Adams v. Riverview Healthcare Association

Full title: Jon Sherman Adams, Plaintiff, v. Riverview Healthcare Association, a…

Court: United States District Court, D. North Dakota

Date published: Mar 17, 2003

A3-02-135 (D.N.D. Mar. 17, 2003)

Opinion

A3-02-135

March 17, 2003

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

RODNEY S. WEBB, United States District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is defendant, Riverview Healthcare's ("Riverview") motion to dismiss, or alternatively to transfer venue (doc. #4). Riverview contends that a North Dakota court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over it, and that even if personal jurisdiction is present, venue is improper. FootnotePlaintiff, Jon Sherman Adams, on the other hand, argues that this case is properly before this Court. For reasons set forth below, Riverview's motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Adams was an employee of Riverview Healthcare, which is located in Crookston, Minnesota. Adams had a bad back and Riverview allowed him to perform work from his home in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The work agreement between Riverview and Adams called for him to spend 80% of his time at Riverview's campus in Crookston, Minnesota, and 20% of his time at his home in Grand Forks. However, Adams' bad back prevented him from working in Crookston on some days and he may have performed as much as 50% of his work at home.

In March 2002, Adams was terminated from his employment with Riverview. Adams alleges that Riverview refused his requests for reasonable accommodations and instead terminated him in retaliation for these requests. The present action followed.

II. LEGAL DISCUSSION

Riverview argues that a North Dakota court cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over it. Adams need only make a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction over defendant in order to survive Riverview's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Digi-Tel Holdings, Inc. v. Proteq Telecommunications (PTE), Ltd., 89 F.3d 519, 522 (8th Cir. 1996). Further, this Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to Adams and must resolve all factual conflicts in his favor. Id. With this standard in mind, the Court begins its analysis of personal jurisdiction.

A. Personal Jurisdiction Over Riverview Healthcare

In determining whether it has personal jurisdiction over a party to a case, a federal district court must follow a two step process: (1) determine whether the forum state's long-arm statute confers jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant; and (2) if so, determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant comports with due process under the Constitution. Austand Co. v. Pennie Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 225 (8th Cir. 1987); Rodenburg v. Fargo-Moorhead Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 632 N.W.2d 407, 414 (N.D. 2001).

It is well established that North Dakota's long-arm statute extends jurisdiction to the full extent permitted by the due process clause. Hebron Brick Co. v. Robinson Brick Tile Co., 234 N.W.2d 250, 255-56 (N.D. 1975). Therefore, this Court need only determine whether jurisdiction over Riverview is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

Absent one of the traditional bases for jurisdiction (presence, domicile or consent) due process requires that Riverview have constitutionally significant "minimum contacts" with the State of North Dakota so that the exercise of personal jurisdiction in the present case does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Guinness Import Co. v. Mark VII Distribs., Inc., 153 F.3d 607, 614 (8th Cir. 1998). "Minimum contacts" are those of a quality or type that would lead Riverview to anticipate being haled into court in North Dakota. World Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980). "[T]here must be some act which [Riverview] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum State, thus invoking benefits and protections of its laws." Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985). Even if the defendant has purposefully established the necessary "minimum contacts" within the forum state, consideration of "fair play and substantial justice" may nevertheless defeat the reasonableness of jurisdiction. Id. at 476-78.

1. General Personal Jurisdiction

In analyzing the due process boundaries of personal jurisdiction, courts have distinguished between "general" and "specific" jurisdiction. Burger King Corp., 471 U.S. at 472, 473 n. 15. General jurisdiction is proper only where a defendant's contacts with the forum state are of such a continuous and systematic nature that the state may exercise personal jurisdiction over the defendant even if the action is unrelated to the defendant's contacts with the state. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A., 466 U.S. 408, 409 (1984). Where general jurisdiction exists, the defendant can be sued in the state on any claim, arising anywhere. Id. Because of this broad basis for jurisdiction, a much higher level of contacts is required; therefore, the exercise of general jurisdiction is typically limited to large companies doing a large amount of business on a regular basis. Dalton v. R W Marine, Inc., 897 F.2d 1359, 1362 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus, Riverview's limited relationship with North Dakota is insufficient to justify the exercise of general jurisdiction.

2. Specific Personal Jurisdiction

Even if Riverview's contacts with North Dakota are not sufficiently "continuous and systematic" for general jurisdiction, it still may be subject to specific jurisdiction on claims related to its activities or purposeful contacts within North Dakota. Specific jurisdiction is proper where (1) the defendant purposefully directed or availed itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and protection of its laws; (2) the controversy is related to or arises out of a defendant's contacts with the forum; and (3) these contacts are reasonable in light of the assertion that personal jurisdiction must agree with fair play and substantial justice. Minnesota Min. and Mfg. Co. v. Nippon Carbide Industries Co., Inc., 63 F.3d 694, 697 (8th Cir. 1995).

i. "Purposeful" Requirement

First of all, Riverview must have purposefully directed its activities at North Dakota residents. Purposefully directed or availed means that the defendant's contacts with the forum state must not be random, fortuitous, attenuated, or the result of unilateral activity of a third person or another party. Burger King, 471 U.S. at 475-76; World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 295.

Most importantly, the record demonstrates that Riverview permitted Adams to work out of his home in North Dakota, at least one day per week, where he transacted business on its behalf. However, allowing Adams to work out of his home was not an activity purposefully directed at North Dakota. The Court finds compelling, Lucachick v. NDS Ams., Inc., 169 F. Supp.2d 1103 (D.Minn. 2001), where an employee in Minnesota sued his California employer for breach of an employment contract. In finding that Minnesota lacked personal jurisdiction over the California employer, the court found it important that the employee's residence in Minnesota was a personal choice and not required by the employment contract. Id. at 1107.

Here, as in Lucachick, it was the employee's (Adams) personal choice to reside in North Dakota. Adams was required to travel to Crookston to remain in contact with Riverview. Riverview did not require Adams to live in North Dakota and did not gain anything from allowing Adams to work in North Dakota. Riverview's contact with North Dakota was only a result of Adams' unilateral activity of choosing to live in North Dakota, and it cannot be said that Riverview purposefully directed its activities toward North Dakota by allowing Adams to work out of his home. Therefore, Riverview did not purposefully avail itself of the benefits and protections of North Dakota law by permitting Adams to work at home.

Although Riverview did not purposefully direct its activities toward North Dakota by permitting Adams to work out of his home, the record does, nevertheless, demonstrate that Riverview purposefully directed its activities toward North Dakota by sending a physician to provide service to patients at a North Dakota medical facility two days per month. The record also shows that Riverview developed a relationship with Altru Hospital in Grand Forks, North Dakota. The extent of the relationship between Altru and Riverview is unclear, but at least involves sending Adams to deliver a speech at the hospital and referring patients to receive care at the hospital.

ii. "Related To" Requirement

However, these activities that Riverview purposefully directed at North Dakota are not related to or connected with Adams' cause of action. Riverview's contacts involve providing healthcare to patients in North Dakota, and these contacts did not commence until after Adams' termination. Riverview's non-employment related contacts occurring after his termination is not relevant. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-17 (purchases of equipment and training services from a forum resident by nonresident defendant held insufficient to support personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in cause of action not related to those purchases). Thus, because Riverview's contacts are not sufficiently related to the cause of action, it does not have the "minimum contacts" with North Dakota that are necessary for a North Dakota court to exercise personal jurisdiction.

iii. "Reasonableness" Requirement

Even if the Court found that Riverview had minimum contacts with North Dakota, which it does not, these contacts must still be examined in light of other factors to determine whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the nonresident defendant comports with "fair play and substantial justice." Guinness Import, 153 F.3d at 614. These other factors are: (1) the nature and quality of contacts with North Dakota; (2) the quantity of such contacts; (3) the relation of the cause of action to the contacts; (4) the interest of the forum state in providing a forum for its residents; and (5) the convenience of the parties. Id. Of these factors, the first three are the most important. Soo Line R.R. Co. v. Hawker Siddeley Canada, Inc., 950 F.2d 526, 529 (8th Cir. 1991).

In regard to the present case, the Court finds that the limited number and low quality of contacts combined with the unrelatedness of the contacts to the cause of action makes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over Riverview unreasonable. Thus, after considering the law and facts, the Court finds that Adams has not made a prima facie showing that Riverview is subject to personal jurisdiction in North Dakota. North Dakota therefore lacks personal jurisdiction over Riverview in the present case.

III. CONCLUSION

Riverview's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is GRANTED (doc. #4-1). Riverview's motion for change of venue is DENIED AS MOOT (doc. #4-2). Riverview's request for oral arguments is DENIED (doc. #5). Adams' claims and causes of action are ORDERED DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

IT IS SO ORDERED.