Our case law is clear that a landlord may be deemed to have waived the notice requirements for a renewal or extension option in circumstances where the tenant is seeking to hold the landlord to an extension of the term. Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 324, 64 A.2d 44 (1949); Johnson v. Mary Oliver Candy Shops, Inc., supra; Perrotti v. Chiodo, 21 Conn. App. 288, 290, 573 A.2d 342 (1990). There is, however, no support in our law for the plaintiff's position that a landlord may waive the notice requirements in a lease in an attempt to bind the tenant to an extension of the lease.

Although a notice requirement in an option to renew a real estate lease is a condition precedent to exercising the option, it is for the benefit of lessors and can be waived orally or by conduct. Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 324, 64 A.2d 44 (1949); see also Zaniewski v. Mancinone, 37 Conn. Sup. 698, 435 A.2d 50 (1981). The trial court found that LaRovera had conducted his business affairs in an informal manner, from an office in the same building as the defendants' shop, and that the parties therefore had dealt with each other in person, without resort to the mails.

See Nowesco, Inc. v. Community Petroleum Products, Inc., 38 Conn. Sup. 585, 456 A.2d 340 (1982). Under these circumstances, the conditions under which the landlord could reject an extension were for its benefit and could, as a matter of law, be waived by it. Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 324, 64 A.2d 44 (1949); Johnson v. Mary Oliver Candy Shops, Inc., 116 Conn. 86, 90, 163 A. 606 (1933). Such a waiver, however, does not demonstrate lack of mutuality.

Although a notice provision in an option to renew is a condition precedent to renewing the option, it is for the benefit of the lessors and can be waived orally or by conduct. Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 324, 64 A.2d 44 (1949). Thus, a real estate broker may be entitled to his commission, even where an option was not exercised under the precise terms of the basic lease and the broker did not participate in the subsequent negotiations between the lessor and the lessee concerning a renewal of the lease, if the facts establish that he was the procuring cause of the lease and of its renewal.

Thus, the Supreme Court has held that the parties can waive a requirement of a written request for extension of a lease. See Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 324-25, 64 A.2d 44 (1949). The Appellate Court has endorsed a waiver of a mortgage requirement that the mortgagee provide written notice of the borrower's right to reinstate a mortgage after acceleration.

A lessor may waive a notice requirement for exercising an option to renew a lease by conduct. Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 324, 64 A.2d 44 (1949). " Our case law is clear that a landlord may be deemed to have waived the notice requirements for a renewal or extension option in circumstances where the tenant is seeking to hold the landlord to an extension of the term."

" 20 Am.Jur. Covenants, Etc. § 3. "[I]t is intrinsic in the word "covenant" that it contain a promise . . ." Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 325, 64 A.2d 44 (1949). "A real covenant runs with the land, while a personal covenant usually does not run with the land . . . 20 Am.Jur.2d Covenants, Etc. § 18. "[I]t is well settled that a covenant personal in its nature and relating to something collateral to the land cannot be made to run with the land . . .

In closing arguments plaintiff cited the case of Perrotti v. Chiodo, 21 Conn. App. 288 (1990), which states that although a notice requirement in an option to renew is a condition precedent to exercising the option, it is for the benefit of the lessors and can be waived orally. Perrotti, 21 Conn. App. 288, 290 citing Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 324 (1949). However, the present case is distinguishable from these cases.

Parenthetically, the provision appears by itself, printed in letters of the same size as every other provision of the guarantee and close to the end of the document and the defendant's signature line. cf. Clarkson v. Classic Motor Carriages, Inc. 8 CONN. L. RPTR. 160. 8 CSCR 95, 96 (1992) (forum selection clause buried in small print among sixteen other clauses under the heading "Limited Warranty"). And in the absence of contrary facts, the law conclusively imputes knowledge of the content of a written contract to its signatories. Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 324 (1949). Clarkson v. Classic Motor Carriages, Inc., supra is not, however, a suit on a foreign judgment.

Connelly v. Kellogg, 136 Conn. 33, 38 (1949). Exceptions to this rule do exist, see Ursini v. Goldman, 118 Conn. 554, 562 (1934); DiUlio v. Goulet, 2 Conn. App. 701, 704 (1984), but "I forgot" or "I do not recall" is not one of them.Adam v. Consolini, 135 Conn. 321, 324 (1949). Next to be discussed are Exhibit "F" and its successor, Exhibit "J". Pursuant to these contracts, the plaintiffs' payment of $20,000.00, later increased to $30,000.