Opinion
14133-22
04-12-2023
LAMAR ADAMS & ANGELA ADAMS, Petitioners v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respondent
ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION
Kathleen Kerrigan Chief Judge
The petition underlying the above-docketed proceeding was filed on June 8, 2022, and taxable year 2016 was referenced as the period in contention. No notices of deficiency or determination issued by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) were attached to the petition. Rather, attached was a copy of a single IRS communication, i.e., a Letter 3340C dated May 4, 2022, sent to petitioners with respect to completion of a request for audit reconsideration for 2016 and the lack of any change by the IRS to the original audit assessment amount. The statements in the petition centered primarily on complaints regarding failure by the IRS to allow claimed dependents.
On August 18, 2022, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction, on the grounds: (1) That the petition was not filed within the time prescribed by section 6213(a) or 7502 of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) with respect to a notice of deficiency for taxable year 2016; and (2) no notice of determination under section 6320 or 6330, I.R.C., to form the basis for a petition to this Court had been sent to petitioners with respect to taxable year 2016, nor had respondent made any other determination with respect to petitioners' such tax year that would confer jurisdiction on the Court as of the time the petition herein was filed. Attached to the motion were copies of a notice of deficiency for the taxable year 2016 dated October 19, 2018, and the corresponding certified mail list, as evidence of the fact that such notice was properly sent to petitioners by certified mail.
This Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. It may therefore exercise jurisdiction only to the extent expressly provided by statute. Breman v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 61, 66 (1976). In a case seeking the redetermination of a deficiency, the jurisdiction of the Court depends, in part, on the issuance by the Commissioner of a valid notice of deficiency to the taxpayer. Rule 13(c), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure; Frieling v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 42, 46 (1983). The notice of deficiency has been described as "the taxpayer's ticket to the Tax Court" because without it, there can be no prepayment judicial review by this Court of the deficiency determined by the Commissioner. Mulvania v. Commissioner, 81 T.C. 65, 67 (1983). The jurisdiction of the Court in a deficiency case also depends in part on the timely filing of a petition by the taxpayer. Rule 13(c), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure; Hallmark Research Collective v. Commissioner, No. 21284-21, 159 T.C. (Nov. 29, 2022); Brown v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 215, 220 (1982). In this regard, section 6213(a), I.R.C., provides that the petition must be filed with the Court within 90 days, or 150 days if the notice is addressed to a person outside the United States, after the notice of deficiency is mailed (not counting Saturday, Sunday, or a legal holiday in the District of Columbia as the last day). The Court has no authority to extend this 90-day (or 150-day) period. Joannou v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 868, 869 (1960). However, a petition shall be treated as timely filed if it is filed on or before the last date specified in such notice for the filing of a Tax Court petition (but after issuance), a provision which becomes relevant where that date is later than the date computed with reference to the mailing date. Sec. 6213(a), I.R.C. Likewise, if the conditions of section 7502, I.R.C., are satisfied, a petition which is timely mailed may be treated as having been timely filed.
Similarly, this Court's jurisdiction in a case seeking review of a determination concerning collection action under section 6320 or 6330, I.R.C., depends, in part, upon the issuance of a valid notice of determination by the IRS Office of Appeals under section 6320 or 6330, I.R.C. Secs. 6320(c) and 6330(d)(1), I.R.C.; Rule 330(b), Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure; Offiler v. Commissioner, 114 T.C. 492 (2000). A condition precedent to the issuance of a notice of determination is the requirement that a taxpayer have requested a hearing before the IRS Office of Appeals in reference to an underlying Notice of Federal Tax Lien Filing and Your Right to a Hearing Under IRC 6320, Final Notice of Intent To Levy and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing (or the equivalent Notice CP90, Intent to seize your assets and notice of your right to a hearing, depending on the version of the form used), or analogous post-levy notice of hearing rights under section 6330(f), I.R.C. (e.g., a Notice of Levy on Your State Tax Refund and Notice of Your Right to a Hearing).
