Id. Indeed, when a defendant attempts to hire new counsel for purposes of delay, a trial court does not abuse its discretion by prohibiting such conduct. See Adams v. State, 210 Ga. App. 151, 153 (1) ( 435 SE2d 514) (1993) (trial court properly prohibited defendant's attempt to delay trial by hiring new counsel after jury selection had already been completed with appointed counsel). Here, the record reveals that appointed counsel had already completed discovery and prepared Hampton's case for trial over the course of several months before Hampton made the court aware of his attempt to hire new counsel.
]" Staples v. State, 209 Ga. App. 802, 804 (3) ( 434 S.E.2d 757) (1993). See also Adams v. State, 210 Ga. App. 151, 153 (1) ( 435 S.E.2d 514) (1993); Jefferson v. State, 209 Ga. App. 859 ( 434 S.E.2d 814) (1993); Tillman v. State, 184 Ga. App. 210, 211 (2) ( 361 S.E.2d 66) (1987). Fulfilling its important responsibility in this area, the trial court fully apprised Hobson of the dangers of self-representation. Staples v. State, supra at 804 (3). After Hobson represented himself for a short time, the trial court did not err in permitting appointed counsel to resume representation pursuant to Hobson's own request.
Id. at 420 (2). See Adams v. State, 210 Ga. App. 151, 152-153 (1) ( 435 SE2d 514) (1993) (trial court properly denied continuance where after a jury was selected, the defendant informed the court that he no longer wished to be represented by his court appointed counsel, contending that his father could hire one for him but made no showing that his father would or could do so). See Tinker v. State, 218 Ga. App. 792, 794 (1) (b) ( 463 SE2d 368) (1995) (court may properly deny a continuance where defendant negligently failed to employ counsel promptly).
The evidence was sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact of Veal's guilt of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Adams v. State, 210 Ga. App. 151, 153(2) ( 435 S.E.2d 514) (1993). 2.
The evidence was sufficient to authorize a rational trier of fact to find defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the offenses of which he was convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 ( 99 S.C. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560); Dunbar v. State, 228 Ga. App. 104, 106 (1), 107 ( 491 S.E.2d 166); Adams v. State, 210 Ga. App. 151, 153 (2) ( 435 S.E.2d 514). Judgment affirmed. Blackburn and Eldridge, JJ., concur.
Whether a defendant has exercised due diligence in hiring counsel is a factual question, and the trial court's grant or denial of a continuance on this basis will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion, which has not been shown here. Wood v. State, 199 Ga. App. 252, 253 (1) ( 404 S.E.2d 589) (1991); see Chambers v. State, 213 Ga. App. 414, 417 (4) ( 444 S.E.2d 820) (1994); Vincent v. State, 210 Ga. App. 6, 8 (3) ( 435 S.E.2d 222) (1993). This case is similar to Adams v. State, 210 Ga. App. 151 ( 435 S.E.2d 514) (1993). There, the court appointed counsel for Adams, based on his indigence.