Opinion
# 2012-015-388 Claim No. 118432 Motion No. M-81735 Cross-Motion No. CM-82171
01-03-2013
DONNELL ADDISON v. THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Synopsis
Defendant's dismissal motion was denied to the extent it alleged that the claim was untimely. Defense counsel expressly withdrew this defense. While claim met the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act 11 (b), summary dismissal was warranted because prison confinement was privileged and, although acts of negligence were ministerial no special duty was owed to the claimant separate and apart from the public at large. Case information
UID: 2012-015-388 Claimant(s): DONNELL ADDISON Claimant short name: ADDISON Footnote (claimant name) : Defendant(s): THE STATE OF NEW YORK Footnote (defendant name) : Third-party claimant(s): Third-party defendant(s): Claim number(s): 118432 Motion number(s): M-81735 Cross-motion number(s): CM-82171 Judge: FRANCIS T. COLLINS Gregory Peck, Esquire Claimant's attorney: By: Philip Hoffman, Esquire Honorable Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General Defendant's attorney: By: Jessica Hall, Esquire Assistant Attorney General Third-party defendant's attorney: Signature date: January 3, 2013 City: Saratoga Springs Comments: Official citation: Appellate results: See also (multicaptioned case) Decision
Defendant moves for dismissal of the instant claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 and 3212 on the grounds the claim is untimely, fails to meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) and fails to state a cause of action. Claimant cross-moves to amend the claim.
Claimant seeks damages arising from the defendant's alleged failure to record the disposition of a criminal action, which rendered him ineligible for participation in the Edgecombe Diversion Program as an alternative to incarceration for a subsequent parole violation. The claim alleges, in pertinent part, the following:
"2. . . . On March 31, 2009 the claimant, DONNELL ADDISON, was sentenced by ALJ Chavez to the 30 day Edgecombe Drug Treatment Program, with a 12 month alternative, as the result of a parole violation . . .
Through no fault of the claimant, he was subsequently rejected by Edgecombe Drug Treatment Program because the State of New York, its agents, servants, and/or employees erroneously stated that he had an open felony in Wyoming County, New York, and the claimant was sent to serve his 12 month hold in state prison.
Throughout his incarceration, the claimant and his legal representative provided voluminous documentation to the State of New York . . . including the Certificate of Disposition proving that the matter in Wyoming County previously had been resolved. However, the claimant remained incarcerated and confined to state prison until October 16, 2009, at which time he was released following a decision by ALJ Geller on October 10, 2009, ordering the claimant's immediate release.
The claimant was falsely held in state prison(s) for over a period of six (6) months as the result of the erroneous actions by the State of New York . . . In failing to avoid the aforesaid incarceration and continued confinement of the claimant, the State of New York . . . [was] negligent, careless, reckless, and grossly negligent in [its] treatment of the [claimant] . . .
4. This claim accrued on or about October 16, 2009" (defendant's Exhibit B, Claim, ¶ 2).
Defendant contends that the claim is both untimely and fails to meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) because it fails to state the date the claim accrued and because it "does not include the time when and the place where such claim arose and the nature of same" (affirmation of Jessica Hall dated June 15, 2012, p. 7). Defendant contends that the claim accrued not upon claimant's release from prison on October 16, 2009 as alleged in the claim, but upon claimant's rejection from Edgecombe Diversion Program in March, 2009 (referring to defendant's Exhibit N) or no later than June 10, 2009 when claimant's attorney was aware of the rejection as indicated in her correspondence (defendant's Exhibit K). As a result, defendant argues that the notice of intention to file a claim dated January 16, 2010 and the claim dated May 25, 2010 were untimely. Lastly, defendant contends that the claim fails to state a cause of action for either wrongful confinement or negligence.
As evidenced by the documentation submitted by defendant in support of its motion, the material facts of this claim are undisputed. The Sentence and Commitment sheet, signed by Rebecca Miller, Chief Clerk, reflects that claimant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of prison contraband on September 30, 2004 (defendant's Exhibit K). Following his release from prison on January 25, 2008, claimant pleaded guilty to violating the conditions of his parole and the penalty imposed by the Administrative Law Judge was a 12-month delinquent time assessment "or 30 day Edgecombe Diversion Program" (defendant's Exhibit J, Parole Revocation Decision Notice dated March 31, 2009). The Judge also noted in the decision that "I will impose a 12 month hold with the opportunity for release to attend the 30 day Edgecombe Diversion Program, which if successfully completed will result in a modification of my decision to a revoke/restore (Time served) to community supervision" (id.).
