"[A] forged instrument may be ratified where the principal retains the benefit of an unauthorized transaction with knowledge of the material facts." (Adirondack Bank v Midstate Foam and Equip., Inc., 159 A.D.3d 1354, 1355 [4th Dept 2018] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted].) However, "even if the note was ratified, [defendant] is not personally liable if his signature on the guaranties was forged and he lacked knowledge of the guaranties' existence, thus rendering the guaranties void ab initio."
"Ratification requires 'full knowledge of the material facts relating to the transaction, and the assent must be clearly established and may not be inferred from doubtful or equivocal acts or language'" (Rocky Point Props. v Sear-Brown Group, 295 A.D.2d 911, 913 [4th Dept 2002]). Here, we conclude that respondents' own submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact whether petitioner ratified the transaction that allegedly caused the trust to lose value (see generally Adirondack Bank v Midstate Foam & Equip., Inc., 159 A.D.3d 1354, 1356 [4th Dept 2018]) and, in any event, petitioner raised questions of fact in opposition to the cross-motion (see generally Robbins v Tucker Anthony Inc., 233 A.D.2d 854, 855 [4th Dept 1996]).
( Rocky Point Props.,Inc. v. Sear-Brown Group, Inc. , 295 A.D.2d 911, 913, 744 N.Y.S.2d 269 [4th Dept. 2002] ). Here, we conclude that respondents’ own submissions failed to eliminate triable issues of fact whether petitioner ratified the transaction that allegedly caused the trust to lose value (see generallyAdirondack Bank v. Midstate Foam & Equip., Inc. , 159 A.D.3d 1354, 1356, 73 N.Y.S.3d 814 [4th Dept. 2018] ) and, in any event, petitioner raised questions of fact in opposition to the cross-motion (see generallyRobbins v. Tucker Anthony Inc. , 233 A.D.2d 854, 855, 649 N.Y.S.2d 856 [4th Dept. 1996] ). Next, "[t]he doctrine of judicial estoppel provides that where a party assumes a position in a legal proceeding and succeeds in maintaining that position, that party may not subsequently assume a contrary position because [the party's] interests have changed" ( Jones v. Town of Carroll , 177 A.D.3d 1297, 1298, 110 N.Y.S.3d 766 [4th Dept. 2019] [internal quotation marks omitted]).
Here, we conclude that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant leave to amend the answer inasmuch as the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit. Indeed, there is no legal basis for the proposed counterclaim insofar as it sought damages as sanctions for allegedly frivolous conduct because "New York does not recognize a separate cause of action or counterclaim seeking the imposition of sanctions" ( Adirondack Bank v. Midstate Foam & Equip., Inc. , 159 A.D.3d 1354, 1357, 73 N.Y.S.3d 814 [4th Dept. 2018] ; see generallyYoung v. Crosby , 87 A.D.3d 1308, 1309, 930 N.Y.S.2d 352 [4th Dept. 2011] ; Schwartz v. Sayah , 72 A.D.3d 790, 792, 899 N.Y.S.2d 316 [2d Dept. 2010] ). We conclude that the proposed defense and counterclaim for fraud is palpably insufficient inasmuch as CPLR 3016 (b) requires that, where a defense or counterclaim is based on fraud, "the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in detail," and here the alleged fraud was not pleaded with sufficient specificity (seeIbarrondo v. Evans, 191 A.D.3d 602, 603, 143 N.Y.S.3d 340 [1st Dept. 2021] ; see generallyFriedland Realty, Inc. v. 416 W, LLC , 120 A.D.3d 1185, 1187, 993 N.Y.S.2d 43 [2d Dept. 2014] ; Nicholas A. Cutaia, Inc. v. Buyer's Bazaar, Inc. , 224 A.D.2d 952, 953, 637 N.Y.S.2d 857 [4th Dept. 1996] ).
