Opinion
C.A. No. 04C-02-219 WCC.
Submitted: June 6, 2005.
Decided: September 30, 2005.
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. DENIED. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. GRANTED.
L. Vincent Rammuno, Rammuno, Rammuno Scerba, P.A., 903 N. French Street, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Plaintiff.
David J. Soldo, Reger Rizzo, LLP, 1001 Jefferson Plaza, Suite 202, Wilmington, Delaware. Attorney for Defendant.
MEMORANDUM ORDER
On or about January 19, 2002, Robert B. Neel, Jr. (the "Decedent"), the father of Nicholas Adams' (the "Plaintiff" or "Adams"), died as a result of an automobile accident negligently caused by Mark Johnson ("Johnson"). The Decedent was a passenger in Johnson's car at the time of the accident, and Johnson did not have automobile insurance coverage for his vehicle. As a result, Adams, through his mother Yvonne Adams-Baez ("Adams-Baez") as guardian ad litem, commenced this wrongful death suit against General Accident Insurance Company ("GAIC"), to recover damages through his mother's uninsured motorist coverage.
While Adams resided with his mother at the time of the accident, his father was not a member of their household. Adams-Baez was never married to the Decedent, nor did they ever live together. On the date of the accident, the Decedent was residing in New Castle, Delaware with his wife, Cynthia Santillo, and was never a named insured under Adams-Baez's policy.
As such, this litigation raises the issue of whether a child covered under his mother's insurance policy can recover wrongful death benefits relating to the death of his father, who is not a member of that household. The Court finds that coverage is not available and will grant summary judgment for the Defendant.
Standard of Review
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party has shown there are no genuine issues of material fact, and as a result, it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. In considering such a motion, the court must evaluate the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Summary judgment will not be granted when the record reasonably indicates that a material fact is in dispute or if it seems desirable to inquire more thoroughly into the facts in order to clarify the application of law to the circumstances. In the instance of cross motions for summary judgment, the parties implicitly concede the lack of disputed material facts and acknowledge adequacy of the record to support the party's respective motion.
Moore v. Sizemore, 405 A.2d 679, 680 (Del. 1979); Schueler v. Martin, 674 A.2d 882, 885 (Del.Super.Ct. 1996).
Pierce v. Int'l Ins. Co. of Ill., 671 A.2d 1361, 1363 (Del. 1996).
Ebersole v. Lowengrub, 180 A.2d 467, 468-9 (Del. 1962).
Browning-Ferris, Inc., v. Rockford Enterprises, Inc., 642 A.2d 820, 823 (Del.Super.Ct. 1993).
Discussion
I. Interpretation of the Insurance PolicyThe first issue that must be resolved is whether there is even a compensable injury under the policy. In interpreting an insurance policy, this Court must respect clear and unambiguous language. If parties dispute the terms of an insurance policy, the Court must treat such dispute as a matter of law and interpret the policy in a common sense manner, allowing each term its plain meaning within the contract. Ambiguity in a contract exists only when the language allows more than one interpretation. The Court will not create an ambiguity to allow further interpretation since doing so potentially creates a new contract not agreed to by the parties.
Engerbretsen v. Engerbretsen, 642 A.2d 13, 17 (Del.Super.Ct. 1995).
Engerbertsen, 642 A.2d at 17. (citing Hallowell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 443 A.2d 925, 926 (Del. 1981)); Emmons v. Hartford Underwriters Ins., 697 A.2d 742, 745 (Del. 1997) (citing Penn Mut. Life Ins. v. Oglesby, 695 A.2d 1146 (Del. 1997)).
Hallowell, 443 A.2d at 926.
Engerbertsen, 642 A.2d at 17 (citing Hallowell, 443 A.2d at 926).
The insurance policy before this Court states compensatory damages will be paid by GAIC to the insured in the event of bodily injury caused by an uninsured motorist. In an effort of clarification, the insurance policy specifically defines material terms. Those relevant to the issue before the Court are:
Specifically, the insurance policy states as follows:
We will pay compensatory damages which an "insured" is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of an "uninsured motor vehicle" because of "bodily injury":
1. Sustained by an "insured"; and
2. Caused by an accident.
The owner's or operators' liability for these damages must arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the "uninsured motor vehicle."
Def.'s Br. Summ. J., Ex. E.
1. "Insured" is defined as "You or any `family member.'"
2. "You" is defined as "The `named insured' shown in the Declarations; and . . . The spouse if a resident of the same household."
3. "Family member" is defined as ". . . a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household."
4. "Bodily injury" is defined as "bodily harm, sickness or disease, including death that results."
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
The Plaintiff requests payment from GAIC through the insurance policy's uninsured motorist coverage for the wrongful death of his father. Adams-Baez is the only listed insured of the insurance policy, and Adams is in fact a family member under the terms of the policy. The initial question is whether Adams did in fact sustain bodily injury within the meaning of the insurance policy, and is therefore insured. Obviously, recognizing that the definition of bodily injury set forth in the policy is problematic to its position, Plaintiff instead requests the Court to rely on the definitions of "harm" in 1) the American Heritage Dictionary, which defines it as a "physical or psychological injury or harm," and 2) the Webster's Dictionary which uses the definition of a "physical or material injury; hurt; damage; detriment; misfortune." However, it is important for this Court to respect clear and unambiguous language within the insurance policy and to interpret the insurance policy with common sense, unless ambiguity exists. Here, the Court finds that no ambiguity exists.
Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., ¶ 11. (citing to The American Heritage Dictionary, 4th Edition, (1992) and Webster's Dictionary (citation omitted by counsel)).
Engerbertsen, 642 A.2d at 17 (citing Hallowell, 443 A.2d at 926).
The policy precisely defines "bodily injury" and there is nothing here to suggest that the Plaintiff has suffered any injuries specifically covered within that definition. Because Adams did not suffer bodily harm, as clearly defined by the policy, he is not able to recover wrongful death damages under a policy in which his deceased father had no interest.
II. Public Policy
The second issue argued by the parties is whether public policy reasons allow or require GAIC to pay damages to Adams with respect to this particular incident. First, uninsured motorist coverage protects an insured party injured by an uninsured tortfeasor by providing coverage of the insured through the terms of their own policy. Thus, uninsured motorist coverage is intended to protect insured parties who are unable to receive damages from a negligent uninsured party. However, this Court determined in Temple that an insurance company has the right to place reasonable limits on the policy, including restricting coverage to the named insured; a standard practice throughout the industry. This Court further reasoned in Temple that so long as the insurance policy was in compliance with 18 Del. C. § 3902, the insurance policy is valid. Here, the insurance policy does in fact comply with the statute, and does not limit coverage inappropriately.
Jones v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins, 610 A.2d 1352, 1354 (Del. 1992).
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. v. Abramowicz, 386 A.2d 670, 672-4 (Del. 1978); Nat'l. Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Fisher, 692 A.2d 892, 895-6 (Del. 1997).
Temple v. The Travelers Indemnity Co., 2000 WL 33113814, *5 (Del.Super.).
18 Del. C. § 3902(a) states in pertinent part:
No policy insuring against liability . . . shall be delivered or issued for delivery . . . unless coverage is provided therein or supplemental thereto for the damages from owners or operators of uninsured or hit-and-run vehicles for bodily injury, sickness, disease, including death, or personal property damage resulting from the ownership, maintenance or use of such uninsured or hit-and-run motor vehicle.
Similarly to the Temple case, this insurance policy limits coverage to "the insured." In Temple, Mrs. Temple received deadly injuries at the hands of an under-insured motorist. Mrs. Temple did not have insurance, and Mr. Temple and Mrs. Temple did not reside together. Mr. Temple and his children filed a claim to recover under-insured motorist benefits against his insurance company. The Court held coverage was not available through Mr. Temple's insurance company for the injuries suffered by his wife since she was not an insured under his policy.
Temple, 2000 WL 33113814, at *5. (". . . this theory would allow coverage to an individual, who was in no way connected to my automobile insurance policy, who did not reside in my household, nor who, if had survived the accident, would have had any right of recovery under my policy.").
While the facts at hand differ slightly, the standard remains. Adams is in fact insured under his mother's policy, but that is not the issue. The Decedent was not insured by GAIC, thus Adam's claim against GAIC is not valid. Had the Decedent survived the accident, there is no dispute that the Decedent would not have a claim against GAIC. As a wrongful death plaintiff, Adams files a cause of action as if he stands in the shoes of the Decedent. Since coverage under GAIC would not be available to the Decedent, it is not available to Adams, and as in Temple, the Adams-Baez insurance policy cannot be stretched to encompass Adams' claim.
Temple, 2000 WL 33113814, *6. ("The Court finds that a fair reading of 18 Del. C. § 3902(b) limits recovery to bodily injuries suffered by the policy's insured or if those injuries had led to the death of the insured, those benefits may flow to his/her legal representative. It does not allow coverage for injuries sustained by non-insured individuals regardless of their relationship to the policyholder.").
Adams concedes the Decedent was not insured by GAIC, yet further argues that he personally sustained bodily injury from the death of his father and therefore has an independent and separate cause of action. Adams relies on Emmons v. Harford Underwriters Insurance and argues he should recover via a separate claim through GAIC since the at-fault tortfeasor was uninsured. However, even if this Court was to conclude that Adams suffered some injury and it was a separate and independent claim, his argument continues to be unpersuasive. The clear distinction between this case and Emmons is that in Emmons the decedent was an insured party under the policy. That is not the case here. While the public policy requires an innocent, insured party injured by an uninsured tortfeasor to be paid through uninsured motorist coverage, neither public policy nor Section 3902(b) requires an insurance company to provide benefits to an insured due to the death of a parent, who resides in a separate household, was never married to the insured mother and who it was never contemplated by any party would be covered by the insurance policy.
Emmons, 697 A.2d 742 (Del. 1997) (Mrs. Mr. Emmons, as husband and wife, were insured under a joint automobile policy. Upon Mr. Emmons death at the hands of a negligent uninsured motorist, Ms. Emmons commenced a wrongful death action and Mr. Emmon's Estate commenced a survival action. Both parties were able to recover damages through the joint insurance policy.).
Temple, 2000 WL 33113814, *6.
Conclusion
The policy here clearly indicated who is insured and explicitly indicated what "bodily injury" entailed. As such, it should be interpreted using the plain meaning of the words within the confines of the policy. Extending coverage as suggested by the Plaintiff would stretch the policy beyond any reasonable meaning and would violate the clear unambiguous terms of the policy. Neither the insurance policy or public policy requires such coverage.For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.