Opinion
2018 CA 0888
06-13-2019
STACEY ADLER v. GERALD JERMARR WILLLIAMS, IN HIS INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY AND OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE MAYOR OF WHITE CASTLE AND THE TOWN OF WHITE CASTLE, LOUISIANA, AND BOARD OF ALDERMEN IN THEIR OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND INDIVIDUALLY, BARBARA O'BEAR, CHRIS LANDRY, ELLIOTT MARTIN, KIPP KNIGHT, AND SHALANDA ALLEN
Charlotte McDaniel McGehee Seth M. Dornier Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant, Stacey Adler Valencia J. Vessel Terry C. Landry, Jr. Plaquemine, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees, Gerald Jermarr Williams, in his individual capacity and official capacity, as the mayor of White Castle and the Town of White Castle, Louisiana and Board of Aldermen in their official capacity and individually, Barbara O'Bear, Chris Landry, Elliott Martin, Kipp Knight, and Shalanda Allen
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION On Appeal from the Eighteenth Judicial District Court In and for the Parish of Iberville State of Louisiana
Docket No. 74,482 Honorable J. Kevin Kimball, Judge Presiding Charlotte McDaniel McGehee
Seth M. Dornier
Baton Rouge, Louisiana Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant,
Stacey Adler Valencia J. Vessel
Terry C. Landry, Jr.
Plaquemine, Louisiana Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees,
Gerald Jermarr Williams, in his
individual capacity and official
capacity, as the mayor of White
Castle and the Town of White Castle,
Louisiana and Board of Aldermen in
their official capacity and
individually, Barbara O'Bear, Chris
Landry, Elliott Martin, Kipp Knight,
and Shalanda Allen BEFORE: GUIDRY, THERIOT, AND PENZATO, JJ. PENZATO, J.
Appellant, Stacey Adler, appeals the trial court's judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Appellees, Gerald Jermarr Williams, in his individual capacity and official capacity, as the mayor of White Castle and the Town of White Castle, Louisiana, and the Board of Aldermen in their official capacity and individual capacity, Barbara O'Bear, Chris Landry, Elliott Martin, Kipp Knight, and Shalanda Allen (collectively referred to as "defendants"), and dismissing all her claims against defendants. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On February 9, 2015, Adler filed a petition for damages, declaratory judgment, injunction, and writ of mandamus against defendants claiming violations of La. R.S. 42:11 et seq. (Open Meetings Law), La. R.S. 23:967(A)(2) (Whistleblower Statute), and the First Amendment to the United States and Louisiana Constitutions. The facts of the petition alleged a wrongful termination claim. Adler alleged that she had been an employee of the Town of White Castle for 24 years and had been the Town Clerk since 1997. Adler claimed that in March 2014, Mayor Williams was told that she had assisted an independent certified public accounting firm in determining that the Assistant Town Clerk, Monica Hamilton, had committed payroll fraud by paying herself unwarranted sick time. She further alleged that Mayor Williams was angry with her for not supporting his re-election campaign in 2014, which he won on December 6, 2014. Adler claimed that she was terminated by a December 31, 2014 letter, effective January 2, 2015, and was ordered to return her keys and any town property in her possession. Mayor Williams sent a second letter dated January 5, 2015, informing Adler that there had been an error in the December 31, 2014 termination letter and that her termination would be effective at the expiration of her term, at 6:00 p.m. on January 20, 2015, the first regular meeting of the Board of Aldermen succeeding a regular election. Adler alleged that the regular meetings of the Town of White Castle were required to be held at 6:00 p.m. on the third Monday of each month. Thus, the meeting after the re-election of Mayor Williams should have been held on January 19, 2015, rather than on January 20, 2015, when it was actually held. Adler further alleged that the notice of the meeting and the meeting agenda did not comply with the White Castle, Louisiana—Code of Ordinances. In addition to the injunctive and declaratory relief, Adler sought damages, attorney's fees, and court costs.
On February 10, 2015, Adler filed a motion for preliminary injunction, which the trial court heard over a period of three days, March 4, 17, and 18, 2015. At the close of Adler's case, defendants moved for a dismissal pursuant to La. R. 23:844, arguing that Adler failed to meet all six factors necessary for an injunction involving a labor dispute. Even though the trial court initially took the matter under advisement and ordered the parties to submit briefs, just two days later, the trial court issued a ruling dated March 20, 2015, denying defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal and ordering the continuation of the trial on the preliminary injunction to take place on May 5, 2015. The minutes dated March 23, 2015, are consistent with the ruling issued March 20, 2015.