Indeed, there is no legal basis for the proposed counterclaim insofar as it sought damages as sanctions for allegedly frivolous conduct because "New York does not recognize a separate cause of action or counterclaim seeking the imposition of sanctions" (Adirondack Bank v Midstate Foam & Equip., Inc., 159 A.D.3d 1354, 1357 [4th Dept 2018]; see generally Young v Crosby, 87 A.D.3d 1308, 1309 [4th Dept 2011]; Schwartz v Sayah, 72 A.D.3d 790, 792 [2d Dept 2010]). We conclude that the proposed defense and counterclaim for fraud is palpably insufficient inasmuch as CPLR 3016 (b) requires that, where a defense or counterclaim is based on fraud, "the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in detail," and here the alleged fraud was not pleaded with sufficient specificity (see Ibarrondo v Evans, 191 A.D.3d 602, 603 [1st Dept 2021] ; see generally Friedland Realty, Inc. v 416 W, LLC, 120 A.D.3d 1185, 1187 [2d Dept 2014]; Nicholas A. Cutaia, Inc. v Buyer's Bazaar, 224 A.D.2d 952, 953 [4th Dept 1996]).
We also reject plaintiff's further contention that the court erred in determining that plaintiff engaged in frivolous conduct and in imposing sanctions for such conduct. We conclude that plaintiff's conduct was "completely without merit in law and cannot be supported by a reasonable argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law[, and was] undertaken primarily to delay or prolong the resolution of the litigation" ( 22 NYCRR 130–1.1 [c][1], [2]; seeEshaghian v. Eshaghian, 146 A.D.3d 529, 529, 43 N.Y.S.3d 902 [1st Dept. 2017], lv dismissed 29 N.Y.3d 980, 52 N.Y.S.3d 288, 74 N.E.3d 673 [2017] ; cf.Adirondack Bank v. Midstate Foam & Equip., Inc., 159 A.D.3d 1354, 1357, 73 N.Y.S.3d 814 [4th Dept. 2018] ). Nevertheless, we conclude that the court erred in failing to comply with 22 NYCRR 130–1.2 because "it failed to set forth in a written decision ‘the conduct on which ... the imposition [of sanctions] is based, the reasons why the court found the conduct to be frivolous, and the reasons why the court found the amount ... imposed to be appropriate’ " ( Fraccola v. 1st Choice Realty, Inc., 124 A.D.3d 1360, 1361, 1 N.Y.S.3d 673 [4th Dept. 2015] ; seeLeisten v. Leisten, 309 A.D.2d 1202, 1203, 765 N.Y.S.2d 301 [4th Dept. 2003] ).
Here, we conclude that Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant leave to amend the answer inasmuch as the proposed amendment is palpably insufficient or patently devoid of merit. Indeed, there is no legal basis for the proposed counterclaim insofar as it sought damages as sanctions for allegedly frivolous conduct because "New York does not recognize a separate cause of action or counterclaim seeking the imposition of sanctions" (Adirondack Bank v Midstate Foam & Equip., Inc., 159 A.D.3d 1354, 1357 [4th Dept 2018]; see generally Young v Crosby, 87 A.D.3d 1308, 1309 [4th Dept 2011]; Schwartz v Sayah, 72 A.D.3d 790, 792 [2d Dept 2010]). We conclude that the proposed defense and counterclaim for fraud is palpably insufficient inasmuch as CPLR 3016 (b) requires that, where a defense or counterclaim is based on fraud, "the circumstances constituting the wrong shall be stated in detail," and here the alleged fraud was not pleaded with sufficient specificity (see Ibarrondo v Evans, 191 A.D.3d 602, 603 [1st Dept 2021] ; see generally Friedland Realty, Inc. v 416 W, LLC, 120 A.D.3d 1185, 1187 [2d Dept 2014]; Nicholas A. Cutaia, Inc. v Buyer's Bazaar, 224 A.D.2d 952, 953 [4th Dept 1996]).
The defendant's memorandum of law identifies that the counterclaim as one grounded upon Section 130-1.1, " Costs; sanctions," of the Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts ( 22 NYCRR 130-1.1) which empowers the court, in its discretion, to award "costs in the form of reimbursement for actual expenses reasonably incurred and reasonable attorney's fees, resulting from frivolous conduct" and to impose financial sanctions for frivolous conduct. However, "New York does not recognize a separate cause of action or counterclaim seeking the imposition of sanctions ***," (Adirondack Bank v. Midstate Foam & Equip., Inc., 159 AD3d 1354, 1357[ 4th Dept . 2018]; Licalzi v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 125 AD3d 942 [2nd Dept. 2015].) The plaintiff's memorandum of law also identifies the counterclaim as one grounded on CPLR 8303-a, " Costs upon frivolous claims and counterclaims in actions to recover damages for personal injury, injury to property or wrongful death."