Opinion
No. 14-08-00305-CR
Opinion filed July 7, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH — Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b).
On Appeal from the 232nd District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 1131864.
Panel consists of Justices YATES, GUZMAN, and SULLIVAN.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
A jury convicted appellant of engaging in organized criminal activity and sentenced him to twenty five years' incarceration. In four issues, appellant contends that (a) his right to a unanimous jury was violated because the jury charge was submitted in the disjunctive, (b) the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that he acted in a combination to carry on criminal activities, and (c) the evidence is factually insufficient to prove the value of the proceeds from his criminal activities exceeded $100,000. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Nigerian informant Victor Nwalie reported to U.S. Postal Services Inspector Matthew Boyden that appellant asked him to help negotiate several checks. Boyden requested that Nwalie get more information so Boyden could investigate the legitimacy of Nwalie's tip. Nwalie agreed to set up a meeting with appellant to see if Boyden could catch appellant with the checks. On June 15, 2006, appellant and Olawie Raji met Nwalie in the parking lot of an apartment complex in Houston. They were joined by Etim King, who arrived separately. Appellant and Raji sat in the front seat of appellant's vehicle; King and Nwalie sat in the back. Boyden watched from a distance, but no recording was made of the meeting. At some point during the meeting, Nwalie called Boyden's cell phone and pretended that Boyden was someone who worked at a bank who could cash the checks. After the meeting ended, Nwalie left in his vehicle, appellant and Raji left in appellant's vehicle, and King followed them in his vehicle. Nwalie contacted Boyden and told him that he had seen the checks in appellant's car, so Boyden stopped appellant and King before they left the apartment complex parking lot. Boyden searched appellant's car. He recovered a magazine containing three un-negotiated checks from the pocket behind the passenger seat. Two of the checks were blank; another was payable to "Patrick Brennan" for $4,600; all three checks were purportedly from an account owned by "Rase Safier." Boyden also recovered a phone list with the name and phone number for "Etim" and seven others, passport photos of appellant, a $1,000 money order purchased from a Kroger supermarket, a Western Union receipt for money sent to Nigeria, and latex gloves. Boyden found the following items on appellant's person: (1) a Social Security card issued in the name of Patrick Brennan; (2) a bank deposit receipt for $8,900 to an account that had been opened using the personal information of Patrick Brennan; (3) pieces of paper with names, account numbers, dates, Social Security numbers, and dates of birth of various people; and (4) ATM and Visa check cards issued by Chase Bank to appellant. Raji had an ATM balance inquiry receipt from the Brennan account and pieces of paper with another person's name, address, and banking information on his person when he was arrested. In addition, Boyden found several items in King's car: a piece of paper containing bank information belonging to an individual named Rafe Safier; a social security card issued to a "Myron Smith"; money order receipts from Kroger; and various addresses, telephone numbers, and figures written on sheets of paper. Boyden also recovered a datebook belonging to another of King's associates, Adesola Imoru, which contained the phone number for Styles Checks, the company that had printed the Rase Safier checks. After recovering this evidence, Boyden began tracing the accounts associated with the checks and other identifying information. His investigation lead to the discovery of the following facts. The checks found in appellant's vehicle had been ordered on a legitimate bank account belonging to New Jersey resident Rafe Safier. Safier reported that numerous unauthorized checks, totaling over $118,000, had been drawn on his account between May and June 2006. These checks were close in numerical sequence; the design on all the checks contained characters from the Shrek movies and all misspelled Safier's first name as "Rase" (the "Safier checks"). The three checks recovered from appellant's car matched the Safier checks. One of the Safier checks had been deposited by Imoru to her own account on June 2, 2006. Imoru said that King gave her the Safier check to deposit into her account. After the check was deposited to her account, King contacted appellant to get his assistance in purchasing money orders. Appellant met Imoru and King at a Kroger store; appellant and Imoru purchased money orders from this store on June 6, 2006, using Imoru's debit card. Another of the Safier checks was payable to Houston resident Richard Guderyon for over $19,000. An on-line bank account was opened using Guderyon's identifying information, but Guderyon did not open this account or give anyone else permission to open this account. Further, he did not know Safier and had never received a check from him. Other Safier checks had been made payable to individuals named Catherine Davies, Matthew Kasunga, Ogochukwu Ogbanzu, Luevisa Dickey, Chanell Showers, a business named Josephs Graphic Designs, and Patrick Brennan. At the time of appellant's trial, investigation into several of these individuals or businesses was still ongoing. Turning to information concerning