Inexplicably, the signed ruling was dated March 20, 2015, and the minutes are dated March 23, 2015, after the date of the ruling. There is no transcript contained in the record dated either March 20, 2015 or March 23, 2015.
Thereafter, the parties appeared before the trial court on May 5, 2015, regarding defendants' request for written reasons for denying their directed verdict. The trial court reiterated its belief that Adler had presented her case and dismissal would be improper. However, after hearing argument of both sides, the trial court vacated its March 20, 2015 ruling denying defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal, ordered briefing on the issue, and subsequently issued a ruling on July 16, 2015, dismissing Adler's claim for damages.
Adler appealed to this court, and we determined that La. R.S. 23:844 was intended to apply to unionized labor disputes of collective bargaining agreements, not to the injunctive relief sought by Adler. Adler v. Williams, 2016-0103 (La. App. 1 Cir. 9/16/16), 203 So. 3d 504, 512. We also held that a denial of a preliminary injunction was warranted in the matter, since Adler's suit was for damages based on her alleged wrongful termination, and noted that Adler made no showing of irreparable injury, loss, or damage whereby she would be entitled to injunctive relief in the form of a preliminary injunction. Adler, 203 So. 3d at 513. We further held that the trial court erred in disposing of Adler's claims for violations of the Open Meetings Law, the Whistleblower Statute, and the Lawrason Act, La. R.S. 33:321, et seq. We specifically referred to numerous instances where both the trial court and counsel for both parties make reference to the hearing concerning only a preliminary injunction and not a trial on the merits. Adler, 203 So. 3d at 514. In summation, we affirmed the trial court's denial of Adler's request for a preliminary injunction, on different grounds than that of the trial court; reversed the trial court's denial of Adler's causes of action for violations of the Open Meetings Law, the Whistleblower Statute, and the Lawrason Act; and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. Adler, 203 So. 3d at 514.
A prior sitting judge in Division A of the Eighteenth Judicial District Court presided over the entirety of the original suit. After the ruling of this court, on February 16, 2017, Adler requested that a status conference be set to discuss the setting of a trial date. A status conference was subsequently held on April 24, 2017, and all parties agreed to a discovery completion date of July 28, 2017. On August 25, 2017, Adler filed a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and injunction against defendants. A second judge, appointed pro tempore following the retirement of the original Division A judge, granted the temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction and set a hearing on the injunctive relief for September 25, 2017. On September 25, 2017, it was determined that the defendants had not been served, and therefore, the hearing on the injunction was continued until October 3, 2017. Prior to that date, on September 28, 2017, defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Adler's claims regarding violations of the Open Meetings Law, the Whistleblower Statute, and the Lawrason Act. The defendants noted that since this court had stated in its prior opinion that a decision on the merits was premature, nearly a year had passed and there had been ample time for discovery, making the matter ripe for decision.
Adler filed an opposition to the motion for summary judgment, relying upon legal arguments, the court minutes dated March 23, 2015, an excerpt of the May 5, 2015 hearing regarding the involuntary dismissal of the preliminary injunction, and excerpts from the preliminary injunction hearing. Adler relied upon the statements of the judge hearing the matter on March 23, 2015, that after the argument of the parties and three days of evidence, Adler had presented more than sufficient evidence on her case-in-chief to establish her claims by a preponderance of the evidence. Adler argued that a regular meeting of the Board of Aldermen did not take place on January 20, 2015, and appropriate notice was not given. She also asserted that her First Amendment claims and the Whistleblower Statute claims were never tried.
The summary judgment was heard and granted by the newly elected judge to Division A, who noted that he had read the entire transcript of the preliminary injunctive hearing, as well as the entire record. On March 7, 2018, a judgment was signed granting defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissing Adler's claims of unlawful termination and violations of Louisiana's Whistleblower Statute, the First Amendment, and the Open Meetings Law. This court subsequently issued a rule to show cause since the March 7, 2018 judgment appeared to be a partial judgment, which did not contain the required designation of finality as required by La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). We also requested the trial court advise this court why the judgment did not warrant a La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B) designation and supplement the record with a per curiam or an amended judgment. On July 16, 2018, the trial court signed an amended judgment designating it as a final judgment. After supplementation of the record with the amended judgment, another panel of this court issued an order maintaining the appeal. Therefore, we address the appeal of the amended judgment.
