Adams v. Russell

16 Citing cases

  1. State v. Edwards

    277 S.W.2d 444 (Tenn. 1955)   Cited 1 times

    Obviously he has been in the penitentiary a few months over 20 years. At the time of the sentence in this case the courts (no appellate court decision at the time) considered that the indeterminate sentence law, 1932 Code, Section 11766, was applicable to murder in the first degree. Adams v. Russell, 179 Tenn. 428, 167 S.W.2d 5. Subsequent to the announcement of Adams v. Russell, supra, this Court reconsidered the question of whether or not the indeterminate sentence law applied in first degree murder cases and concluded that it did not. Franks v. State, 187 Tenn. 174, 213 S.W.2d 105. The petitioner now insists that since this Court has held, Franks v. State, supra, that the indeterminate sentence law does not apply in first degree murder cases that the sentence pronounced by the Greene County Court on the relator here is void and that the relator is entitled to his discharge by this Court. The State argues that the question here as to whether or not this judgment is void has been previously settled in the case of Adams v. Russell, supra. That case presented an attack upon a similar judgment, identical in form with that in the instant case except for the parties involved.

  2. Passarella v. State

    891 S.W.2d 619 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)   Cited 844 times
    Holding that a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel would at most render a judgment voidable, not void

    Archer v. State, 851 S.W.2d 157, 161-62 (Tenn. 1993); Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992); State v. Warren, 740 S.W.2d 427, 428 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986).State ex rel. Jordan v. Bomar, 217 Tenn. 494, 500, 398 S.W.2d 724, 726 (1965); Hall v. Heer, 217 Tenn. 392, 393-94, 398 S.W.2d 71 (1966); State ex rel. Hall v. Meadows, 215 Tenn. 668, 675, 389 S.W.2d 256, 259 (1965); State ex rel. Dickens v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 493, 498, 381 S.W.2d 287, 289 (1964); State ex rel. Grandstaff v. Gore, 182 Tenn. 94, 98, 184 S.W.2d 366, 367 (1945); Adams v. Russell, 179 Tenn. 428, 430, 167 S.W.2d 5, 6 (1942); State ex rel. Conner v. Hebert, 127 Tenn. 220, 243, 154 S.W. 957, 963-64 (1913); State ex rel. Karr v. Taxing Dist., 84 Tenn. (16 Lea) 240, 249 (1886); State ex rel. Stewart v. McWherter, 857 S.W.2d 875, 877 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992), per. app. denied, (Tenn. 1993); State ex rel. Wade v. Norvell, 1 Tenn. Crim. App. 447, 448-49, 443 S.W.2d 839, 840 (1969). See Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992).

  3. Hall v. Heer

    398 S.W.2d 71 (Tenn. 1966)   Cited 9 times

    It is well settled in this State that one in prison under judicial authority may obtain relief by writ of habeas corpus only where the sentence is void, not merely voidable; or where the term of imprisonment has expired. Adams v. Russell, 179 Tenn. 428, 430, 167 S.W.2d 5. The Assistant Attorney General has in his brief cited 155 A.L.R. 145, as an annotation which to some extent covers the question of whether or not a habeas corpus is a proper ground for remedy under cases of this kind, that is, where the prisoner alleges unlawful treatment during his legal custody.

  4. State v. Bomar

    398 S.W.2d 724 (Tenn. 1965)   Cited 9 times

    "It is, of course, well settled that one imprisoned under judicial authority may obtain relief by writ of habeas corpus only where the sentence is void, not merely voidable; or the term of imprisonment has expired." Adams v. Russell, 179 Tenn. 428, 430, 167 S.W.2d 5, 6. See also State ex rel Grandstaff v. Gore, 182 Tenn. 94, 98, 184 S.W.2d 366; State ex rel. Holbrook v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 243, 246, 364 S.W.2d 887.

  5. State v. Bomar

    214 Tenn. 493 (Tenn. 1964)   Cited 18 times

    State, ex rel. Karr v. Taxing District, 84 Tenn. 240 (1886); Lynch, et al. v. State, ex rel. Killebrew, 179 Tenn. 339, 166 S.W.2d 397 (1942). In Adams v. Russell, 179 Tenn. 428, 167 S.W.2d 5 (1942), it was held that the application for the writ in that case was premature. Since there is no dispute about the validity of the conviction in Dickson County, which is to run for a period of twenty years, we assume that the petitioners are being legally and lawfully restrained in the Dickson County case.

  6. State v. Austin

    241 N.C. 548 (N.C. 1955)   Cited 22 times
    Explaining that a "properly convicted" defendant may, on habeas, attack punishment imposed in "excess of that authorized by law" without "disturbing the valid portion of the sentence"

    S. v. Hooker, 183 N.C. 763, 111 S.E. 351; 15 Am. Jur., Criminal Law, section 460, page 118, and cited cases. See also United States v. Peeke, 153 F. 166; Wilson v. Bell, 137 F.2d 716; Kitt v. United States, 138 F.2d 842; National Discount Corp. v. O'Mell, 194 F.2d 452; In re Bonner, 151 U.S. 242, 38 L.Ed. 149; Abeyta v. People, 112 Colo. 49, 145 P.2d 884; Manning v. Commonwealth, 281 Ky. 453, 136 S.W.2d 28; Adams v. Russell, 179 Tenn. 428, 167 S.W.2d 5; Royster v. Smith, 195 Va. 228, 77 S.E.2d 855. For additional cases supporting the above view, see Annotation: 76 A.L.R. 476 where citations from thirty-nine jurisdictions are cited, including S. v. Hooker, supra. It is the general rule in this jurisdiction that where a defendant has been properly convicted but given a sentence in excess of that authorized by law, and comes to this Court pursuant to a petition for writ of certiorari in a habeas corpus proceeding, when such defendant has not served as long under the sentence as he might have been legally imprisoned, we vacate the improper judgment and remand for proper sentence.

  7. Franks v. State

    187 Tenn. 174 (Tenn. 1948)   Cited 23 times
    In Franks v. State, 187 Tenn. 174, 213 S.W.2d 105 (1948), it was held that it was not error to admit testimony of a 7 year old child who stated that children who did not tell the truth "did not go to Jesus."

    " In Adams v. Russell, 179 Tenn. 428, 432, 167 S.W.2d 5, 7, after quoting the above language from Wright v. State, supra, the Court said: "The court assumed, without discussion, that the indeterminate law applied in this first-degree murder case." In Mays v. State, 143 Tenn. 443, 448, 226 S.W. 233, 234, it was said: "As the law now stands, there is no abstract punishment provided for murder in the first degree. The act of 1919 imposes upon the jury the duty of assessing the punishment in such cases within certain limits.

  8. State ex Rel. Grandstaff v. Gore

    182 Tenn. 94 (Tenn. 1945)   Cited 32 times
    In State ex rel. Grandstaff v. Gore, supra [182 Tenn. 94, 184 S.W.2d 369], this Court declared that the purpose of the Habitual Criminal Statute is 'to remove from society a class of confirmed criminals whose depredations have proven to be limited only by their opportunities'.

    The writ of habeas corpus may not be made to perform the office of a writ of error. It is available only when the judgment assailed is void, or when the term of imprisonment has expired. State ex rel. Karr v. Taxing District, 84 Tenn. 240; Lynch et al. v. State ex rel. Killebrew, 179 Tenn. 339, 166 S.W.2d 397. Moreover, as we said in Adams v. Russell, 179 Tenn. 428, at page 434, 167 S.W.2d 5, in concluding that opinion, in any event, this application, as was true in that case, is premature. It can hardly be seriously questioned that the relator is legally subject to imprisonment for the term fixed by the statute for housebreaking and larceny, of which it is undisputed that he was legally convicted, and which term has not expired, and no presumption obtains that one with such a confessed criminal record would be granted parole. However, waiving these considerations, we have elected to examine the merits which the relator now belatedly seeks to set up and rely on and see whether or not, even if he had produced on the hearing of his case all the evidence he now proposes to submit, the result would have been affected.

  9. Goods v. Parker

    No. W2006-00849-CCA-R3-CO (Tenn. Crim. App. Jul. 24, 2007)   Cited 1 times

    Again, because the petitioner in Ussery did not challenge all of his counts, Ussery is inapplicable to this case. Finally, the State argues Adams v. Russell requires a habeas petition to be ripe. 167 S.W.2d 5 (Tenn. 1942), overruled on other grounds by Franks v. State, 213 S.W.2d 105 (Tenn. 1948). In Adams, the petitioner should have statutorily received a determinate sentence of over twenty years.

  10. Foulks v. Carlton

    No. E2005-02558-CCA-R3-HC (Tenn. Crim. App. Mar. 6, 2007)   Cited 1 times

    "It is well established that an accused confined to prison pursuant to judicial authority may only obtain habeas corpus relief when the accused's sentence is void or the term of imprisonment has expired." State ex rel. Stewart v. McWherter, 857 S.W. 2d 875, 877 (Tenn.Crim.App. 1992) (citing Hall v. Heer, 217 Tenn. 392, 398 S.W.2d 71 (1966)); State ex rel. Dickens v. Bomar, 214 Tenn. 493, 381 S.W.2d 287 (1964); State ex rel. Grandstaff v. Gore, 182 Tenn. 94, 184 S.W.2d 366 (1945); Adams v. Russell, 179 Tenn. 428, 167 S.W.2d 5 (1942). The petitioner's claim that his sentence is unlawful because his judgment was marked to reflect applicable law regarding his lack of release eligibility is without merit.