Opinion
NO. 12-11-00120-CR
01-11-2012
TYLER ADAMS, JR., APPELLANT v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE 159TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
ANGELINA COUNTY, TEXAS
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Tyler Adams, Jr. appeals his convictions for aggravated robbery, burglary of a habitation, and debit/credit card abuse, for which he was sentenced to imprisonment for forty-five years, forty-five years, and two years respectively. In one issue, Appellant contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant was charged by indictment for debit/credit card abuse. He was charged by a separate indictment with one count of aggravated robbery and one count of burglary of a habitation. Subsequently, the two causes were consolidated. Appellant pleaded "not guilty" to the three offenses, and the matter proceeded to a jury trial. Ultimately, the jury found Appellant "guilty" as charged on all three counts. Following a jury trial on punishment, the jury assessed Appellant's punishment at imprisonment for forty-five years for aggravated robbery, forty-five years for burglary of a habitation, and two years for debit/credit card abuse. The trial court sentenced Appellant accordingly, and this appeal followed.
LEGAL SUFFICIENCY
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support his convictions. Specifically, Appellant contends that there is no evidence to support the element of identity. Standard of Review
The Jackson v. Virginialegal sufficiency standard is the only standard that a reviewing court should apply in determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support each element of a criminal offense that the state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. See Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Legal sufficiency is the constitutional minimum required by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to sustain a criminal conviction. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 315-16, 99 S. Ct. at 2786-87; see also Escobedo v. State, 6 S.W.3d 1, 6 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. ref'd). The standard for reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge is whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; see also Johnson v. State, 871 S.W.2d 183, 186 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). The evidence is examined in the light most favorable to the verdict. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 320, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Johnson, 871 S.W.2d at 186. A successful legal sufficiency challenge will result in rendition of an acquittal by the reviewing court. See Tibbs v. Florida, 457 U.S. 31, 41-42, 102 S. Ct. 2211, 2217-18, 72 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1982).
443 U.S. 307, 315-16, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2786-87, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979).
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured against the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge. See Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Such a charge would include one that "accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the defendant is tried." IdIdentity
The state is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the person who committed the crime charged. Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex. App.-Austin 2000, pet. ref'd); see also TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.02(a)(2), 29.03(a)(2), 30.02(1), 31.03(a), 32.31(b)(1)(A) (West 2011 & Supp. 2011).
In the case at hand, Ronald Wofford testified that he, his wife, and his daughter were in their residence in Lufkin, Texas, during the early morning hours of April 10, 2010. Wofford further testified that at or about that time, he heard a noise emanating from the downstairs portion of the residence and went downstairs to investigate. Wofford stated that once he was downstairs, he observed an individual he described as a "heavy build," black male, who was approximately forty years old, was five feet nine inches to five feet ten inches tall, and who weighed approximately two hundred ten to two hundred thirty pounds. Wofford further stated that the man picked up Wofford's wife's purse in the breakfast area of the residence, grabbed Wofford's wallet, and walked through the kitchen. According to Wofford, he confronted the man in the kitchen/dining room and picked up a chair, which he used to push the man into the dining room. Wofford testified that the man cursed at him, told him that he had a knife, and brandished the knife, at which point Wofford retreated and allowed the man to flee on foot.
Wofford described the lighting in the downstairs area of the residence where the confrontation between him and the man occurred as "low light," the source of which was a reading lamp and three lights in the bar area. Wofford stated that the estimated distance between him and the intruder was approximately three to four feet and that he had a good chance to observe the man's face. At trial, Wofford identified Appellant as the man he observed in his residence that night. Wofford also identified two debit cards that were taken from his wallet by the intruder and further stated that he had not given anyone permission to use his debit card at Polk's Convenience Store on April 10, 2010.
Lesa Terry testified that on April 10, 2010, she was working at Polk's Convenience Store in Lufkin, Texas. Terry further testified that on that date, a man sought to purchase gasoline and certain items from the store using a debit card. Terry stated that when she attempted to process the card transaction, the machine indicated that she should keep the card because it had been reported lost or stolen. Terry further stated that the person who attempted to make the purchase using that card left the premises and did not pay for the gasoline. The State introduced a video containing security camera footage from Polk's Convenience Store that showed the man Terry saw that day. However, at trial, Terry could not identify Appellant as the person who attempted to make the purchase with that debit card.
Appellant contends that Wofford's in-court identification of him as the man he confronted in his residence is, in fact, no evidence of his identity. Specifically, he argues that, before trial, Detective Paul Jackson instructed Wofford that the suspect on the Polk's Convenience Store surveillance video was the person who attempted to use his debit card and (2) Wofford had previously described the man he confronted in his residence as having a shaved head. Appellant also notes that Terry was unable to identify him in the Polk's Convenience Store surveillance video.
Appellant does not argue on appeal that Wofford's in-court identification of him was impermissibly tainted.
At trial, Jackson testified that the man in the surveillance video does not have a shaved head.
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Despite Appellant's contentions, we cannot discount the fact that Wofford unequivocally identified Appellant at trial as the man he confronted in his residence on the night in question. Moreover, Jackson identified Appellant as the individual in the Polk's store surveillance video and stated he recognized Appellant because Appellant lived in a home on the street behind his. Further, Terry identified a debit card bearing Wofford's name as the card the man in the surveillance video sought to use to purchase gasoline at Polk's store. Even though Terry could not identify Appellant as the person who sought to use that card to purchase gasoline and other items, the jury was able to observe the surveillance video from Polk's store and compare what it saw in that video with Appellant's physical appearance. See Conyers v. State, 864 S.W.2d 739, 740 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1993, pet. ref'd) (in case of aggravated robbery in which store manager could not identify the appellant as the perpetrator, court noted that jury was able to observe still images from surveillance video admitted into evidence and could compare photos with the physical appearance of the appellant). Based on our review of the record, we conclude that there is legally sufficient evidence to support the element of identity in all three counts.
Appellant's sole issue is overruled.
DISPOSITION
Having overruled Appellant's sole issue, we affirm the trial court's judgment. Opinion delivered January 11, 2012.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.
BRIAN HOYLE
Justice
(DO NOT PUBLISH)
TYLER ADAMS, JR., Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
Appeal from the 159th Judicial District Court
of Angelina County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. 29827)
THIS CAUSE came to be heard on the appellate record and briefs filed herein, and the same being considered, it is the opinion of this court that there was no error in the judgment.
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that the judgment of the court below be in all things affirmed, and that this decision be certified to the court below for observance.
Brian Hoyle, Justice.
Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Griffith, J., and Hoyle, J.