Opinion
C.A. No. 98A-07-004 WCC
Submitted: July 21, 1999
Decided: November 4, 1999
Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas — AFFIRMED
Elwyn Evans, Jr., Esquire; 1210 N. King Street, P.O. Box 1037, Wilmington, DE 19899. Attorney for Plaintiff-Below, Appellant.
James R. Leonard, Esquire; Potter, Carmine Leonard, P.A., 840 N. Union Street, P.O. Box 514, Wilmington, DE 19899. Attorney for Defendants-Below, Appellees.
ORDER
This 4th day of November, 1999, after considering Estella Adams' ("Appellant") appeal from the Court of Common Pleas' decision to dismiss her case, it appears that:
1. On May 21, 1998 at 9:00 a.m., the Court of Common Pleas was scheduled to hear Appellant's de novo appeal of a Justice of the Peace decision, which had ruled in favor of First Choice Auto and Truck Repair, Inc. and KA Auto Sales, Inc. ("Appellees"). While Appellant's counsel and Appellees and their counsel timely appeared for trial, Appellant failed to appear. After waiting 45 minutes for Appellant, her counsel requested a continuance over the objection of Appellees' counsel. When the Court of Common Pleas denied the continuance request, Appellees' counsel moved to dismiss the matter. The Court of Common Pleas then ordered that the matter be dismissed in 10 days unless the court received a good cause explanation in writing for Appellant's failure to timely appear.
Appellant had purchased an automobile from Appellee and argued several claims, such as breach of warranty of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, that Appellee knew that the odometer was inoperative and the mileage was incorrect, that its notice of repossession violated 6 Del. C. § 9-504, and that Appellee engaged in unlawful practice under 6 Del. C. § 2513. Appellees counterclaimed to recover a deficiency.
2. On June 1, 1998, Appellant submitted an affidavit to the court, explaining her failure to timely appear. In the affidavit, she explained that a few days before the hearing, one of her two granddaughters, to whom she has legal custody, had heart problems. In addition, Appellant stated that at 7:00 a.m. on May 21, 1998, the day scheduled for her trial, she discovered water on her living room floor and had to call a plumber. She did not arrive at her attorney's office until 9:40 a.m. In sum, she stated, "I lost track of the time for the hearing because I was so stressed by these domestic emergencies." In response, Appellees argued that the affidavit did not justify her untimely appearance because the comments concerning her grandchildren were unrelated to her failure to timely appear and Appellant had received notice similar to Appellees at a pre-trial. On June 4, 1998, the Court of Common Pleas dismissed the matter because it was not satisfied that Appellant's explanation for failing to timely appear amounted to a good cause justifying her absence.
(Appellant Aff.)
3. As a result, Appellant appealed the court's dismissal, acknowledging that while the court has discretion to grant or deny a motion to dismiss, this dismissal was an abuse of discretion. Appellant asserted that dismissal of the case on the merits was extremely harsh. Further, she argued that her untimely appearance was not deliberate or in disrespect to the court, but rather, it constituted a reaction to the water emergency. In response, Appellees argued that the dismissal was within the permissible range of the court's discretion and was not an abuse of discretion. Upon review of the submissions, this Court requested letter memoranda, focusing on whether the finding that Appellant's explanation did not amount to sufficient good cause to justify her absence was an abuse of discretion by the trial court.
4. According to Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 41(b), the trial court may dismiss a plaintiffs action for failure to prosecute or to comply with its rules or orders. This rule bestows this inherent power on the trial court so that it can manage its own affairs and achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of its caseload. In other words, the trial court may grant a dismissal in order to enforce the integrity of its orders and to effectively manage an overwhelming caseload. Therefore, when reviewing a trial court's decision to grant a motion to dismiss, the issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused its discretion. Judicial discretion is defined as "the exercise of judgment directed by conscience and reason, and when a court has not exceeded the bounds of reason in view of the circumstances and has not so ignored recognized rules of law or practice so as to produce injustice, its legal discretion has not been abused."
Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 41(b) provides: (b) Involuntary dismissal; effect thereof. For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to comply with these Rules or any order of Court, a defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any claim against the defendant. After the plaintiff, in an action tried by the Court without a jury, has completed the presentation of plaintiffs evidence, the defendant, without waiving the right to offer evidence in the event the motion is not granted, may move for a dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. The Court as trier of facts may then determine them and render judgment against the plaintiff or may decline to render any judgment until the close of the evidence. Unless the Court in its order for dismissal otherwise specifies, a dismissal under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this Rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction, for improper venue, or for failure to join a party under Rule 19, operates as an adjudication upon the merits.
Hudson v. Davidson, Del. Super., C.A. No. 85A-AU1, Lee, J. (Apr. 20, 1988) (Mem. Op.) at 1 ( citing Gebhart v. Ernest DiSabatino Sons, Inc., Del. Supr., 264 A.2d 157, 1 59Z (1970)). While Gebhart addressed Superior Court Civil Rule 41(b), Court of Common Pleas Civil Rule 4 1 (b) has the same language. See also Lynch v. Stapleford, Del. Super., C.A. No. 94A-10-006, Terry, J. (Apr. 4, 1995) (ORDER).
See Gebhart, 264 A.2d at 159-60.
See Hudson at 1. See also, Gebhart, 264 A.2d at 159.
Lynch Assoc. v. Sweeten Contracting, Del. Super., C.A. No. 98A-09-005, Toliver, J. (July 13, 1999) (ORDER) ( quoting Firestone Tire Rubber Co. v. Adams, Del. Supr., 541 A.2d 567, 570 (1988)).
5. This Court cannot find that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing Appellant's case. After Appellant had not appeared in court for 45 minutes, the Court of Common Pleas denied a continuance request and ordered that dismissal would be granted unless a good explanation was provided in writing. The Court of Common Pleas evaluated the explanations that she "lost track of time . . . because [she] was so stressed by domestic emergencies" and found them insufficient.
As a reviewing court, it would be inappropriate for this Court to either substitute its judgment of whether Appellant's explanation was reasonable or to second guess the trial court's decision. Instead, this Court's review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court's discretion was inappropriately exercised. Here, the record supports a finding that the Court of Common Pleas fully and carefully considered the reasons for Appellant's failure to timely appear. It provided Appellant an opportunity to explain her action, and this Court cannot find that the trial court's dismissal due to Appellant's lack of attendance at a critical court appearance was unreasonable. This was an action pursued by Appellant. As such, she had a unique responsibility to comply with the rules and orders of the court if she wanted to avail herself of the right to litigate this dispute. She disobeyed an order of the court, failed to timely notify her counsel or the court of the reason for such disobedience, and inappropriately prioritized her responsibility to the court. As such, the trial court's decision was reasonable, logical and consistent with its rules and was not an abuse of discretion.
6. As a result, the Court AFFIRMED the Court of Common Pleas' decision to dismiss Appellant's de novo appeal.
IT IS SO ORDERED. _______________________________ Judge William C. Carpenter, Jr.