or. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953); Adm. Vets. Affairs v. U.S. Nat. Bank, 191 Or. 203, 229 P.2d 276 (1951); Pacific Elevator Co. v. Portland, 65 Or. 349, 133 P. 72, 46 LRA NS 363 (1913); State of Oregon v. Shaw, 22 Or. 287, 29 P. 1028 (1892); Probert, op cit supra, 114. Basically, the question is one of semantics; specifically, the problem of determining whether the idea of a building code and its enactment is a referent of the expression "county planning."
Since ch 343, Oregon Laws 1939, amended ch 218, Oregon Laws 1909, the provisions of the former must, therefore, be tested for their validity under Art IV, § 20, as if they had been included in the 1909 enactment itself. Administrator of Veterans' Affairs v. United States National Bank of Portland, 191 Or. 203, 229 P.2d 276. The title of ch 218, Oregon Laws 1909, consumes almost a page of fine print, but, as pertinent, reads:
There is another rule that where the legislature makes a title to an act restrictive, it may not include in the body of the act matters which enlarge the scope of the title, nor can an amendment be enacted by reference to the previous act enlarging the scope of the title. A very complete and exhaustive opinion on this subject was written by Mr. Chief Justice BRAND and may be found in In re Trader's Guardianship, 191 Or. 203, 229 P.2d 276. See also State v. Perry, 77 Or. 453, 151 P. 655; State ex rel. v. Latourette, 168 Or. 584, 593, 125 P.2d 750.
Article VII, section 3, of the Oregon Constitution contains two substantive provisions: In actions of law, it provides that the right of trial by jury "shall be preserved," and that "no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to support the verdict." The legislature's enactment of ORS 31.150 to 30.155 brings into play the presumption that every statute that it enacts is presumed to be constitutional, Adm. Vets. Affairs v. U. S. Nat. Bank, 191 Or 203, 211, 229 P2d 213 (1951), and the understanding that the overlap of judicial and legislative powers regarding civil procedures arises from the legislative police power to protect the public welfare by promoting the efficient and impartial administration of justice. Sadler v. Oregon State Bar, 275 Or 279, 286, 550 P2d 1218 (1976).
After reviewing the pertinent cases in this area, we now turn to the statute under constitutional attack. We begin with the presumption that legislative acts are constitutional. Adm. Vets. Affairs v. U.S. Nat. Bank, 191 Or. 203, 211, 229 P.2d 213 (1951). ORS 163.475 was enacted in 1975 to protect victims of sexual offenses from unnecessary disclosure of their sexual history. State v. Eggleston, 31 Or. App. 9, 12-13, 569 P.2d 1088 (1978).