The trial court also issued a per curiam to this court explaining that the March 7, 2018 judgment was final and did not warrant a designation as a final partial judgment pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 1915(B). However, the trial court also issued the amended judgment containing such designation.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Adler assigned three errors of the trial court as follows:
A. The District Court Erred in Considering the Defendants['] Summary Judgment in Light of this Court's Prior Opinion in this Matter in Docket Number: 2106-CA-[0103];
B. District Court Erred in Failing to Enter Judgment in Favor of the Plaintiff on the Open Meetings Law and Wrongful Termination Under the [Lawrason] Act Consistent with the Statements of the District Court Judge Presiding Over the Trial of These Claims and Pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4209; and,
C. The District Court Erred in Weighing Testimony and Making Credibility Determinations in Granting Summary Judgment in Favor of Defendants.
LAW AND DISCUSSION
Summary judgment procedure is favored and "is designed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action .... and shall be construed to accomplish these ends." La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(2). In reviewing the trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment, this court applies a de novo standard of review using the same criteria applied by the trial courts to determine whether summary judgment is appropriate. Reynolds v. Bordelon, 2014-2371 (La. 6/30/15), 172 So. 3d 607, 610.
The burden of proof is on the mover. Nevertheless, if the mover will not bear the burden of proof at trial on the issue that is before the court, the mover is not required to negate all essential elements of the adverse party's claim, but only to point out to the court the absence of factual support for one or more of the elements necessary to the adverse party's claim. The burden is on the adverse party to produce factual support sufficient to establish the existence of a genuine issue of material fact or that the mover is not entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(D)(1).
After an opportunity for adequate discovery, a motion for summary judgment shall be granted if the motion, memorandum, and supporting documents show that there is no genuine issue as to material fact and that the mover is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(3). The only documents that may be filed in support of or in opposition to the motion are pleadings, memoranda, affidavits, depositions, answers to interrogatories, certified medical records, written stipulations, and admissions. La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4). The court may consider only those documents filed in support of or in opposition to the motion for summary judgment and shall consider any documents to which no objection is made. La. C.C. art. 966(D)(2); Foto v. Rouses Enterprises, LLC, 2017-1601 (La. App. 1 Cir. 8/6/18), 256 So. 3d 386, 388.
While several documents relied on by defendants and submitted by defendants in support of their motion for summary judgment do not comport with La. C.C.P. art. 966(A)(4), Adler did not object to any of these documents and as such, they shall be considered in conjunction with the motion for summary judgment.
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court's role is not to evaluate the weight of the evidence or to determine the truth of the matter, but instead to determine whether there is a genuine issue of triable fact. Janney v. Pearce, 2009-2103 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/7/10), 40 So. 3d 285, 289, writ denied, 2010- 1356 (La. 9/24/10), 45 So. 3d 1079. A genuine issue is a triable issue, which means that an issue is genuine if reasonable persons could disagree; if on the state of the evidence, reasonable persons could reach only one conclusion, there is no need for a trial on that issue. A fact is "material" when its existence or nonexistence may be essential to plaintiff's cause of action under the applicable theory of recovery. Kasem v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2016-0217 (La. App. 1 Cir. 2/10/17), 212 So. 3d 6, 13. First Assignment of Error
In her first assignment of error, Adler claims that the trial court erred in considering the defendants' motion for summary judgment in light of our previous opinion. Our previous opinion determined that the principal demand of the permanent injunction is determined on its merits only after a full trial under ordinary process. Adler, 203 So. 3d at 514. This court then remanded the matter to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with our opinion. Adler, 203 So. 3d at 514.
The defendants in the present case filed a motion for summary judgment after we remanded the matter. Adler insists that this court ordered a trial on the merits, and therefore, the motion for summary judgment was untimely and legally insufficient. She filed a motion to strike in the trial court, claiming that due to the previous opinion issued by this court "this matter remains at the trial of the merits." Therefore, Adler asserted that the motion for summary judgment was untimely according to the time limits contained in La. C.C.P. art. 966(B)(1), requiring that a motion for summary judgment be filed 65 days prior to trial, and in La. C.C.P. art. 966(C)(1), requiring that a contradictory hearing be conducted 30 days prior to trial. The trial court heard the motion to strike and denied it in its entirety.
