Addison v. Whittenberg

124 Citing cases

  1. Kielbasa v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital

    568 N.E.2d 208 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)   Cited 9 times

    The trial court, when considering a motion for summary judgment, should not decide an issue of fact but only determine whether one exists. ( Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 529 N.E.2d 552.) If, on review, the court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists, summary judgment must be reversed. Addison, 124 Ill.2d 287, 529 N.E.2d 552.

  2. Smith v. South Shore Hospital

    187 Ill. App. 3d 847 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 25 times
    In Smith v. South Shore Hospital, 187 Ill. App. 3d 847, 543 N.E.2d 868 (1989) (Smith), plaintiff sought to introduce into evidence the 1983 standards of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals to establish the standard of care for administering a spinal anesthetic for a 1979 surgery.

    On appeal plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment since genuine issues of material facts remain regarding whether Dr. Arcillas met the standard of care for taking a hospital admission history and whether the hospital anesthesiologist negligently administered the spinal anesthesia. • 1, 2 The purpose of summary judgment is to determine whether there exist any genuine issues of material fact ( Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 294, 529 N.E.2d 552; Puttman v. May Excavating Co. (1987), 118 Ill.2d 107, 112, 514 N.E.2d 188; Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill.2d 229, 240, 489 N.E.2d 867); and a motion for summary judgment should be granted when "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law" (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c)). Summary judgment is a drastic measure for disposing of litigation and should only be used when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt.

  3. Higgens v. House

    288 Ill. App. 3d 543 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)   Cited 19 times

    Necessary to the establishment of a prima facie case of medical negligence is the presentation of expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care, a deviation from the standard, and the resulting injury to the plaintiff. Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill.2d 287, 297, 529 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1988). The disposition of a medical malpractice claim by summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue of material fact remains to be resolved; accordingly, when a defendant files a summary judgment motion and affidavit establishing he was not negligent, it is incumbent on the plaintiff to substantiate his allegations of negligence through expert testimony.

  4. Pogge v. Hale

    625 N.E.2d 792 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 5 times
    Applying former Rule 220 (134 Ill. 2d R. 220)

    Even before Rule 220 was adopted in 1984, a plaintiff who had been given sufficient time but had no expert could not prevent summary judgment by his unsupported assertion he might find an expert before trial. ( Stevenson v. Nauton (1979), 71 Ill. App.3d 831, 835-36, 390 N.E.2d 53, 57; see Buck v. Alton Memorial Hospital (1980), 86 Ill. App.3d 347, 355, 407 N.E.2d 1067, 1073.) In Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 294-99, 529 N.E.2d 552, 555-57, the supreme court considered an argument that Rule 220 added something to those cases, that summary judgment was proper where Rule 220(d) would bar plaintiff from introducing any expert testimony not already disclosed. The supreme court followed Stevenson, and granted summary judgment, but decided it was not necessary to consider the Rule 220 argument.

  5. Diggs v. Suburban Medical Center

    191 Ill. App. 3d 828 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989)   Cited 21 times

    • 2 Under section 2-1005(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(c)), summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ( Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 529 N.E.2d 552; Johnson v. Matviuw (1988), 176 Ill. App.3d 907, 531 N.E.2d 970; Bennett, 103 Ill. App.3d 321, 431 N.E.2d 48.) Moreover, a defendant may move for summary judgment at any time. (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1987, ch. 110, par. 2-1005(b).) The purpose of summary judgment is not to try an issue of fact but to determine whether a triable issue of fact exists.

  6. Jordan v. United States

    18-cv-1100-NJR (S.D. Ill. Sep. 29, 2023)

    A plaintiff must present expert testimony in order to establish these elements, as laypersons are generally not qualified to evaluate medical professional conduct. See Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill.2d 287, 297 (1988).

  7. Murphy v. Wexford Health Sources

    Case No. 20-CV-00969-JPG (S.D. Ill. Jun. 15, 2021)

    The litigants agree that Illinois substantive law applies to Murphy's medical-malpractice claim. Thus to prevail, Murphy must first “prove the proper standard of care against which the defendant physician's conduct is measured . . . .” Addison v. Whittenberg, 529 N.E.2d 552, 556 (Ill. 1988). “Whether an issue is relevant in a case is a question of substantive state law; [but] whether the specific evidence offered is relevant to resolving the issue is a procedural question governed by the Federal Rule of Evidence.”

  8. Gay v. Hammersley

    CIVIL NO. 08-cv-059-DRH (S.D. Ill. Jul. 25, 2008)

    Necessary to the establishment of a prima facie case of medical negligence is the presentation of expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care, a deviation from the standard, and the resulting injury to the plaintiff. Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill.2d 287, 297 [124 Ill.Dec. 571], 529 N.E.2d 552, 556 (1988).' Higgens v. House, 288 Ill.App.3d 543, 546, 223 Ill.Dec. 886, 680 N.E.2d 1089, 1092 (1997).Jones v. Dettro, 308 Ill.App.3d 494, 498, 720 N.E.2d 343, 346, 241 Ill.Dec. 888, 891 (Ill.App.

  9. Deluna v. St. Elizabeth's Hospital

    147 Ill. 2d 57 (Ill. 1992)   Cited 105 times
    Holding that section 2-622 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which requires a plaintiff or her attorney in a healing arts malpractice action to append, inter alia, a report of a medical professional certifying the merits of the claim to the complaint, does not unduly infringe upon the inherent and exclusive power of the trial court to judge the legal sufficiency of such a complaint based on the fact alleged

    A consideration of the function performed by the health professional under section 2-622 in making the required certification demonstrates that his task in that regard is essentially no different from the function he is later called upon to perform at trial. In medical malpractice cases, the applicable standard of care and its breach must normally be established through expert testimony. ( Addison v. Whittenberg (1988), 124 Ill.2d 287, 297; Purtill v. Hess (1986), 111 Ill.2d 229, 242.) Clearly, giving such testimony at trial does not constitute the exercise of a judicial function.

  10. Thompson v. LaSpisa

    2023 Ill. App. 211448 (Ill. App. Ct. 2023)   Cited 2 times

    It merely plays a more outsized role in cases of medical negligence because "laypersons normally are not qualified to evaluate professional medical conduct." Addison v. Whittenberg, 124 Ill.2d 287, 297 (1988).