Opinion
TTDFA156009117S
09-07-2018
Marnie J. ADAMS v. Dennis J. ADAMS
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Armata, J.
I
BACKGROUND AND HISTORY OF THE CASE
On May 24, 2016, after a lengthy divorce process, a judgment of dissolution after an uncontested hearing entered in the above-referenced matter. The parties had previously entered into a Custody Parenting Agreement (# 184.50) that was approved by the court, Prestley, J., on November 25, 2015. Pursuant to the terms of the Custody Parenting Agreement, the parties were to share joint custody of their minor children, two boys: Hunter, age eleven, born in 2007, and Gunnar, age nine, born in 2009. On October 11, 2017, the defendant filed a contempt citation, postjudgment (# 386). Additionally, on April 20, 2018, defendant filed a postjudgment motion to modify (# 403) and another contempt citation, postjudgment (# 404). On October 30, 2017, the court, Prats, J., referred the matter to the Family Services office for a Comprehensive Evaluation. On June 29, 2018, August 1, 2018, and August 8, 2018, the court held a hearing on these motions. At the commencement of the August 8 hearing, both parties indicated that the testimony obtained in the restraining order hearing could, and should, be considered by the court in the modification of the parenting plan as there was duplicative evidence and it pertained to issues raised in the motions and evaluation.
On August 1, 2018, at the start of the hearing, the court was informed that on July 30, 2018, the defendant had, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-15, filed an application for relief from abuse from the plaintiff, which matter was scheduled to be heard on August 8, 2018, and that he had witnesses who were also pertinent to this case that he intended to present at that time. To create judicial economy, and because that order could potentially impact the decision in this case, the court continued this hearing to August 8, 2018, to be heard at the same time as the restraining order hearing.
It should also be noted that the plaintiff filed a new motion for contempt, which was scheduled to be heard on the Family Support Magistrate docket on August 28, 2018.
The court will note that after testimony, the plaintiff’s application for relief from abuse was dismissed.[15]
II
EVIDENCE CONSIDERED AND FINDINGS
The court, prior to the hearing, reviewed the existing court file which was extensive and substantial. Additionally, the following evidence was presented at the hearing: testimony of the defendant, Dennis Adams; testimony of the plaintiff, Marnie Hoffman (nee Adams); testimony of Leah Fosse, Family Relations Officers; testimony of Andrea Ricci, the defendant’s girlfriend, and testimony from Anise Taylor, the defendant’s mother. There was also documentary evidence presented by the parties which was considered by the court as well.
Fosse, whom the court finds completed a credible and thorough investigation of the family, testified about the Comprehensive Evaluation she performed, which came into evidence as Exhibit A. Fosse testified as to the background of the case and the multiple efforts made by the court to assist the family in resolving their conflict. Fosse also described the parties’ history, their poor dynamic and interactions, which are troubling, create conflicts, and will leave memories that will mar the children’s childhood. This includes multiple referrals to the Department of Children and Families (DCF). Additionally, Fosse testified that Susan Giles, the children’s therapist, would have sessions with the children where the parents could be heard fighting in the waiting room. The court also heard credible evidence during the hearing of multiple arguments between the parents in front of the children and in public places such as sporting events, wherein the police would have to be called, pick-ups/drop offs, etc. The court finds the above true and again notes that these are sad memories for the children to have.
In its discretion, the court has ordered the comprehensive evaluation sealed pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-11, which provides in relevant part: "The records and other papers in any family relations matter may be ordered by the court to be kept confidential and not to be open to inspection except upon order of the court or judge thereof for cause shown." See also Myles v. Myles, 136 Conn.App. 483, 488-89, 46 A.3d 301 (2012).
It is reported that Family Relations met with this couple at least fourteen times to help the parties resolve this matter during the course of this litigation. This case was also referred to Family Relations for four (4) Comprehensive Evaluations, three (3) of which were withdrawn or not utilized because the parties reached an agreement. Fosse also testified that the court appointed a guardian ad litem to assist the parties in resolving the matters, but said guardian is no longer involved to assist this family.