We first find that the time limits in La. C.C.P. arts. 966(B)(1) and 966(C)(1) do not preclude defendants from filing a motion for summary judgment at an earlier date. Although a status conference was held in this matter and a discovery completion date set, a trial date was never set that would trigger the time limits in the above statutes. Furthermore, the purpose of the summary judgment motion is to allow courts to decide whether enough evidence exists to go to trial, thus giving judges an opportunity to weed out meritless litigation. Macaluso v. Macaluso, 99-0935 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/12/00), 762 So. 2d 180, 182. Our previous opinion determining that the merits could not be decided on the preliminary injunction did not preclude defendants from filing a motion for summary judgment. We also note that although Adler assigned as error that the trial court's consideration of the motion for summary judgment in light of our previous opinion, she did not brief this assignment. Assignments of error that are not briefed may be considered abandoned. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). Therefore, this assignment of error lacks merit. Second Assignment of Error
Adler's second assignment of error is that the trial court failed to enter judgment in her favor based on the statements of the trial court and pursuant to La. R.S. 13:4209. Adler appears to be arguing that summary judgment should not have been granted based upon the statements the trial court made reflected in the March 23, 2015 minutes and statements made at the May 5, 2015 hearing in connection with the defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal of the preliminary injunction. We note that the trial court vacated its denial of the involuntary dismissal and signed a judgment on July 16, 2015, dismissing the preliminary injunction and the entire case. Adler has not indicated to this court how the statements of a trial court regarding an involuntary dismissal of a preliminary injunction establish precedent for the merits of a case or prevent this court from determining whether summary judgment was appropriately granted.
We note that Adler assigns as error that the trial court did not enter judgment in her favor. As Adler did not file her own motion for summary judgment, we can only assume that she intended to assign as error that the trial court erred in either granting the motion for summary judgment in favor of defendants or failing to deny the motion for summary judgment.
As we stated earlier, at the close of Adler's case on the preliminary injunction, defendants moved for an involuntary dismissal. The trial court subsequently denied the motion for involuntary dismissal and ordered the continuation of the trial on the preliminary injunction to take place on May 5, 2015. When all the parties appeared on May 5, 2015, the trial court stated that when Adler had previously rested at the preliminary injunction hearing, he was of the opinion that she had presented her case and it would not be proper to dismiss the lawsuit, thus giving the defendants the opportunity to present their case. He then stated he would have ruled in favor of Adler. Adler seems to argue that the trial court was bound on summary judgment by these statements made in open court on May 5, 2015. Adler ignores that ultimately the trial court vacated its March 20, 2015 ruling denying defendants' motion for involuntary dismissal and subsequently issued a ruling on July 16, 2015, dismissing Adler's claim for damages, thereby ruling in contravention to the statements the trial court made in open court on May 5, 2015, and upon which Adler relies.
It appears that Adler is arguing that the statements of a trial court at a hearing are law-of-the-case and binding. The law-of-the-case doctrine is a discretionary guide that relates to (a) the binding force of a trial judge's ruling during the later stages of trial, (b) the conclusive effects of appellate rulings at trial on remand, and (c) the rule that an appellate court ordinarily will not reconsider its own rulings of law on a subsequent appeal in the same case. Family Worship Ctr. Church, Inc. v. Solomon, 2017-0064 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/21/18), 255 So. 3d 649, 658, writ denied, 2018-1778 (La. 1/28/19), 263 So. 3d 427. The statements to which Adler refers do not constitute rulings of the trial court. Adler has pointed this court to no law which prevents a trial court from ruling in contravention to a prior statement made in open court. Therefore, to the extent Adler is arguing that this court is bound by statements that a trial court made in open court, for which there is no judgment, this assignment is without merit.
With regard to La. R.S. 13:4209, Adler presents no argument as to this statute and only mentions it in her assignment of error and under issues presented for review. As noted hereinabove, assignments of error which are not separately briefed are deemed abandoned. Uniform Rules—Courts of Appeal, Rule 2-12.4(B)(4). However, we note that La. R.S. 13:4209 is not applicable to the instant case, as the motion for summary judgment at issue was heard, ruled upon, and a judgment rendered by the same judge. Third Assignment of Error
Adler's third assignment of error is that the trial court erred in weighing testimony and making credibility determinations in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. Adler states that the trial court's "reasons for judgment are in the record and are the best evidence of the credibility determinations and weighing of evidence and in part a misunderstanding of the facts from the lengthy cold record." Adler then refers this court to the testimony taken at the preliminary injunction hearing and the statements made by the trial court at the May 5, 2015 hearing.
Although Adler does not specifically assign as error that the trial court erred in finding no genuine issue of material fact as to her claims regarding the Open Meetings Law, wrongful termination under the Lawrason Act, or the retaliation claim in violation of her First Amendment rights or the Whistleblower Statute, we will address these issues pursuant to our de novo review. See Reynolds, 172 So. 3d at 610. In connection therewith, we review whether the trial court erred in making credibility determinations or weighing evidence.
