Opinion
Civil Action 1:21-CV-909
09-29-2023
CRAIG ADAMS, Plaintiff v. HANOVER FOODS CORP. AND JEFF WAREHIME, Defendants
This memorandum is provisionally filed under seal because it references material included in sealed exhibits submitted by defendants. Mindful of the public right of access to the courts, it is our intention to unseal the memorandum. Before doing so, however, we will entertain any request for appropriate redaction. We will task the parties to meet and confer to review this memorandum and, within seven days of today's date, to report what, if any, material they believe should be redacted and explain-with citations to applicable authority-the basis for the requested redaction.
Christopher C. Conner, United States District Judge
Plaintiff Craig Adams brings this suit against defendants Hanover Foods Corporation (“Hanover”) and Jeff Warehime, his former employer and its chief executive officer, for retaliation and hostile work environment under state and federal law. Defendants move for summary judgment. We will grant the motion.
I. Factual Background & Procedural History
Local Rule 56.1 requires that a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 be supported “by a separate, short, and concise statement of the material facts, in numbered paragraphs, as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue to be tried.” M.D. PA. L.R. 56.1. A party opposing a motion for summary judgment must file a separate statement of material facts, responding to the numbered paragraphs set forth in the moving party's statement and identifying genuine issues to be tried. Id. Unless otherwise noted, the factual background herein derives from the parties' Rule 56.1 statements of material facts. (See Docs. 49-2, 54). To the extent the parties' statements are undisputed or supported by uncontroverted record evidence, the court cites directly to the statements of material facts.
Hanover grows, packs, markets, and distributes canned, frozen, fresh, and snack foods. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 1). It is headquartered in Hanover, Pennsylvania, and has a total of 14 plants, including one in Clayton, Delaware. (See id.) Hanover hired Adams in January 2017 as Vice President of Quality Assurance and Research Development. (See Id. ¶ 3). Adams was responsible for all aspects of quality control (“QC”) at Hanover's plants. (See id. ¶ 4). His specific responsibilities included, inter alia, managing all QC staff, managing audit processes, overseeing QC equipment, and developing QC policies and procedures. (See id.)
A. Adams' Medical Conditions
Adams has suffered from back pain for many years and has been diagnosed with various back conditions including disc degeneration and lumbar radiculopathy. (See Doc. 52, Ex. D at 3-4). During his time at Hanover, Adams took over-the-counter painkillers, used an inversion table, obtained chiropractic adjustments, and occasionally received nerve block injections to treat his back pain. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 6; see also Doc. 49-3, Ex. B, Adams Dep. 35:16-40:25). Adams also suffered from anxiety, depression, and insomnia at different times throughout his employment. (See Adams Dep. 41:1-43:13; see also Doc. 52, Exs. D, E, G).
Despite his impairments, Adams maintained an active lifestyle and was able to engage in his daily activities in life and at work “[a]s long as [he] took Motrin every day.” (See Adams Dep. 57:20-58:23). Adams testified in his deposition that he rode a sport-style motorcycle multiple times per week, rode his bicycle three to four days a week for approximately six miles and 45 minutes at a time, cared for himself, and was able to eat, bend, reach, sit, stand, and work. (See id.) Management at Hanover was aware of Adams' back pain, but Adams testified he “would try to be very discrete about it” and “typically it didn't interfere with [his] duties.” (See id. at 70:20-71:18). Adams also testified he did not tell Warehime he had a serious medical issue or an anxiety disorder, (see id. at 67:24-68:4), and he never requested accommodations, medical leave, or time off, (see id. at 69:16-70:7).
Adams claims Warehime harassed him about his conditions, (see id. at 70:1671:18, 72:14-17), and that his job made his conditions worse, (see id. at 62:16-22). Adams testified to several instances of perceived harassment. On one occasion, Warehime “ridiculed [Adams] for being weak” when he stood up or squatted to stretch during meetings. (See id. at 71:1-6). On another, Warehime “ridiculed Adams for not answering e-mails over the weekend.” (See id. at 87:2-21). A third instance was when Adams told Warehime he had a doctor's appointment and Warehime responded “I'm a doctor, tell me what's wrong.” (See id. at 81:8-82:2). According to Adams, Warehime made comments like this “all the time” because Warehime “was a mean, unhappy person.” (See id. at 73:3-17).
B. April Richter's Termination
Adams reported directly to Hanover's CEO, Jeff Warehime. (See Adams Dep. 26:8-9). Warehime often called Adams into his office and directed Adams to terminate employees. (See Adams Dep. 93:23-94:14). Adams recalls this happening a total of seven times-four times regarding male employees and three times regarding female employees. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 15). Adams consistently resisted these directives because he felt there was “no real rhyme or reason” to them, and he wanted to protect each individual's continued employment. (See Adams Dep. 93:21-94:14).