Defendant also submits the affidavits of Kathleen M. Kiley, Assistant Counsel for the Board of Parole; Rebecca Miller, Chief Clerk in Supreme and County Court; and Janet Buck, Principal Information Technology Analyst with the Office of Court Administration. Ms. Kiley indicates that claimant was initially released to parole supervision on January 25, 2008 and declared delinquent as of February 14, 2009.She states that following a final revocation hearing on March 31, 2009, claimant pleaded guilty to violating the conditions of his parole and was given a "12-month time assessment or[,] in the alternative, if he completed the 30-day drug treatment diversion program at Edgecombe Correctional Facility, he would not have to serve the 12-month time assessment" (defendant's Exhibit F, ¶ 8). According to Ms. Kiley, it was additionally noted by the Administrative Law Judge that upon successful completion of the Edgecombe Diversion Program he "would modify the decision to a revoke and restore to parole supervision" (id., ¶ 8).
Although Ms. Kiley erroneously states that the claimant was declared delinquent as of February 14, 2008, it is clear from the Parole Revocation Decision Notice that he was declared delinquent as of February 14, 2009.
Rebecca Miller indicates she was present in the courtroom for claimant's sentencing in 2004 and personally entered the data into the system on September 30, 2004. She states that an error report was not generated regarding the information she entered and she has "no knowledge as to why [the disposition of the criminal charges] was not reflected on Mr. Addison's RAP sheet" (defendant's Exhibit G, ¶ 5). The disposition of the 2004 charge was resubmitted in 2010, although Ms. Miller was unable to state why or by whom the information was resubmitted.
Janet Buck describes the various computer applications used to record case information. She states that ADBM is used for the initial electronic collection of case information and describes the interrelationship between the computer systems as follows:
"CRIMS is the mainframe computer application used by UCS, and is the gateway for electronic reporting of criminal disposition information to the New York Division of Criminal Justice Services (DCJS). ADBM is incompatible with CRIMS, and therefore data inputted by courts using ADBM cannot be reported directly to CRIMS. CDR was designed in 1993 to bridge this gap and receive criminal dispositions from ADBM courts" (defendant's Exhibit H, ¶ 2).
In order to facilitate the transfer of information from ADBM to CDR, the "540 field" must be completed to indicate whether or not case information should be transmitted to CDR (id., ¶ 3). Ms. Buck indicates one reason the claimant's criminal disposition may not have been transmitted from ADBM to the CDR is that the "540 field" was improperly completed (id., ¶ 6). Ms. Buck concludes that "I cannot determine, on the basis of the available CDR records, the precise sequence that resulted in the disposition data not being transmitted earlier to CDR. It is plain, however, that no electronic transmission of the case disposition to DCJS would have occurred prior to June 2010" (id., ¶ 7).
In support of his cross motion to amend the claim, claimant submits a proposed amended claim in which he recites the material elements of a wrongful confinement claim (see claimant's Exhibit 1, ¶¶ 9-14) and alleges in further detail the basis for his negligence claim. Claimant seeks to allege that he was denied acceptance to the Edgecombe program as the result of an " 'open felony', [which] if accurate, could only be due to the actions or inactions of the Defendant STATE . . . in not properly inputting, recording , and/or maintaining the disposition and sentence of the charge in Wyoming County, New York in 2004" (claimant's Exhibit 1, ¶ 19). Claimant alleges further that the State violated a special duty owed to him by denying him entry into the Edgecombe program (claimant's Exhibit 1, ¶ 20), and by failing to "properly input, record, and/or maintain the disposition of the criminal charge against him with the resulting plea of guilty on July 9th, 2004" (id. at ¶ 26).
Claimant's affidavit was also submitted in support of the cross motion (claimant's Exhibit 2). He avers that "[b]ased upon the opportunity to do the 30 day program at Edgecombe, and upon consultation with my attorney, I agreed to plead guilty to the [parole] violation" (affidavit of Donnell Addison, p. 1). He also states that his attorney advised the Parole Specialist of the fact that claimant's sentence for the 2004 felony conviction had been served but "they advised they could do nothing and would not admit me to Edgecombe at that time" (claimant's Exhibit 2, p. 2). He states that in pleading guilty to the charge against him in 2004, he "relied on them to properly record the disposition as I had to rely upon them as I could not personally record the disposition of the charge against me" (id.).
