Opinion
CV 23-5019-SPG (AGR)
07-24-2024
LATOYA L. ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. CHRISTA GARCIA, et al, Defendants.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
SHERILYN PEACE GARNETT UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
I.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff LaToya L. Adams (“Plaintiff”), who is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) alleging violations of the Violence Against Women Act, violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and violations of the Uniform Commercial Code 9-609. (ECF No. 12).
The FAC names 16 defendants in 3 states. The ten defendants in California are: Leslie Morales and Paula Hastings, who are alleged to be employees at the Cecil Hotel; Kelly Jurado, Tierra Watts and Kyle McCurdy, who are alleged to be employees at Step Up on Second; Christa Garcia and Patrick Komesu, who are alleged to be employees at the Santa Monica Housing Authority (“SMHA”); (4) SAMO Apartments; and Aurianna Mcvay and Amatul Slaam, who are alleged to be employees of the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles (“HACLA”). (FAC ¶¶ 6-17). All individuals are sued in both their individual and official capacities. (Id.). The sole Wyoming defendant is Safe House of Cheyenne, Wyoming. (Id. ¶ 18). The five defendants in Colorado are: Ermelinda Archibeque, who is alleged to work in the Victim Assistance Program of the District Attorney's Office in Greeley, Colorado; Camille Vandergriff, who is alleged to work at the Cross Roads Safe House in Fort Collins, Colorado; Lily Williamson, who is alleged to work at the Safe Shelter of St Vrain, Colorado; and Francis the Supervisor and MacKayla the Shift Lead at Catholic Charities in Fort Collins, Colorado. (Id. ¶¶ 19-23, 52). All individuals are sued both in their individual and official capacities. (Id.).
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court screened the FAC and dismissed the FAC with leave to amend within 30 days after entry of its May 3, 2024 Order. (ECF No. 20 (“Order”)). The Order warned Plaintiff that if she failed to file a timely Second Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies, “this action will be dismissed without prejudice.” (Id. at 11).
Plaintiff did not file a timely Second Amended Complaint or request additional time to do so.
II.
ORDER
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that this action is dismissed without prejudice for the reasons stated in the attached Order dated May 3, 2024.
ORDER DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED COMPLAINT WITH LEAVE TO AMEND AND DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE REQUEST [FOR] SECOND AMENDED CONSOLIDATED COMPLAINT [ECF NOS. 15, 16]
Before the Court are Plaintiff LaToya L. Adam's (“Plaintiff”) First Amended Complaint, (ECF No. 12 (“FAC”)), and Request [for] Second Amended Consolidated Complaint, (ECF No. 16 (“Motion”)). Having considered Plaintiff's submissions, the relevant law, and the record in this case, the Court DISMISSES the FAC and DENIES the Motion, both without prejudice.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 23, 2023, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed a civil rights complaint and a request to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECF Nos. 1, 3). The Court postponed ruling on the request and granted Plaintiff leave to file a First Amended Complaint that cured the deficiencies described in the order. (ECF No. 6). On September 11, 2023, Plaintiff filed a document that the Court construed as the FAC. (FAC; ECF No. 19). Subsequently, on February 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed a Request for Service at Government Expense, (ECF No. 15), as well as the Motion, seeking leave to file a Second Amended Complaint, (Mot.).
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), the Court has examined the FAC to determine whether it states a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Court's evaluation is governed by the following standards.
To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a ‘probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. (citations omitted).
A pro se complaint is to be liberally construed. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam). “[T]he liberal pleading standard,” however, “applies only to a plaintiff's factual allegations.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 330 n.9 (1989). The Court is “not required to accept as true allegations that contradict exhibits attached to the Complaint” or allegations that contradict “matters properly subject to judicial notice,” nor must it accept “allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” Seven Arts Filmed Ent., Ltd. v. Content Media Corp. PLC, 733 F.3d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Furthermore, the Court may not, under the guise of liberally reading a pro se submission, “supply essential elements of the claim that were not initially pled.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982). Before dismissing a pro se civil rights complaint for failure to state a claim, the Court should give the plaintiff a statement of the complaint's deficiencies and, unless it is clear the deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment, an opportunity to cure them. Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135-36 (9th Cir. 1987). Nevertheless, “[u]nder Ninth Circuit case law, district courts are only required to grant leave to amend if a complaint can possibly be saved. Courts are not required to grant leave to amend if a complaint lacks merit entirely.” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc).
III. DISCUSSION
A. First Amended Complaint
The FAC names sixteen defendants in three states: California, Wyoming, and Colorado.
