Summary
denying defendant immunity when agreement with landowner did not provide defendant with authority to exclude others from using the property or to open it for recreational use
Summary of this case from Corbett v. City of Myrtle BeachOpinion
March 12, 1993
Appeal from the Supreme Court, Monroe County, Wisner, J.
Present — Denman, P.J., Green, Balio, Doerr and Boehm, JJ.
Cross appeal unanimously dismissed without costs and order modified on the law and as modified affirmed in accordance with the following Memorandum: Plaintiff was injured while operating his motorbike on a right-of-way owned by Baltimore Ohio Railroad Company (B O). Plaintiff alleges that he was injured when the left handlebar of his motorbike came into contact with a guy-wire supporting a wooden pole that had been placed on the property by defendant pursuant to a written agreement between defendant and B O.
Supreme Court erred in determining that defendant is entitled to the protection of General Obligations Law § 9-103. Under its agreement with B O, defendant had the right to "construct, maintain and use" a high-voltage transmission line along the right-of-way where the accident occurred. By virtue of its limited use of the property, defendant does not qualify as an "owner, lessee or occupant of premises" entitled to the broad grant of immunity afforded by the statute (General Obligations Law § 9-103 [a]; cf., Bowles v. Kawasaki Motor Corp. USA, 179 A.D.2d 299).
The sole purpose of General Obligations Law § 9-103 is "to induce property owners, who might otherwise be reluctant to do so for fear of liability, to permit persons to come on their property to pursue specified activities" (Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, 68 N.Y.2d 446, 451; accord, Iannotti v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 74 N.Y.2d 39, 43). The agreement with B O conferred no authority upon defendant to exclude others from using the property or to open the right-of-way for recreational use. Therefore, the basic purpose of the statute would not be served by extending the immunity from liability to defendant (see, Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, supra, at 452).
Supreme Court properly concluded that defendant is not entitled to summary judgment on the ground that the incident was as consistent with non-negligence as with negligence. Further, defendant failed to meet its burden of establishing, as a matter of law, that plaintiff assumed the risk of injury (see, Lamey v Foley, 188 A.D.2d 157).
We modify the order, therefore, by striking the first, third, fourth and fifth ordering paragraphs, granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's second affirmative defense, denying defendant's cross motion for summary judgment and reinstating the complaint.
Defendant's cross appeal is dismissed. Defendant is not aggrieved by the order that granted its cross motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint (see, CPLR 5511; Town of Massena v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 45 N.Y.2d 482, 488; Flower City Insulation v. Board of Educ., 188 A.D.2d 157).