In September 2018, Warehime instructed Adams to terminate April Richter, the Director of Hanover's Research and Development Department, (see id. at 91:2492:4), because Warehime received information she was not performing well, (see Id. at 94:22-95:14). Warehime also instructed Adams to terminate Zachary Wolfe, another employee in the Research and Development Department, for similar reasons. (See id. at 101:12-17, 105:6-9). Adams opposed Warehime's attempt to terminate both employees. (See id. at 94:15-95:8, 106:18-107:4). Adams told Warehime Richter's performance did not justify termination-saying something along the general line of “Jeff, you're just wrong, her performance is fine”-and refused to carry out Warehime's directive. (See id. at 101:1-11, 109:20-24). Adams did not raise any issue with Warehime related to Richter's sex nor did he express, explicitly or implicitly, that Warehime was discriminating against Richter in any manner. (See id. at 100:8-101:11).
Warehime reinstructed Adams to terminate Richter on multiple occasions over the next 14 months, but Adams refused to do so. (See Id. at 96:5-11). Shortly before Richter's eventual termination, Adams met with Hanover's Vice President, Gary Knisley, and Hanover's In-House Counsel, Stephanie Kleinfelter, to discuss Richter's pending termination. (See id. at 118:7-16; see also Doc. 55 at 5). Knisley also called Chuck Muzzy, Hanover's Director of Human Resources, to join the conversation. (See Adams Dep. 118:23-119:10; see also Doc. 55 at 5). When asked whether he raised concerns during the meeting about Warehime discriminating against Richter, Adams replied that he “didn't say much of anything during that meeting.” (See id. at 118:17-119:14). Hanover terminated Richter at Warehime's direction in November 2019. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 20).
In March 2020, Richter filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) alleging sex-based discrimination, disability-based discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. J). Hanover's outside counsel, Adam Santucci, interviewed Adams on or about April 9, 2020, in preparation of Hanover's defense against Richter's EEOC charge. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 22). Adams reported to Santucci that Warehime had terminated Richter due to Warehime's perception of Richter's performance. (See Adams Dep. 113:9-114:11; see also Doc. 55-9 at 16 (Santucci's notes from Adams' interview)). Adams also told Santucci he disagreed with Warehime's perception and had defended Richter's performance to him. (See Adams Dep. 110:12-17). Adams did not tell Santucci he believed Warehime terminated Richter because of her sex or for any other discriminatory reason. (See id. at 110:12-111:4, 113:9-114:11; see also Doc. 55-9 at 12-16 (Santucci's notes from Adams' interview)). Adams did not otherwise participate in or provide any support for Richter's EEOC charge during his time at Hanover. (See id. ¶ 25).
C. Adams' Termination
Adams' disagreements with Warehime were not limited to the latter's evaluations regarding employee performance. The two also had different views regarding the reasonableness of certain job demands, for instance, Warehime's insistence Adams check his emails on weekends. (See Adams Dep. 79:6-81:1). Nevertheless, Adams continued to serve in an important role at Hanover and was critical to Hanover's operations. (See Doc. 55-5, Warehime Dep. 40:18-22). In September 2019, one year after Adams initially refused to terminate Richter, he requested a pay raise. (See id. at 42:11-17). Warehime provided Adams a $10,000 raise and one additional week of vacation time. (See id. at 41:19-42:17). Warehime provided Adams the raise because-at the time-Hanover “couldn't afford to lose” him. (See id.)
The Clayton plant narrowly avoided a class one recall on corn that was contaminated with a pathogen at some point in 2019. (See Adams Dep. 138:15-13910). In February 2020, Hanover voluntarily withdrew specific lots of frozen white sweet corn from the market out of an abundance of caution. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. L). This triggered one of Hanover's customers to email Warehime stating they no longer felt comfortable receiving product from Hanover. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 28). The customer noted it made its decision after consulting with its food safety and quality assurance leadership. (See id. ¶ 29). The customer further explained their decision was based on the severity of Hanover's recall and ongoing discrepancies found in an audit it conducted of Hanover. (See id.) Warehime forwarded this email to Adams, and Adams responded: “We will continue working on closing all of the corrective actions identified during the [customer's] audit.” (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. M).