The affidavit of Mayor Williams set forth that he did not violate the Whistleblower Statute; that he had worked with Adler for four years and she never reported that Hamilton committed errors regarding payroll; and that Adler was an extremely difficult employee who would sometimes usurp his authority as Mayor. He also explained that according to the Lawrason Act, the Town Clerk's term automatically ends at the commencement of the first Board of Aldermen meeting succeeding the general election for the offices of the Mayor and Aldermen. Therefore, he realized that his December 31, 2014 letter to Adler was in error, and drafted the January 5, 2015 letter informing Adler that her employment would actually end on January 20, 2015 at 6:00 p.m. Adler did not return to work after December 31, 2014, but she was compensated until January 20, 2015. Mayor Williams also explained that Monday, January 19, 2015, was the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday. Therefore, the regular meeting of the Board of Aldermen was held on January 20, 2015. At this meeting, Mayor Williams recommended Hamilton for the position of Town Clerk, and the Board of Aldermen voted to approve that recommendation. Mayor Williams denied that Adler was terminated from her position as Town Clerk. He did not recommend her for re-appointment after the election because he found her difficult to work with and because she had tried to usurp his authority as Mayor.
In opposing the motion for summary judgment, Adler filed this court's previous opinion, the trial court minutes from March 23, 2015, an excerpt of what the trial court said at the May 5, 2016 hearing, and excerpts from the testimony of Mayor Williams at the preliminary injunction hearing. On appeal, Adler refers this court to our previous opinion and several excerpts of testimony contained in the preliminary injunction hearing. Adler argues that summary judgment must be reversed with regard to all of her claims, which include violations of the Open Meetings Law, the Whistleblower Statute, her First Amendment rights, and a wrongful discharge claim.
We first address whether Adler was wrongfully terminated. The Town of White Castle is a municipality governed by the Lawrason Act, which establishes the position of Town Clerk for every town. La. R.S. 33:381. Louisiana Revised Statutes 33:386 states that the Town Clerk is to be appointed by the Mayor and confirmed by the Board of Aldermen for a specified term as follows:
A. At the first regular meeting of the board of aldermen elected at a regular municipal election, the mayor, subject to confirmation by the board of aldermen, shall appoint a clerk, ... In making or approving such appointments and in filling vacancies, the mayor and board of aldermen shall give preference to residents of the municipality if all other considerations are equal.
* * *
D. The term of the clerk, ... shall end at the time of the first regular meeting of the board of aldermen elected at a regular municipal election.
Therefore, the term of the Town Clerk's appointment ends automatically at the conclusion of the term for which the Town Clerk was appointed. However, Adler claims that she was wrongfully terminated. We recognize that Adler received a letter dated December 31, 2014, notifying her that she was terminated effective January 2, 2015, and a second letter dated January 5, 2015, stating that she was actually terminated effective January 20, 2015, the first regular meeting of the Board of Aldermen succeeding a regular election. There is ample evidence offered in support of the motion for summary judgment that Adler's term expired on January 20, 2015, the date of the first regular meeting of the Board of Aldermen succeeding a regular election. There is also evidence that even though Adler did not work between December 31, 2014 and January 20, 2015, she was compensated her regular wages during that time. Therefore, we find that defendants have shown there is no genuine issue of material fact as to the claim for wrongful termination. Adler points to nothing that required Mayor Williams to reappoint her for another term. Instead, the law is clear that her appointment ceased at the first regular meeting of the Board of Aldermen succeeding a regular election. La. R.S. 33:386.
Adler also claims that she was retaliated against because Mayor Williams incorrectly believed that she did not support him in his re-election bid, thereby violating the First Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Louisiana Constitution. The First Amendment generally prohibits government officials from dismissing or demoting an employee because of the employee's engagement in constitutionally protected political activity. Heffernan v. City of Paterson, N.J., 136 S. Ct. 1412, 1416, 194 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2016). With a few exceptions, the Constitution prohibits a government employer from discharging or demoting an employee because the employee supports a particular political candidate. Heffernan, 136 S. Ct. at 1417.
