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Adams v. Zucker Enterprises, Inc.

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Jun 15, 2005
705 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)

Opinion

No. 5-391 / 04-1072

Filed June 15, 2005

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, Artis Reis, Judge.

Luann Adams appeals from the district court's entry of judgment in favor of the employer on her claim of disability discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act. AFFIRMED.

Bruce H. Stoltze of Brick, Gentry, Bowers, Swartz, Stoltze, Schuling Levis, P.C., Des Moines, for appellant.

Brent D. Rosenberg of Rosenberg, Stowers Morse, Des Moines, for appellee.

Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Mahan and Zimmer, JJ.


Luann Adams appeals from the district court's entry of judgment in favor of her former employer, Zucker Enterprises, Inc., doing business as Zook's Harley-Davidson (hereinafter "Zook's"), on her claim of disability discrimination under the Iowa Civil Rights Act (ICRA). Specifically, she avers the district court's finding that she was terminated for a nondiscriminatory reason is not supported by substantial evidence. We affirm.

I. Background Facts Proceedings.

Zook's, a Harley-Davidson motorcycle dealership, employed Adams as a sales associate in the apparel department from 1993 until her termination on June 13, 2000. Adams was the unfortunate victim of several prior sexual assaults, unrelated to her employment at Zook's. As a result of these attacks, she suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). She further suffered from major depressive disorder and panic disorder. Unfortunately, sometime after she was diagnosed in 1999, the symptoms associated with her mental disorders began to have a negative effect on her employment. She increasingly arrived late to work. On other occasions, her symptoms prevented her from coming into work altogether. Zook's, aware of Adams's mental disorders, expressed a tolerance and understanding of her increased absenteeism and tardiness. Although Zook's was willing to accommodate Adams, her therapist decided it would be best if Adams sought inpatient treatment for her disorders. Pursuant to her therapist's recommendation, Adams requested a two-week medical leave of absence, which would enable her to receive inpatient treatment at Two Rivers Psychiatric Hospital (hereinafter "Two Rivers") in Kansas City. Zook's granted Adams's request, and she received treatment at Two Rivers from March 18 to April 4, 2000. Unfortunately, two weeks proved to be an insufficient amount of time to effectuate Adams's recovery. Consequently, Adams requested an additional two weeks of medical leave. Zook's again acquiesced to Adams's request. Following the completion of her inpatient treatment, the professionals at Two Rivers recommended Adams take an additional eight weeks of leave to facilitate her treatment. Zook's again granted this request setting Adams's return date as June 12, 2000. Throughout Adams's treatment, Zook's continued to provide Adams with all her employment benefits, including health insurance.

Adams worked primarily as a sales associate; however, she intermittently performed some managerial tasks as well.

Individuals suffering from PTSD have chronic elevated levels of adrenaline in the bloodstream. This can cause insomnia, hypervigiliance, irritability, and angry outbursts. PTSD patients often experience nightmares, flashbacks, intrusive memories of original traumas, and dissociative states. Adams's mental disability was well documented and she exhibited most, if not all, of these symptoms.

Adams's therapist felt her symptoms were being exacerbated by the day-to-day stress associated with working at Zook's.

Sometime during late May and early June of 2000, Zook's acquired information suggesting that Adams, although on medical leave, was providing motorcycle detailing and other services to Original Motorcycle (hereinafter "Original"), a competing motorcycle dealership. Zook's employee handbook strictly prohibited working for a competing motorcycle dealership or repair shop. Specifically, the handbook provided, "You may not do any type of work for another dealer, repair shop, company, or individual who sells[,] services or repairs Harley-Davidson, Buell or any other products, sold, serviced or repaired by [Zook's Harley-Davidson]." It was around this same time frame that Adams's therapist sent a letter to Zook's requesting another eight weeks of medical leave for Adams. On June 2, 2002, Adams's supervisor, Jon Olsen, traveled to Original to investigate the rumors surrounding Adams's employment outside of Zook's. Upon observing Adams working at Original, Olsen told her, "I'm not sure that was a really wise decision." On June 3, 2000, Olsen again observed Adams detailing motorcycles for Original at a motorcycle extravaganza. On June 6, 2000, Olsen issued what he regarded as a verbal warning to Adams by stating "it was not cool" to be working for Original. According to Olsen's testimony, Adams became extremely agitated and threatened legal action following his admonishment.

"Detailing" refers to the process of polishing and washing motorcycles.