The transcripts of the examinations before trial of Catherine Grant and Shelda L. Washington, both of whom were employed at Edgecombe during the time of claimant's rejection from the program, were also submitted by claimant in opposition to defendant's motion (claimant's Exhibits 3 and 4). Ms. Grant testified that it was only after April 2009 that they started keeping track of the inmates who were rejected from the program. Ms. Washington testified that in determining whether or not to accept or reject an inmate into the program, their RAP sheet is reviewed and "[i]f there was a felony without a disposition, then the parolee would be deemed ineligible" for the program (claimant's Exhibit 4, p. 31).
As a threshold matter, defendant's affirmative defense regarding the timeliness of the claim was limited to any cause of action "other than wrongful confinement" (defendant's Exhibit C). Moreover, defense counsel expressly withdrew this defense in its Response To Claimant's Demand For A Bill Of Particulars As To Affirmative Defenses (defendant's Exhibit D, response no. 5). Defense counsel stated therein: "The Office of the Attorney General will hereby withdraw any Affirmative Defense alleging the claimant failed to comply with the Court of Claims Act sections 10 and 11" (defendant's Exhibit D, p. 3). Inasmuch as a defense relating the timeliness of the claim is waived if not asserted in either a pre-answer dismissal motion or as an affirmative defense in defendant's answer (Court of Claims Act § 11 [c]), dismissal of the claim on the ground it was untimely would be inappropriate.Defendant withdrew its defense that the claim was untimely and the matter is no longer preserved for review.
Defense counsel's assertion that the claim was somehow amended following a discovery conference with the Court is baffling in light of the fact that no amended claim was filed with the Court. Moreover, the conference to which defense counsel refers was for the sole purpose of resolving a discovery dispute in which defense counsel contended that an examination before trial of a witness with knowledge of the manner in which criminal dispositions are recorded was irrelevant to the facts alleged in the claim.
Defendant's contention that the claim fails to meet the pleading requirements of Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) is also meritless. Court of Claims Act § 11 (b) requires that a claim set forth "the time when and place where such claim arose, the nature of same, the items of damage or injuries claimed to have been sustained and, except in an action to recover damages for personal injury, medical, dental or podiatric malpractice or wrongful death, the total sum claimed." In Heisler v State of New York (78 AD2d 767 [1980]) the Appellate Division, Fourth Department, made clear in discussing the pleading requirements of § 11 (b) that while pleading with "absolute exactness" is not required, the claim "must be specific enough so as not to mislead, deceive or prejudice the rights of the State" (id. at 767). Heisler was cited with approval by the Court of Appeals in Lepkowski v State of New York (1 NY3d 201, 207 [2003]) for the conclusion that the guiding principle underlying § 11 (b) is whether the State is able " 'to investigate the claim[s] promptly and to ascertain its liability under the circumstances' " (Lepkowski v State of New York, 1 NY3d at 207, quoting Heisler v State of New York, 78 AD2d at 767). In this Court's view, the instant claim satisfies this standard.
Defendant's next contention that the claim fails to state a cause of action for either wrongful confinement or negligence is meritorious. On a motion to dismiss a claim pursuant to CPLR 3211 (a) (7) the court is required to "accept the facts as alleged in the [claim] as true, accord [claimant] the benefit of every possible favorable inference, and determine only whether the facts as alleged fit within any cognizable legal theory" (Leon v Martinez, 84 NY2d 83, 87-88 [1994]; see also Goshen v Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 98 NY2d 314, 326 [2002]). Thus, the determination is made by reference to whether "the proponent of the pleading has a cause of action, not whether he has stated one" (id. at 88 [quotation marks and citation omitted]). Giving claimant the benefit of every possible favorable inference, the facts alleged fail to state a cause of action.
To establish a prima facie case of false imprisonment, claimant must "show that: (1) the defendant intended to confine him, (2) the [claimant] was conscious of the confinement, (3) the [claimant] did not consent to the confinement and (4) the confinement was not otherwise privileged" (Broughton v State of New York, 37 NY2d 451, 456 [1975], cert denied sub nom. Schanbarger v Kellogg, 423 US 929 [1975]). The law is settled that " '[a] detention, otherwise unlawful, is privileged where the confinement was by arrest under a valid process issued by a court having jurisdiction' " (Donald v State of New York , 17 NY3d 389, 395 [2011], quoting Davis v City of Syracuse, 66 NY2d 840, 842 [1985] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]; see also Nuernberger v State of New York, 41 NY2d 111 [1976]; Nazario v State of New York, 75 AD3d 715 [2010], lv denied 15 NY3d 712 [2010]; Holmberg v County of Albany, 291 AD2d 610, 612 [2002], lv denied 98 NY2d 604 [2002]). Absent an allegation in the claim, "express or inferable," that the parole warrant or order of commitment was invalid on its face or that the issuing entity lacked jurisdiction to issue the warrant, a claim for wrongful confinement lacks merit as a matter of law (Ferrucci v State of New York, 42 AD2d 359, 361 [1973], affd 34 NY2d 881 [1974]; Mullen v State of New York, 122 AD2d 300 [1986], lv denied 68 NY2d 609 [1986], cert denied 480 US 938 [1987]). Here, like the facts in Donald v State of New York (supra), claimant fails to allege in either his claim or proposed amended claim any defect in the process by which he was arrested for violating the conditions of his parole or in the jurisdiction of the court that issued that process. Assuming the facts alleged in the claim to be true, therefore, the claim fails to state a cause of action for wrongful confinement.
