Opinion
No. 73A04-1101-CR-62
10-21-2011
MICHAEL J. ADKINS, Appellant, v. STATE OF INDIANA, Appellee.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: ANDREW B. ARNETT Indianapolis, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: GREGORY F. ZOELLER Attorney General of Indiana JODI KATHRYN STEIN Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind.Appellate Rule 65(D), this
Memorandum Decision shall not be
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing
the defense of res judicata, collateral
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT:
ANDREW B. ARNETT
Indianapolis, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:
GREGORY F. ZOELLER
Attorney General of Indiana
JODI KATHRYN STEIN
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
APPEAL FROM THE SHELBY SUPERIOR COURT
The Honorable Jack A. Tandy, Judge
Cause No. 73D01-1006-FA-3
MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MATHIAS , Judge
Michael J. Adkins ("Adkins") was convicted in Shelby Superior Court of Class B and Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor and was sentenced to an aggregate term of twenty-four years, with four years suspended. Adkins appeals and argues: (1) that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions, and (2) that the trial court erred in imposing consecutive sentences.
We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
The victim in this case, C.C., was born in 1993. When C.C. was four years old, she and her mother moved in with Adkins in Shelbyville, Indiana. When C.C. was six years old, her mother married Adkins. When C.C. was a sophomore in high school, she confided in a friend that Adkins had molested her. She later told her boyfriend the same thing, but she never told her mother. C.C. later explained that she did not tell her mother because she was afraid her mother would not believe her or that her brother and sister would somehow be harmed if she did tell.
C.C.'s mother and Adkins later had two children together.
In 2009, C.C.'s mother and Adkins separated, and C.C. eventually moved in with her father in Huntington, Indiana. Thereafter, C.C.'s boyfriend informed a guidance counselor at his school that C.C. had reported being molested by Adkins. The guidance counselor then contacted C.C., who confirmed that Adkins had molested her. The guidance counselor informed the Department of Child Services ("DCS"), and C.C. was interviewed by a DCS caseworker and a detective with the Shelby County Sheriff's Department.
C.C. informed the authorities that, when she was between the ages of four and fourteen, Adkins repeatedly forced her to fondle his penis until he ejaculated. She also stated that Adkins had repeatedly placed his tongue on her vagina and forced her to place her mouth on his penis. Adkins also placed his finger in C.C.'s vagina on numerous occasions.
C.C. further stated that Adkins's abuse continued after she turned fifteen. She reported that Adkins repeatedly inserted his penis into her vagina, often waking her up in the middle of the night to molest her. When C.C. refused to have sex with Adkins on one occasion, he picked her up by the neck and leg and threw her to the ground. Just before C.C. turned sixteen, Adkins removed C.C.'s clothes, pushed her face-down into the bed, and inserted his penis into C.C.'s anus, ignoring C.C.'s pleas to stop. Adkins later had anal intercourse with C.C. again. He also touched C.C.'s breasts with his hands and mouth, forcibly kissed her, made her fondle his penis, and performed oral sex on her. And on two occasions, Adkins inserted a sex toy into C.C.'s vagina.
On June 24, 2010, the State charged Adkins with Class A felony child molesting and Class C felony child molesting, with both of these charges stemming from acts that occurred when C.C. was under the age of fourteen. The State also charged Adkins with Class B felony sexual misconduct with a minor and Class C felony sexual misconduct with a minor, with these charges stemming from the acts that occurred after C.C. was fourteen years old, but before she was sixteen years old.
A jury trial commenced on December 14, 2010. On December 15, 2010, the jury found Adkins guilty of the B and C felony sexual misconduct with a minor charges, but acquitted him of the A felony child molesting charges. At a sentencing hearing held on January 12, 2011, the trial court found no mitigating factors but found one significant aggravating factor: that Adkins had abused a position of trust. On the Class B felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Adkins to eighteen years, with four years suspended. And on the Class C felony conviction, the trial court sentenced Adkins to a consecutive term of six years. Thus, Adkins was sentenced to twenty-four years, with twenty years executed and four suspended. Adkins now appeals.
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Adkins first argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor.
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. Instead, we consider only the evidence supporting the conviction and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If there is substantial evidence of probative value from which a reasonable trier of fact could have drawn the conclusion that the defendant was guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, then the judgment will not be disturbed.Green v. State, 945 N.E.2d 205, 207 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted).