Fosse testified that there were three accepted referrals to DCF, all of which were closed.
In her report, Fosse also reviewed the criminal records of the parties, of which the court took judicial notice. Fosse reported that both parties had criminal arrest records and that both provided police reports and arrest records of the same. While the court finds that the plaintiff was convicted of issuing a bad check in 2006, the court also finds that the defendant was convicted on June 15, 2017, for criminal impersonation in violation of General Statutes § 53a-130 and two counts of breach of peace in the second degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-181. These convictions arise from claims that defendant posted explicit photos of plaintiff and his ex-girlfriend to an online social media account. As a result of these convictions, the defendant received a total effective sentence of two years in the custody of the Commissioner of Correction, execution suspended, and two years of probation. As noted by Fosse in her testimony and as testified to by the defendant, notwithstanding the defendant’s guilty plea to these charges, he still maintains that he is innocent and that it was the plaintiff who posted the pictures so as to frame him. The court does not find the defendant credible as to this assertion.
Included in the terms of probation were: "1. Obey family court orders. 2. Surrender police certification and not seek certification. 3. Surrender firearms permit/not to possess firearms. 4. Not pursue early termination of probation. 5. Transfer any firearms in possession of 6. Not to videotape exchange of children or take photos during exchange. 7. No direct contact with victim [plaintiff in this action] except through a 3rd party with regards to minor children only and family proceedings ..."
Fosse also testified about the defendant and stated that while the defendant initially indicated he wanted no change to the parenting plan, he then changed his mind during the course of the evaluation to seek sole custody. There was also evidence that the defendant was inconsistent in supporting the children in their therapy, at one point trying to unilaterally cancel the therapy. At times, the defendant had conflicts with the therapist. In her testimony, Fosse also indicated that defendant is not always present for his children, noting that during the home visits, the defendant suggested the children go outside and play. Fosse testified that the children were excited by this and wanted their father to play with them but he remained inside. Fosse describes the interaction as "sporadic." She also noted that the children are fearful that they will receive even less of father’s attention after the birth of his new child. As Fosse put it, Gunner and Hunter were "not [the defendant’s] primary priority."
Fosse also noted that the defendant seeks to provoke the plaintiff. The court finds the same to be true and noted the following examples: the defendant helped the children produce a drawing, "Mrs. Woe is me," which makes fun of the plaintiff; sent notations on checks to the plaintiff such as "M.H.H.B.H.A.H"; filing for a § 46b-15 application during the hearing; making reports to DCF that were unsubstantiated, having the children write a letter to their mother asking her to keep the cat because the defendant’s apartment would not allow for animals; having the children withhold information from the plaintiff, etc. As to requesting the children to withhold information from the plaintiff, which the defendant claims he did so as to avoid an argument with the plaintiff, Fosse concluded, as does the court, that this action puts the defendant’s needs above those of the children and places them in a loyalty bind, which is not in their best interests.
According to the plaintiff’s testimony, these letters stand for "Mamie Hoffman Hebert Bagley Hoffman Adam Hoffman," and are a reference to her prior relationships.
Fosse also testified about the plaintiff, indicating that the plaintiff’s assertions and interpretations conflicted, the plaintiff often complained about the defendant having engaged in behaviors similar to hers, the plaintiff was not forthcoming or cooperative with the investigation, she engaged the children in the case, and has intentionally withheld the children from the defendant. Further, testimony in the case indicated that the plaintiff could add to the controversy by sending inappropriate and insulting text messages. The court finds the foregoing to be true. Notwithstanding the same, Fosse also reported that the plaintiff appeared to do her best and was amendable to interventions, incorporated behavior plans, and took feedback well. Fosse also noted the boys would go to the plaintiff first if they did not feel safe. There was also testimony that the plaintiff, as a gift, helped the children produce a book of memories for their father that was positive and affirming. The court also finds the foregoing to be true.