Adams also had disagreements with James Osborn, Hanover's Vice President of Operations, around this same time. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. N). Osborn accused Adams of failing to properly lead his team at the Clayton plant. (See id.) Osborn informed Warehime of his complaints by copying Warehime on this accusatory email. (See id.) Adams responded by emailing Warehime and copying Knisley, Kleinfelter, and Muzzy stating he “had [his] fill of Mr. Osborn's accusations” and asked Warehime to speak with Osborn. (See id.) In March 2020, Hanover experienced additional problems at the Clayton plant. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. O). Randall Culp, Hanover's Vice President of Frozen Operations, emailed Adams regarding these issues. (See id.)
Warehime eventually decided to hire an additional executive, Sam Martin, to assist Adams in overseeing all QC functions at Hanover's plants. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. P). The hire occurred around the same time Hanover was investigating Richter's EEOC charge. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 21). On April 10, 2020, the day after Santucci interviewed Adams regarding Richter's EEOC charge, Warehime split Hanover's QC responsibilities between Martin and Adams. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. P; see also Doc. 49-2 ¶ 22). Each individual was responsible for six plants-Clayton remaining with Adams-and Martin was to report to Adams on all day-to-day activities. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. P). Adams remained responsible for all QC functions at his six plants including, but not limited to, food safety initiatives; product holds, reworks, and releases; microbiological lab work; product grading; environmental swabbing; managing company specifications; compliance; and overall time management. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 34). On April 22, 2020, Warehime sent a follow-up email to Adams and Martin regarding their assignments, emphasizing Adams is responsible for staffing and management at his assigned plants. (See Id. ¶ 35).
On May 16, 2020, Betty Affeldt, Clayton Operations Manager, reported staffing and production issues at Clayton to James Walsh, Clayton Plant Manager. (See id. ¶ 37). Walsh raised these concerns with Perry Boulter, Clayton QC Manager, noting this was both a production and QC issue. (See id. ¶ 38). Boulter emailed Adams regarding the QC issues stating the “situation is understatedly bad.” (See id.)
On May 29, 2020, Culp emailed Adams regarding a plan for the upcoming pea season. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. U). Culp told Adams “Jeff [Warehime] expects you and I to be down [at the Clayton plant] several days a week given all the Operational and QC issues last year along with new people in both our groups.” (See id.) Culp also stated he was going to be out for some time in mid-June but would be available for calls and texts while he was out. (See id.)
Culp left Adams a voicemail less than one week later, on June 3, 2020, noting Walsh was angry due to issues with staffing, training, and QC at the Clayton plant. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 40). Walsh also emailed Adams and Boulter detailing his “deep concerns” about “major issues on the [quality assurance] side of the program.” (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. W). Boulter emailed Adams stating he was “overwhelmed” and unsure what to do. (See id.) Boulter complained QC continues to be “the whipping post for all wrongs” and “beg[ged]” Adams “for further direction.” (See id.) Adams then emailed Culp and Muzzy stating he was frustrated and his QC team was being harassed. (See Adams Dep. 144:23-145:12). Culp denied Adams' assertions and noted Adams failed to properly follow the previously developed plan. (See id. at 145:18-25). Culp asked Adams to meet him at the Clayton plant to address the ongoing issues. (See id. at 146:1-7). Warehime also emailed Adams the same day instructing Adams to physically be at the Clayton plant that week and most of next week because “this is crunch time” and “I cannot have a repeat of last year.” (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. X). Warehime told Adams “[y]ou need to lead your team and make sure we are covered and the only way to do that is if you are present during this time.” (See id.)
Warehime informed Adams just over three weeks later, on June 19, 2020, he had “received numerous complaints so far this season about the QC techs being ‘not very helpful' in the plants.” (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. Y). Warehime noted “this is a big problem” and directed Adams to retrain QC techs “to spend more time seeing the production lines, communicating with production people and being more helpful and informative with plant management.” (See id.)
On July 1, 2020, Warehime held an in-person meeting with Adams, Osborn, and Culp. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. Z; see also Warehime Dep. 25:13-26:6). The group discussed problems with QC equipment and the scheduling of QC managers at the Clayton plant. (See id.) On July 29, 2020, Warehime reminded Adams he had promised Warehime his department would manage the unit at Clayton, run it continuously, keep it fully functional, and prevent any delays. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. AA). Adams responded that the equipment was functioning as designed and managers were working opposite shifts, providing adequate coverage for the plant. (See id.) Culp was copied on each of these emails. (See id.) At Culp's direction, Walsh checked whether Adams' responses were accurate. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. BB). Walsh reported some of Adams' information was inaccurate because of undisclosed issues with staffing and QC managers on certain days. (See id.)
