Opinion
Record No. 1817-92-4
April 26, 1994
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY HERMAN A. WHISENANT, JR., JUDGE
Bradley T. White (Brunner White, P.L.C., on brief), for appellant.
Marla Lynn Graff, Assistant Attorney General (Stephen D. Rosenthal, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Robert Anthony Adkins (defendant) was convicted in a bench trial of operating a motor vehicle after having been adjudicated an habitual offender. He complains on appeal that the traffic stop which preceded his arrest was an "unreasonable search and seizure" in violation of the fourth and fourteenth amendments and, therefore, the trial court erroneously admitted evidence resulting from the ensuing investigation. We agree and reverse the conviction.
The parties are familiar with the record, and a recitation of the facts is unnecessary to our disposition of this appeal.
In reviewing the ruling on defendant's suppression motion, we view the evidence in the "light most favorable to . . . the prevailing party below," the Commonwealth in this instance, and the decision of the trial judge will be disturbed only if plainly wrong. Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d 47, 48 (1991). Our review of the record includes evidence adduced at both the trial and any suppression hearing.See DePriest v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 577, 583, 359 S.E.2d 540, 542-43 (1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 985 (1988). To prevail on appeal, the defendant must "show . . . that the denial of [his] motion . . . constitute[d] reversible error."Motley v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___ ___, 437 S.E.2d 232, 233 (1993).
Stopping a motor vehicle and detaining its occupants constitutes a seizure, "even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the [resulting] detention [is quite] brief."Leeth v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 335, 340, 288 S.E.2d 475, 478 (1982); Brown v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___ ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1994). A police officer may stop a motor vehicle for investigatory purposes if the officer possesses a reasonable and articulable suspicion "'that a motorist . . . is . . . subject to seizure for violation of law.'" Waugh v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 620, 621, 405 S.E.2d 429, 429 (1991) (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). When the "stop is made without a warrant, the burden is on the Commonwealth to prove that [it] complied with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment." Lee v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___ ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1994).
In determining whether the requisite "reasonable and articulable suspicion exists," there are no "bright line rules." Hoye v. Commonwealth, ___ Va. App. ___ ___, ___ S.E.2d ___, ___ (1994). "Each instance of police conduct must be judged for reasonableness in light of the particular circumstances," and "[c]ourts must apply objective standards" in evaluating the officer's "suspicion." Castaneda v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 574, 580, 376 S.E.2d 82, 85 (1989) (en banc); see Brown, ___ Va. App. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. The officer "must be able to 'point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from these facts, reasonably warrant' stopping a person to conduct further investigation." Lowery v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 314, 317, 388 S.E.2d 265, 266 (1990) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968)).
Here, we find that the circumstances presented to the police officer failed, as a matter of law, to provide requisite reasonable suspicion that defendant was, or had been, engaged in criminal activity and not simply sleeping in a vehicle, which he subsequently operated in a lawful fashion. Therefore, the stop of defendant's automobile was unjustified and violated the protections assured by the fourth and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution.
Accordingly, we reverse the conviction and dismiss the indictment.
Reversed and final judgment.