Here, like in Castille, Mauk's first and only presentation of his federal claims — that the Georgia Court of Appeals violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights — came in his petition for writ of certiorari before the Georgia Supreme Court. Because the Georgia Supreme Court's decision to grant certiorari is discretionary, see, e.g., Adair v. Traco Div., 192 Ga. 59, 14 S.E.2d 466, 469 (Ga. 1941), and because certiorari can only be granted in cases "which are of gravity or great public importance," Ga. Const. art. VI, § 6, ¶ 5, we cannot say, in light of Castille, that Mauk has fairly presented his claims. Mauk's claims were presented in a procedural context in which the merits were not considered, as the Georgia Supreme Court's denial of certiorari does not constitute a ruling on the merits.

" Hicks v. Louisville c. R. Co., 182 Ga. 595, 601 ( 186 S.E. 662). In Adair v. Traco Division, 192 Ga. 59, 65 ( 14 S.E.2d 466), this court said: "Thus, petitions are frequently denied without determining whether the decision of the Court of Appeals was correct, or probably correct. Under our interpretation of the Constitution and laws, the decisions of that court were intended to be final, except in a narrow class of cases; and it was not the purpose of the foregoing provision of the Constitution to make of the Supreme Court a court for hearing appeals from the Court of Appeals generally. As to most cases, that court is and should be considered as a court of last resort, though technically it is not such. If this had not been the purpose of the Constitution, there would have been little need for another court to share the work formerly coming to the Supreme Court. Primarily, as before, this court's jurisdiction is to review certain decisions and judgments of law made by nisi prius judges in certain classes of cases, and the power to entertain applications for certiorari to the Court of Appeal

The court erred in sustaining defendant's demurrer on the ground that there was a misjoinder of parties plaintiff and causes of action. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C.A., Sections 201 to 218, inc.; Hunt v. Natl. Linen Supply Corp., 157 S.W.2d 608; Adair v. The Traco Division, 14 S.E.2d 466; State ex rel. St. Louis, Brownsville Mexico Railway Co. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200; McNorrill v. Gibbs, 45 F. Supp. 363, 6 Labor Cases, 61,181; Greenberg v. Bailey Lbr. Co., Minn. D.C. St. Louis County, 4 Labor Cases 60,366. Fry Edwards for respondent.

It has also been held that an employee's suit for double the amount of unpaid wages authorized by the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act may be instituted in state courts pursuant to the provision that such actions may be commenced "in any court of competent jurisdiction." Forsyth v. Central Foundry Co., 240 Ala. 277 [ 198 So. 706] (1940); Duke v. Helena-Glendale FerryCo., 203 Ark. 865 [ 159 S.W.2d 74, 139 A.L.R. 1404] (1942); Adair v. Traco Division, 192 Ga. 59 [ 14 S.E.2d 466] (1941); Harrison v. Herzig Building Supply Co., 290 Ky. 445 [ 161 S.W.2d 908] (1942); Mengel v. Ishee, 192 Miss. 366 [ 4 So.2d 878] (1941); Abre v. Lindsay Bros. Co., 211 Minn. 136 [ 300 N.W. 457] (1941); Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, Inc., 173 Misc. 531 [17 N.Y.S.2d 851] (1941), aff'd per curiam, 287 N.Y. 577 [ 38 N.E.2d 234], 26 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1941); Atkocus v. Terker, 30 N.Y.S.2d 628 (1941); Hart v. Gregory, 218 N.C. 184 [ 10 S.E.2d 644, 130 A.L.R. 265] (1940); Floyd v. DuBoisSoap Co., (Ohio App.) 38 N.E.2d 919 (1941); Tapp v. Price-Brass Co., 177 Tenn. 189 [ 147 S.W.2d 107] (1941); Stringer v. Griffin Grocery Co., (Tex.Civ.App.) 149 S.W.2d 158 (1941); Hargrave v. Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp., 36 F. Supp. 233 (E.D.Okla. 1941); aff'd 129 F.2d 655 (C.C.A. 10, 1942). Section 205(e) of the Emergency Price Control Act provides that: "Any suit or action under this subsection may be brought in any court of competent jurisdiction."

(Citation omitted.) Adair v. Traco Division, 192 Ga. 59, 65-66 ( 14 S.E.2d 466) (1941). See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. VI, Sec. VI, Par. V.