On July 29 and 30, 2020, Culp sent Kleinfelter a series of emails documenting repeated deficiencies with the QC department under Adams' supervision. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. FF). On August 2, 2020, Walsh again notified Adams of coverage issues at Clayton and reported QC managers in fact were not working opposite shifts. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 50). Culp emailed Adams the same day stating he was “deeply concerned with the lack of QC leadership in Clayton” and addressed Adams' anticipated response: “[The QC team] need[s] to recognize, it is NOT harassment, it is absolute frustration on the parts of operations supervision and management that they are left to handle everything on the back shifts.” (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. CC). Culp emailed Adams again the next day regarding other QC staffing issues at Clayton. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 52). Culp stated one QC manager left the plant before sanitation was complete and explained current staffing coverage was not adequate. (See id.) Culp copied Warehime on this email. (See id.) Warehime called Adams into his office later that afternoon and terminated him. (See id. ¶ 53).
D. Procedural History
Adams filed a complaint on May 19, 2021, and an amended complaint on April 14, 2022. The amended complaint asserts eight employment-discrimination claims under state and federal law. Hanover moves for summary judgment, and Adams concurs in part with the motion. The motion is fully briefed and ripe for disposition.
The eight claims are: Count 1 - Title VII Retaliation; Count 2 - PHRA Retaliation; Count 3 - ADA Disability Discrimination; Count 4 - ADA Disability-Hostile Work Environment; Count 5 - ADA Disability Retaliation; Count 6 - PHRA Disability Discrimination; Count 7 - PHRA Disability-Hostile Work Environment; and Count 8 - PHRA Disability Retaliation. Adams concurs in the motion as to Counts 3, 5, 6, and 8, and therefore, only Counts 1, 2, 4, and 7 remain.
II. Legal Standard
Through summary adjudication, the court may dispose of those claims that do not present a “genuine dispute as to any material fact” and for which a jury trial would be an empty and unnecessary formality. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). The burden of proof tasks the nonmoving party to come forth with “affirmative evidence, beyond the allegations of the pleadings,” in support of its right to relief. See Pappas v. City of Lebanon, 331 F.Supp.2d 311, 315 (M.D. Pa. 2004); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The court is to view the evidence “in the light most favorable to the non[]moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party's favor.” Thomas v. Cumberland County, 749 F.3d 217, 222 (3d Cir. 2014).
This evidence must be adequate, as a matter of law, to sustain a judgment in favor of the nonmoving party on the claims. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250-57 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-89 (1986). Only if this threshold is met may the cause of action proceed. See Pappas, 331 F.Supp.2d at 315.
III. Discussion
Adams' remaining claims fall into two categories. He claims Hanover unlawfully terminated him because he opposed Hanover's discriminatory firing of a female employee and participated in proceedings related to that employee's EEOC charge, in violation of Section 704(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (Count 1), and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 951 et seq. (Count 2). Adams also alleges he experienced a hostile work environment on account of his disability, in violation of both the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (Count 4), and the PHRA (Count 7). We will address the remaining claims seriatim.
Adams seeks an adverse inference and spoliation sanctions against Hanover for eliminating evidence from Adams' business cell phone. (See Doc. 55 at 14-15). We find this argument to be without merit because the duty to preserve evidence on Adams' phone was not reasonably foreseeable when Hanover reset it. See Bull v. UPS, 665 F.3d 68, 73, 79 (3d Cir. 2012). Hanover terminated Adams on August 3, 2020, (see Doc. 49-2 ¶ 53), and conducted a factory reset on his phone in accordance with company policy no later than August 19, 2020, (see Doc. 55-7 at 3). This was approximately three weeks before Adams filed a charge with the EEOC, on September 9, 2020. (See Doc. 20 ¶ 96). Adams has not produced any evidence indicating litigation was reasonably foreseeable when Hanover reset his phone. Thus, Adams has failed to demonstrate spoliation regarding his business phone.
A. Retaliation Claims (Counts 1 and 2)
Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee because he, inter alia, “has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter.” See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The PHRA likewise forbids discrimination “against any individual because such individual has opposed any practice forbidden by this act.” See 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(d).To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title VII, a plaintiff must establish (1) he engaged in a protected activity, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. See Carvalho-Grevious v. Del. State Univ., 851 F.3d 249, 257 (3d Cir. 2017) (citing Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331, 340-41 (3d Cir. 2006)).
Our court of appeals generally applies the same analytical framework to PHRA retaliation claims as to Title VII retaliation claims. See Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 791 n.9 (3d Cir. 2016) (citing Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 500 (3d Cir. 1997)).
