Opinion
19-CV-00241 EAW
2020-02-14
Adelakun Jubril ADEJOLA, Petitioner, v. William BARR, Attorney General of the United States, et al., Respondents.
Adelakun Jubril Adejola, Batavia, NY, pro se. Adam A. Khalil, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, for Respondents.
Adelakun Jubril Adejola, Batavia, NY, pro se.
Adam A. Khalil, U.S. Attorney's Office, Rochester, NY, for Respondents.
DECISION AND ORDER
ELIZABETH A. WOLFORD, United States District Judge
INTRODUCTION
Pro se petitioner Adelakun Jubril Adejola ("Petitioner"), a civil immigration detainee currently held at the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility in Batavia, New York, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 1). The Court issued a Decision and Order on October 4, 2019, finding that Petitioner was entitled to an individualized bond hearing at which the Government bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses either a risk of flight or a danger to the community. (Dkt. 12) (the "D & O"). Judgment pursuant to the D & O was entered on October 7, 2019. (Dkt. 13) (the "Judgment"). Presently before the Court is a motion by Petitioner "for injunction relief from judgement in accordance with United State Civil Service Federal Rules (Civil Procedure Rule 60B)." (Dkt. 14). The Court liberally construes this motion as a motion to enforce the Judgment and, for the reasons set forth below, denies Petitioner's request.
Petitioner has also filed a motion to expedite consideration of his motion (Dkt. 15); that motion is denied as moot in light of the Court's issuance of the instant decision.
BACKGROUND
The factual background of this case is set forth in detail in the D & O, familiarity with which is assumed for purposes of this Decision and Order. The Court has summarized the key details below, and includes the relevant developments since the Court's issuance of the D & O.
Petitioner is a native and citizen of Nigeria. (Dkt. 5-1 at ¶ 5). He entered the United States on or about June 13, 2017, with authorization to remain until December 12, 2017. (Id. ). On March 15, 2018, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") received information that Petitioner was working for a local business. (Id. at ¶ 6). Petitioner was arrested by ICE officers and transferred to the Buffalo Federal Detention Facility. (Id. ). Petitioner was further served with a notice to appear charging him with being subject to removal pursuant to § 237(a)(1)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B). (Id. at ¶ 8).
On March 16, 2018, the Department of Homeland Security made a determination that Petitioner would be detained pending a final administrative determination of his case. (Id. at ¶ 9). Petitioner made a motion for bond redetermination on March 22, 2018. (Id. at ¶ 10). An immigration judge ("IJ") held a bond hearing on April 10, 2018, and denied Petitioner's request for a change in custody status on the basis that he was a flight risk. (Id. ). At the bond hearing, the burden of proof was placed on Petitioner to demonstrate that he was not a flight risk and did not present a danger to the community. (See Dkt. 5-2 at 9, 20).
Petitioner appealed the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") on April 30, 2018. (Dkt. 5-1 at ¶ 11). On July 18, 2018, BIA remanded the appeal because it had been unable to obtain a record of the proceedings before the IJ. (Dkt. 5-2 at 16). On August 28, 2018, the IJ conducted a re-calendered bond hearing. (Id. at 18). Prior to holding the re-calendered hearing, the IJ located and played for the parties the recording of the bond hearing held on April 10, 2018—apparently, the recording had been "erroneously recorded on the removal side of the case." (Id. at 18-19). On October 12, 2018, the IJ held that Petitioner had not born the burden of showing a material change in circumstances warranting a redetermination of his request for bond. (Id. at 19). Petitioner appealed the IJ's denial of his request for redetermination, and the BIA affirmed the IJ's decision on February 13, 2019. (Id. at 20-21).
Petitioner commenced the instant action on February 25, 2019. (Dkt. 1). On October 4, 2019, the Court entered the D & O, in which it ordered Respondents to afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing at which the Government bore the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses either a risk of flight or a danger to the community within 14 days. (Dkt. 12).
