Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-11996 No. 6387
10-05-2016
SCOTT D. ADAMS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Appearances: Max D. Holmquist, Denali Law Group, P.C., Anchorage, for the Appellant. Amy W. Paige, Assistant District Attorney, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
NOTICE Memorandum decisions of this Court do not create legal precedent. See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d) and Paragraph 7 of the Guidelines for Publication of Court of Appeals Decisions (Court of Appeals Order No. 3). Accordingly, this memorandum decision may not be cited as binding authority for any proposition of law. Trial Court No. 1JU-13-1030 CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Juneau, Philip M. Pallenberg, Judge. Appearances: Max D. Holmquist, Denali Law Group, P.C., Anchorage, for the Appellant. Amy W. Paige, Assistant District Attorney, and Craig W. Richards, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee. Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, Allard, Judge, and Suddock, Superior Court Judge. PER CURIAM.
Sitting by assignment made pursuant to Article IV, Section 16 of the Alaska Constitution and Administrative Rule 24(d).
Scott D. Adams challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction for felony failure to appear.
Former AS 11.56.730(a)-(c)(1) (2014).
When we review a claim of legally insufficient evidence, we must view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. We then determine whether the evidence, viewed in that light, was sufficient to find each element of the crime proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 188 P.3d 700, 702 (Alaska App. 2008).
Id.
Here, the evidence showed that, while on pretrial release in a pending felony case, Adams appeared telephonically at a change of plea hearing on September 10, 2013. At that hearing, the court ordered Adams verbally and in writing to appear again at the next hearing, scheduled for September 24, 2013. Adams did not appear at the second court hearing and never offered any explanation for his failure to appear.
Adams was subsequently arrested and charged with the crime of felony failure to appear. To convict Adams of this criminal offense, the State was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) Adams was charged with a felony and released under the provisions of AS 12.30; (2) Adams knew he was supposed to appear before the court at the time and place of a scheduled hearing; and (3) Adams acted with criminal negligence in failing to appear at the time and place of the scheduled hearing.
Former AS 11.56.730(a) (2014). We note that prior to 2010, the State was required to prove that a defendant made a deliberate, conscious choice not to attend a scheduled hearing to prove the crime of failure to appear. See former AS 12.30.060 (2008); Guthrie v. State, 222 P.3d 890, 892 (Alaska App. 2010). But in 2010 the legislature repealed AS 12.-30.060 and enacted AS 11.56.730, which requires that a defendant act only with criminal negligence. SLA 2010, ch. 19 §§ 2, 30. The statute was also recently amended to make it a no jail-time violation if the person makes contact with the court within 30 days after failing to appear, or if the person did not fail to appear for the purpose of avoiding prosecution. See SLA 2016 ch. 36, §§ 27, 28 (S.B. 91).
On appeal, Adams concedes that the first two elements were satisfied in his case. But he argues that the State failed to prove that he acted with criminal negligence.
Under Alaska law, a person acts with "criminal negligence" with respect to a result or a circumstance when the person fails to perceive "a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the result will occur or that the circumstance exists." "[T]he risk must be of such a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation."
AS 11.81.900(a)(4).
Id.
Here, as Adams concedes, he was given proper notice of his next court hearing and he then failed to appear at that hearing, which was held only two weeks later. Thus, viewing the facts presented at trial in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict, as we are required to do on appeal, we conclude that a fair-minded fact-finder could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that Adams's conduct constituted "a gross deviation from the standard of care that a reasonable person would observe in the situation" and could therefore find Adams guilty of felony failure to appear.
Id.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the superior court.