Moreover, it is clear that claimant's arrest was, in fact, pursuant to a parole warrant and his confinement authorized by the decision of the Administrative Law Judge dated March 31, 2009 (see defendant's Exhibit J; Executive Law § 259-i [3] [a] [i]). The Parole Revocation Decision Notice imposed a 12-month delinquent time assessment unless claimant completed a 30-day program at Edgecombe (defendant's Exhibit J) (compare Engel v State of New York, UID No. 2009-015-190 [Ct Cl, Collins, J., July 21, 2009] [potential merit of a wrongful confinement claim was not established where the movant's parole was revoked and he was ordered held until the maximum expiration date of his sentence unless he completed a drug treatment program]). As written, the Parole Revocation Decision Notice clearly authorized the claimant's confinement for a period of 12 months. The claimant's confinement was therefore privileged.
To the extent claimant asserts a negligence cause of action in both the claim and amended claim, analysis of defendant's immunity defense (defendant's third affirmative defense) is required. Prior to the Court of Appeals decision in McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194 [2009]), courts drew a distinction between discretionary conduct, for which a municipality was immune from liability in the absence a special duty owing directly to the injured party (see e.g. Laratro v City of New York, 8 NY3d 79 [2006]; Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186 [2004]; Cuffy v City of New York, 69 NY2d 255 [1987]), and ministerial conduct for which the municipality could be subjected to liability under general tort principles (see e.g. Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95 [2000]; National Westminster Bank, USA v State of New York, 155 AD2d 261 [1989], affd 76 NY2d 507 [1990]; Lapidus v State of New York, 57 AD3d 83 [2008]; Hunt v State of New York, 36 AD3d 511 [2007]; Shaw v Town of Camillus, 288 AD2d 902 [2001]; Davis v State of New York, 212 AD2d 939 [1995]; Marx v State of New York, 169 AD2d 642 [1991]; Glowinski v Baum, 105 AD2d 1153 [1984]; Stewart v State of New York, 18 Misc 3d 236 [2007]; Schwandt v State of New York, 4 Misc 3d 405 [2004]; see generally Metz v State of New York, 27 Misc 3d 1209 [A] [2010]; Signature Health Ctr., LLC v State of New York, 28 Misc 3d 543 [2010]). In Lapidus v State of New York (supra), for example, the Court specifically held that the State is not immune from liability for ministerial acts negligently performed by court employees which resulted in the claimant being improperly adjudicated as a second felony offender and required to serve a portion of a longer sentence. In McLean v City of New York (12 NY3d 194 [2009]), however, the Court of Appeals clarified that "[g]overnment action, if discretionary, may not be a basis for liability, while ministerial actions may be, but only if they violate a special duty owed to the plaintiff, apart from any duty to the public in general" (id. at 203; see also Metz v State of New York, ___NY2d ___, 2012 WL 5948966 [2012]; Valdez v City of New York, 18 NY3d 69 [2011]; Dinardo v City of New York, 13 NY3d 872 [2009]; Murchinson v State of New York, 97 AD3d 1014 [2012]; Lewis v State of New York, 68 AD3d 1513 [2009]). Thus, not only must a claimant aggrieved by a court clerk's error establish that the conduct complained of was ministerial, he or she must further establish that such conduct violated a special duty owed to the individual claimant.
