Opinion
CIV-22-317-D
05-25-2022
MIGUEL ADRIAN ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. THE GEO GROUP INC., et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHON T. ERWIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Miguel Adams, appearing prose, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging civil rights violations. (ECF No. 1). Chief United States District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti has referred this matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). A review of the Complaint has been conducted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Based on that review, it is recommended that the Court: (1) dismiss, with prejudice, the official capacity claims against all individual Defendants; (2) dismiss, without prejudice, the remaining claims against Defendants GEO, Bowen, and Honickner, and (3) conclude that Plaintiff has stated individual capacity Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Achidi and Smith, limited to the recovery of monetary damages.
I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT
The Court must review each complaint in which a prisoner seeks redress against a governmental entity, officer, or employee and each case in which a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court is required to dismiss the complaint or any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b); see also Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 121718 (10th Cir. 2007) (indicating that court uses same analysis for complaint's sufficiency whether performed sua sponte or pursuant to a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must accept Mr. Adams' allegations as true and construe them, and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). Since Mr. Smith is proceeding pro se, his complaint must be construed liberally. See id. at 1218. The Court “review[s] the complaint for plausibility; that is, to determine whether the complaint includes enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1256 (10th Cir. 2009) (quotations and citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged (his) claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility requirement “serves not only to weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim against them.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008).
A complaint fails to state such a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).
Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal).
III. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT
While an inmate at Lawton Correctional and Rehabilitation Facility (LCRF), Mr. Adams alleges he was the victim of cruel and unusual punishment in the form of deliberate indifference to his chronic diverticulitis. (ECF Nos. 1:5, 16-24). As Defendants, Mr. Adams names: (1) The GEO Group, corporate owner of LCRF (GEO); (2) Mark Bowen, warden of LCRF; (3) Nurse Smith, employee of LCRF; (4) Nurse Achidi, employee of LCRF; and (5) FNU Honickner, as “medical administrator” at LCRF (ECF No. 1:1, 2, 3, 13, 14, 17, 19, 20-22, 24).
On April 26, 2021, Plaintiff alleges that he: (1) informed Defendant Achidi that he was suffering stomach pain and (2) requested that she check Plaintiff's vitals and take his temperature which could have revealed the presence of an infection related to his diverticulitis. (ECF No. 1:20). Mr. Adams contends that Defendant Achidi declined the request, left Plaintiff's cell, and returned two hours later after being contacted by a correctional officer that Plaintiff was still in extreme pain. (ECF No. 1:20). Upon her return, Mr. Adams states that Nurse Achidi again declined Plaintiff's request to take his vitals, stated that Plaintiff would have to die before he received medical attention, and left, with Mr. Adams still suffering in extreme pain. (ECF No. 1:20).
On July 27, 2021, Mr. Adams states that he advised Defendant Smith that he was suffering severe stomach pain, and asked her to check his vitals and take his temperature to check for an infection. (ECF No. 1:22). According to Plaintiff, Defendant Smith declined the request, left Plaintiff's cell, and never came back, despite numerous requests. (ECF No. 1:22). The following morning, Plaintiff was still suffering stomach pain and went to medical to seek relief. (ECF No. 1:22). While there, Mr. Adams states that Defendant Smith told him that he had “never turned in a sick call slip,” there was “nothing she could do for him,” and the situation was not considered an “emergency sick call matter.” (ECF No. 1:22). Plaintiff again requested that Nurse Smith check for an infection, and she did. (ECF No. 1:22-23). Defendant Smith told Plaintiff he had a temperature of 100 degrees, which Plaintiff believed showed an infection and warranted further medical attention. (ECF No. 1:23). According to Plaintiff, however, Nurse Smith “refused to help and call the doctor,” and sent Plaintiff back to his cell. (ECF No. 1:23).
Later that morning, Mr. Adams states that he was rushed back to medical with a temperature “around 100 to 104.” (ECF No. 1:23). Plaintiff was subsequently taken to a hospital outside the facility where he received antibiotics for 6 days and was scheduled for surgery. (ECF No. 1:24). According to Plaintiff:
Defendant Smith should be held accountable for her poor action that could have been fatal to the Plaintiff.
The Defendant's job was to help offenders that need medical attention and call the doctor on call to let him know the Plaintiff's symptoms and status. This Defendant failed to do so and made the Plaintiff suffer in pain near death and once again the Defendant should be held accountable to deter from future poor decisions.(ECF No. 1:24).
Plaintiff sues each Defendant in their individual and official capacities and seeks monetary relief. (ECF No. 1:2, 3, 13, 25-28).
