Opinion
Case No.: 1:11-CV-155 (WLS)
11-26-2013
ALLEN ALPHONZO ADAMS, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY COMMISSIONER FOR CALHOUN COUNTY, et al., Defendants.
ORDER
Presently pending before the Court are pleadings styled as Motion for Objective [sic] an [sic] Return Answer Too [sic] Order Made on 11-04-2013 in Doc. 144 (Doc. 145), Petition for Writ of Mandamus (Doc. 146), and Affidavit in Support of Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 147). The Court construes Motion for Objective [sic] an [sic] Return Answer Too [sic] Order Made on 11-04-2013 in Doc. 144 (Doc. 145) as a Motion for Reconsideration.
I. Motion for Reconsideration
On March 6, 2013, the Court adopted a Recommendation from United States Magistrate Judge Thomas Q. Langstaff dismissing the above-captioned matter against all defendants. (Docs. 115 & 140.) Plaintiff subsequently filed Notice for Interlocutory Appeal, which the Court construed as a Motion for Leave to File Interlocutory Appeal. (Docs. 142 & 144.) On November 4, 2013, the Court denied that Motion. (Doc. 144.) An interlocutory appeal was improper because judgment had been entered against all defendants and would therefore not be interlocutory. (See Doc. 141.) Based on Defendant's filings now under review (Docs. 145-147), the Court finds that Notice for Interlocutory Appeal (Doc. 142) may have been intended to be a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal.
"An appeal may not be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies in writing that it is not taken in good faith." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). Accordingly, the Court cannot grant such a request upon finding that the appeal sought to be taken in forma pauperis is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). While the good faith test under § 1915 does not require a preliminary showing of any particular degree of merit, the examining court at least must be able to determine from the in forma pauperis application whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits. DeSantis v. United Technologies Corp., 15 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1289 (M.D. Fla. 1998) (citations omitted). That is, legal theories raised in the appeal must be "capable of being convincingly argued." Ghee v. Retailers Nat. Bank, 271 F. App'x 858, 859-60 (11th Cir. 2008) (quoting Sun v. Forrester, 939 F.2d 924, 925 (11th Cir. 1991)). Otherwise, if they are not, they are "indisputably meritless," frivolous, and thus, brought without good faith. Id. (quoting Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993)).
Upon review of the pleadings filed after judgment was entered in the above-captioned matter (Docs. 142, 143, 145-47), the Court finds that the intended appeal is not taken in good faith because the Court is unable to determine "whether the appeal involves legal points arguable on their merits." See DeSantis, 15 F. Supp. 2d at 1289. Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff requests to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, that request is DENIED. Also, to the extent Plaintiff requests the Court to reconsider its November 4, 2013 Order denying Plaintiff's motion to certify an interlocutory appeal, that request is DENIED. As such, Plaintiff's Motion for Objective [sic] an [sic] Return Answer Too [sic] Order Made on 11-04-2013 in Doc. 144 (Doc. 145) is DENIED.
II. Motion for Writ of Mandamus
"A writ of mandamus 'is only appropriate when: (1) the plaintiff has a clear right to the relief requested; (2) the defendant has a clear duty to act; and (3) no other adequate remedy is available.' " United States v. Collins, 524 F. App'x 573, 574 (11th Cir. 2013) (citing Cash v. Barnhart, 327 F.3d 1252, 1258 (11th Cir. 2003)). Plaintiff claims that he is entitled to mandamus because the clerk "fail[ed] to docket an[d] file [Plaintiff's] notice for interlocutory appeal filed on March 25, 2013." (Doc. 146 at 1.) However, Plaintiff's Notice for Interlocutory Appeal was filed on March 18, 2013. (Doc. 142.) To the extent Plaintiff's claims that the Court improperly denied his requests to proceed in forma pauperis, or his request for the Court to certify an interlocutory appeal, Plaintiff's Motion for Writ of Mandamus (Doc. 146) is DENIED for the reasons stated above and in its prior referenced orders.
III. Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
To the extent Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 147) should be construed as a Request to Proceed In Forma Pauperis on Appeal, that Motion (Doc. 147) is DENIED for the reasons stated above. To the extent Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to Proceed In Forma Pauperis (Doc. 147) seeks to proceed in forma pauperis in any other context or for any other purpose, such a request is DENIED as Plaintiff has provided no legally cognizable reason or justification for the same.
IV. Prefiling Approval
Plaintiff's Complaint in this case was dismissed without prejudice because he provided a false response to a complaint form question. (Doc. 115 at 8.) "If Plaintiff wishes to proceed with the claims raised in this action, he must submit a new complaint, along with" the filing fee as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See Wallace v. Strength, No. CV 108-009, 2008 WL 2097146, *2 n.2 (S.D. Ga. May 16, 2008). Because Plaintiff has previously filed a litany of meritless motions, the Court is concerned that Plaintiff will continue to burden this Court's docket with voluminous filings. Accordingly, the Court finds it appropriate to notify Plaintiff that such behavior will result in the requirement that Plaintiff first seek permission from the Court before filing additional pleadings.
Although the Court is sensitive to the importance of providing defendants access to a forum to vindicate their constitutional rights, it is also aware of its "responsibility to prevent single litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on the judicial machinery needed by others." Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1074 (11th Cir. 1986) (en banc). The right of access to the courts "is neither unconditional nor absolute." Smith v. United States, 386 F. App'x 853, 857 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting Procup, 792 F.2d at 1077-78). "Federal courts have both the inherent power and the constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs the ability to carry out Article III judicial functions." Procup, 792 F.2d at 1073-74. For that reason, "[a] litigant 'can be severely restricted as to what he may file and how he must behave in his applications for judicial relief.'" United States v. Powerstein, 185 F. App'x 811, 813 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting Procup, 792 F.2d at 1074).
The Eleventh Circuit has afforded district courts broad discretion in shaping restrictions on a litigant's right to file pleadings. For example, in United States v. Powerstein, the Eleventh Circuit upheld a district court's order barring a defendant "from filing any other pleading or documents of any kind in this case, subject to the pains and penalties of contempt of court, unless this Court is ordered by the Eleventh Circuit . . . or the Supreme Court . . . to accept filing." 185 F. App'x at 813. In that case, the appellant, a convicted felon who had been released from prison, had filed sixty-one documents challenging his conviction. Id. at 812 & n.1. The Eleventh Circuit held that the injunction was not overbroad in part because it permitted him to file pleadings if permitted by the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at 813. On several occasions, the Eleventh Circuit has also upheld restrictions that require prefiling approval by the district judge before new filings may be docketed. Cofield v. Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 936 F.2d 512, 518 (11th Cir. 1991); Copeland v. Green, 949 F.2d 390, 391 (11th Cir. 1991).
Plaintiff is NOTICED that the continued filing of voluminous, meritless, or repetitive pleadings in this Court may result in the requirement that he seek prefiling approval before new filings may be docketed.
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W. LOUIS SANDS, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT