Opinion
Civil Action 22-20-SDD-RLB
01-03-2023
COREY MARQUEE ADAMS #357624 v. LOUISIANA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, ET AL.
NOTICE
RICHARD L. BOURGEOIS, JR. UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Please take notice that the attached Magistrate Judge's Report has been filed with the Clerk of the United States District Court.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), you have fourteen (14) days after being served with the attached Report to file written objections to the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and recommendations therein. Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendations within 14 days after being served will bar you, except upon grounds of plain error, from attacking on appeal the unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge which have been accepted by the District Court.
ABSOLUTELY NO EXTENSION OF TIME SHALL BE GRANTED TO FILE WRITTEN OBJECTIONS TO THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT.
MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Defendant Jarvis Callihan (R. Doc. 16). The Motion is opposed. See R. Doc. 17.
The plaintiff states in his Opposition that he has voluntarily dismissed his claims against defendant Callihan and refers to an amended complaint. See R. Doc. 17 at paragraph 17(B). However, no such amended complaint has been filed in the instant matter.
The pro se Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated at Louisiana State Penitentiary (“LSP”), filed this proceeding pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Americans With Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, et seq. (“ADA”), and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794 (“RA”) against numerous Defendants, complaining that his constitutional rights were violated due to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, deliberate indifference to his health and safety, use of excessive force, and denial of a fair disciplinary hearing. He seeks monetary, declaratory, and injunctive relief.
Named as defendants are Louisiana Department of Corrections, Michael Howard, Chad Darbonne, Luke Rheams, John Orr, Matthew Gamble, Thomas Sterling, Charles Gooden, Roger Young, Jeremy McKey, James Arnold, Michael Lollis, Jarvus Callahan, Jane Doe, Gabriel Hebert, Randy Lavespere, Tracey Falgout, Unknown Gauthier, and Toby Goody.
Defendant Callihan first seeks dismissal on jurisdictional grounds, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, of Plaintiff's § 1983 claims against him in his official capacity. The plaintiff states in his Complaint that all defendants are sued in their individual capacities under § 1983. Nevertheless, to the extent the plaintiff may be asserting a § 1983 claim for monetary damages against defendant Callihan in his official capacity, § 1983 does not provide a federal forum for a litigant who seeks monetary damages against either a state or its officials acting in their official capacities, specifically because these officials are not seen to be “persons” within the meaning of § 1983. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). In addition, in Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991), the United States Supreme Court addressed the distinction between official capacity and individual capacity lawsuits and made clear that a suit against a state official in an official capacity for monetary damages is treated as a suit against the state and is therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Id. at 25. Accordingly, to the extent the plaintiff may be asserting a § 1983 claim against defendant Callihan in his official capacity for monetary damages, any such claims are subject to dismissal.
Turning to Plaintiff's claims that are not subject to dismissal on the basis of Eleventh Amendment immunity, Defendant next asserts, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court clarified the standard of pleading that a plaintiff must meet in order to survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). Specifically, “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra, at 555. “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678, quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, supra. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. It follows that, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged-but it has not ‘show[n]'-‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.' ” Id. at 679. “Where a Complaint pleads facts that are ‘merely consistent with' a defendant's liability, it ‘stops short of the line between possibility and plausibility of entitlement to relief.' ” Id. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the Complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Further, “[a] document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally construed' ... and ‘a pro se Complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.' ” Id. (citation omitted). Notwithstanding, the court need not accept “a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation,” Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986), or “naked assertions [of unlawful conduct] devoid of further factual enhancement.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, supra, 556 U.S. at 678 (internal quotation marks omitted).
In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following with regards to defendant Callihan: On August 25, 2021, the plaintiff was issued a disciplinary report, and on September 1, 2021, was brought before the disciplinary board. Defendant Callihan was one of two board members. Defendant Callihan read the disciplinary report and the plaintiff plead not guilty. The plaintiff then began to give a statement in his defense. Defendant Callihan stopped the plaintiff during his statement. He also did not allow the plaintiff to submit an emergency grievance into the disciplinary record as an exhibit. The plaintiff was found guilty of defiance and aggravated disobedience.