Other types of IRS notice which may form the basis for a petition to the Tax Court, likewise under statutorily prescribed parameters, include a Notice of Final Determination Concerning Your Request for Relief From Joint and Several Liability, a Notice of Final Determination Not To Abate Interest, a Notice of Determination of Worker Classification, Notice of Certification of Your Seriously Delinquent Federal Tax Debt to the State Department, or a Notice of Final Determination Concerning Whistleblower Action. No pertinent claims involving section 6015, 6404(h), 7436, 7345, or 7623, I.R.C., respectively, have been implicated here. Likewise absent is any suggestion that the perquisites have been met to support one of the statutorily described declaratory judgment actions that may be undertaken by the Court.
Petitioners were served with a copy of respondent's motion to dismiss and on October 18, 2022, filed an objection. Therein, petitioners did not directly counter the jurisdictional allegations set forth in respondent's motion regarding timeliness and lack of relevant notices and did not allege that petitioners had filed with the Tax Court before the statutory deadline. Instead, the objection focused on petitioners' long-running efforts to resolve their 2016 tax matters administratively with the IRS and their frustrations with the agency. The response emphasized delays in trying to deal with the agency, inadequate communications from the IRS, and repetitive submission of requested documents. For instance, they stated: "Respondents willfully and purposely disregarded all proofs submitted by petitioners because the work history yielded a better chance to collect. Petitioners were in contact with respondents before the 90 day period was over and purposely mislead by Agents that funds would be released, petitioners has call log and all correspondences." The response closed by reiterating their right to the credits claimed and asking the Court to facilitate recovery of funds from the IRS.
On this record, then, the Court considers whether jurisdiction has been established with respect to either a deficiency or a collection proceeding for 2016. As regards a deficiency case, and as previously noted, the initial petition herein was filed with the Court on June 8, 2022, which date is 1,328 days after the date of the notice of deficiency for 2016 issued to petitioners. The envelope in which the petition was received by the Court bears a U.S. Postal Service postmark dated June 2, 2022, which date is 1,322 days after the date of the notice. The petition clearly was not filed or mailed within 90 days of the date of the notice mailed to petitioners, i.e., the petition was not filed or sent to the Court on or before the January 17, 2019, deadline. Moreover, petitioners have made no claim that petitioners filed a timely Tax Court petition in response to this deficiency notice.
Rather, petitioners' objection and other documents in the record show that both before and after receiving the notice of deficiency petitioners have endeavored to communicate with and to submit information to, and to seek information from, the IRS. The law is well settled, however, that once a notice of deficiency has been issued, further administrative contact or consideration does not alter or suspend the running of the 90-day period. Even confusing IRS responses or correspondence during the administrative process cannot override the clearly stated deadline in the statutory notice of deficiency. Such confusion is not uncommon given that the IRS frequently treats as separate processes or proceedings what taxpayers view as a single dispute. Taxpayers not infrequently have also conflated this Court with an IRS unit, but the IRS is a completely separate and independent entity from the Tax Court. In a similar vein, audit reconsideration is unrelated to, and has no bearing on, rights to petition the Tax Court.
Although section 7502, I.R.C., allows a timely mailed petition to be treated as timely filed, that section mandates that the envelope bearing the petition be "properly addressed to the agency, officer, or office with which the document is required to be filed.". Sec. 7502(a)(2)(B), I.R.C. A petition seeking redetermination of a deficiency must be filed with this Court and not the IRS. Sec. 6213(a), I.R.C. Hence, the mailing (or faxing) of a petition, correspondence, return, or other documentation to the IRS is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on this Court. Axe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 256 (1972). The statute is clear, and this Court must follow it. Estate of Cerrito v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 896 (1980). The Court would also note that a notice of deficiency issued to a taxpayer states on its face the last day to petition the Tax Court (not the IRS) and provides expressly in multiple places that the filing period extends 90 days from the date of the letter. The first pages of the notice are likewise explicit in providing that petitions must be filed with the U.S. Tax Court and in giving the Court's address as "400 Second Street, NW, Washington, DC 20217". With these definitive rules regarding the inefficacy of written correspondence to the IRS, it is clear that efforts to contact the IRS by phone can offer no greater protection.
