Opinion
No. 3:00 CV 0075
July 14, 2000
Chris K. Starkey, Fort Wayne, IN, for Petitioner.
Theresa A. Stevens, Indianapolis, IN, for Respondents.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Jeremy Lee Adang, an Indiana prisoner confined at the Westville Correctional Facility, filed a petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, by his next-friends and by counsel, seeking the restoration of good time credits lost as the result of prison disciplinary actions. A state prisoner has a liberty interest in good time credits he has earned, as good time directly affect the length of his sentence. Hamlin v. Vaudenberg, 95 F.3d 580, 584 (7th Cir. 1996). Habeas corpus is an appropriate remedy for loss of good time credits, Harris v. Duckworth, 909 F.2d 1057, 1058 (7th Cir. 1990), and a state prisoner may maintain a petition for writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the procedures by which a prison disciplinary board revoked his good time credits violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 454 (1985); Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
Jeremy Adang is serving a six year sentence for burglary imposed by the Allen Superior Court. This case involves a long series of Conduct Adjustment Board ("CAB") proceedings which are factually set forth in the response to order to show cause filed by the Indiana Attorney General, and by the CAB records attached thereto. These submissions establish that in 1998 and 1999, there were seven such proceedings that resulted in the loss of good time credits or demotion to a lower good time earning classification.
When they filed this petition, Jeremy Adang's parents did not know how many disciplinary actions had resulted in Jeremy losing good time credits. In the interest of judicial economy, this court is indulging these petitioners by permitting them to bring all of the CAB proceedings identified in the return to order to show cause, where the better practice would be normally be that each be considered in a separate case.
As a preliminary matter, pursuant to the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Hogan v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 189, 190 (7th Cir. 1996), the court will, sua sponte, strike the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC") and IDOC Commissioner Ed Cohn as respondents in this case. The proper respondent is Jeremy Adang's custodian, Westville Correctional Facility ("WCF") Superintendent Daniel McBride.
Jeremy Adang's parents Terry and Beth Adang seek to bring this petition on Jeremy's behalf, as his guardians and next friends. This court is well aware of the problems inherent in next friend proceedings for person seeking relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See Brinkman-Roche v. Anderson, Cause Number 3:98cv0347 AS. This court is also familiar with the implications of Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990), which establishes that to establish standing as a next friend in a federal habeas case:
First, a "next friend" must provide an adequate explanation — such as inaccessibility, mental incompetence, or other disability — why the real party in interest cannot appear on his own behalf to prosecute the action. Second, the "next friend" must be truly dedicated to the best interests of the person on whose behalf he seeks to litigate and it has been further suggested that a "next friend" must have some significant relationship with the real party in interest. The burden is on the "next friend" clearly to establish the propriety of his status and thereby justify the jurisdiction of the court.Id. at 163-164 (citations omitted).
The petitioners argue that Jeremy has mental and psychological disabilities that justify his parents bringing this action as his next friends. Counsel for the parties in this case have ably argued the merits of whether Jeremy's parents are proper "next friends" for the purposes of this action.
In order to conclusively resolve Jeremy Adang's mental and psychological state, it would probably be necessary to gather more evidence than is available in this record. But rather than conduct an extensive and time-consuming hearing, the court concludes that no particular harm can be done by letting this lawyer and the so-called next friends proceed with this case. Whitmore dealt with an inmate who wished to waive his direct appeal to the Arkansas Supreme Court in order to expedite the carrying out of his death sentence. Another inmate sought to intervene to obtain a stay of execution. In this case, unlike Whitmore, there is no suggestion that Jeremy Adang is hostile to a challenge to loss of good time in disciplinary actions. Accordingly, bottoming a dismissal of this petition on the question of whether his parents may file a "next friend" habeas petition would invite a refiling of the petition by an attorney directly on behalf of Jeremy Adang. In the interest of judicial economy, this court will consider the issues raised in this petition.