Defendant asserts that he is entitled to qualified immunity in connection with Plaintiff's claims. The qualified immunity defense is a familiar one and, employing a two-step process, operates to protect public officials who are performing discretionary tasks. Huff v. Crites, 473 F. App'x. 398 (5th Cir. 2012). As enunciated in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the first step in the analysis is to consider whether, taking the facts as alleged in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the defendant's conduct violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights. Id. at 201. Second, the district court looks to whether the rights allegedly violated were clearly established. Id. This inquiry, the Court stated, is undertaken in light of the specific context of the case, not as a broad, general proposition. Id. The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining whether a constitutional right was clearly established is whether it would have been clear to a reasonable state official that his conduct was unlawful in the situation which he confronted. Id.
Undertaking the qualified immunity analysis, the Court finds that Defendant's motion should be granted. Plaintiff's allegations, accepted as true, fail to state a claim for violation of his right to procedural due process.
An inmate does not have a constitutional right to have his prison disciplinary or administrative proceedings (including informal complaints) properly investigated, handled, or favorably resolved, Mahogany v. Miller, 252 F. App'x. 593, 595 (5th Cir. 2007), and there is no procedural due process right inherent in such a claim. As stated by the United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit in Geiger v. Jowers, 404 F.3d 371 (5th Cir. 2005) (in the context of the handling of an administrative grievance):
Insofar as [the plaintiff] seeks relief regarding an alleged violation of his due process rights resulting from the prison grievance procedures, the district court did not err in dismissing his claim as frivolous.. .[The plaintiff] does not have a federally protected liberty interest in having these grievances resolved to his satisfaction. As he relies on legally nonexistent interest, any alleged due process violation arising from the alleged failure to investigate his grievances is indisputably meritless. Id. at 373-74.
This conclusion is equally applicable in the context of prison disciplinary proceedings. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Grounds, 2014 WL 1049164, *2 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 14, 2014) (finding that an inmate's claim regarding a failure to conduct a “proper investigation” of a disciplinary charge “did not amount to a constitutional deprivation”); and Jackson v. Mizell, 2009 WL 1792774, *7 n.11 (E.D. La. June 23, 2009) (noting that “the Court fails to see how a prisoner could ever state a cognizable claim alleging an inadequate disciplinary investigation”). Nor does this Court sit as some form of an appellate court to review errors made by state tribunals that do not affect an inmate's constitutional rights. See, e.g., Coleman v. Director, TDCJ-CID, 2009 WL 56947, *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2009) (noting, in the context of an inmate's habeas corpus proceeding arising out of a prison disciplinary proceeding, that “[i]n the course of reviewing state proceedings, a federal court does not sit as a super state appellate court.”).
Moreover, in Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995), the Supreme Court noted that in some rare situations, an inmate may be entitled to procedural Due Process when state action exceeds the sentence in such an unexpected way as to give rise to protection by the Due Process Clause of its own force. Normally, however, the Due Process Clause, itself, does not afford an inmate a protected liberty interest that would entitle him to the procedural protections set forth in Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). It is only those restrictions that impose “atypical and significant hardship[s] ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” that will invoke the prospect of state-created liberty interests. Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 222-23 (2005). Thus, while Sandin made it clear that punishments that impact upon the duration of confinement, or which exceed the sentence in an unexpected manner, or that impose “atypical and significant hardship[s] ... in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life” will give rise to the protection afforded by the Due Process Clause, more routine disciplinary action will not invoke this constitutional protection. Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484.
In the instant case, the plaintiff does not allege that he was sentenced to any punishment which would amount to disciplinary action that infringes upon a constitutionally protected liberty interest which would invoke the protection of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the plaintiff's allegations regarding his disciplinary proceedings fail to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
RECOMMENDATION
It is the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (R. Doc. 16) be granted, dismissing the plaintiff's claims against defendant Callihan, with prejudice. It is further recommended that this matter be referred back to the Magistrate Judge for further proceedings herein.