Furthermore, it is equally well settled that where the Commissioner's representatives provide erroneous advice based upon a mistaken interpretation of the law, courts and the Commissioner are not bound by the agent's statements and must follow the applicable statutes, regulations, and caselaw. See, e.g., Dixon v. United States, 381 U.S. 68, 72-73 (1965); Auto. Club of Mich. v. Commissioner, 353 U.S. 180, 183 (1957); Neri v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 767, 771-772 (1970). Consequently, the same result must obtain regardless of whether the jurisdictional question is later raised by the Commissioner or by the Court sua sponte. Moreover, despite its superficial appeal, it has long been the rule that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is unavailable in these circumstances. As this Court has stated, an "estoppel argument must fail for the simple reason that the doctrine of estoppel cannot create jurisdiction where none otherwise exists." Energy Res., Ltd. v, Commissioner, 91 T.C. 913, 917 (1988).
As to a collection case for 2016, respondent's jurisdictional allegations likewise stand unrebutted. Petitioners have at no time established that a notice of determination for that year under section 6320 and/or 6330, I.R.C., was issued. Instead, it appears that petitioners may be attempting to rely on the Letter 3340C attached to the petition as the equivalent of a notice of determination. Such is contrary to the law described above.
Thus, the record at this juncture suggests that petitioners may have sought the assistance of the Court after having become frustrated with administrative actions by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and any attempts to work with the agency but that the petition here was not based upon or instigated by a specific IRS notice expressly providing petitioners with the right to contest a particular IRS determination in this Court. Suffice it to say that no IRS communication supplied or mentioned by petitioners to date, constitutes, or can substitute for, a notice of deficiency under section 6212, I.R.C., or a notice of determination issued pursuant to sections 6320 and/or 6330, I.R.C, or any other of the narrow class of specified determinations by the IRS that can open the door to the Tax Court, as of the date the petition was filed. Moreover, the expansive view of the Court's jurisdiction intimated in the objection clearly exceeds the bounds of the limited jurisdiction detailed above. Absent a specific statutory grant to the Court to address a particular notice or scenario, the Court has no general jurisdiction to consider and redress complaints simply because they may pertain to taxes. Stated otherwise, the Court is simply without authority to consider the propriety of any IRS activity (or inactivity) in absence of a determination to petitioners within the meaning of the statutes discussed herein and a timely petition.
In conclusion, the Court has no authority to extend that period provided by law for filing a petition "whatever the equities of a particular case may be and regardless of the cause for its not being filed within the required period." Axe v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 256, 259 (1972). As a Court of limited jurisdiction, the Court is simply unable to offer any remedy or assistance when a petition is filed late. Unfortunately, governing law recognizes no reasonable cause or other applicable exception to the statutory deadline. Accordingly, since petitioners have failed to establish that the petition was mailed or filed within the required period with respect to the notice of deficiency for 2016, and have failed to establish the existence of any other determination by the IRS that could support this litigation as to 2016, this case must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Court would, however, encourage petitioners, despite the frustration, to consider continuing to work administratively through the IRS, which, being entirely separate from the Tax Court, may yet be able to offer alternative avenues for relief.
In conclusion then, while the Court is sympathetic to petitioners' situation and understands the challenges of the circumstances faced and the good faith efforts made, the Court on the present record lacks jurisdiction in this case to review any action (or inaction) by respondent in regard to petitioners' taxes. Congress has granted the Tax Court no authority to afford any remedy in the circumstances evidenced by this proceeding, regardless of the merits of petitioners' complaints.
The premises considered, it is
ORDERED that respondent's Motion To Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction is granted, and this case is dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.