The ten defendants in California are: Leslie Morales and Paula Hastings, who are alleged to be employees at the Cecil Hotel; Kelly Jurado, Tierra Watts and Kyle McCurdy, who are alleged to be employees at Step Up on Second; Christa Garcia and Patrick Komesu, who are alleged to be employees at the Santa Monica Housing Authority; SAMO Apartments; and Aurianna Mcvay and Amatul Slaam, who are alleged to be employees of the Housing Authority of the City of Los Angeles. (FAC ¶¶ 6-17). All individuals are sued in both their individual and official capacities. (Id.)
The sole Wyoming defendant is Safe House of Cheyenne, Wyoming. (Id. ¶ 18).
The five defendants in Colorado are: Ermelinda Archibeque, who is alleged to work in the Victim Assistance Program of the District Attorney's Office in Greeley, Colorado; Camille Vandergriff, who is alleged to work at the Cross Roads Safe House in Fort Collins, Colorado; Lily Williamson, who is alleged to work at the Safe Shelter of St Vrain, Colorado; and Francis the Supervisor and MacKayla the Shift Lead at Catholic Charities in Fort Collins, Colorado. (Id. ¶¶ 19-23, 52). All individuals are sued both in their individual and official capacities. (Id.)
The FAC contains three claims for relief against all defendants: (1) a claim seeking relief for violations of the Violence Against Women Act (“VAWA”); (2) a claim seeking relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and (3) a claim for purported violations of the Uniform Commercial Code. (Id. ¶¶ 58-68). The FAC seeks monetary and injunctive relief. (Id. at 11).
1. Claim One: Violence Against Women Act
Plaintiff alleges that she was wrongfully denied an External Emergency Transfer under VAWA from certain “mentioned premises” and that this denial resulted in Plaintiff's “assault and personal injury.” (Id. ¶ 60). See 34 U.S.C. § 12491(e) (requiring “appropriate agency” to adopt model emergency transfer plan); 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(e) (requiring “covered housing provider” to adopt emergency transfer plan). For relief under Claim One, Plaintiff requests an immediate External Emergency Transfer. (FAC at 11 ¶ A).
Plaintiff contends that she is entitled to relief under 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(b)(2). (Id. ¶ 60). Although 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005(b) describes certain prohibited bases “for denial or termination of assistance or eviction,” however, it does not confer a private right of action on impacted tenants. Instead, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”), with which Plaintiff “filed an official complaint,” (FAC ¶ 35), has enforcement authority for VAWA, 34 U.S.C. § 12493. Accordingly, Claim One is DISMISSED with prejudice.
The Court further notes that, in United States v. Morrison, the Supreme Court invalidated as unconstitutional VAWA's private right of action for victims of gender-motivated violence. 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000). See also Beverly v. Cnty. of Orange, No. 22-55080, 2022 WL 14003695, at *1 (9th Cir. Oct. 24, 2022) (affirming dismissal of VAWA claim), cert. denied sub nom. Beverly v. Orange Cnty. Sheriff, 143 S.Ct. 816 (2023), reh'g denied, 143 S.Ct. 1778 (2023); United States v. Allen, 341 F.3d 870, 880 (9th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging Morrison).
2. Claim Two: 42 U.S.C. § 1983
As an initial matter, Paragraphs 64 and 65 of this claim refer to “Defendants Counties.” (FAC ¶¶ 64-65). The FAC does not name any county as a defendant. If Plaintiff chooses to file a Second Amended Complaint, the Court advises Plaintiff to name the correct defendants and make clear the name of the defendant(s) to which Claim Two applies.
To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States by a defendant acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). “[T]o seek redress through § 1983, however, a plaintiff must assert the violation of a federal right, not merely a violation of federal law.” Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 340 (1997) (emphasis in original). “Plaintiffs suing under § 1983 must demonstrate that a statute-not a regulation-confers an individual right.” Save Our Valley v. Sound Transit, 335 F.3d 932, 943 (9th Cir. 2003).
The FAC alleges that defendants, acting under color of state law, deprived Plaintiff of housing that was safe from actual and imminent threats. (FAC ¶¶ 62-63). The FAC further alleges that the unnamed County defendants failed to adopt clear policies and failed to train employees as to the “proper actions of VAWA.” (Id. ¶¶ 64-65).
As to Plaintiff's § 1983 claim against all defendants, the Supreme Court has not recognized a constitutional right to housing. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (“We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and economic ill.... Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions.”). Furthermore, although cited in the FAC, the Ninth Amendment “has not been interpreted as independently securing any constitutional rights for purposes of making out a constitutional violation” in a § 1983 action. Schowengerdt v. United States, 944 F.2d 483, 490 (9th Cir. 1991). See also San Diego Cnty. Gun Rights Comm. v. Reno, 98 F.3d 1121, 1125 (9th Cir. 1996), overruled in part on other grounds by District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
To the extent Plaintiff bases this claim on VAWA, the Ninth Circuit does not appear to have addressed the question of whether a plaintiff may seek relief under § 1983 for purported VAWA violations. In determining whether a particular statute establishes a federal right, the Supreme Court has identified three factors: (1) “Congress must have intended that the provision in question benefit the plaintiff”; (2) “plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assertedly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and amorphous' that its enforcement would strain judicial competence”; and (3) “the statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the States,” meaning that “the provision giving rise to the asserted right must be couched in mandatory, rather than precatory, terms.” Blessing, 520 U.S. at 340-41. A showing that a statute gives rise to federal right creates only “a rebuttable presumption that the right is enforceable under § 1983.” Id. at 341. “[D]ismissal is proper” if Congress foreclosed a remedy under § 1983 either expressly “or impliedly, by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme that is incompatible with individual enforcement under § 1983.” Id.