Per Fosse’s testimony, the plaintiff had a contradictory pattern of stating that although she wants the children to have a relationship with their father, at the same time she would display an unwillingness to facilitate visitation with their father. The plaintiff also had a pattern of making unilateral decisions that interfered with or diminished the defendant’s parenting time, against court orders. The plaintiff also describes the "right of first refusal" as only applying to the defendant and not to her.
The plaintiff indicated she had a significant issue with the defendant’s poor judgment of introducing the children to significant others, but she would do the same. Later, she would deny that they were significant relationships.
There was a claim that the plaintiff did not fully cooperate with the evaluation in that she refused to allow Fosse to speak to a gentleman she had been dating. The plaintiff indicated that she did not understand why Fosse had to talk to him and saw this as a means of the defendant merely trying to embarrass her.
It is interesting to note that Fosse testified that when she interviewed the children, both boys, independently, gave the exact same responses when asked inquiries. The boys indicating that they wished their father would "be more responsible and keep us safe," they both reported that they do not feel they get a lot of attention from their father, and both stated separately that they are "not his primary priority." Fosse took from this that the plaintiff was coaching the boys for the evaluation.
During the hearing, several text messages from the plaintiff to the defendant came into evidence. In one message, while asking about who would claim the child for tax purposes, the plaintiff referred to the defendant by a derogatory term; the plaintiff also texted the defendants’ pregnant girlfriend that "[m]any have worn your shoes, everyone has tried to tell you, the narcissistic, sociopath [defendant] doesn’t care about you at all. He is not capable of love and only takes care of himself." The plaintiff also sent additional degrading and derogatory texts about the defendant. The plaintiff also engages in group text with the defendant’s family in an effort to manipulate the defendant, despite requests to not do the same.
The court also finds that the defendant cannot accept his responsibility as to how his family has gotten to this point; instead, the defendant seeks to place the blame on the plaintiff. As noted previously, the defendant continues to blame the plaintiff for his arrest, even though he pled guilty to the charges; the defendant claims that it is the plaintiff’s fault that she is not receiving financial support for the children because she had him arrested and, therefore, created obstacles for his employment. As Fosse noted in her testimony, the defendant had "some emotional axe to grind." Fosse also testified that the defendant presented as "almost juvenile in his remarks regarding his communication with the mother and appeared to derive some level of satisfaction from causing her distress"; that the defendant’s "impulse to provoke Ms. Hoffman appears to be part of an enduring character trait that seems unlikely to change. Indeed, Mr. Adams has indicated in interviews that he has no intention of changing that aspect of his behavior." Fosse also testified that the defendant can be "unstable, reckless, and misleading when he seems to be losing control of circumstances ... [and] has issues controlling his impulses and emotional responses."
It is also noted through the testimony that the parties have different parenting styles, with the plaintiff being more hyper-vigilant, and having "a style that is doting and overly protective," whereas the defendant’s style is more "laid back," and he has a "hands off approach" that "borders on carelessness." Fosse testified that the defendant is a permissive and laissez-faire parent. Fosse stated that the mother perceives this as the defendant being neglectful and dangerous. Fosse indicated that this has more to do with different parenting styles than any neglect by the defendant. The court agrees with Fosse’s interpretation.
The court asked Fosse to describe the children. Fosse indicated that Hunter was "as cute as can be," is protective of his mother, intelligent, playful, and overly comfortable when talking to professionals. Fosse indicated there were no school concerns relative to Hunter and, despite a lot of absences, they did not affect his grades. As to Gunner, Fosse indicated that he was silly, talkative, and relieved to talk. Gunner is sweet, polite, and also had no behavioral problems. There were, however, concerns relative to the children from the professionals involved, including their therapist and officials from the Stafford Elementary School. Giles, the children’s therapist, indicated that the children were exhibiting some defiant and aggressive behavior. Additionally, Stafford Elementary School officials indicated that Hunter seems to hold his feelings at school and the teacher worries there is more going on with him. The court also heard testimony wherein Hunter, during a conflictual visitation exchange, was crying and complained of a stomach ache. Fosse testified that the plaintiff has intense anxiety as a result of the behaviors of the defendant, and that the children are caught in the middle. This makes it especially difficult as Hunter sees himself as the protector of his mother. Fosse also indicated that both children want "to be seen by" the defendant, but that the defendant can be scary at times. Fosse also testified that the children see the plaintiff as the psychological parent. Unfortunately for Hunter and Gunner, the court found this evidence credible.