1. "Jurisdiction of a suit by an employee to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, and an additional equal amount as `liquidated damages,' and attorney's fees, under the fair-labor standards act of 1938 29 U.S.C.A. 216, is not vested exclusively in the courts of the United States, but may be heard and determined in any State court of competent jurisdiction." Adair v. The Traco Division, 192 Ga. 59 ( 14 S.E.2d 466). 2.

1. "Jurisdiction of a suit by an employee to recover unpaid minimum wages and overtime compensation, and an additional equal amount as `liquidated damages,' and attorney's fees, under the fair-labor standards act of 1938 29 U.S.C.A. § 216, is not vested exclusively in the courts of the United States, but may be heard and determined in any State court of competent jurisdiction." Adair v. The Traco Division, 192 Ga. 59 ( 14 S.E.2d 466) — answer by Supreme Court to certified questions in this case. 2.

thin the meaning of §§ 24(9) and 256 of the Judicial Code ( 28 U.S.C. § 41 (9) and 371). Robertson v. Argus Hosiery Mills, 121 F.2d 285, 286 (C. C.A. 6th), certiorari denied, 314 U.S. 681; Stewart v. Hickman, 36 F. Supp. 861 (W.D. Mo.); Kuligowski v. Hart, 43 F. Supp. 207, 4 Wage Hour Rept. 203 (N.D. Ohio); Wingate v. General Auto Parts Co., 40 F. Supp. 364 (W.D. Mo.); Barron v. F.H.E. Oil Co., 4 Wage Hour Rept. 551 (W.D. Tex.); Hart v. Gregory, 218 N.C. 184, 10 S.E.2d 644; Forsyth v. Central Foundry Co., 240 Ala. 277, 198 So. 706; Graves v. Armstrong Creamery Co., 154 Kan. 365, 118 P.2d 613; Emerson v. Mary Lincoln Candies, 173 Misc. 531, 17 N.Y.S.2d 851; affirmed 261 A.D. 879, 26 N.Y.S.2d 489; affirmed, 287 N.Y. 33, 38 N.E.2d 234; Abroe v. Lindsay Bros. Co., 300 N.W. 456 (S.Ct. Minn.); Tapp v. Price-Bass Co., 147 S.W.2d 107 (S.Ct. Tenn.); Duke v. Helena-Glendale Ferry Co., 159 S.W.2d 74, 5 Wage Hour Rept. 206 (S.Ct. Ark.); Dennis v. Equitable Equipment Co., 7 So.2d 397 (Ct.App.La.); Adair v. Traco Division, 192 Ga. 59, 14 S.E.2d 466. . . . The other line of cases holding § 16(b) to be remedial rather than penal involves determination of the applicable statute of limitations. Collins v. Hancock, 4 Wage Hour Rept. 522 (D. La. Caddo Parish); Tucker v. Hitchcock, No. 370, S.D. Fla., Oct. 2, 1941; Klotz v. Ippolito, 40 F. Supp. 422 (S.D. Texas)."

Sperry Hutchinson Co. v. Blue, 4 Cir., 202 F. 82; United States v. Eisenbeis, 9 Cir., 112 F. 190, 195; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039; City of Boston v. McGovern, 1 Cir., 292 F. 705, 706; Morel v. Harry Thoens Co., D.C., 63 F. Supp. 188. The plaintiffs had the option to sue either in the state or federal court. They were permitted to choose their forum, and they elected to bring their suit in the state court of Georgia. Adair v. Traco, Division 192 Ga. 59, 14 S.E.2d 466; Mid-Continent Pipe Line Co. v. Hargrave, 10 Cir., 129 F.2d 655, 656. Having made their election they are estopped to deny the validity and finality of the state court decree. Sperry Hutchinson Co. v. Blue, 4 Cir., 202 F. 82, 84; Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 235, 28 S.Ct. 641, 52 L.Ed. 1039.

The Georgia Supreme Court has explained that “decisions of [the Georgia Court of Appeals] [are] intended to be final, except in a narrow class of cases” involving “great public concern” or matters of “gravity and importance.” Adair v. Traco Div., 14 S.E.2d 466, 469 (Ga. 1941). Thus, “[a]s to most cases, [the Georgia Court of Appeals] is and should be considered as a court of last resort, though technically it is not such.” Id.