"[A] request for cancellation of an insurance policy must be unequivocal and absolute." Adler v. Burnes, 288 Mass. 409, 412, 192 N.E. 922 (1934). Sullivan's letter was not. It did not demand that coverage be terminated immediately.

While the insured can cancel forthwith at any time by request, the request for cancellation must be unequivocal and absolute. (Richards, supra; Atlantic Fire Ins. Co. of Raleigh, N.C. v. Smith, 183 Okla. 97 [ 80 P.2d 216]; Adler v. Burnes, 288 Mass. 409 [ 192 N.E. 922, 923]; and see American Glove Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., 15 Cal.App. 77, 80 [ 113 P. 688].) No formal or written notice of cancellation is required (Richards, supra; American Glove Co. v. Pennsylvania Fire Ins. Co., supra, at p. 80); the surrender of the policy is not a prerequisite to cancellation (Richards, supra; Stevenson v. Sun Ins. Office, 17 Cal.App. 280, 288 [ 119 P. 529]; Firpo v. Slyter, 95 Cal.App. 500, 504 [ 272 P. 1111]); nor is the return of the unearned premium a condition precedent to cancellation.

This conversation in 1934 did not amount to anything more than an expression of opinion that, if the defendant did not cease from improperly using the plaintiff's premises and desist from permitting his building to injure her property, she would increase his rent. Adler v. Safeguard Ins. Co. 288 Mass. 409, 413. She tried the cases on that theory and apparently the finding of the judge was made at the rate fixed by these notices.

A similar reply "All right" was held to have been properly found by a master as not intended to be any more than a tentative suggestion. Nickerson v. Weld, 204 Mass. 346, 357. Adler v. Safeguard Ins. Co. 288 Mass. 409, 413. The making of successive oral agreements, each of which modified the previous existing agreement by extending its term to the end of the next calendar year, was in every instance followed by a memorandum signed by the defendant.

See Gutlon v. Marcus, 165 Mass. 335, 336. This result is consistent with if not required by the decisions in Parker v. Smith Charities, 127 Mass. 499, 501, Elder v. Federal Ins. Co. 213 Mass. 389, 391, and Adler v. Safeguard Ins. Co. 288 Mass. 409, wherein we held under comparable circumstances that the insured could not recover from the company premiums paid. There is ample support for this view in the decisions of other courts.

We are of opinion that this letter did not constitute as matter of law a direction in writing to the petitioner to do the work, within the meaning of art. XVII, but properly construed had in view further conference between the parties after they had met on the site where the contemplated blasting was to be done, and the judge in substance so ruled. It is apparent that the letters did not constitute a completed contract before the parties met on the site and had a further conference. Lyman v. Robinson, 14 Allen, 242. Stuart v. Cambridge, 125 Mass. 102. Young v. Titcomb, 268 Mass. 14, 19. Adler v. Safeguard Ins. Co. 288 Mass. 409, 412, 413. We are also of opinion that the finding of failure of the petitioner to make a written statement to the architect of the nature of the work performed, within one week after the beginning of the work, and to file with the architect, on or before the tenth day of the month succeeding that in which the work was done, an itemized statement of the details and amount of such work as required by art. XVII of the contract, precludes the petitioner from recovery.

While the insured can cancel forthwith at any time by request, the request for cancellation must be unequivocal and absolute. (Richards, supra; Atlantic Fire Ins. Co. of Raleigh, N.C. v. Smith, 183 Okla. 97, 80 P.2d 216; Adler v. Burnes, 288 Mass. 409, 192 N.E. 922, 923; and see American Glove Co. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., 15 Cal.App. 77, 80, 113 P. 688.) No formal or written notice of cancellation is required (Richards, supra; American Glove Co. v. Pennsylvania Ins. Co., supra, at p. 80, 113 P. at p. 689); the surrender of the policy is not a prerequisite to cancellation (Richards, supra; Stevenson v. Sun Insurance Office, 17 Cal.App. 280, 288, 119 P. 529; Firpo v. Slyter, 95 Cal.App. 500, 504, 272 P. 1111); nor is the return of the unearned premium a condition precedent to cancellation.