Interestingly, both parents had suspicions of substance abuse by the other parent. Fosse, during the course of her investigation, contacted each parent’s primary care physician, but neither of them gave Fosse any information regarding substance or suspected addictions for either parent. Also, the court heard no evidence during the hearing regarding substance abuse. Both parents made claims that the other used corporeal punishment against the children and, based on the evidence presented, the court finds that both parents have done so in the past. The court, however, does not find that to be the central issue of the case.
Additionally, the court heard the testimony of Ricci, the defendant’s girlfriend, who is pregnant with his child. Ricci testified as to the conflict between the parents, including between herself and the plaintiff, and antagonistic text messages she received from the plaintiff. As a result of the same, Ricci no longer wanted to be the conduit for information between the parties relative to the children. Further, Ricci testified that in response to a visitation dispute, she did not inform the defendant of the plaintiff’s message because Ricci was worried about his response.
On February 1, 2017, the court, Farley, J., ordered (# 327.10) that "[c]ommunication regrading issues with the children shall be communicated through third party Andrea Ricci." Ricci testified that she never agreed to the same.
During his testimony, the defendant indicated that he "wants this madness to stop," that "something needs to change," that "the kids are the victim," "whatever it is now, is not working," and that the "parents have no ability to work together." Further the defendant wrote to the plaintiff that "[o]ur positions are seemingly light years apart on most if not all matters. To think for a moment we could ever co-parent based on the current order, or the order Leah has written, is the definition of insanity. Fun fact: there are 400 entry lines in the court on our case with 5 more pending, so the evidence suggests this isn’t working." The defendant, to his credit, testified that something needs to change because what is currently in place is not working and is not good for the children. The court, unfortunately, agrees with the defendant’s assessment. Sadly, what needs to change is the parents’ ability to get along and work toward their children’s common goal. They need to get over the pain of the past and focus on how they can benefit their children’s future by reducing their conflict and acrimony. The court does not have confidence that this will happen.
III
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND APPLICABLE LAW
"Before a court may modify a custody order, it must find that there has been a material change in circumstances since the prior order of the court, but the ultimate test is the best interest of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Harris v. Hamilton, 141 Conn.App. 208, 219, 61 A.3d 542 (2013). "The burden of proving a change to be in the best interest of the child rests on the party seeking the change." Kearney v. State, 174 Conn. 244, 249, 386 A.2d 223 (1978).
"To obtain modification, the moving party must demonstrate that circumstances have changed since the last court order ... Because the establishment of changed circumstances is a condition precedent to a party’s relief, it is pertinent for the trial court to inquire as to what, if any, new circumstance warrants a modification of the existing order." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kelly v. Kelly, 54 Conn.App. 50, 55-56, 732 A.2d 808 (1999) In a motion for modification of custody, the movant bears the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Anthony E., 96 Conn.App. 414, 900 A.2d 594, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 914, 908 A.2d 535 (2006). The court will note that it advised the parties of the same at the start of the hearing. The court is also charged with deciding these matters based upon the statutory criteria set forth in General Statutes § 46b-56(c) which, in relevant part, directs the court when making any order regarding the custody, care, education, visitation, and support of children, to "consider the best interests of the child, and in doing so [the court] may consider, but shall not be limited to, one or more of [sixteen enumerated] factors ... The court is not required to assign any weight to any of the factors that it considers."
