Opinion
CIVIL ACTION NO: 03-2587 SECTION "K"(1)
May 27, 2004
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the undersigned is the motion of the defendant, John E. Potter, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service ("Postal Service"), to dismiss the claims of pro se plaintiff, Linda P. Adams ("Adams"), pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (6), and 56(b). Rec. doc. 13 at 1. For the reasons discussed below, Adams's claims against the Postal Service pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 are dismissed.
The parties have consented to the trial of this matter before a magistrate judge. Rec. doc. 11.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In this Title VII action, Adams claims that the Postal Service abolished her job as an office machine operator and failed to grant her a modified position on the day shift based on her race, color, gender, and in retaliation for previous complaints to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"). The Postal Service has moved to dismiss Adams's claims on the basis that the court lacks jurisdiction over this matter. In the alternative, the Postal Service argues that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Adams has failed to exhaust her administrative remedies due to her untimely contact with the EEO counselor.
In December 1990, Adams began work as a mail handler with the Postal Service. Rec. doc. 13 at app. p. 24. She sustained an on-the-job injury in November 1998 and filed a workers' compensation claim in January 1999. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 20-23, 69, 164. Sometime after February 1999, she accepted a position as an office machine operator. Rec. doc. 13 at app. p. 162. Later in 1999, an internal study by the Postal Service found that there was no longer a need for the office machine operator position which Adams occupied. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 163-64. Consequently, the Postal Service abolished the office machine operator position Adams had occupied and reassigned her to a position of mail handler. Rec. doc. 13 at app. p. 15. Adams objected to this assignment. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 17-19. Between December 1999 and June 2000, Adams submitted several light-duty requests consistent with certain work restrictions established by her physician, including a restriction that she only be assigned to work during daytime hours with weekends off. During this time period, the Postal Service accommodated these requests in accordance with her work restrictions. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 86-116. On May 3, 2000, an examining physician lifted the restriction that Adams only be assigned to work during daytime hours. Rec. doc. 13 at app. p. 6. Following the removal of this restriction, the Postal Service offered Adams other light-duty assignments that were within her medical restrictions, but with schedules that were not to her liking. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps.20-23. Adams subsequently failed to report to work at the scheduled time for these work assignments. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps.20-23, 25-28. The Postal Service filed removal proceedings on August 18, 2000, charging Adams with being absent without leave. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 25-28. Adams thereafter filed a collective bargaining grievance, which the parties settled on September 18, 2000, by reducing her proposed removal to a 14-day suspension. Rec. doc. 13 at app. p. 29. While her removal proceeding was still pending, Adams requested, but did not receive, time off to attend a New Orleans Saints football game on Sunday, September 3, 2000. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 30-32. On September 3, 2000, Adams reported to work but clocked out and did not return that day. Rec. doc. 13 at app. p. 30. The Postal Service thereafter reinstated removal proceedings on September 20, 2000. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 30-32. The Postal Service's proposed removal of Adams was settled on October 13, 2000 when the parties, entered into a "Last Chance Agreement" which resolved all issues concerning the proposed removal in all appeal forums, including the EEOC. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 37-39.
In addition to the office machine operator position, the Postal Service also abolished ten other positions in Adams's department. Rec. doc. 13 at app. p. 164.
These restrictions were due to Adams's prior work-related injury which she incurred in 1998. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 20-23.
Adams had contacted an EEOC counselor on October 10, 2000. Rec. doc. 13 at app. p. 33-36. In her initial meeting with the EEOC counselor, Adams's complaints focused mainly on the removal proceedings, but also included allegations regarding the abolishment of her position and the Postal Service's unwillingness to accommodate her schedule requests. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 33-34. Adams filed a formal complaint with the EEOC on December 15, 2000. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps.40-43. On January 9, 2001, the EEOC accepted Adams's complaint with regard to the suspension and removal issues. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 47-49. On April 17, 2001, the EEOC amended its acceptance of the issues to exclude the suspension and removal issues which had already been settled by the "Last Chance Agreement," and to consider instead the issues of the abolishment of her job and the Postal Service's alleged failure to act on her medical restrictions when she was not granted a modified position on the day shift. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 65-67. On June 25, 2003, EEOC Administrative Judge Kevin C. Rung heard arguments on the issue of whether the Postal Service discriminated against Adams on the basis of race, color, gender, physical or metal disability, and whether it retaliated against her when her job was abolished and she was not given a job on the day shift. Rec. doc. 13 at app. p. 162. Judge Rung issued a bench decision on July 23, 2003, finding that the Postal Service had not discriminated against Adams on any basis, Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 161-173. On August 11, 2003, the Postal Service issued a "Notice of Final Action" fully implementing the EEOC's finding of no discrimination. Rec. doc. 13 at app. pps. 178-180. On September 16, 2003, Adams filed an appeal of the EEOC's decision in this Court. Rec. doc. 1.
ADAMS HAS NOT EXHAUSTED HER ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The exclusive remedy for claims of discrimination by federal employees is provided for in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a)-(e). Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 835 (1976). Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 grants an aggrieved federal employee the right to bring suit in federal district court. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c). Before bringing suit, however, an employee must first exhaust her administrative remedies against her federal employer. Pacheco. v. Rice, 966 F.2d 904, 905 (5th Cir. 1992); see also Brown, 425 U.S. at 832-33. The EEOC regulations provide, in pertinent part, that an agency may accept complaints only if the complainant brings to the attention of the EEOC Counselor the matter causing her to believe she had been discriminated against within 45 days of the date of the alleged discriminatory event. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.105(a) (2003). Thus, the failure to notify an EEO counselor in a timely fashion may bar a claim, absent a defense of waiver, estoppel, or equitable tolling. Pacheco, 966 F.2d at 905.
