Riemer, 348 Ill. App. 3d at 35, 807 N.E.2d at 1013. The Roisers rely primarily on Adams v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Corp., 338 Ill. App. 3d 745, 789 N.E.2d 436 (2003), to sustain their burden of establishing that general jurisdiction is properly asserted over the nonresident corporations. We do not find Adams' analysis particularly persuasive because it relied primarily on specific jurisdiction case law and principles to determine whether general jurisdiction was properly asserted over a Missouri defendant.
¶ 39 Standard of Review ¶ 40 The central issue in this consolidated appeal is whether the St. Clair County circuit court had personal jurisdiction over American Bank Holdings, based on either traditional jurisdictional factors or waiver. Court rulings on personal jurisdiction are reviewed de novo. KSAC Corp. v. Recycle Free, Inc., 364 Ill. App. 3d 593, 594, 846 N.E.2d 1021, 1022 (2006); Community Merchant Services, Inc. v. Jonas, 354 Ill. App. 3d 1077, 1083, 822 N.E.2d 515, 521-22 (2004); Adams v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Corp., 338 Ill. App. 3d 745, 747, 789 N.E.2d 436, 439 (2003). ¶ 41 Personal Jurisdiction
That is because the Illinois long-arm statute was amended, effective September 7, 1989, to include a so-called "catchall provision." Mors v. Williams, 791 F. Supp. 739, 741 (N.D. Ill. 1992); see also Adams v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Corp., 338 Ill. App. 3d 745, 789 N.E.2d 436 (2003). This catchall provision, which is subsection (c), states that a court "may also exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois constitution and the Constitution of the United States."
When a jurisdictional case is decided without the court hearing testimony, we review the trial court's decision without deference. Adams v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Corp., 338 Ill. App. 3d 745, 747, 789 N.E.2d 436, 439 (2003). In a case where the plaintiff alleges that the court has jurisdiction over a nonresident, the plaintiff carries the burden of establishing a prima facie basis for the exercise of that jurisdiction.
The minimum contacts standard is dependent upon whether the forum asserts specific jurisdiction or general jurisdiction.Adams v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Corp., 789 N.E.2d 436, 440 (Ill.App.Ct. 2003). Specific jurisdiction, the jurisdiction asserted in this case, applies to a defendant when the suit arises out of or relates to the defendant's contacts with the forum.
However, even assuming that plaintiffs' challenge to the propriety of this appeal may be considered, Baber maintains that we may still review his appeal because an order concerning personal jurisdiction over a defendant is still a proper question of law pursuant to Rule 308. In support of this contention, Baber cites two appellate court opinions, Wesly v. National Hemophilia Foundation, 2020 IL App (3d) 170569, and Adams ex rel. Adams v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Corp., 338 Ill.App.3d 745 (2003), wherein both courts considered the denial of a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction on the merits following a Rule 308 certification and application.
¶ 10 We address first the standard of review. Generally, an appeal under Supreme Court Rule 308 is limited to the question that is identified by the circuit court. Adams v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Corp., 338 Ill.App.3d 745, 747, 273 Ill.Dec. 536, 789 N.E.2d 436 (2003). When, as in the case at bar, the circuit court has not heard testimony, the standard of review for a permissive interlocutory appeal of a certified question is de novo. Adams, 338 Ill.App.3d at 747, 273 Ill.Dec. 536, 789 N.E.2d 436. On this the parties agree.
ANALYSIS An appeal under Rule 308 (155 Ill. 2d R. 308) is limited to the question certified for review. Adams v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Corp., 338 Ill. App. 3d 745, 747, 789 N.E.2d 436, 439 (2003). We will ordinarily not expand the question under review in order to answer other questions that could have been included but were not. Jones v. City of Carbondale, 217 Ill. App. 3d 85, 88, 576 N.E.2d 909, 911 (1991).
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984) (holding general jurisdiction in Texas improper where a Colombian corporation's contacts with the forum “consisted of sending its chief executive officer to Houston for a contract-negotiation session; accepting . . . checks drawn on a Houston bank; purchasing helicopters, equipment, and training services from [a Fort Worth company] for substantial sums; and sending personnel to . . . Fort Worth for training”); McKia-Coy v. Horseshoe Hammond, LLC, 2008 WL 4326468, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17, 2008) (exercising general jurisdiction where the casino advertised to Illinois consumers and provided free transport between Illinois and Indiana); Adams ex. Rel. Adams v. Harrah's Md. Heights Corp., 789 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ill.App.Ct. 2003) (similar). Neither McKia-Coy nor Adams is binding on this Court.
In a case with facts very similar to this case, an Illinois court found that general jurisdiction existed over defendant's casino under the state's long-arm statute. Adams ex rel. Adams v. Harrah's Maryland Heights Corp., 789 N.E.2d 436, 439 (Ill.App. 5 Dist. 2003). In that case, two Illinois residents were injured at the casino, located in Maryland Heights, Missouri, near St. Louis.