In that situation, “a plaintiff need only establish that the state imposed on it a new or increased level of activity without providing any funding to pay for it.” Adair v. Michigan, 486 Mich. 468, 785 N.W.2d 119 (2010) ( Adair I ). See also Adair v. Michigan (On Remand), 267 Mich.App. 583, 705 N.W.2d 541 (2005); Adair v. Michigan (After Remand), 474 Mich. 1073, 712 N.W.2d 702 (2006); Adair v. Michigan (On Second Remand), 279 Mich.App. 507, 760 N.W.2d 544 (2008).

Although plaintiffs insisted that because they had brought a declaratory action, they did not need to quantify the underfunding, but only needed to show that an underfunding had occurred, the special master granted defendants' motion. The special master cited Adair v Michigan, 486 Mich 468 (2010) (Adair I), in which the Supreme Court affirmed a declaratory judgment that the Legislature had violated the prohibition of unfunded mandates (POUM) provision of the Headlee Amendment, holding that when the state provides no funding at all for a mandate, a POUM claim does not require proof of the specific increased costs necessitated by the state mandate. Rather, the plaintiff need only establish that the state imposed on it a new or increased level of activity without providing any funding to pay for it.

Our Supreme Court held that the state violated the POUM provision when it required plaintiff school districts to collect, maintain, and report to the Center for Educational Performance and Information (CEPI) certain types of data for use by the state, without providing funds to reimburse the school districts for the necessary increased costs they would incur in order to comply with those recordkeeping mandates. Adair v. Michigan, 486 Mich. 468, 494, 785 N.W.2d 119 (2010)( Adair I ). Thereafter, our Legislature appropriated $25,624,500 to reimburse plaintiff school districts for the compliance costs incurred during the 2010–2011 school year.

"The plaintiff in a declaratory-judgment action bears 'the burden of establishing the existence of an actual controversy, as well as the burden of showing that . . . it has actually been injured or that the threat of imminent injury exists.' " Adair v Michigan (On Second Remand), 279 Mich App 507, 514; 760 NW2d 544 (2008), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds Adair v Michigan, 486 Mich 468 (2010), quoting 22A Am Jur 2d, Declaratory Judgments, § 239, p 788; see also Adair v Michigan, 486 Mich 468, 482-483; 785 NW2d 119 (2010) (because the plaintiffs met their initial burden of demonstrating a violation of the "prohibition of unfunded mandates" or "POUM" clause of § 29 of the Headlee Amendment, they were entitled to a declaratory judgment unless the State demonstrated that the plaintiff school districts' costs were not increased as a result of the requirements or that the costs incurred were not necessary). Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.

According to the state, these omissions by plaintiffs serve as a waiver of their right to recover costs under Const. 1963, art. 9, § 32. In Adair v. Michigan, 486 Mich. 468, 494, 785 N.W.2d 119 (2010), a majority of the Supreme Court clearly opined that plaintiffs "are entitled to the costs incurred in maintaining this action" and directed this Court to determine on remand the amount of costs and attorney fees to be awarded. We are duty-bound to comply strictly with our Supreme Court's mandate.

"[T]he plaintiff in a declaratory-judgment action bears 'the burden of establishing the existence of an actual controversy, as well as the burden of showing that . . . it has actually been injured or that the threat of imminent injury exists.' " Adair v Michigan (On Second Remand), 279 Mich App 507, 514; 760 NW2d 544 (2008), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds 486 Mich 468 (2010), quoting 22A Am Jur 2d, Declaratory Judgments, § 239, p 788. See also Adair v Michigan, 486 Mich 468, 482-483; 785 NW2d 119 (2010) (stating that because the plaintiffs met their initial burden of demonstrating a violation of the "prohibition of unfunded mandates" clause of § 29 of the Headlee Amendment, they were entitled to a declaratory judgment unless the state demonstrated that the plaintiff school districts' costs were not increased as a result of the requirements or that the costs incurred were not necessary).