These factors include: (1) The temperament and developmental needs of the child; (2) the capacity and the disposition of the parents to understand and meet the needs of the child; (3) any relevant and material information obtained from the child, including the informed preferences of the child; (4) the wishes of the child’s parents as to custody; (5) the past and current interaction and relationship of the child with each parent, the child’s siblings and any other person who may significantly affect the best interests of the child; (6) the willingness and ability of each parent to facilitate and encourage such continuing parent-child relationship between the child and the other parent as is appropriate, including compliance with any court orders; (7) any manipulation by or coercive behavior of the parents in an effort to involve the child in the parents’ dispute; (8) the ability of each parent to be actively involved in the life of the child; (9) the child’s adjustment to his or her home, school and community environments; (10) the length of time that the child has lived in a stable and satisfactory environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity in such environment, provided the court may consider favorably a parent who voluntarily leaves the child’s family home pendente lite in order to alleviate stress in the household; (11) the stability of the child’s existing or proposed residences, or both; (12) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved, except that a disability of a proposed custodial parent or other party, in and of itself, shall not be determinative of custody unless the proposed custodial arrangement is not in the best interests of the child; (13) the child’s cultural background; (14) the effect on the child of the actions of an abuser, if any domestic violence has occurred between the parents or between a parent and another individual or the child; (15) whether the child or a sibling of the child has been abused or neglected, as defined respectively in section 46b-120; and (16) whether the party satisfactorily completed participation in a parenting education program established pursuant to section 46b-69b.
The court finds that the defendant has met his burden of proof in that there has been a change of circumstances such that he is in a new relationship, therapeutic supports that were put in place are not working, and that the current parenting plan, as admitted by both parties, is clearly not in the best interests of the minor children and, in fact, may be harming them. Accordingly, the parenting plan must change, and because the parties are unable to agree, the court must determine the same.
As a part of that, the court must assess the parties’ credibility. "The fact-finding function is vested in the trial court with its unique opportunity to view the evidence presented in a totality of the circumstances, i.e., including its observations of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses and parties." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Cavoli v. DeSimone, 88 Conn.App. 638, 646, 870 A.2d 1147, cert. denied, 274 Conn. 906, 876 A.2d 1198 (2005). "It is well established that in cases tried before courts, trial judges are the sole arbiters of the credibility of witnesses and it is they who determine the weight to be given specific testimony ... it is the quintessential function of the factfinder to reject or accept certain evidence, ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Antonio M., 56 Conn.App. 534, 540, 744 A.2d 915 (2000). "The sifting and weighing of evidence is peculiarly the function of the trier [of fact]." Smith v. Smith, 183 Conn. 121, 123, 438 A.2d 842 (1981). "[N]othing in our law is more elementary than that the trier [of fact] is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded to the testimony." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Toffolon v. Avon, 173 Conn. 525, 530, 378 A.2d 580 (1977). "The trier is free to accept or reject, in whole or in part, the testimony offered by either party." Smith v. Smith, supra, 183 Conn. 123. "The determination of credibility is a function of the trial court." Heritage Square, LLC v. Eoanou, 61 Conn.App. 329, 333, 764 A.2d 199 (2001).
Further, General Statutes § 46b-56a(a) provides: "For the purposes of this section, ‘joint custody’ means an order awarding legal custody of the minor child to both parents, providing for joint decision-making by the parents and providing that physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to assure the child of continuing contact with both parents ..." "The difference between a sole custodian and a joint legal custodian is that the sole custodian has the ultimate authority to make all decisions regarding a child’s welfare, such as education, religious instruction and medical care whereas a joint legal custodian shares the responsibility for those decisions." Emerick v. Emerick, 5 Conn.App. 649, 657 n. 9, 502 A.2d 933 (1985), cert. dismissed, 200 Conn. 804, 510 A.2d 192 (1986); see Tabackman v. Tabackman, 25 Conn.App. 366, 368-69, 593 A.2d 526 (1991); Carroll v. Carroll, 55 Conn.App. 18, 25-26, 737 A.2d 963 (1999).