Under the first prong, Title VII includes an “opposition clause” and a “participation clause.” See Slagle v. County of Clarion, 435 F.3d 262, 265-66 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a)); see also EEOC v. Allstate Ins. Co., 778 F.3d 444, 452 (3d Cir. 2015). The opposition clause protects employees who “oppose[] any practice made an unlawful employment practice” by Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Moore, 461 F.3d at 341. The participation clause protects employees who “participate in certain Title VII proceedings” against the employer. See Moore, 461 F.3d at 341 (citing Slagle, 435 F.3d at 266). In both instances, “the employee must hold an objectively reasonable belief, in good faith, that the activity they oppose is unlawful under Title VII.” See Id. (citing Clark County v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 271 (2001) (per curiam)).
If the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the employer to identify “a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for having taken the adverse action.” See Canada v. Samuel Grossi & Sons, Inc., 49 F.4th 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2022) (quoting Daniels v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 776 F.3d 181, 193 (3d Cir. 2015)). The defendant's burden at this rebuttal stage is “relatively light;” it is a burden of production only. See Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 417, 426 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Tomasso v. Boeing Co., 445 F.3d 702, 707 (3d Cir. 2006)). If the employer meets its burden, the plaintiff then must show by a preponderance of the evidence the employer's stated reasons were mere pretext for discrimination. See id. at 42627 (citing Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994)).
1. Prima Facie Case - Opposition Clause
Title VII's opposition clause protects employees who object to a supervisor's discriminatory treatment of a coworker. See Moore, 461 F.3d at 343. Such opposition activity can include “informal protests of discriminatory employment practices, including making complaints to management.” See id. (quoting Curay-Cramer v. Ursuline Acad. of Wilmington, Del., Inc., 450 F.3d 130, 135 (3d Cir. 2006)). In assessing whether a plaintiff's complaints constitute opposition activity, “we look to the message being conveyed rather than the means of conveyance.” See Id. (quoting Curay-Cramer, 450 F.3d at 135). That “message” cannot be “vague or equivocal,” see Id. at 341, 343 (citing Barber v. CSX Distrib. Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995)), and it must clearly concern “the type of conduct that is generally protected by” Title VII, see Kengerski v. Harper, 6 F.4th 531, 537 (3d Cir. 2021). Hence, a “general complaint of unfair treatment”-one that “does not explicitly or implicitly allege” unlawful discrimination-is not protected opposition activity. See Barber, 68 F.3d at 702. Even when an employee has made an “oblique reference” to sex discrimination, the “mere mention of [sex] does not transform a general list of grievances into opposition to unlawful activity under Title VII.” See Perry v. Harvey, 332 Fed.Appx. 728, 733 (3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential).
The court acknowledges that nonprecedential decisions are not binding upon federal district courts. However, we cite these nonprecedential decisions because we have carefully considered each decision and we are persuaded by each panel's ratio decidendi.
Adams contends Hanover retaliated against him for opposing Warehime's discriminatory firing of Richter, a female employee. Adams admits that when he spoke to Warehime, he objected only to Warehime's assessment of Richter's work performance. (See Doc. 55 at 5). He nonetheless posits “it may also be inferred” from the Rule 56 record that he raised concerns with Warehime about Warehime's “male chauvinistic attitudes and sexist behavior.” (See id. at 5-6). The trouble for Adams is that the record-including Adams' own deposition testimony-refutes any such inference. Adams expressed disagreement to Warehime and others about the latter's desire to terminate Richter, (see Adams Dep. 94:15-95:8; Doc. 55-4, Muzzy Dep. 18:11-19:7; Doc. 55-9 at 14 (Santucci's notes from Adams' interview)), but Adams testified he never raised any objection with Warehime relating to Richter's sex, (see Adams Dep. 100:8-101:22; 106:14-17). Adams conceded in his deposition: “I never told him that I thought [her termination] was because she was a woman.” (See Id. at 101:3-4). Adams could not recall making any such complaints to management, nor indicating to others Warehime was discriminating against Richter on the basis of sex or otherwise. (See id. at 113:2-114:8; 118:7-119:14; see also Muzzy Dep. 19:2-7). Nor did Adams implicitly or explicitly express support for Richter's EEOC charge prior to his own termination. (See Adams Dep. 113:2-114:8, 117:11118:6). All the record establishes is Adams refused as a general rule to terminate any employee, male or female, he perceived as performing well, and he suspected- but never expressed-that Warehime was motivated by discriminatory animus. (See id. at 94:22-97:7, 100:8-101:22; 106:14-17). Those general complaints, devoid of reference or even allusion to Richter's sex, do not constitute protected activity. See Barber, 68 F.3d at 702. Adams has failed to establish the first element of his prima facie case vis-a-vis the opposition clause.