"[T]he plaintiff in a declaratory-judgment action bears ‘the burden of establishing the existence of an actual controversy, as well as the burden of showing that ... it has actually been injured or that the threat of imminent injury exists.’ " Adair v. Michigan (On Second Remand) , 279 Mich. App. 507, 514, 760 N.W.2d 544 (2008), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds 486 Mich. 468, 785 N.W.2d 119 (2010), quoting 22A Am. Jur. 2d, Declaratory Judgments, § 239, p. 788. See also Adair v. Michigan , 486 Mich. 468, 482-483, 785 N.W.2d 119 (2010) (stating that because the plaintiffs met their initial burden of demonstrating a violation of the "prohibition of unfunded mandates" clause of § 29 of the Headlee Amendment, they were entitled to a declaratory judgment unless the state demonstrated that the plaintiff school districts' costs were not increased as a result of the requirements or that the costs incurred were not necessary).

This Court has recognized that the purpose of a statute is a relevant consideration when applying the statute in a broad array of cases. See, e.g., Adair v Michigan, 486 Mich 468, 477; 785 NW2d 119 (2010) (stating that "the primary and fundamental rule of constitutional or statutory construction is that the Court's duty is to ascertain the purpose and intent as expressed in the constitutional or legislative provision in question") (emphasis added). Indeed, the members of the majority in this case recently found the purpose of the Michigan Campaign Finance Act worthy of lengthy consideration in Mich Ed Ass `n v Secretary of State (On Rehearing), 489 Mich 194; NW2d (2011).

87 Mich at 506 n 22 (opinion by HATHAWAY, J.) (gratuitously calling into question the viability of Wickens, a case having no relevance to that dispute); Zahn v Kroger Co, 483 Mich 34; 764 NW2d 207 (2009) (gratuitously observing that the parties to the contract were business entities "with equal bargaining power," as if the latter circumstance, not at all relevant in that case, might be relevant in a different case); Anglers, 486 Mich at 982 (refusing to dismiss a moot case); Scott v State Farm Mut Auto Ins Co, 483 Mich 1032 (2009) (relaxing the causal connection that must exist between an injury sustained and the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle in no-fault cases); Decosta v Gossage, 486 Mich 116; 782 NW2d 734 (2010) (refusing to enforce notice-of-intent requirements under MCL 600.2912b(2); Chambers v Wayne Co Airport Auth, 483 Mich 1081 (2009), Beasley v Michigan, 483 Mich at 1025, and Ward, 485 Mich at 917 (all refusing to enforce pre-litigation notice requirements); Adair v Michigan, 486 Mich 468; 785 NW2d 119 (2010) (reducing a Headlee Amendment plaintiffs burden of proof); Lansing Sch Ed Ass'n, 487 Mich at 352-353 (nullifying historical standards for determining whether a plaintiff has "standing" to bring a lawsuit); Univ of Mich v Titan Ins Co, 487 Mich at 292-293 (eroding the no-fault act's one-year-back rule); O'Neal, 487 Mich at 504-506 (opinion by HATHAWAY, J.) (concluding that whichever lost-opportunity formula benefits the plaintiff the most in any particular case is the correct formula to be utilized); Vanslembrouck v Halperin, 483 Mich 965 (2009) (incorrectly characterizing MCL 600.5851(7) as a statute of limitations that can be tolled rather than a saving provision that cannot be tolled); Sazima v Shepherd Bar Restaurant, 483 Mich 924 (2009) (expanding what injuries can be considered to have occurred "in the course of employment" for purposes of workers' compensation); and the 2010 amendments of MCR 2.112 and MCR 2.118,485 Mich (undermining affidavit of merit requ

U.S. Framing argues that in Adair v State, 486 Mich. 468, 493; 785 N.W.2d 119 (2010), the Michigan Supreme Court concluded that a single claim standing alone constituted a "suit." Adair, however, does not mandate that every claim is a separate suit for all purposes; rather, the Court in Adair observed that in that case, the single remaining claim continued to constitute a suit after the other claims were dismissed.