In Daddio v. O’Bara, 97 Conn.App. 286, 904 A.2d 259, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 932, 909 A.2d 957 (2006), the Appellate Court reviewed an order of sole custody and stated that "[o]ur review of the record reveals that the court’s determination that it was in the child’s best interest for the plaintiff to have sole legal custody had a basis in the evidence. The record is replete with evidence that the plaintiff and the defendant had been unable, for a significant amount of time, to work together with respect to the child." Id., 296. The court also found that the "evidence overwhelmingly proves that these parents are unable to work together cooperatively except on the simplest of issues." Id. The court further stated that "the parties lack a common base, similar values and respect for each other." Id. The court also noted that "joint custody, in order to be effective and in the child’s best interest, requires reasoned communication and therefore concluded that the parties had failed to meet this standard. In fact, the parties’ agreement required consultation on major issues involving the child." Id. As a result, the court found that the original order regarding custody, and all those subsequent, were not in the child’s best interest. (Emphasis in original.) Id. Those same facts exist in the present case.
As in Daddio v. O’Bara, there is "ample evidence before the court pertaining to the parties’ inability to cooperate and communicate with respect to the decisions regarding the minor child. Simply put, the parenting arrangement, contemplated by the orders of joint legal custody, was not working ... Their interactions resulted in litigation that had a ‘toxic’ effect on the child. It is clear from the record that the evidence supported the court’s conclusion that joint legal custody, which requires a level of cooperation between parents, was not in the child’s best interest." Daddio v. O’Bara, supra, 97 Conn.App. 297.
Although this court’s decision is contrary to Fosse’s recommendation, this court is not bound to accept the recommendations of experts in a domestic case. See Szczerkowski v. Karmelowicz, 60 Conn.App. 429, 434, 759 A.2d 1050 (2000). As in Daddio v. O’Bara, supra, 97 Conn.App. 303, "this court’s order flows naturally from its decision to award the plaintiff sole custody. Such an order also effectuates the important goal of minimizing conflict between the parties, something that all involved have agreed is of paramount importance." In fact, the parties in the present case concede the same.
What is sad for the court to note is the degree of conflict between the parents as reported by Fosse, which she found concerning. She testified that their communication was unhealthy and acrimonious. She testified that both parents want to be right and prove the other parent wrong. She further testified that the children are being severely damaged by the parent’s conflict. Fosse also reported that the children indicated that both their mother and their father speak negatively about the other. With respect to her report, Fosse testified that the relationship between the parents is toxic. She also noted that when they want, they are able to work things out and communicate in a civil enough way that they can both hear each other and get their needs met. Fosse and other professionals involved indicated that this case is not about the children, but has more to do with the parent’s issues. Sadly the court finds the above true and, after hearing the testimony and reviewing the parties’ behavior during the hearing, the court finds Fosse’s assessments accurate.
The court will note that for close to a year, when the parties got along, no motions were filed.
Further, the court did not find defendant credible with regard to some of his testimony, such his explanation for his criminal case, his inability to pay support, the facts surrounding his calling the police during the children’s sporting event. Instead, the court found his actions gave support to Fosse’s observations that he derives some level of satisfaction from causing the plaintiff distress and he seeks to provoke the plaintiff, such as filing for relief from abuse, etc. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the court also found fault with the plaintiff’s actions, including being contradictory in her assessment of the parents’ behavior, sending derogatory and provoking texts, involving third parties, and unilaterally withholding access. However, the plaintiff is more of the psychological parent to the children and is in the better position to make parenting decisions, as has been noted by professionals in the case.
IV
CONCLUSION AND ORDERS
The court, having considered all of the evidence presented, including all exhibits and the testimony of the parties and witnesses as well as applicable common and statutory law including, without limitation, General Statutes § § 46b-56, 46b-56a, 46b-56c, and 46b-215a, makes the following orders. All findings of fact made by the court have been made by a fair preponderance of the evidence.
1. Sole legal custody to the plaintiff mother.
2. The plaintiff shall have an affirmative obligation to notify the defendant, through "Our Family Wizard" (see # 11 below) of all major medical, education, and religious decisions. Said notification shall be in a timely manner. Further, the plaintiff shall send the defendant weekly updates relative to the children, including schedules of the children’s activities, appointments, etc.
3. Nothing in this order shall be deemed to prevent the defendant from having contact with any third-party relative to information concerning his children or having access to any medical, hospital, or other health records of such minor children. See General Statutes § 46b-56(g).