Patrick Brennan, appellant opened a bank account using Brennan's identifying information on April 26, 2006 (the "Brennan account"). Although the initial deposit was only $20, between May 19 and June 20, 2006, numerous larger deposits were made into this account, including a Safier check for $4,800 deposited on June 7 and another Safier check for $8,900 deposited on June 13. ATM and debit card transactions totaling over $10,000 were processed through the Brennan account during this same period of time. Surveillance photos from several ATM transactions showed appellant withdrawing funds from, depositing funds to, or making balance inquiries on this account during the late-May/early-June time frame before his arrest. Further, New York resident Brennan reported that in April 2006, unknown persons attempted to open five to six credit card accounts in his name. He also reported that, during this same time period, an unknown person or persons "moved money around" in an account he had set up with the proceeds from the sale of his home without his knowledge or permission. In addition to these uncontested facts, several individuals testified and a significant volume of documentary evidence, including numerous bank statements, copies of checks, ATM surveillance photos, and cell phone records, was admitted into evidence at appellant's trial. Further, Postal Inspector Boyden testified regarding his experience investigating advanced fraud and identity theft schemes. He provided a flow chart linking appellant, Imoru, King, and Raji (among others) to a fairly complicated check negotiation scheme. According to Boyden, King seemed to be controlling the Safier account because he had all the original information for it. He testified that, in his experience, such a check cashing scheme usually involves people who control the original source, such as a "hijacked account," people who recruit others to participate in the scheme, and others who are willing to receive or cash the checks, called "collusive account holders." Boyden stated that deposits of some of the other Safier checks had been traced to other individuals, including Catherine Davies, Tuka Siafa, and Ayodeji Abiola, and that his investigation was still ongoing. Boyden described the activity in the Brennan account as follows:The bottom line is this account was fraudulent from the inception. It was funded with nothing, almost nothing but Mr. Safier['s] checks totaling approximately a little — — I believe a little bit over $20,000.00. Those funds were withdrawn very quickly during what we call point of sell [sic] transactions. Gas stations, grocery stores, ATM withdrawals for cash as well as the purchasing of money orders which once you purchase a money order you can immediately convert somewhere else to cash. So it just further dilutes the ability to trace those funds but the funds were very quickly withdrawn in a matter of days.After the State rested, appellant testified in his defense. He explained that he came to the United States from Nigeria in 2002 to attend school. At first, his parents provided him money, but they became financially unable to do so. He started working, but was informed by "Immigration" that he was not eligible to work because of his immigration status as a student. He then got married and applied to have his immigration status changed. However, before his immigration status was approved, King suggested that he could use someone else's information to get a job. Appellant stated he used Patrick Brennan's information to apply for some jobs and set up a bank account so he could get his paychecks deposited directly into the account. According to appellant, King approached him to see if he could cash a check for him because King did not have a bank account; King offered appellant money in exchange for cashing the check. King gave him one of the Safier checks, and appellant deposited it into the Brennan account. He admitted depositing another Safier check into this account, but insisted that he then gave King all of Brennan's identifying information back and refused to cash any more checks for him because he had become suspicious of King. He further acknowledged that he made several purchases and withdrawals using the debit card from this account, but explained that King asked him to do so. He also admitted accompanying King and Imoru to purchase money orders at Kroger. Further, he could not explain how the information regarding various other people's credit cards, bank accounts, and identifying information got into his car, or how the $8,900 receipt from a deposit to the Brennan account and a Social Security card in Brennan's name were discovered on his person. He also insisted that King brought the magazine containing the checks into his car on the day he was arrested. After both sides rested and closed, the jury found appellant guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity and sentenced him to twenty-five years' incarceration in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Division. The trial court rendered judgment on the jury's verdict and also recommended that appellant pay $118,000 in restitution to Safier's bank. This appeal timely ensued.
II. THE JURY CHARGE
In his first issue, appellant contends the trial court erred in submitting the predicate offense of money laundering in the disjunctive, thus violating his right to a unanimous jury verdict. As is relevant here, the jury charge provided as follows:A person engages in organized criminal activity, if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination, he commits money laundering.
. . .