The petition alleges that the challenged CAB actions violated both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. But the Fifth Amendment's due process clause applies only to acts of the federal government and does not limit actions of state officials. Craig v. Cohn, 80 F. Supp.2d 944, 947 (N.D.Ind. 2000) ; Huffaker v. Bucks County District Attorney's Office, 758 F. Supp. 287, 290 (E.D.Pa. 1991). The liberty interest in good time credits enjoyed by State prisoners arises under the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
The procedural protections, established by Wolff v. McDonnell, for inmates facing loss of good time credits in prison disciplinary hearings, are essentially advance written notice of the disciplinary charges, an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence and witnesses, and adjudication by a neutral committee that puts its findings on the record. McKinney v. Meese, 831 F.2d 728, 733 (7th Cir. 1987). Once a prisoner has been granted these procedural protections, the role of a reviewing court "is limited to determining whether there was sufficient evidence to support the committee's decision." Id. at 733. A committee's determination of guilt is constitutionally valid if there is "any evidence in the record that could support the conclusion reached by the disciplinary board." Superintendent, Mass. Correctional Institution v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455, 105 S.Ct. 2768, 2773, 86 L.Ed.2d 356 (1985).
According to the petition, Jeremy Adang has been diagnosed as having an IQ of 69, giving him a mental capacity of a typical ten year old. The petition also asserts that Jeremy has been diagnosed as having mental problems that require psychiatric treatment and that when he receives improper treatment or does not take properly prescribed psychiatric medication, he is incapable of regulating his own conduct or defending himself at disciplinary hearings.
Attached to the petition is an order entered in 1996, before Jeremy was incarcerated, in which the Allen Superior Court found that he was "incapable of handing his person and property" based on the factors cited by the petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Allen Superior Court designated Jeremy's parents as his guardians.
Jeremy's parents contend that the guardianship order entered by the Allen Superior Court remained in force after his conviction, and entitled them to be notified of disciplinary charges against Jeremy and to participate in the CAB hearings. The Indiana Department of Correction apparently took the position that Jeremy's conviction, which committed him to the custody of the IDOC, superseded the guardianship order. Jeremy's next friends state in their response to the return to order to show cause that for IDOC officials "to ignore the court order because they contend that Jeremy's imprisonment revoked it likewise borders on contempt of court. The General Assembly has provided a method for someone who does not believe a guardianship is proper to have it set aside."
The petitioners assert that Jeremy Adang is not capable of representing himself in disciplinary actions. Wolff v. McDonnell, which establishes to contours of a state prisoner's Constitutional due process rights when facing the loss of good time credits, did not hold that all inmates facing the loss of good time credits were entitled to a lay advocate. Only inmates who were illiterate or faced some other severe detriment have a Constitutional right to assistance from a lay advocate. Wolff v. McDonnell 418 U.S. at 571.
Wolff v. McDonnell provides that a prisoner who lacks the intellect to represent himself is entitled to a lay advocate. For the purposes of this memorandum, this court will accept the proposition that Jeremy Adang is sufficiently incapacitated, within the meaning of Wolff v. McDonnell, to be within the class of prisoners entitled to a lay advocate at CAB hearings where he faced the potential loss of good time credits. The records submitted by the respondent indicate that prison officials afforded Jeremy a lay advocate each time he requested one. The petitioners essentially contend that, in lieu of appointing a lay advocate, the IDOC should have allowed them to participate in the disciplinary hearings.
But even where a prisoner is Constitutionally entitled to lay assistance at a prison disciplinary hearing, prison officials are the persons who have the authority to chose who is entitled to serve as a lay advocate. In Wolff, the Court held that prisoners "within the class of inmates entitled to advice or help from others in the course of a disciplinary hearing" should "be free to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, or if that is forbidden, to have adequate substitute aid in the form of help from the staff or from a sufficiently competent inmate designated by the staff." Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. at 571. Prison officials could allow persons from outside the prison to participate in disciplinary hearings as lay advocates, but the Constitution does not require that they do so.
Moreover, under Wolff, and its progeny, the respondent is not Constitutionally obligated to notify these next friends of the pending CAB proceedings involving Jeremy Adang. The Constitution does not establish a right for state appointed guardians of a prisoner to be notified of prison disciplinary charges against the that prisoner or to be present at the hearing. To the extent that Jeremy's parents had any rights in this regard, they arise under the 1996 order entered by the Allen Superior Court.