It is undisputed that Adams signed for and received a copy of the employee handbook.

The letter was dated May 31, 2000. The record does not reflect when Zook's actually received the letter.

Shortly after Olsen's investigation, Tom Zucker, the owner of Zook's, Keith Zoellner, the general manager of Zook's, and Olsen met to discuss Adams's situation and her involvement with Original. Zucker testified that the decision to terminate her employment was based solely on the fact she violated company policy by providing services to Original. Because Zook's decided to terminate Adams, her request for an additional eight weeks of leave became a nonissue and was never definitively acted upon. By letter dated June 13, 2000, Zoellner advised Adams the decision had been made to terminate her employment with Zook's. On June 15, 2000, Olsen issued a memorandum to Zook's remaining employees regarding Adams's termination. The memorandum stated the sole reason Adams had been let go was due to the fact she had been working at the Original shop in violation of company policy.

On April 1, 2002, Adams filed a petition claiming Zook's wrongfully terminated her employment based on her requests for medical leave due to her disability. Adams alleged causes of action under the ICRA and the common law. In its answer, Zook's asserted it terminated Adams for a nondiscriminatory reason. A three-day bench trial commenced on January 20, 2004. On March 1, 2004, the district court entered judgment in favor of Zook's dismissing Adams's causes of action. The district court found Zook's terminated Adams solely because she violated the employee handbook by working for Original, not because of her disability. Accordingly, the district court concluded Adams was not entitled to relief under the ICRA. The district court further determined Adams was not entitled to relief on her common-law wrongful termination claim because it was preempted by the ICRA. On March 15, 2004, Adams filed a motion pursuant to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 1.904( b) asserting the court erred in failing to find disability discrimination was a factor in Zook's decision to terminate Adams. Adams further argued the district court erred in finding her common-law wrongful termination claim was preempted by the ICRA. After hearing oral arguments, the district court denied Adams's motion in its entirety. Adams appeals.

II. Standard of Review.

Appellate review of disability discrimination claims tried to the court is at law. Schlitzer v. University of Iowa Hosps. Clinics, 641 N.W.2d 525, 529 (Iowa 2002). We are bound by the district court's findings of fact if they are supported by substantial evidence. Id. Evidence is substantial if a reasonable person would accept it as adequate to reach a conclusion. Vincent v. Four M Paper Corp., 589 N.W.2d 55, 59 (Iowa 1999). When evaluating whether evidence is substantial, we view it in the light most favorable to upholding the judgment of the district court. Id. We are not bound, however, by the district court's application of legal principles or conclusions of law. Id. III. Statutory Framework.

The Iowa Civil Rights Act generally prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified person because of a disability. Iowa Code § 216.6(1) (2003); see Casey's Gen. Stores, Inc. v. Blackford, 661 N.W.2d 515, 519 (Iowa 2003). In construing the ICRA, the corresponding federal statutory framework — in this case the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) — is instructive. See Blackford, 661 N.W.2d at 519; see also Schlitzer, 641 N.W.2d at 529. With these principles in mind, we note that Adams did not put forth direct evidence of discrimination. Consequently, her disability discrimination claim is assessed under the burden-shifting framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green and its progeny. 411 U.S. 792, 802-03, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973); see also St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07, 113 S. Ct. 2742, 125 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1993); United States Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-15, 103 S. Ct. 1478, 75 L. Ed. 2d 403 (1983); Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-56, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981). Under this framework, a claimant must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Young v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 152 F.3d 1018, 1021 (8th Cir. 1998). If the plaintiff satisfies this initial burden, a rebuttable presumption of discrimination is created, and the burden the shifts to the defendant-employer to rebut the presumption by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Id. If the employer proffers such a reason, the presumption of discrimination disappears and the claimant must demonstrate the nondiscriminatory reason asserted by the employer is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination. Id. At all times the burden of proving intentional discrimination remains with the plaintiff. Id. IV. Prima Facie Case.

In order to succeed on her claim of disability discrimination, Adams must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination by showing (1) she has a disability as defined by the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(2) (2000); (2) she is qualified to perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) she has suffered an adverse employment action from which an inference of unlawful discrimination arises. See Allen v. Interior Constr. Servs., Ltd., 214 F.3d 978, 981 (8th Cir. 2000) (setting forth the elements of a prima facie case of discrimination under the ADA). The district court made a specific factual finding that Adams was terminated solely because she violated the "Other Employment" provision of the employee handbook. In accord with this finding, the court determined Adams had not carried her burden with respect to the third prong of her prima facie case because she had not shown her termination gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Upon our review of the record, we conclude substantial evidence supports the district court's finding.