2. Prima Facie Case - Participation Clause
Adams' conduct, however, arguably is protected by the participation clause. Title VII prevents employers from retaliating against employees who participate “in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.” See 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). The participation clause “offers much broader protection” than the opposition clause. See Slagle, 435 F.3d at 266 (citations omitted). Our court of appeals has not determined whether participating in an employer's internal investigation can qualify as protected activity. Other courts of appeals, and district courts within our circuit, have drawn a line at the time a formal agency charge is filed: participating in an internal investigation prior or unrelated to that charge is not protected activity, see, e.g., Townsend v. Benjamin Enters., Inc., 679 F.3d 41, 49 (2d Cir. 2012) (collecting cases); see also Washco v. FedEx, 402 F.Supp.2d 547, 55455 (E.D. Pa. 2005) (same), but participating in an internal investigation after the charge is filed is an extension of the EEOC process and thus protected, see, e.g., Abbott v. Crown Motor Co., 348 F.3d 537, 543 (6th Cir. 2003); Clover v. Total Sys. Servs., Inc., 176 F.3d 1346, 1353 (11th Cir. 1999); see also Tuthill v. Consol. Rail Corp., No. 96-CV-6868, 1997 WL 560603, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 26, 1997) (collecting cases) (noting one purpose of participation clause “is to protect access to the EEOC” (emphasis added)), aff'd, 156 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision).
There is no dispute Adams participated in Hanover's internal investigation into Richter's EEOC charge after it was filed; he provided information during a postcharge interview with Hanover's outside counsel. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 22). We will therefore assume arguendo Adams can prove he engaged in protected participation activity.
3. Prima Facie Case - Causation
Adams nevertheless has not adduced evidence establishing a causal connection between his participation in the interview and his termination. At the prima facie stage, a plaintiff must marshal enough evidence of causation “to raise the inference that [their] protected activity was the likely reason for the adverse [employment] action.” See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259 (second alteration in original) (quoting Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 1997)). For retaliation claims, the timing between an employee's protected activity and the adverse employment action may be indicative of causation if it is “unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive.” See Shaner v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 505 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503). A “bright line rule” for unusually suggestive timing does not exist, but “temporal proximity” alone is rarely sufficient to establish causation. Compare Jalil v. Avdel Corp., 873 F.2d 701, 708 (3d Cir. 1989) (two-day lapse sufficient to infer causation) with LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Assn, 503 F.3d 217, 233 (3d Cir. 2007) (inference from temporal proximity “begins to dissipate” with lapse of three or more months); see also Shinn v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 783 Fed.Appx. 229, 233 (3d Cir. 2019) (nonprecedential) (citing Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep't, 380 F.3d 751, 760 (3d Cir. 2004) (two-month lapse, by itself, insufficient)). Absent temporal proximity, a plaintiff may establish causation by pointing to “any other evidence in the record sufficient to support the inference of retaliatory animus.” See LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 232-33 (citing Farrell v. Planters Lifesavers Co., 206 F.3d 271, 279-81 (3d Cir. 2000)).
Adams participated in the interview with Hanover's outside counsel in April 2020 and was terminated in August 2020. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶¶ 22, 52, 53). This fourmonth lapse is not sufficient alone to establish causation. See LeBoon, 503 F.3d at 233. Adams participated in the interview at Hanover's request and concedes he was “absolutely following the company line.” (See Adams Dep. 110:12-17, 113:2-5). He did not complain to Hanover's outside counsel about sex discrimination nor express support for Richter's EEOC charge; during his deposition, he acknowledged this silence and explained it was due to fear Hanover might retaliate against him. (See id. at 113:2-114:11). Adams did not talk to anyone else about Richter's charge and did not participate in the EEOC investigation in any other way. (See id. at 117:11118:6). Adams' own testimony regarding his limited and compliant participation in this lone interview does not support an inference that Hanover was “motivated by a desire to retaliate” when it discharged him several months later. See Crosbie v. Highmark Inc., 47 F.4th 140, 146 (3d Cir. 2022).