In its collateral review of prison disciplinary proceedings under § 2254, this Court must examine the record for alleged constitutional errors. See Bell v. Duckworth, 861 F.2d 169 (7th Cir. 1988). cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1088 (1989). This court does not, however, sit as a trier de novo in prison disciplinary proceedings or as a court of common law review, Cain v. Lane, 857 F.2d 1139, 1140 (7th Cir. 1984), nor does this court does sit to determine questions of state law. Kraushaar v. Flanigan, 45 F.3d 1040 (7th Cir. 1995).
Counsel for the petitioners has ably presented the petitioner's contentions in this case regarding the effect of the guardianship entered by the Allen Superior Court. But the authority of this court to review prison disciplinary actions is severely circumscribed, and the relief requested is beyond the power of this court to grant. Even in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, this court lacks jurisdiction to enjoin a state's employees to follow state law; "(a) federal court's grant of relief against state officials on the basis of state law, . . . does not vindicate the supreme authority of federal law. On the contrary, it is difficult to think of a greater intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state officials on how to conform their conduct to state law. Such a result conflicts directly with the principles of federalism that underlie the Eleventh Amendment." Pennhurst State School Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984). Any questions regarding whether the order of the Allen Superior Court appointing Jeremy Adang's parents as his guardians remained valid after his commitment to the Indiana Department of Correction, and if so what obligations IDOC officials were subject to under the order, are matters of state law that must be resolved by the state courts.
The court next turns to the Constitutional validity of the seven disciplinary actions in which Jeremy Adang lost good time credits or was demoted to a lower credit time earning classification. The petitioners concede in their response to the respondent's return to the order to show cause that there was some evidence to support each of the disciplinary. Accordingly, this court's review of these CAB actions is restricted to the procedure used by WCF officials in these hearings.
The respondent asserts that the doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default preclude this court from reviewing any of the disciplinary actions in which Jeremy lost good time credits or was demoted in good time earning classification. Indiana does not allow prisoners to challenge the loss of good time in prison disciplinary actions in state courts, but the Indiana Department of Correction has established an administrative appeals process by which state prisoners may challenge adverse results of disciplinary actions. In Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d 993 (7th Cir. 1992), a case that arose in the Hammond division of this court, the Seventh Circuit held that an Indiana state prisoner who fails to pursue an administrative appeal of his denial of parole or of a prison disciplinary conviction "forfeit[s] his state remedies" and is thus also "barred from obtaining relief from the federal court." 978 F.2d at 995. The petitioners admit that Jeremy Adang did not file administrative appeals in any of the cases in which he lost good time credits. Accordingly, Jeremy failed to exhaust the state administrative remedies available to him and his failure to file timely administrative appeals constitute procedural default. Markham v. Clark, 978 F.2d at 995.
Procedural default will be excused only if the habeas petitioner can show cause and prejudice for his failure to exhaust his claims, or if a failure to review the claims on procedural grounds would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Howard v. Sullivan, 185 F.3d 721 (7th Cir. 1999). The petitioners argue that Jeremy's failure to pursue administrative appeals arose from the fact that he was incapable of representing himself and therefore "circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(B)(ii). But the CAB officials appointed a lay advocate for Jeremy each time he requested one, which is the remedy set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell where an inmate's lacks the capacity to represent himself, and a lay advocate presumably could have assisted Jeremy in pursuing administrative appeals as well as assisting him at the hearing itself. Based on the record before it and the applicable statutory and case law, this court does not believe that it has the authority to rule that the IDOC procedures in these disciplinary actions establish rendered the process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant, thus creating an exception to the ruling in Markham v. Clark requiring Indiana prisoners to exhaust their administrative remedies.
For the foregoing reasons, this court STRIKES the Indiana Department of Correction and Indiana Department of Correction Commissioner Ed Cohn as respondents and GRANTS Terry J. Adang and Beth A. Adang leave to proceed as Jeremy Adang's next friends in this case. After reviewing the parties' submissions, the court concludes that Jeremy Adang failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies, and DENIES his petition for writ of habeas corpus without prejudice to the petitioners' right to seek further clarification in state court of their rights under the guardianship order.