Adair v. Chrysler

4 Citing cases

  1. East Parker Prop. v. Pelican Realty

    335 So. 2d 466 (La. Ct. App. 1976)   Cited 16 times
    In East Parker Properties, Inc. v. Pelican Realty Co., 335 So.2d 466 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1976) writ denied, 338 So.2d 699, the court took the approach that in deciding whether or not restrictions have been abandoned the first question is what the subdivider intended the plan of the subdivision to be; and then whether the violations show that the intended plan was disrupted.

    However, for this rule to be applicable, the property owner against whom abandonment is asserted, must have known of the alleged violations or have had a duty to know. Also, there is no abandonment of subdivision restrictions unless violations have been such that there has been a subversion of the original scheme of the subdividers, resulting in a substantial change in the intended nature of the subdivision. Guyton, supra; Marquess v. Bamburg, La.App., 188 So.2d 721, Adair v. Chrysler, La.App., 212 So.2d 552. See also Plauche v. Albert, La.App., 42 So.2d 876. Melrose Civic Association v. Universal Builders, Inc., 289 So.2d 521 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1973), writ refused, La., 293 So.2d 171 (1974).

  2. Ritter v. Fabacher

    517 So. 2d 914 (La. Ct. App. 1987)   Cited 6 times

    As a result of the alleged abandonment of the restriction in dispute a substantial change in the intended nature of the subdivision must take place. Guyton, supra; Marquess, supra [ 188 So.2d 721 (La.App. 1966)]; Adair v. Chrysler, 212 So.2d 552 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 1968); See also Plauche v. Albert, 42 So.2d 876 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1949); Melrose Civic Association v. Universal Builders, Inc., 289 So.2d 521 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1973), writ refused, 293 So.2d 167 (La. 1974). Taking the building restrictions as a whole, it is apparent that they are intended to maintain the subdivision as a residential neighborhood.

  3. Schwab v. Kelton

    405 So. 2d 1239 (La. Ct. App. 1981)   Cited 4 times

    Also, there is no abandonment of subdivision restrictions unless violations have been such that there has been a subversion of the original scheme of the subdividers, resulting in a substantial change in the intended nature of the subdivision. Guyton, supra, Marquess v. Bamburg, La.App., 188 So.2d 721, Adair v. Chrysler, La.App., 212 So.2d 552. See also Plauche v. Albert, La.App., 42 So.2d 876. Melrose Civic Association v. Universal Builders, Inc., 289 So.2d 521 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1973), writ refused, La., 293 So.2d 167 (1974).

  4. Gwatney v. Miller

    371 So. 2d 1355 (La. Ct. App. 1979)   Cited 16 times
    Holding that the storage and repair of equipment, including two tractor-trailers, used in connection with the business of operating a street fair violated covenants that limited use of property to residential purposes only

    As a result of the alleged abandonment of the restriction in dispute a substantial change in the intended nature of the subdivision must take place. Guyton, supra; Marquess, supra; Adair v. Chrysler, 212 So.2d 552 (La.App. 2nd Cir 1968); See also Plauche v. Albert, 42 So.2d 876 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1949); Melrose Civic Association v. Universal Builders, Inc., 289 So.2d 521 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1973), writ refused 293 So.2d 167 (La., 1974). The record reveals that among the plaintiffs, Alton Pitre sells real estate from his home; Lawrence Harry sells shrimp from his home; William Menard sells tomato plants which are grown on his property; Raymond Jeoffroy advertises his concrete business in the yellow pages using his home telephone number; and, Jeanette Francez parks a school bus on her property when she is not driving it for a living.