Opinion
CIV-21-297-D
03-25-2022
MIGUEL ADRIAN ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. THE GEO GROUP INC., et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHON T. ERWIN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Miguel Adrian Adams, appearing pro se, brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging civil rights violations. (ECF No. 17). Chief United States District Judge Timothy D. DeGiusti has referred this matter to the undersigned magistrate judge for initial proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B)-(C). Defendants, The GEO Group (GEO) and Mark Bowen, have filed a Motion to Dismiss/Motion for Summary Judgment and brief in support. (ECF No. 39). For the reasons set forth herein, it is recommended that Defendants' motion be GRANTED and the claims against Defendants GEO and Bowen be dismissed without prejudice.
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Defendants GEO and Bowen seek dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). (ECF No. 39). In ruling on Defendants' motion, the court “‘must accept all the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and must construe them in the light most favorable to . . . [P]laintiff.'” Thomas v. Kaven, 765 F.3d 1183, 1190 (10th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted). To survive dismissal, Plaintiff's “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true, ” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, ” then the plaintiff has not “nudged (his) claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility requirement “serves not only to weed out claims that do not (in the absence of additional allegations) have a reasonable prospect of success, but also to inform the defendants of the actual grounds of the claim against them.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1248 (10th Cir. 2008). “The plausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement, but it asks for more than a sheer possibility. . . .” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
A complaint fails to state a claim when it lacks factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. (footnote and citation omitted). Bare legal conclusions in a complaint are not assumed to be true; legal conclusions “must be supported by factual allegations” to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 662.
“[A] pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Whether a complaint contains sufficient facts to avoid dismissal is context-specific and is determined through a court's application of “judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1184-85 (10th Cir. 2010) (discussing Iqbal).
II. PLAINTIFF'S ALLEGATIONS AND RELIEF SOUGHT
While an inmate at Lawton Correctional and Rehabilitation Facility (LCRF), Mr. Adams alleges he was the victim of cruel and unusual punishment in the form of: (1) his life being put in danger after being demoted to “level one” with a misconduct and (2) deliberate indifference to his chronic diverticulitis. (ECF Nos. 17:7, 17-1:1-3). Plaintiff gives no additional information on the first claim but spends most of his brief on the alleged medical claim. See ECF Nos. 17 & 17-1. Regarding said claim, Mr. Adams alleges:
• medical staff ignored sick call requests and failed to “do protocol on the Plaintiff” which could have revealed serious pain associated with his diverticulitis;
• Nurse Achidi: (1) refused to take Plaintiff's temperature which he believes could have shown whether his intestines were leaking, and (2) laughed at Plaintiff and told him that if he was still suffering in two hours, he could notify the correctional officer on duty; and
• he suffered from stomach pain while at LCRF and was refused the right to be taken to an outside hospital for surgery.(ECF No. 17-1:1-3). Relevant to the instant motion, Mr. Adams identifies GEO and Warden Bowen as Defendants and seeks monetary relief. (ECF No. 17:4, 6, 7).
In response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff mentions a “Nurse Smith, ” whom Mr. Adams alleges ignored Plaintiff's fever and refused to call a doctor in order to facilitate outside medical care. (ECF No. 43:3-4). But Nurse Smith was not mentioned in Plaintiff's Amended Complaint, nor were the allegations against this individual responsive to anything in Defendants' dispositive motion. Compare ECF No. 39 with ECF No. 43. As a result, the Court need not consider any allegations against Nurse Smith. See Cty. of Santa Fe, N.M. v. Pub. Serv. Co. of N.M., 311 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 2002) (noting that “a federal court may only consider facts alleged within the complaint” when ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion; See Jojola v. Chavez, 55 F.3d 488, 494 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that a court is limited to assessing the legal sufficiency of the allegations contained within the four corners of the complaint) (citation omitted); See Blackmon v. U.S.D. 259 School Dist., 769 F.Supp.2d 1267, 1267 (D. Kan. Feb. 15, 2011) (“To the extent Plaintiff tried to assert additional or different claims in her response to Defendant's motion to dismiss, those claims are not allowed.”).
III. DISMISSAL OF CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANTS GEO AND BOWEN
The Court should dismiss, without prejudice, the claims against Defendants GEO and Bowen.