McLean set forth three ways in which a special duty to the claimant may arise:
" '(1) when the municipality violates a statutory duty enacted for the benefit of a particular class of persons; (2) when it voluntarily assumes a duty that generates justifiable reliance by the person who benefits from the duty; or (3) when the municipality assumes positive direction and control in the face of a known, blatant and dangerous safety violation' " (id. at 199, quoting Pelaez v Seide, 2 NY3d at 199-200).Here, the State's duty to record the criminal disposition was clearly ministerial governmental function. The Rules of the Chief Administrator of the Courts (22 NYCRR 115.4) required the following in this regard:
"[E]ach court having jurisdiction over the processing or disposition of criminal actions shall report case activity and disposition information with respect to each criminal action, on a form prescribed pursuant to section 115.1 of this Part, or by electronic media in a manner prescribed by the Chief Administrator. All such information shall be reported within 24 hours following the occurrence of the event if reported by electronic media, or within 48 hours if reported by form."
Having established that the duty allegedly breached was ministerial, pursuant to McLean the negligent performance of a ministerial function, standing alone, is an insufficient predicate for the imposition of liability. While a criminal disposition must be properly and promptly entered in the court records (and reported to the Division of Criminal Justice Services puruant to Executive Law § 837-b), no private right of action may be fairly implied from the regulatory requirement (see generally City of New York v Smokes-Spirits.Com, Inc., 12 NY3d 616 [2009]; Palaez v Seide, 2 NY3d 186, 200 [2004]; Carrier v Salvation Army, 88 NY2d 298 [1996]; Sheehy v Big Flats Community Day, 73 NY2d 629 [1989]). The Court of Appeals re-stated the requirements necessary to form a special relationship through breach of a statutory duty in Pelaez v Seide (3 NY3d at 200 [internal citation omitted]):
"To form a special relationship through breach of a statutory duty, the governing statute must authorize a private right of action. One may be fairly implied when (1) the plaintiff is one of the class for whose particular benefit the statute was enacted; (2) recognition of a private right of action would promote the legislative purpose of the governing statute; and (3) to do so would be consistent with the legislative scheme . . . If one of these prerequisites is lacking, the claim will fail."
Here, the rule requiring reports of criminal case dispositions (22 NYCRR 115.4) appears to be no more than a means of tracking case activity and controlling court calendars (see also 22 NYCRR 115.2). No intent to benefit claimant as a member of the class for whose particular benefit the regulation was enacted is discernable from the regulation. Given the limited purpose of the regulation, recognition of a private right of action would not be consistent with the regulatory scheme. Moreover, the availability of article 78 relief to correct the claimant's criminal record militates against the creation of a private right of action for a violation of the regulation (see Signature Health Ctr., LLC v State of New York, 92 AD3d 11, 17 [2011], lv denied 19 NY3d 811 [2012]).
Nor do the facts reflect either a voluntary assumption of a duty by the State and the claimant's justifiable reliance thereon, or the assumption of positive direction and control in the face of a known and dangerous safety violation (see Garrett v Holiday Inns, 58 NY2d 253 [1983]). Similar cases decided since McLean have concluded that the special duty requirement was lacking (see e.g. Anderson-Haider v State of New York, 29 Misc 3d 816 [2010] [negligence claim based upon disclosure of youthful offender history in violation of statutory requirement that such records be sealed was summarily dismissed as claimant failed to establish a special duty owed to the claimant]; Hill v State of New York, UID No. 2009-041-045 [Ct Cl, Milano, J., Dec. 7, 2009]; [claimant failed to establish violation of a special duty arising from the ministerial error of a court clerk in improperly completing two certificates of disposition without indicating that the sentences were to run concurrently]). Accordingly, to the extent the claim and proposed amended claim allege a negligence cause of action arising from the court clerk's failure to properly record a criminal disposition, it must be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
For similar reasons, claimant's contention that Edgecombe was negligent in denying claimant entry into the program must fail. He failed to establish a special duty owed to the claimant or that the decision rejecting him from Edgecombe was anything other than a discretionary one for which the State is immune from liability.
Based on the foregoing, defendant's motion to dismiss the claim is granted and the claim is dismissed. Claimant's cross motion is denied.
January 3, 2013
Saratoga Springs, New York
FRANCIS T. COLLINS
Judge of the Court of Claims
The Court considered the following papers:
1. Notice of motion dated June 15, 2012;
2. Affirmation of Jessica Hall dated June 15, 2012 with exhibits;
3. Notice of cross motion dated September 11, 2012;
4. Affirmation of Philip Hoffman dated September 11, 2012 with exhibits;
5. Reply affirmation of Jessica Hall dated September 24, 2012 with exhibits;
6. Affirmation of Jessica Hall dated October 1, 2012;
7.Affirmation of Philip Hoffman dated October 2, 2012 with exhibit.