On October 7, 2019, notice was served on Petitioner that a bond hearing would be held on October 16, 2019, before an IJ. (Dkt. 20-1 at ¶ 5). Petitioner was further informed that all submissions were due to the immigration court by October 11, 2019. (Id. ). On October 8, 2019, ICE submitted to the immigration court and served on Petitioner a "packet of intended bond evidence." (Id. at ¶ 7).
Petitioner requested a copy of the hearing notice on October 11, 2019, and a copy was provided on October 15, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 8). On October 14, 2019, Petitioner submitted "a packet of evidence in support of bond" to the immigration court. (Id. at ¶ 9).
A bond hearing was held before IJ Mary C. Baumgarten on October 16, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 11). The IJ determined that Petitioner presented a substantial risk of flight and denied bond in an oral decision. (Id. ). Petitioner appealed the IJ's order to the BIA on November 6, 2019. (Id. at ¶ 12). As of the date Respondents filed their opposition to the instant motion, no decision had been rendered by the BIA. (Id. at ¶ 13).
It appears that Petitioner may have subsequently withdrawn his appeal. (See Dkt. 25 at 21 (letter from Petitioner to BIA stating that he "withdraw[s] his appeal regarding the Immigration Judge's decision of the Bond proceeding that took place on the 16th October 2020")).
Petitioner filed the instant motion to enforce on October 23, 2019. (Dkt. 14). The Court ordered Respondents to file a response by January 10, 2020. (Dkt. 17). Respondents filed their response three days late, on January 13, 2020. (Dkt. 20). Petitioner thereafter filed his reply (Dkt. 21) and a motion to strike Respondents' response as untimely (Dkt. 22). Respondents then filed a motion for a retroactive extension of time file their response. (Dkt. 23).
DISCUSSION
I. Respondents' Untimely Response
As an initial matter, the Court considers Petitioner's request that the Court strike Respondents' response because it was untimely filed, and Respondents' corresponding request that their late filing be excused.
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6, the Court may grant a retroactive extension of time on motion where "the party failed to act because of excusable neglect." Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B). "Excusable neglect under Rule 6(b) is a somewhat elastic concept and is not limited strictly to omissions caused by circumstances beyond the control of movant," but may also "encompass delays caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, at least when the delay was not long, there is no bad faith, there is no prejudice to the opposing party, and movant's excuse has some merit." LoSacco v. City of Middletown , 71 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1995) (alteration, citation, and quotations omitted).
In this case, Respondents have explained that the three-day delay in filing was because of attorney error—namely, Respondents' counsel had various filings due on January 9, 10, 13, and 14, 2020, and mistakenly believed that the response in this case was due on January 13, 2020. (See Dkt. 23 at ¶¶ 3-6). Although "a calendaring error by a party's attorney is rarely a basis for excusable neglect," it may suffice where, as here, the delay was minimal and there was no prejudice to the opposing party. Rose v. City of Utica , No. 6:14-CV-01256 BKS TWD, 2018 WL 2041621, at *3 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2018), aff'd , 777 F. App'x 575 (2d Cir. 2019). The delay in this case amounted to only one business day, and Petitioner suffered no prejudice. Further, there is no evidence of bad faith on the part of Respondents or counsel. As such, "[d]espite the weakness of [Respondents'] reasons for the late filings, the other factors ... suffice in these circumstances to support a finding of excusable neglect." Id. The Court accordingly grants Respondents' motion for an extension of time (Dkt. 23) and denies Petitioner's motion to strike (Dkt. 22). However, Respondents' counsel is cautioned as to the importance of complying with Court deadlines, as the Court may not be so lenient in addressing any future late filings.