A. Defendant GEO
Plaintiff has sued GEO, LCRF's corporate owner. See ECF No. 17:4; see supra. Plaintiff makes no specific allegations against GEO in the Amended Complaint, but in the response to the Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiff states: “These Defendants [GEO and Bowen] should be held accountable for there [sic] employee actions.” (ECF No. 43:4). However, a private actor such as GEO cannot be held liable under § 1983 solely based on the actions of its employees. See Smedley v. Corrections Corp. of America, 175 Fed.Appx. 943, 946 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978)). To establish GEO's liability under § 1983, Plaintiff must establish three basic elements: (1) GEO has an official policy or custom; (2) that caused a violation of Plaintiff's federal rights; and (3) “was enacted or maintained with deliberate indifference to an almost inevitable” federal rights violation. Schneider v. City of Grand Junction Police Dep't, 717 F.3d 760, 769-71 (10th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff makes no such allegations in his Amended Complaint and supporting brief. See ECF Nos. 17 & 17-1. Mr. Adams alleges that his life was put in danger and prison officials deliberately ignored his serious medical needs, but he does not claim that the alleged wrongdoing was attributable to an official policy or custom of GEO. Accordingly, Plaintiff has failed to state a valid claim against GEO and the Court should dismiss any claim against this Defendant, without prejudice.
B. Defendant Bowen
Plaintiff asserts that his constitutional rights were violated through deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs-i.e.-his diverticulitis, as well as his life being “put in danger” after being demoted to “level one.” See supra. But Mr. Adams has failed to provide any specific details in support of how he believes Defendant Bowen had participated in the alleged deprivations.
In a case such as this one where Mr. Adams has brought claims against more than one defendant, “it is particularly important . . . that the complaint make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, to provide each individual with fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008). Mr. Adams has failed to do so and the Court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff's complaint or construct a legal theory on plaintiff's behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997). Mr. Adams' failure to link Defendant Bowen with any of the alleged violations, renders the Complaint legally deficient. See Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, at Arapahoe County Justice Center, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007) (explaining “that, to state a claim in federal court, a complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant's action harmed (the plaintiff); and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.”).
Additionally, to the extent that Plaintiff alleges liability against Defendant Bowen in a supervisory capacity, Mr. Adams must allege that Defendant Bowen: (1) promulgated, created, implemented, or possessed responsibility for the continued operation of a policy that (2) caused the complained of constitutional harm and (3) acted with the state of mind required to establish the alleged constitutional deprivation. Dodds v. Richardson, 614 F.3d 1185, 1199 (10th Cir. 2010). But here, Plaintiff has failed to allege the violation of any particular policy which Defendant Bowen created or possessed responsibility over which caused the alleged harm. See ECF No. 17.
Based on the forgoing, the Court should dismiss, without prejudice, any claim against Defendant Bowen because the Amended Complaint does not “make clear exactly who is alleged to have done what to whom, ” and, as such, does not provide Defendant Bowen with “fair notice as to the basis of the claims against him[.]” Robbins, 519 F.3d at 1250; see also Brooks v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 762 Fed.Appx. 551, 557-58 (10th Cir. 2019) (explaining that the standard set forth in Robbins, is “the standard by which [courts] review complaints asserting § 1983 claims against multiple defendants”); see also Mayfield v. Presbyterian Hosp. Admin., 772 Fed.Appx. 680, 686 (10th Cir. 2019) (affirming dismissal (when complaint contained “undifferentiated allegations” that did not “provide fair notice” to defendants because plaintiff had not “attributed specific acts to them”).
IV. RECOMMENDATION AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT
The Court should GRANT Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 39) and dismiss the claims against Defendants GEO and Bowen without prejudice.
Plaintiff is hereby advised of his right to object to this Report and Recommendation. See 28 U.S.C. § 636. Any objection must be filed with the Clerk of the District Court by March 14, 2022. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). Failure to make timely objection to this Report and Recommendation waives the right to appellate review of both factual and legal questions contained herein. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1123 (10thCir. 2010).
V. STATUS OF THE REFERRAL
This Report and Recommendation does not dispose of all issues currently referred to the undersigned Magistrate Judge in the captioned matter.