Adams raises two other arguments in attempt to establish causation: he avers (1) Hanover planned to terminate him sooner but strategically waited until after it settled Richter's EEOC charge and (2) Warehime engaged in a “pattern of antagonism” toward Adams by hiring Martin to assist Adams with his job duties in April 2020. (See Doc. 55 at 8-11). Neither claim finds support in the evidence. First, Adams repeatedly testified that Hanover decided to terminate him before the interview, (see Adams Dep. 82:4-17, 111:11-16, 112:16-113:1), refuting his theory that his participation in the interview-his only protected activity-was the likely reason for his eventual termination, see Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259. With respect to Martin, Adams testified his job responsibilities were overwhelming, (see Adams Dep. 61:24-63:3), and he does not dispute that Martin brought needed relief, but he nonetheless avers Warehime hired Martin “[u]nder the guise to assist [him]” and “ultimately to replace [him],” (see id. at 116:13-117:3). That claim is based purely on speculation; he cites no evidence from which a factfinder could infer Warehime hired Martin to fire and replace Adams as part of some retaliatory long game. Indeed, when asked during his deposition what he based that belief on, Adams replied “You tell me. I don't know.” (See id. at 116:22-117:3). Such conjecture cannot carry the day at the summary-judgment stage. See Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Williams v. Borough of W. Chester, 891 F.2d 458, 460 (3d Cir. 1989)).
In sum, Adams has not produced evidence from which a jury reasonably could find his participation in the post-EEOC charge interview was the likely reason for his termination. See Carvalho-Grevious, 851 F.3d at 259. Adams' failure to establish causation is fatal to his retaliation claims under Title VII and the PHRA.
4. Nonretaliatory Reasons and Pretext
Assuming arguendo Adams could establish his prima facie case, he cannot overcome Hanover's proffered nonretaliatory reasons for terminating him. At this stage, Hanover must articulate one or more legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for its employment decision. See Samuel Grossi, 49 F.4th at 346. This is a burden of production only and requires Hanover to submit evidence which, presumed true, “present[s] a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason for having taken the adverse action.” See id. (quoting Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193). Adams must then demonstrate that Hanover's “proffered explanation was false, and that retaliation was the real reason for the adverse employment action.” See id. (quoting Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193). Our court of appeals has recognized this is a “difficult burden” for a plaintiff to overcome. See Fuentes, 32 F.3d at 765.
The various issues at Adams' assigned Clayton plant both before and after Adams' only instance of protected activity provide a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for his termination. The record demonstrates various leaders at Hanover lodged complaints about Adams or QC issues at Clayton as early as February and March of 2020. (See, e.g., Doc. 49-3, Ex. N; Doc. 49-3, Ex. O). Similar complaints continued to come in after the interview, on at least six different occasions leading up to Adams' termination. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. S (May 16, 2020); Doc. 49-3, Ex. W (June 3, 2020); Doc. 49-3, Ex. Y (June 19, 2020); Doc. 49-3, Ex. BB (July 30, 2020); Doc. 49-3, Ex. CC (August 2, 2020); Doc. 49-3, Ex. DD (August 3, 2020)). Hanover has consistently cited these issues in explaining the grounds for Adams' termination. (See Warehime Dep. 22:24-23:14, 28:18-25; see also Doc. 49-3, Ex. DD). Adams admits the issues occurred but claims they were “blown out of proportion.” (See Adams Dep. 145:13-17, 164:9-18). Yet Adams also concedes it was Warehime's prerogative, as CEO, to decide what emphasis to put on these issues. (See Id. at 164:9-18). Whether Hanover “made the best or even a sound business decision” by terminating Adams is not the relevant inquiry. See Keller v. Orix Credit All., Inc., 130 F.3d 1101, 1109 (3d Cir. 1997) (en banc) (citation omitted). What matters is Adams cannot show Hanover was “so plainly wrong” for terminating him based on the issues he concedes existed at his assigned plant. See Crosbie, 47 F.4th at 146 (quoting Keller, 130 F.3d at 1109). Adams has not adduced any evidence from which a jury could reasonably find Hanover's performance-based reasons for terminating him were false and that retaliation was the “real reason.” See Samuel Grossi, 49 F.4th at 346 (quoting Daniels, 776 F.3d at 193). We will therefore grant Hanover's motion for summary judgment on these claims.
B. Hostile Work Environment Claims (Counts 4 and 7)
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against “a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to . . . [the] terms, conditions, and privileges of employment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). The PHRA also prohibits an employer from disability discrimination “with respect to . . . terms, conditions, or privileges of employment or contract.” See 43 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 955(a).A plaintiff alleging hostile work environment under either statute must prove “(1) [he] is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) [he] was subject to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment was based on [his] disability or a request for an accommodation; (4) the harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [his] employment and to create an abusive working environment; and (5) [his employer] knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to take prompt remedial action.” See Walton v. Mental Health Ass'n of Se. Pa., 168 F.3d 661, 667 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Kendrell v. Sec'y U.S. Dep't of Def., 851 Fed.Appx. 317, 321 (3d Cir. 2021) (nonprecedential) (citing Castleberry v. STI Grp., 863 F.3d 259, 263 (3d Cir. 2017)).