As currently pleaded, the FAC does not identify the particular right Plaintiff seeks to vindicate through Claim Two. See id. at 342 (placing burden on plaintiffs “to identify with particularity the rights they claimed”). Although, liberally read, the FAC claims that defendants allegedly violated 24 C.F.R. § 5.2001 and 24 C.F.R. § 5.2005, (FAC ¶ 60), a plaintiff seeking relief under § 1983 must identify a statute, not a regulation, that confers a right upon them. Save Our Valley, 335 F.3d at 943. The provisions Plaintiff has identified are regulations promulgated by HUD and contained within the Code of Federal Regulations, not statutes passed by Congress.
The FAC also alleges that unspecified counties failed to adopt clear policies and failed to train employees as to “proper actions of VAWA.” (FAC ¶¶ 64-65). Even if Plaintiff had identified the counties at issue, vague and conclusory allegations such as these are insufficient to state a claim. To state a claim under § 1983, Plaintiff must name the relevant defendant(s), identify specific actions taken by that party, and cite to specific statutory provisions that confer an individual right upon her. See Blessing, 520 U.S. at 343-44 (finding statutory requirement that state operate child support program in substantial compliance with Title IV-D did not create a federal right because law was not intended to benefit individual children and custodial parents, but rather was standard to measure systemwide performance of program).
For these reasons, Claim Two is dismissed with leave to amend.
3. Claim Three: Uniform Commercial Code
The FAC alleges that Defendants' “blatant[] ignoring” of Plaintiff's requests for an External Emergency Transfer violated the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) § 9-609. (FAC ¶¶ 67-68). The Court cannot discern any basis for a claim under UCC § 9-609 against any defendant. UCC § 9-609 concerns the right of a secured party, such as a lender or consignor, to take possession of collateral if a debtor defaults. The FAC does not contain any allegations that would support a conclusion that Plaintiff is either a secured party or a debtor within the meaning of this provision. Claim Three is dismissed with leave to amend.
4. Personal Jurisdiction over Claims Against Defendants in Wyoming and Colorado
The FAC names one defendant in Wyoming and five defendants in Colorado. The FAC does not allege any bases for this Court's personal jurisdiction over the Wyoming or Colorado defendants in the Central District of California. Generally speaking, “[i]t is the plaintiff's burden to establish the court's personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” Donell v. Keppers, 835 F.Supp.2d 871, 876 (S.D. Cal. 2011) (quoting Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d 915, 922 (9th Cir.2001)). “For a court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, that defendant must have at least ‘minimum contacts' with the relevant forum such that the exercise of jurisdiction ‘does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'” Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Minimum contacts may be established via general jurisdiction or specific jurisdiction. See id. at 801-02. General jurisdiction exists where the defendant's contacts with the forum state “are so continuous and systematic as to render them essentially at home in the forum state.” Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). For example, a natural person is subject to general jurisdiction in their place of domicile. Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Judicial Dist. Ct., 592 U.S. 351, 358-59 (2021). Specific jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff's claims or causes of action “arise out of or relate to” the defendant's contacts with the forum state. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff's claims against the Wyoming defendant are based on events that occurred while Plaintiff was living in Wyoming. (FAC ¶ 48). These allegations would support a Wyoming court's personal jurisdiction, but do not provide a basis for a California court to exercise personal jurisdiction. Similarly, Plaintiff's claims against the Colorado defendants are based on events that occurred while Plaintiff was living in Colorado. (Id. ¶¶ 49-57). Although these claims indicate that a Colorado court could properly exercise personal jurisdiction over these defendants, there is no indication that these claims have any connection to California such that this Court may exercise personal jurisdiction over the Colorado defendants. Accordingly, all claims against the Wyoming and Colorado defendants are dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction.
5. State Law Claims
The FAC invokes supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims (id. ¶ 3), but the FAC does not contain any state law claims. In any event, unless Plaintiff properly states a federal claim for relief, the Court will decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over any state law claims and will instead dismiss those claims without prejudice to Plaintiff's ability to prosecute them in a state court action. See 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3); Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-law claims once it has ‘dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.'”) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3)); Gini v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't, 40 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 1994) (if court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, dismissal should be without prejudice).
