Opinion
NO. 00-497
July 18, 2001
Minute Entry
Before the Court is a motion for Summary Judgment Pursuant to Rule 56 (Rec. Doc. 13) filed by defendant, the City of New Orleans. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se has filed no opposition. The motion, set for hearing on July 18, 2001, is before the Court on briefs without oral argument.
On June 14, 2001, when the final pre-trial conference was scheduled to take place, the Court granted Plaintiff a continuance based on his assertion that he intended to enroll counsel. To date, Plaintiff has not done so. Further, not withstanding the Court's admonition that Plaintiff would have to abide by Court rules should he elect to remain pro se, he has not responded to the instant motion.
Plaintiff brought this suit against three New Orleans Police officers and the City of New Orleans ("the City") following his arrest in February 1999, during a domestic dispute. Plaintiff, himself a New Orleans police officer, alleges that he was falsely accused of various crimes by one officer and then arrested without probable cause by another.
The City now seeks summary judgment asserting that Plaintiff "has failed to proffer any pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions or affidavits to show any genuine issue of material facts." Rec. Doc. 13, at 1. Although Plaintiff did not oppose the motion, the Court must nevertheless determine whether the City's motion has merit given its dispositive nature. See John v. State of Louisiana, 757 F.2d 698, 708 (5th Cir. 1985).
In support of its motion, the City relies solely on the pleadings and offers no evidence of any kind to meet its initial burden as movant for summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court will consider the City's motion as one for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See Steelman v. United States, 318 F.2d 733, 734 n. 2 (Cl.Ct. 1963) ("[P]laintiff's motion (for summary judgment] is a motion for judgment on the pleading (sic] inasmuch as no material outside the pleadings is incorporated in support of said motion."). In determining a Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court must accept the non-moving party's allegations as true. F.D.I.C. v. Hudson, 800 F. Supp. 867, 869 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (citing Hal Roach Studios v. Richard Feiner Co., 883 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1989)). Judgment on the pleadings is appropriate only if the moving party clearly establishes that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Id. Where the allegations of the complaint are sufficient to state a claim, plaintiff's failure to respond to a Rule 12(c) motion does not entitle defendant to dismissal. See Maggette v. Dalsheim, 709 F.2d 800, 802 (2d Cir. 1983)
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that sergeants Davis and Harrison acted in concert to secure his false arrest — Davis by falsely accusing Plaintiff of criminal trespass and battery, and Harrison of effecting the arrest notwithstanding having known that the accusations were false thereby rendering the arrest without probable cause. Taking these allegations as true, as the Court is compelled to do at this juncture, the City's motion must be denied with respect to these two defendants because Plaintiff has alleged facts sufficient to state a claim under section 1983.
The inartfully drafted complaint does not expressly allege that officer Harrison knew of the alleged falsity of the accusations. Nevertheless, the Court can discern the gist of what Plaintiff is attempting to allege. Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro Se, the Court is compelled to construe his complaint liberally. See Johnson v. Atkins, 999 F.2d 99, 100 (5th Cir. 1993).
The liability of the third officer and defendant, Captain Chester Cook, is premised solely on the theory of respondeat superior given that Davis and Harrison were his subordinates. See Complaint, ¶ 13. It is well-settled, however, that the doctrine of respondeat superior does not operate in the realm of section 1983 to render government officials liable for the acts of their subordinates. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 534 (5th Cir. 1997). Given that Plaintiff alleged no other basis for holding officer Cook liable, the motion is granted insofar as Plaintiff does not state a claim against Captain Cook.
Finally, Plaintiff alleged two bases for holding the City liable for the actions of officers Davis and Harrison. First, Plaintiff alleges that the City is liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior. Complaint, ¶ 14. Second, Plaintiff alleges that the City's failure to adeqately train, supervise, and discipline officers Davis and Harrison contributed to their having unlawfully arrested him. Id.
Pursuant to Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed. 22 611 (1978), a municipality such as the City, can be held liable under section 1983 when the constitutional injury is caused by a policy or custom of the municipality. Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany, 187 F.3d 452, 471 (5th Cir. 1999). Failure to properly train officers is a basis for municipal liability under Monell's progeny.Snyder v. Trepagnier, 142 F.3d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1998), cert. dismissed, 526 U.S. 1083, 119 S.Ct. 1493, 143 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999) (citingCity of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 109 S.Ct. 1197, 103 L.Ed.2d 412 (1989)). Thus, giving the complaint a liberal construction and taking the facts alleged as true, Plaintiff's complaint is sufficient to withstand a motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion is denied insofar as the City seeks dismissal.
Acordingly;
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Rec. Doc. 13) filed by the City of New Orleans should be and is hereby GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART. The motion is GRANTED insofar as Captain Chester Cook is DISMISSED from the suit. The motion is DENIED in all other respects, without prejudice to the City to file a properly supported motion for summary judgment.