II. Petitioner's Motion
Petitioner seeks injunctive relief from the Court, arguing that the bond hearing on October 16, 2019, did not comport with the Court's D & O because the IJ "engaged in speculation and conjecture to arrive at a decision that [Petitioner] worked in the United States" and that she "seemed to have shifted the burden of proof to the petitioner." (Dkt. 14 at 10-11). Petitioner further contends that the bond hearing otherwise failed to comport with due process because he was not timely served with notice of the bond hearing, which he claims prejudiced him in various ways. (Id. at 12). Petitioner seeks immediate release from custody under appropriate conditions of supervision. (Id. at 17). For the reasons discussed below, the Court finds that Respondents have complied with the D & O and that no further relief is necessary. A. Jurisdiction
The federal habeas corpus statute gives district courts jurisdiction to hear immigration-related detention cases. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) ; Demore v. Kim , 538 U.S. 510, 517-18, 123 S.Ct. 1708, 155 L.Ed.2d 724 (2003) (holding federal courts have jurisdiction to review challenges to pre-removal detention); Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 688, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001) (holding " § 2241 habeas corpus proceedings remain available as a forum for statutory and constitutional challenges to post-removal-period detention" in immigration cases). District courts do not have jurisdiction over challenges to the legality of final orders of deportation, exclusion, and removal; jurisdiction to review such challenges rests exclusively in circuit courts. See Gittens v. Menifee , 428 F.3d 382, 384 (2d Cir. 2005) ("[The REAL ID Act, 119 Stat. 231, § 106(a) (May 11, 2005) ] eliminates habeas jurisdiction over final orders of deportation, exclusion, and removal, providing instead for petitions of review ... which circuit courts alone can consider.").
Respondents rely on the language in 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) to argue that the Court lacks jurisdiction over Petitioner's motion because "the IJ's decision involved discretionary judgments, the review of which is explicitly prohibited from district court review under 8 U.S.C. § 1126(e)...." (Dkt. 20 at 9-10). The Court is not persuaded by Respondents' argument for the reasons that follow.
As an initial matter, it is not clear that 8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) applies here. Section 1226(e) states:
The Attorney General's discretionary judgment regarding the application of this section shall not be subject to review. No court may set aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under this section regarding the detention or release of any alien or the grant, revocation, or denial of bond or parole.
8 U.S.C. § 1226(e) (emphases added). "The Court is skeptical that [Petitioner's] bond hearing constitutes a proceeding conducted under Section 1226 ; rather, it was a court-ordered bond hearing that demanded procedural protections beyond those compelled by the statute itself." Gutierrez Cupido v. Barr , No. 19-CV-6367-FPG, 2020 WL 103477, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 2020) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 830, 847-48, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018) ); see Darko v. Sessions , 342 F. Supp. 3d 429, 434-35 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) ("[W]hile the Supreme Court held that § 1226(a) does not mandate that a clear and convincing evidence burden be placed on the government in bond hearings, it left open the question of whether the Due Process Clause does.").
Even if the bond hearing ordered by the Court was a bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, " § 1226(e) does not preclude ‘challenges to the statutory framework that permits the alien's detention without bail,’ " and only "precludes an alien from ‘challenging a discretionary judgment by the Attorney General or a decision that the Attorney General has made regarding his detention or release.’ " Jennings , 138 S. Ct. at 841 (quoting Demore , 538 U.S. at 516-17, 123 S.Ct. 1708 ). Other courts in this District have held that § 1226(e) does not deprive district courts of jurisdiction to determine whether an IJ followed a court order granting a bond hearing pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. See Apollinaire v. Barr , No. 19-CV-6285-FPG, 2019 WL 4023560, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2019) ("[T]he statute presents no obstacle to review because the Court is not reviewing an immigration judge's discretionary judgment, but whether its order was followed[.]"); Hechavarria v. Whitaker , 358 F. Supp. 3d 227, 235-36 (W.D.N.Y. 2019) ("[T]he Court is not reviewing a discretionary judgment of the IJ under § 1226, and it is not ‘set[ting] aside any action or decision by the Attorney General under § 1226. Nor is this Court simply reviewing , as the government contends, how the IJ applied [the clear and convincing] burden to the facts before it and weighed the evidence. Instead, the Court is determining whether the order it issued on November 2, 2018, was followed—that is, whether [the petitioner] received the due process to which he was entitled." (alterations in original) (quotations, citation, and footnote omitted)); see also Nguti v. Sessions , No. 16-CV-6703, 2017 WL 5891328, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2017) ("[T]he question here is not whether this Court believes that the proof establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that [the petitioner] is a danger to the community. Rather, the question is whether the immigration judge relied upon proof that could not possibly establish by clear and convincing evidence—as a matter of law—that [the petitioner] is a danger to the community."); Enoh v. Sessions , No. 16-CV-85(LJV), 2017 WL 2080278, at *10 (W.D.N.Y. May 15, 2017) (holding "the IJ failed to apply the clear and convincing standard" at the petitioner's bond hearing ordered pursuant to Lora v. Shanahan , 804 F.3d 601 (2d Cir. 2015) ). This Court agrees and follows these courts in holding that it has jurisdiction to determine whether the IJ complied with the D & O.