IV. OFFICIAL CAPACITY CLAIMS-INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS
Mr. Adams sues each Defendant in their official and individual capacities for exhibiting deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See supra. In doing so, Plaintiff identifies each individual defendant as an employee of LCRF, a private prison owned and operated by GEO. (ECF No. 1:2, 3, 13). However, as employees of a private prison, these Defendants are not state officials, and official capacity claims cannot be asserted against them. See Jones v. Barry, 33 Fed.Appx. 967, 971 (10th Cir. 2002) (“the CCA defendants are not state actors, and they do not have an “official capacity.”); Alamin v. Patton, No. CIV-13-1001-F, 2016 WL 7217857, at *6 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 13, 2016) ("As employees of a private prison, they are not state officials, and official capacity claims cannot be asserted against them.”). As a result, the Court should dismiss the official capacity claims against all Defendants, with prejudice.
V. DEFENDANTS GEO AND BOWEN
Plaintiff has sued Mark Bowen, warden of LCRF, in his individual capacity and GEO, LCRF's corporate owner. See supra. But Plaintiff's claim of liability against these two Defendants is based solely on Mr. Adams' belief that they maintained some sort of supervisory control over the actions of GEO employees. Mr. Adams states:
Plaintiff seeks liability against GEO in both its individual and official capacities. (ECF No. 1:2). But as a private entity, GEO lacks traditional individual or official capacities. See Smith v. Lawton Corr. Facility, No. CIV-18-110-C, 2018 WL 1406592, at *3 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 7, 2018), report and recommendation adopted, No. CIV-18-110-C, 2018 WL 1403911 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 20, 2018).
The GEO Group Inc and Mark Bowen are to be held responsible for their employees wrongful action. The GEO care is an affiliate of GEO Group and responsible for providing medical care to prisoners incarcerated in GEO's Group's [sic] facilities. Nurse Achidi, Nurse Smith, Medical Administrator Honickner [sic] they are and w[]ere employee's of the GEO Group and/or GEO care and responsible for providing medical care to prisoners incarcerated in GEO Group's [sic] facilities and Mark Bowen (warden) is the overseer of these employees and has purposely negelected [sic] the numerous complaints of said Defendant's [sic] as well as the GEO Group. These Defendants should be held accountable for there [sic] neglect of prisoners rights to have proper medical treatment if needed to deter those Defendant's [sic] from future neglect of prisoner rights.(ECF No. 1:19). The Court should dismiss the claims against these Defendants, without prejudice.
A private actor such as GEO cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely based on the actions of its employees. See Smedley v. Corrections Corp, of America, 175 Fed.Appx. 943, 946 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Monell v. Dept of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). To establish GEO's liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish three basic elements: (1) GEO has an official policy or custom; (2) that caused a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights; and (3) “was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable” federal rights violation. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dept, 717 F.3d 760, 769-71 (10th Cir. 2013). Likewise, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges liability against Defendant Bowen in a supervisory capacity, Mr. Adams must allege that Defendant Bowen: (1) promulgated, created, implemented, or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010).
Here, Plaintiff has failed to allege the violation of any particular policy created or maintained by either GEO or Defendant Bowen which caused the alleged deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs. See ECF No. 1. In an attempt to create a connection between these Defendants and the alleged constitutional violation, Plaintiff references the LCRF inmate handbook, which he states was approved and signed by GEO and Defendant Bowen. (ECF No. 1:19). According to Plaintiff, he utilized the “emergency sick call” procedures as outlined in the handbook to seek medical attention, but was nonetheless treated with deliberate indifference by Nurses Achidi and Smith, as described above. See ECF No. 1:20-24; see supra. The Court should conclude that these allegations are too tenuous to link Defendants GEO and Bowen to the actions of Nurses Achidi and Smith. Although Plaintiff utilized a policy arguably attributable to these Defendants (the emergency sick call procedure), the policy itself was not the cause for the alleged constitutional violation. Instead, Plaintiff attributes the alleged violation to the deliberate indifference of Nurses Achidi and Smith in failing to respond to his requests for treatment, not the fact that a policy existed which allowed him to seek medical care in the first instance. As a result, the Court should conclude that Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim against Defendants GEO and Bowen, and the Court should dismiss the remaining claims against these Defendants, without prejudice.
VI. DEFENDANT HONICKNER
To succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must show “the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and law of the United States,” and that the violation “was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). Because § 1983 is a vehicle for imposing personal liability on government officials, the Court must pay “careful attention to particulars, especially in lawsuits involving multiple defendants.” Pahls v. Thomas, 718 F.3d 1210, 1225-26 (10th Cir. 2013). "[I]t is particularly important” that plaintiffs “make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, . . . as distinguished from collective allegations.” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1215 (10th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Conclusory allegations of involvement do not suffice. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.”).