To prevail in a retaliation claim, a public employee must establish that: (1) his speech involved a matter of public concern; (2) he suffered an adverse employment action for exercising his right to free speech; and (3) the exercise of free speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employment action. Johnson v. Southern Univ., 2000-2615 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/01), 803 So. 2d 1140, 1146. Adler testified at the preliminary injunction hearing that she believed she was not reappointed as the Town Clerk because Mayor Williams believed that she supported his opponent during his re-election bid. She stated that the only evidence she had that Mayor Williams did not reappoint her due to his inaccurate belief was a conversation that her ex-husband had with Mayor Williams. Adler's ex-husband, Louis Adler, testified at the preliminary injunction hearing that Mayor Williams told him that he believed Adler had supported an opponent and that Mayor Williams had lost Adler's loyalty and did not trust her anymore.
In discussing the retaliation claim, the trial court stated:
As to the First Amendment violation, the only real evidence I could gather from the record that I read, was that Ms. Adler's husband['s] testimony of a conversation he had with the Mayor, which the Mayor, from his testimony, denied. So I guess it's incumbent upon me to figure out who I believe, you know.At the summary judgment stage, the judge's function is not to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but it is to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial. There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Jones v. Am. Alternative Ins. Corp., 2014-0367 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1/8/15), 169 So. 3d 386, 392.
As we have already stated, Adler was not terminated, but her term ended pursuant to the Lawrason Act, specifically, La. R.S. 33:386(D). Therefore, the testimony of Louis Adler did not create a genuine issue of material fact, as the trial court did not have to rely on his testimony in granting the motion for summary judgment. Any conversations as to why Adler was not reappointed are immaterial and do not create a genuine issue of material fact. The trial court determined that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the First Amendment claims (or the other claims of Adler), since by law, she was not terminated. Based upon our de novo review, we agree with the trial court that Adler's term ended at the time of the first regular meeting of the Board of Aldermen elected at a regular municipal election.
Adler also claims that the defendants violated the Open Meetings Law as it relates to notice and the agenda of the January 20, 2015 meeting of the Board of Aldermen. She asserts that the January 20, 2015 meeting was not a regular meeting. The Board of Aldermen was required by La. R.S. 42:19(A)(1)(b)(i) to give written public notice of any regular, special, or rescheduled meetings no later than twenty-four hours, exclusive of Saturdays, Sundays, and legal holidays, before the meeting. The notice is required to include the agenda, date, time, and place of the meeting. La. R.S. 42:19(A)(1)(b)(ii)(aa). Written public notice is required to be posted at the principal office of the public body holding the meeting or by publication in an official journal of the public body. La. R.S. 42:19(A)(2)(a).
Mayor Williams testified by affidavit that on January 16, 2015, the notices and agenda for the Board of Aldermen's meeting were placed on the door of the Town Annex and on the same day notice was placed in the Town's newspaper, at least twenty-four hours prior to the January 20, 2015 meeting. The notices, which were filed in support of the motion for summary judgment, provide notice that the regular meeting would be held on Tuesday, January 20, 2015, at 6:00 p.m. Adler offers no evidence to dispute the notice. Therefore, we find no genuine issue of material fact as to the appropriateness of notice.
Adler further argues that the January 20, 2015 meeting was not a regular meeting, since it was held on a Tuesday. She claims that a town ordinance requires regular meetings to be held on the third Monday of the month. Mayor Williams agreed in his affidavit that a town ordinance requires regular meetings to be held on the third Monday of the month. He further explained that during his tenure as mayor, the Board of Aldermen meetings have never been held on the third Monday of January due to observance of the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday. He also stated that Monday, January 19, 2015, was the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday. Therefore, the Board of Aldermen meeting was held on Tuesday, January 20, 2015.
Adler claims that the meeting date could not be changed by custom. However, we note that Adler and her attorneys were present at the January 20, 2015 meeting. We agree with the trial court that the Open Meetings Law was not violated by rescheduling, with proper notice, of the regular meeting to the day after the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday.
The only argument Adler presents with regard to the Whistleblower Statute is that based on the comments of the trial court at the May 5, 2016 hearing, summary judgment should not have been granted. We have already discussed that the trial court issued a ruling contrary to its statements at that hearing. Therefore, we need not address any other issues with regard to the Whistleblower Statute. --------
CONCLUSION
For the above and foregoing reasons, we affirm the July 16, 2018 amended judgment granting summary judgment in favor of Gerald Jermarr Williams, in his individual capacity and official capacity, as the mayor of White Castle and the Town of White Castle, Louisiana, and the Board of Aldermen in their official capacity and individually, Barbara O'Bear, Chris Landry, Elliott Martin, Kipp Knight, and Shalanda Allen. All costs of this appeal are assessed against Stacey Adler.
AFFIRMED.