A person commits the offense of money laundering if the person knowingly:
(1) acquires or maintains an interest in, conceals, possesses, transfers, or transports the proceeds of criminal activity; or
(2) facilitates a transaction involving the proceeds of criminal activity.(emphasis added). This definition tracks the money laundering statute. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 34.02(a)(1), (2) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Our review of jury charge error involves a two-step process. Ngo v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 743 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). First, we must determine whether error occurred. Id. If error exists, we must then evaluate whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require reversal of the conviction. Id. The Texas Constitution requires a unanimous verdict in felony cases. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 13; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 36.29 (a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). However, a defendant's right to jury unanimity is not violated when the jury is disjunctively instructed on alternate means or theories of committing the same offense. Jefferson v. State, 189 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Martinez v. State, 129 S.W.3d 101, 103 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). The statute in question here provides that a person commits the offense of engaging in organized criminal activity "if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination . . ., he commits or conspires to commit one or more of the following . . . any offense under Chapter 34 or 35[.]" TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a)(10) (Vernon Supp. 2008). As is applicable here, chapter 34 of the Texas Penal Code criminalizes the offense of money laundering, which includes, among other things, (a) acquiring or maintaining an interest in, concealing, possessing, transferring, or transporting the proceeds of criminal activity or (b) conducting, supervising, or facilitating a transaction involving the proceeds of criminal activity. Id. § 34.02(a)(1), (2). Finally, "criminal activity" includes any offense classified as a felony under Texas or federal law. Id. § 34.01(1)(A). To find appellant guilty of engaging in organized criminal activity in this case, the jury had to first conclude that appellant engaged in money laundering. However, appellant argues, with no citation to authority, that the fact that money laundering was a predicate offense and not the primary offense alleged does "not change the requirement of unanimity. This predicate charge was an essential element of engaging in organized criminal activity and a prerequisite for conviction of that offense." But the Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded that, in the context of felony murder, the jury is not required to agree on the predicate felony committed because the felony constitutes the "manner or means" that make up the offense of felony murder. White v. State, 208 S.W.3d 467, 469 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). Similarly, the predicate felony offense here, money laundering, constitutes the manner or means of the charged offense, engaging in criminal activity. Indeed, other courts have concluded that in an organized criminal activity prosecution, both the identity of the persons involved in the combination and the overt acts committed in furtherance of the combination are preliminary fact issues underlying the verdict. See Bogany v. State, 54 S.W.3d 461, 463 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref'd); Garcia v. State, 46 S.W.3d 323, 327-28 (Tex.App.-Austin 2001, pet. ref'd). Juries are not required to unanimously agree on the preliminary factual issues underlying the verdict. Bogany, 54 S.W.3d at 463; Garcia, 46 S.W.3d at 327-28. We thus conclude that there is no error in the jury charge and overrule appellant's first issue.
III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Standard of Review
In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Salinas v. State, 163 S.W.3d 734, 737 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). The jury, as the trier of fact, "is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and of the strength of the evidence." Fuentes v. State, 991 S.W.2d 267, 271 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). The jury may choose to believe or disbelieve any portion of the testimony. Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986). The jury may also draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). When faced with conflicting evidence, we presume the trier of fact resolved conflicts in favor of the prevailing party. Turro v. State, 867 S.W.2d 43, 47 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). In evaluating the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we view all the evidence in a neutral light and will set aside the verdict only if we are able to say, with some objective basis in the record, that the conviction is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust because the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury's verdict. Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 414-17 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). We cannot declare that a conflict in the evidence justifies a new trial simply because we disagree with the jury's resolution of that conflict, and we do not intrude upon the fact-finder's role as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony. See id. at 417; Fuentes, 991 S.W.2d at 271. The fact-finder may choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented. Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991); Bargas v. State, 252 S.W.3d 876, 888 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.). In our review, we discuss the evidence that, according to appellant, undermines the jury's verdict. Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).Appellant's Intent
