Inasmuch as the best interests of the child generally lie in being nurtured and guided by both parents (see Matter of Gonzalez v Santiago, 167 A.D.3d 887, 889), "[i]t is generally in the best interest of the child for a rapport to be established with the noncustodial parent" (Matter of Schack v Schack, 98 A.D.2d 802, 802; see Zafran v Zafran, 28 A.D.3d 753, 755). Thus, "[a] noncustodial parent is entitled to meaningful parental access, and denial of that right must be based on substantial evidence that parental access would be detrimental to the welfare of the child" (Matter of Justice F. [Jessica V.], 192 A.D.3d 1025, 1027; see Matter of Rodriguez v Silva, 121 A.D.3d 794, 795).
"'[T]he determination of [parental access] is within the sound discretion of the [hearing] court based upon the best interests of the child, and its determination will not be set aside unless it lacks a sound and substantial basis in the record'" (Matter of Justice F. [Jessica V.], 192 A.D.3d 1025, 1027, quoting Matter of Sinnott-Turner v Kolba, 60 A.D.3d 774, 775). Here, the evidence presented at the hearing demonstrated that throughout the child's life, the father had only been with the child for a period of several hours on the days that they spent time together, and thus, the record supports the Family Court's parental access determination.
The hearing evidence established that the plaintiff suffered a mental breakdown and was subjected to involuntary psychiatric hospitalizations for 16 consecutive days in June 2019, and for 47 consecutive days later in 2019. The court properly concluded that the plaintiff's condition, along with her lack of insight into her mental health issues and the impact of those issues on the parties’ child, constituted a change in circumstances that warranted modifying the custody arrangement so as to award the defendant sole legal and residential custody, and to limit the plaintiff to supervised parental access (see Matter of Justice F. [Jessica V.], 192 A.D.3d 1025, 140 N.Y.S.3d 762 ). Furthermore, the record does not support the plaintiff's contention that the court failed to accord due consideration to the wishes of the child or to the original custody arrangement agreed to by the parties.
As there was no other custody order in place, and the father had no greater right to the custody of the children than the mother, the children were not being illegally detained by the mother, and the father cannot establish a right to habeas corpus relief (see Matter ofKiara B. v. Omar R., 147 A.D.3d 476, 46 N.Y.S.3d 417 ). Moreover, given that the "paramount concern in any custody dispute is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child" ( Matter of Justice F. [Jessica V.], 192 A.D.3d 1025, 1026, 140 N.Y.S.3d 762 ), we note that the children and the mother were all born in France, and the mother's temporary move to France with the children was prompted by challenges created by the global COVID–19 pandemic and was undertaken to provide the children with a healthier environment in which to thrive. Accordingly, the determination of the Family Court was, based upon the record before us, made in the best interests of the children (see Domestic Relations Law § 70[a] ).
As there was no other custody order in place, and the father had no greater right to the custody of the children than the mother, the children were not being illegally detained by the mother, and the father cannot establish a right to habeas corpus relief (see Matter of Kiara B. v Omar R., 147 A.D.3d 476). Moreover, given that the "paramount concern in any custody dispute is to determine, under the totality of the circumstances, what is in the best interests of the child" (Matter of Justice F. [Jessica V.], 192 A.D.3d 1025, 1026), we note that the children and the mother were all born in France, and the mother's temporary move to France with the children was prompted by challenges created by the global COVID-19 pandemic and was undertaken to provide the children with a healthier environment in which to thrive. Accordingly, the determination of the Family Court was, based upon the record before us, made in the best interests of the children (see Domestic Relations Law § 70[a]).