"An inference of discrimination arises when there is some evidence of a causal connection between a plaintiff's disability and the adverse employment action taken against the plaintiff." Allen, 214 F.3d at 982 (citing Greer v. Emerson Elec. Co., 185 F.3d 917, 922 (8th Cir. 1999). Typically, the evidence most often proffered to establish this connection is that of disparate treatment, whereby a claimant demonstrates that other similarly situated employees not within plaintiff's protected class were treated more favorably. See id.; see also Wallin v. Minnesota Dep't of Corr., 153 F.3d 681, 687 (8th Cir. 1998). However, although disparate treatment evidence commonly gives rise to an inference of discrimination, it is not the exclusive means by which a claimant may establish such an inference. Young, 152 F.3d at 1022 (citing Miners v. Cargill Communications, Inc., 113 F.3d 820, 824 n. 7 (8th Cir. 1997)). Rather, any credible evidence tending to prove than an employer acted adversely to an individual because of a disability will suffice. See Greer, 185 F.3d at 922.

In support of the third prong of her prima facie case, Adams points to the termination letter authored by Zook's detailing the reasons for her termination. She relies upon the following language contained in the termination letter to support an inference of intentional discrimination:

Due to your inability to return to work within the time approved for your leave of absence and your deliberate violation of the Other Employment guidelines as explained in the Employee Handbook, your employment at Zook's Harley-Davidson is hereby terminated effective immediately.

Adams asserts this language, and other language referencing her leaves of absence, indicate Zook's terminated her because of her disability. We disagree. We agree that when portions of the letter are read out of context, the reasons cited for Adams's termination could be construed as confusing and ambiguous. However, upon consideration of the termination letter in its entirety, the only logical inference that can be gleaned therefrom is that Adams was fired due to the fact she continued to work for a competing motorcycle shop in contravention to the rules promulgated in the employee handbook, not because of her disability. Further, assuming arguendo the termination letter could be read to suggest Adams was terminated because of her disability, the remaining evidence presented at trial clearly refuted any such inference. The memorandum issued by Olsen to the remaining Zook's employees and the testimony introduced at trial support the conclusion that Adams was terminated solely because for much of the time she was unable to work at Zook's, she was able and willing to work for a competing motorcycle dealership, in violation of the employee handbook. Thus, even if the termination letter could be read as creating an inference of discrimination, the remaining evidence presented at trial established Zook's dissatisfaction with Adams stemmed directly from her involvement with Original, and it was within the province of the district court to determine the weight of the evidence. See Cole v. Staff Temps, 554 N.W.2d 699, 706 (Iowa 1996) (citing Courtney v. American Nat'l Can Co., 537 N.W.2d 681, 686 (Iowa 1995)).

Adams further relies upon the fact that she was fired immediately after her third leave of absence expired — the same day her fourth leave of absence would have commenced. We also find this argument to be unavailing. Zook's willingly accommodated Adams's disability and granted all of her leave requests for approximately three months before she was ultimately terminated. It wasn't until Zook's discovered Adams's misconduct that the parties' relationship began to deteriorate. Thus, any argument with respect to "temporal proximity" weighs in favor of Zook's because Zook's willingly assisted Adams until she persisted in violating the employee handbook. In light of the foregoing, we conclude substantial evidence supports the conclusion that Zook's actions were solely motivated by Adams's violation of company policy and not by a discriminatory animus.

The parties further argue at length in their briefs over whether Adams met her burden with respect to the second prong of her prima facie case — whether she was a "qualified individual." However, because we have determined Adams did not meet her burden with respect to prong three, we need not address this issue. Additionally, we will not entertain Adams's remaining arguments with respect to further analysis under the burden-shifting paradigm of McDonnell Douglas and its progeny. As the district court correctly concluded, further analysis in this case is unwarranted because Adams failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the district court.

AFFIRMED.


Summaries of

Adams v. Zucker Enterprises, Inc.

Court of Appeals of Iowa
Jun 15, 2005
705 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)
Case details for

Adams v. Zucker Enterprises, Inc.

Case Details

Full title:LUANN ADAMS, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ZUCKER ENTERPRISES, INC., d/b/a…

Court:Court of Appeals of Iowa

Date published: Jun 15, 2005

Citations

705 N.W.2d 105 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)