The Court also notes that the Notice of Appeal filed on November 1, 2019 (see Dkt. 16), does not divest it of jurisdiction over Petitioner's motion. The "filing of a notice of appeal confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons , 470 U.S. 373, 378-79, 105 S.Ct. 1327, 84 L.Ed.2d 274 (1985). "The divestiture of jurisdiction rule is, however, not a per se rule." United States v. Rodgers , 101 F.3d 247, 251 (2d Cir. 1996). "One exception is that, absent a stay, a district court retains jurisdiction to enforce its orders and judgments despite an appeal." Apollinaire , 2019 WL 4023560, at *2 ; see Enoh , 2017 WL 2080278, at *4-5 (holding the court had jurisdiction in a habeas case brought pursuant to § 2241 "to decide in the first instance whether the government has complied with the order of February 22, 2017," despite the filing of a notice of appeal of the order). Accordingly, the Court has jurisdiction to rule on Petitioner's motion.
B. Exhaustion
Respondents also contend that Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. (Dkt. 20 at 7-9). The Court finds it would not be appropriate to require exhaustion of the issues raised in Petitioner's motion to enforce.
"There is no statutory requirement of administrative exhaustion before immigration detention may be challenged in federal court by a writ of habeas corpus; however, such exhaustion is generally required as a prudential matter." Paz Nativi v. Shanahan , No. 16-CV-8496 (JPO), 2017 WL 281751, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 23, 2017) (collecting cases). "Exhaustion of administrative remedies may not be required when: (1) available remedies provide no genuine opportunity for adequate relief; (2) irreparable injury may occur without immediate judicial relief; (3) administrative appeal would be futile; and (4) in certain instances a plaintiff has raised a substantial constitutional question." Guitard v. U.S. Sec'y of Navy , 967 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1992) (citing Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp. , 303 U.S. 41, 50-51, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938) ); see Compunnel Software Grp., Inc. v. Gupta , No. 14 Civ. 4790(SAS), 2015 WL 1224298, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2015) ("The exhaustion doctrine, however, is also subject to numerous exceptions.").
Here, the Court does not rule on new claims in deciding Petitioner's motion. Rather, the Court only decides whether Petitioner received the relief he is entitled to pursuant to the D & O. The Court finds exhaustion of Petitioner's administrative remedies is not required here. See Hechavarria , 358 F. Supp. 3d at 237-38 ("[B]ecause of delays inherent in the administrative process, BIA review would result in the very harm that the bond hearing was designed to prevent: ‘ "prolonged" detention without due process during lengthy and backlogged removal proceedings.’ " (quoting Enoh , 2017 WL 2080278, at *3 )); cf. Argueta Anariba v. Shanahan , No. 16-CV-1928 (KBF), 2017 WL 3172765, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2017) ("A petitioner need not re-exhaust his or her Lora claim each time the government fails to comply with its Lora obligations.").
Moreover, Petitioner's motion for enforcement raises constitutional questions, and "the BIA does not have jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues." United States v. Gonzalez-Roque , 301 F.3d 39, 48 (2d Cir. 2002) ; Matter of Rodriguez-Carrillo , 22 I & N. Dec. 1031, 1035 (BIA 1999) ("[N]either the Immigration Judge nor this Board may rule on the constitutionality of the statutes that we administer."). Accordingly, exhaustion would also be futile. See Hechavarria , 358 F. Supp. 3d at 238 (finding "the third and fourth exhaustion exceptions—the futility of an administrative appeal and a substantial constitutional question ... also apply to this case" because the motion for enforcement raised constitutional questions (citation omitted)).