In the style of the Complaint and when listing the Defendants, Plaintiff names "Medical Administration Honickner” or Honickner as "Medical Administrator.” (ECF No. 1:1, 13, 14). But in the body of the Complaint, Mr. Adams fails to allege any wrongdoing committed by this Defendant. See ECF No. 1. The Court "will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). Mr. Adams' failure to link Defendant Honickner with any of the alleged violations, renders the Complaint legally deficient. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed (the plaintiff); and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”). As a result, the Court should dismiss the individual capacity claim against Defendant Honickner, without prejudice, for failure to state a claim. See Mayfed v. Presbyterian Hosp. Admin., 772 Fed.Appx. 680, 686 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal when complaint contained “undifferentiated allegations” that did not “provide fair notice” to defendants because plaintiff had not “attributed specific acts to them”).
VII. DEFENDANTS ACHIDI AND SMITH
With the forgoing recommendations, what remains are Plaintiff's individual capacity claims against Nurses Achidi and Smith, alleging deliberate indifference to Plaintiff's serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. See supra. The Court should conclude that Plaintiff has stated a claim against these Defendants.
The Eighth Amendment “imposes duties on [prison] officials, who must provide humane conditions of confinement; prison officials must ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care, and must 'take reasonable measures to guarantee the safety of the inmates[.]' ” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (quoting Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526-527 (1984)). A "prison official's 'deliberate indifference' to a substantial risk of serious harm to an inmate violates the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 828; see also Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745, 751 (10th Cir. 2005) ('“A prison official's deliberate indifference to an inmate's serious medical needs is a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”). "The test for constitutional liability of prison officials 'involves both an objective and a subjective component.' ” Mata, 427 F.3d at 751 (quoting Sealock v. Colorado, 218 F.3d 1205, 1209 (10th Cir. 2000)).
Objectively, the harm complained of must be sufficiently "serious” to merit constitutional protection, and subjectively, the defendant must be aware of a substantial risk to plaintiff's health or safety and act in purposeful disregard of that risk. Martinez v. Beggs, 563 F.3d 1082, 1088-89 (10th Cir. 2009); see also Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (explaining that an Eighth Amendment violation occurs when an official's conduct (1) causes an injury that, objectively, is "sufficiently serious,” i.e., an injury that equates to the "denial of the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities”; and (2) that official had a "sufficiently culpable state of mind.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
As for medical care, a medical need is considered sufficiently serious "if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Hunt v. Uphof 199 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Ramos v. Lamm, 639 F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir. 1980)). But "[w]here the necessity for treatment would not be obvious to a lay person, the medical judgment of the physician, even if grossly negligent, is not subject to second-guessing in the guise of an Eighth Amendment claim.” Mata, 427 F.3d at 751. And “a delay in medical care only constitutes an Eighth Amendment violation where the plaintiff can show the delay resulted in substantial harm.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “The substantial harm requirement may be satisfied by lifelong handicap, permanent loss, or considerable pain.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
The subjective component is met if a prison official “knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837. "[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. "Unlike the objective component, the symptoms displayed by the prisoner are relevant to the subjective component of deliberate indifference.” Martinez, 563 F.3d at 1089. "Finally, the subjective component requires the prison official to disregard the risk of harm claimed by the prisoner.” Id.
Here, Plaintiff has alleged that he suffers from chronic diverticulitis which has been diagnosed and treated by a physician. See supra. The Court should conclude that these allegations meet the objective element of the Eighth Amendment test. The Court should also conclude that Plaintiff has satisfied the subjective component of the Eighth Amendment test by alleging that Nurses Achidi and Smith declined to take his vitals or otherwise determine whether Plaintiff was suffering an intestinal infection, and instead left him to suffer in "extreme pain” without seeking further medical attention and ultimately resulting in Plaintiff's hospitalization. See supra. Accordingly, the Court should conclude that Plaintiff has stated an Eighth Amendment individual capacity claim against these Defendants, limited to the recovery of monetary damages.
VIII. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The Court should: (1) dismiss, with prejudice, the official capacity claims against all individual Defendants; (2) dismiss, without prejudice, the remaining claims against Defendants GEO, Bowen, and Honickner, and (3) conclude that Plaintiff has stated individual capacity Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Achidi and Smith, limited to the recovery of monetary damages.
Plaintiff is hereby advised of his right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court by June 13, 2022. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10th Cir. 2010).
IX. STATUS OF THE REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation does not dispose of all issues currently referred to the undersigned magistrate judge in the captioned matter.