The trial court, when considering a motion for summary judgment, should not decide an issue of fact but only determine whether one exists. ( Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 529 N.E.2d 552.) If, on review, the court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment must be reversed. Addison, 124 Ill.2d 287, 529 N.E.2d 552.
On appeal plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment since genuine issues of material facts remain regarding whether Dr. Arcillas met the standard of care for taking a hospital admission history and whether the hospital anesthesiologist negligently administered the spinal anesthesia. • 1, 2 The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether there exist any genuine issues of material fact ( Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 294, 529 N.E.2d 552; Puttman v. May Excavating Co. (1987), 118 Ill.2d 107, 112, 514 N.E.2d 188; Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867); and a motion for summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c)). Summary judgment is a drastic measure for disposing of litigation and should only be used when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.
Necessary to the establishment of a prima facie case of medical negligence is the presentation of expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care, a deviation from the standard, and the resulting injury to the plaintiff. Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill.2d 287, 297, 529 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1988). The disposition of a medical malpractice claim by summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved; accordingly, when a defendant files a summary judgment motion and affidavit establishing he was not negligent, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to substantiate his allegations of negligence through expert testimony.
Even before Rule 220 was adopted in 1984, a plaintiff who had been given sufficient time but had no expert could not prevent summary judgment by his unsupported assertion he might find an expert before trial. ( Stevenson v. Nauton (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 831, 835-36, 390 N.E.2d 53, 57; see Buck v. Alton Memorial Hospital (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 347, 355, 407 N.E.2d 1067, 1073.) In Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 294-99, 529 N.E.2d 552, 555-57, the supreme court considered an argument that Rule 220 added something to those cases, that summary judgment was proper where Rule 220(d) would bar plaintiff from introducing any expert testimony not already disclosed. The supreme court followed Stevenson, and granted summary judgment, but decided it was not necessary to consider the Rule 220 argument.
• 2 Under section 2-1005(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c)), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ( Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 529 N.E.2d 552; Johnson v. Matviuw (1988), 176 Ill. App.3d 907, 531 N.E.2d 970; Bennett, 103 Ill. App.3d 321, 431 N.E.2d 48.) Moreover, a defendant may move for summary judgment at any time. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(b).) The purpose of summary judgment is not to try an issue of fact but to determine whether a triable issue of fact exists.
A plaintiff must present expert testimony in order to establish these elements, as laypersons are generally not qualified to evaluate medical professional conduct. See Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill.2d 287, 297 (1988).
The litigants agree that Illinois substantive law applies to Murphy's medical-malpractice claim. Thus to prevail, Murphy must first “prove the proper standard of care against which the defendant physician's conduct is measured . . . .” Addison v. Whittenberg, 529 N.E.2d 552, 556 (Ill. 1988). “Whether an issue is relevant in a case is a question of substantive state law; [but] whether the specific evidence offered is relevant to resolving the issue is a procedural question governed by the Federal Rule of Evidence.”
Necessary to the establishment of a prima facie case of medical negligence is the presentation of expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care, a deviation from the standard, and the resulting injury to the plaintiff. Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill.2d 287, 297 [124 Ill.Dec. 571], 529 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1988).' Higgens v. House, 288 Ill.App.3d 543, 546, 223 Ill.Dec. 886, 680 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (1997).Jones v. Dettro, 308 Ill.App.3d 494, 498, 720 N.E.2d 343, 346, 241 Ill.Dec. 888, 891 (Ill.App.
A consideration of the function performed by the health professional under section 2-622 in making the required certification demonstrates that his task in that regard is essentially no different from the function he is later called upon to perform at trial. In medical malpractice cases, the applicable standard of care and its breach must normally be established through expert testimony. ( Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 297; Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill.2d 229, 242.) Clearly, giving such testimony at trial does not constitute the exercise of a judicial function.
It merely plays a more outsized role in cases of medical negligence because "laypersons normally are not qualified to evaluate professional medical conduct." Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill.2d 287, 297 (1988).