C. Compliance with the D & O
In reviewing Petitioner's motion to enforce, "it is important to emphasize that the Court's task is narrow: it is to determine whether Respondent complied with the Decision and Order, not to review the hearing evidence de novo [.]" Apollinaire , 2019 WL 4023560, at *3 ; see Gutierrez Cupido , 2020 WL 103477, at *3 (same); Hechavarria , 358 F. Supp. 3d at 236 ("[T]he Court is determining whether the order it issued on November 2, 2018, was followed—that is, whether Hechavarria received the due process to which he was entitled."); Nguti , 2017 WL 5891328, at *2 ("In reviewing the government's compliance with the May 2, 2017 order, this Court is careful not to overstep its bounds and set aside an immigration judge's bond determination on discretionary or evidentiary grounds."). In the D & O, the Court ordered Respondents to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing where the Government bore the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that detention is justified. (Dkt. 12 at 1). Accordingly, the Court must now determine whether during Petitioner's bond hearing the IJ "relied upon proof that could not possibly establish by clear and convincing evidence—as a matter of law—that [Petitioner] was a danger to the community" or a flight risk. Nguti , 2017 WL 5891328, at *2 ; see Apollinaire , 2019 WL 4023560, at *3 (same). "[C]lear and convincing evidence ... means something more than ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ and something less than ‘beyond a reasonable doubt.’ " United States v. Chimurenga , 760 F.2d 400, 405 (2d Cir. 1985). "The clear-and-convincing burden of proof ‘requires the government to prove that a factual contention is highly probable.’ " Apollinaire , 2019 WL 4023560, at *3 (quoting Hechavarria , 358 F. Supp. 3d at 240 ); see Colorado v. New Mexico , 467 U.S. 310, 316, 104 S.Ct. 2433, 81 L.Ed.2d 247 (1984) (discussing that clear and convincing evidence requires presenting evidence that shows "the truth of its factual contentions are ‘highly probable’ ").
In this case, the transcript of the bond hearing demonstrates that the IJ appropriately placed the burden on the Government to show that Petitioner was a risk of flight. While not dispositive, the IJ expressly noted on multiple occasions that the Government bore the burden and the Government acknowledged the same. (See Dkt. 20-2 at 76, 78-79, 85, 92). Indeed, the first exhibit the IJ entered into evidence was the D & O. (Id. at 73-74).
The Government waived any argument that Petitioner posed a risk of danger to the community. (See Dkt. 12 at 20; Dkt. 20-2 at 78-79).
Further, the evidence submitted by the Government at the bond hearing was sufficient to support the IJ's conclusion that it had met its burden of proving risk of flight. The Government submitted evidence that Petitioner had unlawfully worked while present in the United States on a B-2 visa, evidencing his disregard for United States immigration law. (See id. at 6, 80). The Government further submitted evidence that Petitioner lacked any real property in the United States, that his familial ties to the United States were minimal at best, that he had been in the United States for only a short period of time prior to being apprehended, and that there was a high likelihood his appeal of the denial of his request for relief from removal would be denied. (Id. at 7, 18-24, 80-82). The Government also submitted evidence tending to show that Petitioner had fabricated documents submitted in connection with his request for relief in immigration court and that there were significant additional issues regarding his credibility. (Id. at 18-24, 83).
Indeed, Petitioner's appeal was ultimately denied by the BIA on December 10 2019. (Dkt. 20-2 at 122-26).