4. The defendant shall have parenting time every Thursday night from after school pick up from school until Friday morning return to school; if there is no school, then the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff by 10 a.m. the next morning.
5. The defendant shall also have parenting time alternating weekends from Friday after school, picking up from school, until Monday morning returning to school; if there is no school, then the defendant shall return the children to the plaintiff by 10 a.m. the next morning.
6. If school is not in session, then pick ups and drop offs will take place at Connecticut State Police Troop C in Stafford.
7. During the summer, each parent shall have two nonconsecutive weeks’ vacation. A week is no more than seven days and is defined as Monday through Friday, together with the vacationing parent’s regularly scheduled weekend access. The parties shall let each other know the week they selected by April 1 of each year. In the event both parents select the same week, the plaintiff shall have preference in even years and the defendant shall have preference in odd years.
8. Holiday shall be defined as the date of the holiday from 9 a.m. to 7:30 p.m., unless otherwise indicated. The parties shall alternate the holiday access with the children as follows:
Holiday
ODD years
EVEN years
Easter
Mother
Father
Halloween
Father
Mother
Thanksgiving
Father
Mother
from 11 a.m.
overnight until 11 a.m.
the Friday after
Friday after
Mother
Father
Thanksgiving from 11 a.m.
overnight until 11 a.m.
Independence Day
Father
Mother
Memorial Day
Mother
Father
Labor Day
Father
Mother
New Year’s Eve
(overnight)
Father
Mother
As to Christmas Eve/Christmas Day, the children shall be with the defendant from 10 a.m. until 9 p.m. Christmas Eve each year. The children shall be with the plaintiff from 9 p.m. on Christmas Eve through Christmas Day each year.
The balance of the Christmas break shall be shared equally between the parents, excluding the specifically articulated holidays.
Mother’s Day shall be with the plaintiff.
Father’s Day shall be with the defendant.
9. As to school breaks, the defendant shall have the option to parent the children during the February vacation (if any) in odd years, and April vacation (if any) in even years. He shall give the plaintiff at least two weeks advance notice if he intends to exercise that option. The plaintiff shall have the option to parent the children during the February vacation (if any) in even years, and April vacation (if any) in odd years. She shall give the defendant at least two weeks advance notice if she intends to exercise that option.
10. At such time when the defendant is no longer prohibited from having direct contact with the plaintiff, the parties shall engage in co-parenting therapy through the Children’s Law Center Families in Transition Program. The parties shall have their first session within forty-five days of the date that the defendant is allowed contact with the plaintiff, and shall attend regularly until discharged by the program.
11. In accordance with the Office of Adult Probation, the parties shall not have any direct contact with one another; instead, they shall communicate through "Our Family Wizard" and shall not engage in any insulting or insinuating messages. The parties shall each be responsible for their costs to access the same and shall ensure that they are signed up for the program within thirty days of this order.
12. If there is an emergency concerning the children, the parties may communicate through a third party.
13. Pursuant to Strobel v. Strobel, 92 Conn.App. 662, 663, 886 A.2d 865 (2005), and Practice Book § 25-26, either party must file a Request For Leave To File with the presiding judge of this judicial district before filing any motions or pleadings. The request must include a copy of the proposed motion. As with all postjudgment motions, it must be served on the opposing party. The opposing party may file any objection to the request. Any objection must be filed within ten (10) days. If an objection is filed, the court will schedule a hearing to determine the merits of the request, at which time the moving party must demonstrate probable cause that each of the alleged grounds cited in the proposed motion exist. The court may determine the request with or without a hearing if no objection is filed. Practice Book § 25-26(g). Pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56(i), both parents and children to engage in appropriate therapy to deal with the issues presented.
General Statutes § 46b-56(i) provides: "As part of a decision concerning custody or visitation, the court may order either parent or both of the parents and any child of such parents to participate in counseling and drug or alcohol screening, provided such participation is in the best interests of the child."
15. All other orders not affected by this decision shall remain in full force and effect.
SO ORDERED. 1