The Postal Service argues that despite the EEOC's full investigation of Adams's complaint and its rendering of a final decision on the merits, she did not initially meet the 45-day filing deadline. The Postal Service contends that Adams has not exhausted her administrative remedies and is now barred from bringing suit in federal district court. In a hearing before Administrative Judge Rung, the EEOC considered two distinct incidents of alleged discrimination: (1) the abolishment of Adams' position as office machine operator on November 5, 1999, and (2) the Postal Service's alleged failure to recognize Adams' medical restrictions and grant her a modified position on the day shift, occurring in June and July 2000. Adams did not contact an EEO counselor regarding either of these incidents until October 10, 2000, more than 45 days after either of the alleged discriminatory events. Thus, the filing of Adams' formal complaint with the EEOC was untimely. The issue before the Court is whether the EEOC's acceptance and full investigation of Adams' untimely complaint now bars the Postal Service from asserting a timeliness defense after it has implemented a final action consistent with the EEOC's ruling. The Fifth Circuit, in an early case, held that once a government agency accepts a complaint and acts on it, the time limit mentioned in the regulations is no longer mandatory. Huntley v. Dept. of Health, Educ. Welfare 550 F.2d 290, 295 (5th Cir. 1977). However, when later addressing the issue, the Court clarified its earlier position:
The Postal Service does not directly address this issue or the line of cases cited below.
[T]he Huntley holding is limited to the situation in which [an] agency has in fact made a finding of discrimination, and we reject [the] contention that [a] federal agency, by merely accepting and investigating a tardy complaint, automatically waives its objection to the complainant's failure to comply with the prescribed time delays. Oaxaca v. Roscoe, 641 F.2d 386, 390 (5th Cir. 1981).
A broad reading of Huntley, the Court has noted, is unacceptable because agencies may inadvertently overlook timeliness problems and should not thereafter be bound. Henderson v. U.S. Veterans Admin., 790 F.2d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 1986). Moreover, such a broad interpretation could discourage administrative resolution of meritorious claims, which nevertheless are untimely. Id. Thus, an agency will be precluded from raising a timeliness defense only where it has made "a specific finding during the administrative process that the complaint was timely." Munoz v. Aldridge, 894 F.2d 1489, 1495 (5th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Lopez v. La. Nat'l Guard, 733 F. Supp. 1059, 1068 (E.D. La. 1990) ("[W]here the employing agency makes no explicit finding of timeliness and rejects the merits of the complaint, the mere fact that the agency accepted the complaint is alone insufficient to support a conclusion that the agency extended the time period at issue so as to make an otherwise untimely complaint timely."). In Munoz, two civilian employees brought Title VII actions against the United States Air Force for alleged acts of discrimination. See Munoz, 894 F.2d at 1490. The Court found that the Air Force had made a specific finding of timeliness of the plaintiffs' complaint at the initial stage, and on appeal to the EEOC had also contended that the Munozes were "proper plaintiffs." See id. at 1495. In addition, the Air Force had examined their complaint and found it timely, argued on appeal that it was timely, and engaged in extensive discovery premised on the complaint's timeliness. Id. Based on these actions, the Court found that the Air Force was bound by its previous acceptance of the timeliness of the complaint and therefore could not raise the timeliness issue. Id. Here, unlike in Munoz, the Postal Service did not make a specific finding that Adams's complaint was timely. Rather, it merely accepted and investigated Adams's complaint and implemented the decision of the EEOC Administrative Judge finding that Adams had not been discriminated against. Thus, the Postal Service's actions can be described as an oversight of a timeliness problem to which it is not bound. See Henderson, 790 F.2d at 441.
ADAMS'S CLAIM DOES NOT WARRANT EQUITABLE TOLLING
In certain circumstances, the courts have excused the untimely filing of a complaint on equitable grounds. See Irwin v. Veterans Admin., 498 U.S. 89. 95-96 (1990). However, "[f]ederal courts have typically extended equitable relief only sparingly." Id. at 96. In general, federal courts have allowed equitable tolling "in situations where the claimant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the filing deadline to pass." Id. The court will not apply equitable tolling, however, on the basis that timeliness was not raised as a defense at the administrative stage. Rowe v. Sullivan, 967 F.2d 186, 192 (5th Cir. 1992). In the present case, Adams does not argue nor is there any basis to substantiate a claim that the Postal Service induced or tricked her into missing the filing deadline for her EEOC complaint. In addition, Adams does not argue that she lacked knowledge of the filing deadlines for EEOC complaints that might have otherwise been grounds for equitable tolling. See Rowe, 967 F.2d at 192 ("[E]quitable might have otherwise been grounds for equitable tolling. See Rowe, 967 F.2d at 192 ("[E]quitable tolling may apply where the claimant has vigorously pursued his action, but inadvertently missed deadlines due to his or her lack of sophistication with the procedural requirements of Title VII claims."). Thus, there is no basis here for the court to extend equitable tolling to Adams's untimely filing of her complaint.
CONCLUSION
The failure to timely notify' the appropriate administrative authority of a discrimination complaint against a federal agency does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction, but rather results in dismissal of the claim for lack of merit. See Oaxaca, 641 F.2d at 388; see also Lopez, 733 F. Supp. at 1068 ("[A]ny failure to satisfy [the] timeliness requirements, while perhaps not a subject matter jurisdiction defect, constitutes a failure to state a proper claim under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16."). Because matters outside of the pleadings were considered, the Postal Service's alternative request for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(b) will be granted; Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Postal Service's motion for summary judgment (Rec. doc. 13) is GRANTED.