B. Motion for Leave to Amend
Plaintiff attached a proposed amended complaint, (ECF No. 16-1 (the “proposed SAC”)), to her Motion. The proposed SAC does not cure the deficiencies described above and contains additional deficiencies discussed below. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion is denied without prejudice to her ability to file a Second Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies identified in this Order.
1. Minor Plaintiffs
The proposed SAC purports to add Plaintiff's two minor children, who are alleged to be residents of Wyoming, as plaintiffs. (ECF No. 16-1 at 1, 8). Plaintiff may represent herself in court. As a pro se litigant, however, she may not represent any other person or entity in her lawsuit. United States v. Mitchell, 915 F.2d 521, 526 n.8 (9th Cir. 1990) (pro se litigant does not have standing to raise claims of other persons whose rights may have been violated); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (“Although a non-attorney may appear in propria persona in his own behalf, that privilege is personal to him.”); Central District Local Rule 83-2.2 (same). Simply put, a self-represented litigant “has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself.” C.E. Pope Equity Trust, 818 F.2d at 697. This rule extends to claims seeking relief on behalf of a self-represented litigant's child: “a parent or guardian cannot bring an action on behalf of a minor child without retaining a lawyer.” Johns v. Cnty. of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1997). If Plaintiff wishes to seek relief on behalf of her children, she must retain counsel to file any amended complaint. See id.
2. Claims Based on Purported Miranda Violations
The proposed SAC adds two members of the Los Angeles Police Department (“LAPD”) as defendants. (ECF No. 16-1 at 15-17). Among other complaints, Plaintiff alleges that these two officers arrested her without reading her Miranda rights. Under Supreme Court precedent, Plaintiff may not seek damages under § 1983 for Miranda violations. Tekoh, 597 U.S. at 152.
The Fifth Amendment is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and provides that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” Vega v. Tekoh, 597 U.S. 134, 141 (2022). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
3. Wyoming and Colorado Defendants
The proposed SAC names numerous additional defendants in Wyoming and Colorado without alleging any factual basis for the Court's personal jurisdiction over these defendants.
The proposed SAC seeks to add thirteen new Wyoming defendants: five officers with the Cheyenne Police Department; Renee Hansen of Hansen & Associates; two employees of the Laramie County Detention Facility Center, Deputy Karissa and Deputy Orr; M&F Towing and its owner; Dr. Collin Prince; and Chelsea Cox, an employee at Laramie County School District. (ECF No. 16-1 at 20-28, 30-32, 38-39). As with the Wyoming defendant named in the FAC, Plaintiff does not allege any basis for this court's personal jurisdiction over any of the Wyoming defendants. See above, Section III.A.4. All the events described in the proposed SAC appear to have occurred in Wyoming while Plaintiff was in Wyoming. In addition, Plaintiff's proposed claims against Hansen and Prince are based on a violation of HIPAA (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act). (Id. at 21, 30-31). HIPAA does not provide for a private civil action for damages. Garmon v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 847 (9th Cir. 2016).
The proposed SAC also seeks to add ten new Colorado defendants: Avis Budget and two of its employees, John Campbell and Brad Dobesh, at Loveland Airport; Safe Shelter of St. Vrain; Bondi Beach restaurant; Officer Maher and Corporal Matsui of Larimer County, Colorado; the District Attorney's Office of Fort Collins, Colorado; Cross Roads Safe House in Fort Collins, Colorado; and (7) Catholic Charities in Fort Collins, Colorado. (ECF No. 16-1 at 28-31, 34-37). As with the Colorado defendants named in the FAC, see above, Section III.A.4, Plaintiff does not allege any basis for this Court's personal jurisdiction over any of the Colorado defendants. All the events at issue appear to have occurred in Colorado while Plaintiff was in Colorado. In addition, prosecutors are immune from liability for “pursuing prosecution” of Plaintiff. (Id. at 35-36). See, e.g., Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976) (prosecutor is immune from civil suit based on role in deciding whether to initiate prosecution and in presenting state's case).
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed above, the Court DISMISSES the FAC with leave to amend and DENIES Plaintiff's Motion, without prejudice to her ability to file a Second Amended Complaint that cures the deficiencies identified in this Order within 30 days after entry of this Order. Plaintiff's request for service of the FAC is denied, without prejudice, in light of this Order. (ECF No. 15).
If Plaintiff chooses to file a Second Amended Complaint, it must bear the docket number assigned to this case, be labeled “Second Amended Complaint,” be filed within 30 days after entry of this Order, and be complete in and of itself without reference to the prior complaints, attachments, pleadings or other documents.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to provide Plaintiff with a blank Central District of California civil rights complaint form.
If Plaintiff does not file a timely Second Amended Complaint, this action will be dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.