In his second and third issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. Specifically, he asserts the State failed to establish that he and at least two other members of a combination worked together in a continuing course of criminal activities. Appellant contends that the State did not prove the "requisite intent to work together in [a] continuing course of criminal activity" or "the commission of money laundering in furtherance of a combination." Here, to establish appellant engaged in organized criminal activity, the State had to prove that he knowingly engaged in money laundering and that he intentionally established, maintained, participated in, or participated in the profits of a combination. Cf. Hart v. State, 89 S.W.3d 61, 63-64 (Tex.Crim.App. 2002) (explaining that there are two parts to mental state requirement of engaging in criminal activity; first is culpable mental state for enumerated offense and second is intent to establish, maintain, participate in, or participate in the profits of a combination). A jury may infer knowledge and intent from the acts, words, and conduct of the accused. Id.; Jarnigan v. State, 57 S.W.3d 76, 87 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.). We must examine the entire record to determine if it contains evidence of the requisite intent. Hart, 89 S.W.3d at 64. We consider whether there is sufficient evidence of appellant's culpable mental state to commit money laundering first. As is relevant here, a person commits the offense of money laundering if he knowingly:(1) acquires or maintains an interest in, conceals, possesses, transfers, or transports the proceeds of criminal activity; [or]
(2) conducts, supervises, or facilitates a transaction involving the proceeds of criminal activity[.]TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 34.02(a)(1), (2). Criminal activity includes any offense classified as a felony under the laws of this state or the United States. Id. § 34.01(1)(A). Appellant admits he committed the felony offense of forgery. Further, the record reflects that appellant conducted transactions involving the proceeds of this criminal act by repeatedly using the funds he deposited in the Brennan account; ATM cameras recorded him checking the balance on the account and making withdrawals. He also stated that he made purchases using the debit card attached to the Brennan account. Thus there is both legally and factually sufficient evidence to support that appellant knowingly engaged in the offense of money laundering. We therefore turn to the sufficiency of the evidence to support appellant's intent to establish, maintain, participate in, or participate in the profits of a combination. A "combination" is defined as "three or more persons who collaborate in carrying on criminal activities," although participants may not know each other's identity and the members of the combination may change periodically. Id. § 71.01(a). "[T]he State must prove that the appellant intended to `establish, maintain, or participate in' a group of three or more, in which the members intend to work together in a continuing course of criminal activities." Nguyen v. State, 1 S.W.3d 694, 697 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999). However, the acts proving the existence of a combination need not themselves be criminal. Id. (citing Barber v. State, 764 S.W.2d 232 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988)). Appellant asserts that the testimony establishes three separate interactions that could support his conviction. The first involved appellant, King, and Imoru meeting and purchasing a money order. Appellant insists that there is no evidence of any joint action between these three individuals; he asserts that Imoru was not asked to cash any other checks and did not know King was involved in other transactions involving checks. The second interaction, according to appellant, involves only he and King — the transactions regarding the Brennan account and the deposits of the Safier checks into this fraudulent account. Finally, appellant contends that the third interaction, involving King, Nwalie, Raji, and appellant only establishes the participants were "perhaps conspiring to commit money laundering at the time of their arrest," but this offense had not taken place and conspiracy to commit money laundering was never pleaded or charged. We disagree with appellant's interpretation of this evidence and further note that appellant has disregarded the large volume of documentary evidence indicating a concerted effort to carry on an ongoing criminal enterprise. The record reflects that numerous individuals deposited checks illegally drawn on the Safier account. In fact, two of these individuals, Catherine Davies and appellant, deposited more than one of these checks. Both appellant and Imoru testified that King wrote the Safier checks they deposited. They both admitted they were aware that the checks were not valid when they deposited them. Further, appellant, King, and Imoru all went together to withdraw funds via the purchase of a money order from Imoru's account after she had deposited one of the Safier checks. Appellant also acknowledged his guilt in regard to establishing the Brennan account. Although he claimed he did not make the final $8,900 deposit and had returned the account information to King before this deposit was made, he could not explain why a deposit receipt for $8,900 to this account, as well as a Social Security card in Brennan's name, were discovered on his person at the time of his arrest. As discussed above, Boyden also explained that the type of activity that occurred in the Brennan account was typical of a money laundering scheme. Raji, another person involved in the alleged combination, had a copy of an ATM balance inquiry receipt in his pocket when he was arrested. King, Raji, and appellant all participated in the meeting arranged by Nwalie to discuss cashing other checks. King, Raji, and appellant were all arrested with incriminating evidence on their persons, e.g., information regarding other people's personal identifiers, bank accounts, or credit card numbers. Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that there is sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find that appellant intentionally worked with at least two others in an ongoing criminal enterprise. See Ford v. State, No. 03-06-00663-CR, 2009 WL 961529, at *5-6 (Tex.App.-Austin Apr. 10, 2009, no pet. h.) (concluding evidence was legally sufficient to support conviction for engaging in criminal activity when defendant and two others were arrested with counterfeit blank checks and appellant and each of the other two had been together at two separate locations when criminal activities had taken place); Jarnigan, 57 S.W.3d at 87-88. Additionally, viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we find no objective basis in the record for concluding that the jury's verdict was clearly wrong or manifestly unjust because it was contradicted by the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-17; Jarnigan, 57 S.W.3d at 87-88. We conclude that the record contains legally and factually sufficient evidence from which the jury could infer appellant's intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination in which the members intended to work together in a course of criminal activity. We overrule appellant's second and third issues.