Our court of appeals has held that “the same legal standard that applies to the ADA applies equally to disability discrimination claims under the PHRA.” Colwell v. Rite Aid Corp., 602 F.3d 495, 499 n.3 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996).
Adams' hostile work environment claims fail on the first element. The ADA defines a disability as “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities . . .; (B) a record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an impairment.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1). The PHRA utilizes a nearly identical definition. See PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 954(p.1). Major life activities include “caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). A plaintiff claiming a disability under either statute must do more than “merely submit[] evidence of a medical diagnosis of an impairment.” See Pritchett v. Ellers, 324 Fed.Appx. 157 (3d Cir. 2009) (nonprecedential) (quoting Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002), superseded on other grounds by ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110325, 122 Stat. 353)). He must demonstrate such impairment “substantially limits” a major life activity. See Kelly, 94 F.3d at 105.
Adams has failed to establish he has an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity or that he has a record of such an impairment. Adams conceded during his deposition, and his medical records substantiate, his back pain and mental health issues did not substantially limit any major life activity during his employment at Hanover. (See Doc. 49-2 ¶ 11; see also Doc. 52, Exs. D, E, G). Adams testified he was able to ride a sport-style motorcycle multiple times per week; ride a bicycle three to four times a week for 45 minutes at a time; drive six hours round trip in a single day; care for himself; eat, bend, and reach; sit and stand; work 12-hour days; and perform his full duties. (See Adams Dep. 57:20-58:23, 62:2-15). Adams may be impaired, but on this Rule 56 record, a reasonable jury could not find he is disabled as that term is defined by the ADA and PHRA.
Likewise, Adams has not put forth evidence indicating anyone at Hanover regarded him as disabled. A plaintiff showing a disability under a “regarded as” theory must establish he “has been subjected to an action prohibited under this chapter because of an actual or perceived physical or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is perceived to limit a major life activity.” See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A). A plaintiff may establish a “regarded as” disability by demonstrating his employer “‘misinterpret[ed] information about [his] limitations to conclude that [he] is incapable of performing' his [] job requirements.” See Eshleman v. Patrick Indus., Inc., 961 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Ross v. Kraft Foods N. Am., Inc., 347 F.Supp.2d. 200, 204 (E.D. Pa. 2004)).
Adams did not ask for accommodations, seek medical leave, or tell his employer he could not perform his job requirements. (See Adams Dep. 67:4-68:4, 69:16-70:7). He also did not use any special devices which could have indicated such an impairment. See Kelly, 94 F.3d at 106. Even viewed in the light most favorable to Adams, the record establishes only that he informed others at Hanover about his impairments, (see Adams Dep. 90:9-91:3), and certain parts of the job made those impairments worse, (see id. at 61:9-63:3). There is no evidence, however, suggesting anyone perceived Adams' impairments as limiting his ability at work. (See Muzzy Dep. 13:12-18; see also Warehime Dep. 45:16-48:14). The record shows the opposite: Warehime expected Adams to perform all his job responsibilities, and Adams told Warehime he could. (See Doc. 49-3, Ex. M). Adams testified in his deposition that he “would try to be very discrete about [his back pain],” he is “the kind of guy that just kind of sucks it up and goes forward,” and “typically [back pain] didn't interfere with [his] duties.” (See id. at 70:20-71:18). Adams also never told Warehime he had a serious medical issue or an anxiety disorder. (See id. at 67:24-68:4). The evidence simply does not show that anyone at Hanover regarded Adams as disabled.
Adams also has failed to establish he experienced severe or pervasive harassment during his time at Hanover. To establish that a work environment was abusive as required for a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must show the environment was “objectively hostile or abusive” and plaintiff also subjectively perceived it that way. See Walton, 168 F.3d at 667 (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993)). Courts consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing the severity of alleged workplace harassment, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's work performance.” Id. (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 23).
Adams' testimony shows he was subject to offensive comments and, according to his testimony, those comments occurred “all the time,” tipping the frequency factor in his favor. (See Adams Dep. 73:7-13, 85:16-86:8). But Adams' testimony establishes unequivocally that his work performance was not impacted by the comments, (see id. at 78:15-79:1), and no evidence indicates any comments were “physically threatening or humiliating.” See Harris, 510 U.S. at 23. The three example comments Adams was able to recall, (see Adams Dep. 85:16-86:8), while obviously inappropriate, are “mere offensive utterance[s],” see Harris, 510 U.S. at 23, and are not sufficient to show the work environment was “objectively hostile or abusive,” see Walton, 168 F.3d at 667 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 22). Therefore, Adams' hostile-work-environment claims fail on this element as well.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth herein, we will grant defendants' motion. An appropriate order shall issue.