Adkins notes that the only evidence supporting his convictions came from C.C., either directly through her testimony, or indirectly by the testimony of the people she told about Adkins's sexual abuse. Adkins further notes that there was no other corroborating evidence, such as medical evidence. This, however, is immaterial to our review. It has long been held that testimony from the victim alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction. Warren v. State, 701 N.E.2d 902, 906 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). "[A] conviction may stand on the uncorroborated evidence of a minor witness." Id. (citing Nelson v. State, 525 N.E.2d 296, 297 (Ind. 1988)). Here, C.C. clearly testified as to the sexual abuse she suffered at the hands of Adkins, and her testimony by itself is sufficient to support Adkins's convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor. See id. (testimony of victim sufficient to support defendant's conviction for sexual misconduct with a minor).
Still, Adkins argues that C.C.'s testimony was insufficient to support his convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor because the jury acquitted him of the child molesting charges:
If they [the jury] did not believe [C.C.]'s account for the abuse that occurred under Counts I and II [the child molesting charges], then it was unreasonable for them to believe her as to the abuse that occurred under Counts III and IV [the sexual misconduct charges].Appellant's Br. at 9. Thus, the essence of Adkin's argument is that the jury's verdicts were inconsistent.
Based upon its verdicts on Counts I and II, there was no evidence of probative value from which this jury could have found Adkins guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Our supreme court has recently held that "[j]ury verdicts in criminal cases are not subject to appellate review on grounds that they are inconsistent, contradictory, or irreconcilable." Beattie v. State, 924 N.E.2d 643, 649 (Ind. 2010). Thus, that the jury acquitted Adkins of the child molesting charges has no impact on our review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor. See id. at 648-49. We therefore conclude that C.C.'s testimony regarding Adkins's repeated sexual abuse that occurred after C.C. was fourteen but before she was sixteen was sufficient to support Adkins's convictions for sexual misconduct with a minor.
II. Sentencing
Adkins next argues that the trial court failed to give an adequately detailed sentencing statement. We review sentencing decisions for an abuse of discretion. Anglemyer v. State, 868 N.E.2d 482, 490 (Ind. 2007). Under the current advisory sentencing scheme, trial courts no longer have any obligation to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors against each other when imposing a sentence. Id. at 491. Thus, the relative weight or value assignable to reasons properly found, or to those which should have been found, is not subject to review for abuse of discretion. Id. Still, a trial court must enter a statement including reasonably detailed reasons or circumstances for imposing a particular sentence. Id.
The trial court here stated the following when pronouncing Adkins's sentence:
My job in deciding a person's sentence after a trial is to look at both, certainly the circumstances of the crime and the circumstances of the offender in fashioning an appropriate sentence. I'm a little more optimistic about the potential for treatment of everyone. Not saying that . . . I don't know whether that'll be successful in your particular case, but I don't . . . I think it's, I would be remiss in doing my job if I didn't fashion a sentence that at least allowed you to have that opportunity, so my thoughts in deciding your sentence are to fashion a sentence that appropriately punishes you for your conduct but also gives some means that we are to offer you treatment so this type of activity does not occur in the future and there are not other victims. I will find one aggravating circumstance, that being that you were in a position of trust with your stepdaughter and you violated that trust and that's certainly a very significant factor in me looking at your situation here. I do not find any mitigating circumstances in your situation. Based upon that finding, those findings, I'm [going to] sentence you to 18 years on Count III, order that 14 years be served on an executed basis and four years be suspended and I'll sentence you to six years on Count IV, to be served on an executed basis for a total sentence, also I'm [going to] order those sentences be conserved [sic] on a consecutive basis, for a total sentence of 24 years to the Department of Correction with 20 years to beTr. pp. 349-50.
served on an executed basis and four years suspended. I'll give you credit for 121 days that you've been in custody to this point.
In this statement, the trial court clearly rejected any mitigating factors, found one "very significant" aggravating factor, and noted its desire to impose a sentence that fit the severity of Adkins's crimes yet still afforded him an opportunity at some form of treatment or rehabilitation. As the State notes, the fact that the trial court found only one aggravating factor is not problematic. Our supreme court has held that when sentencing a defendant on multiple counts, "an Indiana trial judge may impose a consecutive sentence if he or she finds at least one aggravator." Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 686 (Ind. 2005). In fact, the same aggravating circumstance may be used to both enhance a sentence and justify consecutive terms. Rhoiney v. State, 940 N.E.2d 841, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied.
Although the trial court's sentencing statement is not a model, we conclude that the statement is sufficiently detailed so as to explain why the trial court chose to impose consecutive sentences. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Adkins.
Conclusion
Adkins's argument regarding the alleged inconsistency in the jury's verdicts is not reviewable on appeal, and the evidence of the victim is sufficient to support his convictions. The trial court's sentencing statement was reasonably detailed and adequately explained the trial court's decision to impose consecutive sentences.
Affirmed. BAILEY, J., and CRONE, J., concur.