The IJ's oral decision confirms that she considered this evidence and relied upon it in determining that Petitioner presented a risk of flight. In particular, the IJ concluded that Petitioner's immigration history was "checkered at best," and she expressly considered and found not credible Petitioner's claim that he was not unlawfully working in the United States. (Id. at 105). The IJ noted that this testimony by Petitioner was contradicted by the sworn testimony of the immigration officer to whom Petitioner had admitted working. (Id. at 105-104). The IJ further noted that the evidence of record did not support a conclusion that Petitioner had familial ties in the United States, because although a particular individual had been identified by Petitioner as his "cousin," an affidavit from that individual's wife identified Petitioner as her husband's "close friend." (Id. at 106-107). The IJ went on to note that even assuming Petitioner had a cousin or even two cousins in the United States, these were not "family ties of the type who can confer immigration benefits" to Petitioner. (Id. at 108). The IJ explained that Petitioner did not have "employment history in the United States of any length or stability," and found that his attendance at his prior court proceedings was a neutral factor as he had been in custody throughout the relevant time period. (Id. at 108-109). The IJ further took into account Petitioner's relatively low likelihood of success on his appeal, given the substantial credibility issues that had been identified in connection with his request for relief, and concluded that there was no reason to think that Petitioner would have an incentive to return to court or submit for removal from the United States in the event his appeal was unsuccessful. (Id. at 109-10).
The Court finds that the IJ applied the appropriate standard in assessing whether Petitioner was a risk of flight. The IJ further thoroughly reviewed the evidence submitted by the Government and considered numerous relevant factors. The Court cannot find, on the instant record, that the IJ "relied upon proof that—as a matter of law—could not establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that" Petitioner was a risk of flight. Nguti , 2017 WL 5891328, at *3. To the extent Petitioner is arguing that the IJ's assessment of that evidence was wrong or that she erred in her credibility determinations or the weight she gave to particular aspects of the record, such arguments are beyond the scope of this Court's jurisdiction. See id.
The IJ also appropriately considered whether less restrictive means could be used to secure Petitioner's presence at future proceedings, including his request for release on a $5,000 bond. (Dkt. 20-2 at 110-11); see also Navarijo-Orantes v. Barr , No. 19-CV-790, 2019 WL 5784939, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2019) ("The decision maker must consider—and must address in any decision—whether there is clear and convincing evidence that no less-restrictive alternative to physical detention, including release on bond in an amount the petitioner can reasonably afford, with or without conditions, would also reasonably address those purposes."). The IJ considered the letters submitted by Petitioner, but ultimately concluded that Petitioner's conduct, including but not limited to his actions and lack of candor in his removal proceedings, supported the conclusion that less restrictive alternatives could not mitigate the substantial risk of flight. (Id. at 110-11). Again, it is not this Court's role to engage in a re-weighing of the evidence considered by the IJ. The IJ applied the burden of proof ordered by the Court, performed the necessary analysis, and relied on the evidence of record in reaching her conclusion. That is sufficient to establish compliance with the Court's D & O.
Petitioner's argument that he was denied notice of the hearing is unpersuasive. Respondents have submitted records showing that Petitioner was served with notice of the hearing on October 7, 2019. (Dkt. 20-2 at 2). Further, Petitioner acknowledged at the bond hearing that he had received this notice, though he went on to complain that he did not receive a "custom" notice directly from the immigration court. (Id. at 73). There is also no evidence in the record before the Court that Petitioner requested a continuance from the IJ.
Additionally, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he was prejudiced by the alleged lack of notice. Although he submitted his documents late, the IJ nonetheless reviewed them and admitted them into evidence. (See Dkt. 20-2 at 74-75). Moreover, while Petitioner claims that he could have submitted additional evidence regarding his cousin, the record already contained substantial evidence regarding Petitioner's cousin that was expressly brought to the IJ's attention. Petitioner's claim that he had an attorney who could have represented him had he received more notice is also belied by the record. In particular, on October 11, 2019, Petitioner send a letter to the clerk of the immigration court stating that he did "not have an attorney to represent [him] in [his] upcoming bond hearing." (Dkt. 20-2 at 62). On these facts, the Court does not find a due process violation as claimed by Petitioner.
For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Respondents have complied with the D & O and denies Petitioner's motion to enforce the Judgment. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner's motion to enforce the Judgment (Dkt. 14) is denied. Petitioner's motion to expedite (Dkt. 15) is denied as moot. Respondents' motion for an extension to time to file their response (Dkt. 23) is granted and Petitioner's motion to strike Respondents' response as untimely (Dkt. 22) is denied.
SO ORDERED.