Opinion
Civil No. 01-447-KI.
September 6, 2001
David B. Adler, Seattle, WA., Herbert George Grey, Beaverton, Oregon. Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Roderick A. Boutin, Bowerman Boutin, LLP, Oregon City, Oregon. David K. Miller, Miller Wagner, LLP, Portland, Oregon, William H. Stockton, Brisbee Stockton, Hillsboro, Oregon. Attorneys for Defendants.
OPINION
Plaintiffs Reggie and Lisa Huff allege that defendants engaged in various schemes to steal the Huffs' business, plaintiff Acro-Tech, Inc., away from them. Previously before the court were: (1) defendants Hallsworth and JDH Services, Inc.'s motion to dismiss or to stay or to enlarge time (#26) and; (2) defendants Robert and Luann Jackson, The Robert K. Jackson Family Trust ("Jackson Trust") and LB Land, Inc.'s motion to dismiss or to stay or to enlarge time (#24). After oral argument, I agreed to defer ruling on these motions because of several procedural difficulties with removal and remand of a related case and to allow defendants to move against the merits of the complaint. Currently before the court are: (1) defendant Boutin's motion to dismiss (#46); defendants Hallsworth and IDH Services, Inc.'s motions to dismiss (#48); defendants Robert Jackson, Luann Jackson, The Robert K. Jackson Family Trust and LB Land, Inc.'s motion to dismiss (#50); and plaintiff's motion to strike (#54).
I will refer to Reggie Huff as "Huff' and his wife as "Lisa Huff"
I will refer to Robert Jackson as "Jackson" and his wife as "Luann Jackson."
ALLEGED FACTS
Plaintiffs Reggie and Lisa Huff are the founders and majority shareholders of plaintiff Acro-Tech, Inc. Huff patented four inventions related to internal combustion engine performance and environmental compatibility. He assigned some of the patents to Acro-Tech. Plaintiffs allege that defendants, acting through an enterprise, tried to acquire Acro-Tech through unlawful means and for no compensation in order to gain control of its patents. Defendants' methods included:
(1) ruses to gain access to Acro-Tech's confidential business information; (2) threatening Acro-Tech directors to resign and give up their shares in the corporation; (3) forcing Acro-Tech to defend frivolous lawsuits concerning its leased office space; and (4) threatening litigation if plaintiffs did not trade stock as defendants wished.
LEGAL STANDARDS
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) will only be granted if it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his complaint which would entitle him to relief" Gilligan v. Jamco Development Corp., 108 F.3d 246, 248 (9th Cir. 1997). Normally, the review is limited to the complaint, and all allegations of material fact are taken as true and viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. A court may deny leave to amend when any proposed amendment would be futile. Reddy v. Litton Industries, Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 921 (1991).
DISCUSSION
I. RICO
The Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1962 prohibits the following:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a), (1), or (c) of this section.18 U.S.C. § 1962.
Plaintiffs allege claims under each section of the statute against various defendants.
A. Section 1962(c) (Claim One)
A violation under § 1962(c) requires proof of: (1) conduct; (2) of an enterprise; (3) through a pattern; (4) of racketeering activity.Howard v. America Online, Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 828 (2000).
1. Enterprise
Defendants contend that plaintiffs do not adequately allege a separate enterprise and do not allege how the enterprise engaged in interstate commerce.
An enterprise under RICO includes groups with a formal legal structure and groups whose members merely associate in fact. Simon v. Value Behavioral Health, Inc., 208 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir.), amended on other grounds, 234 F.3d 428 (9th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 843 (2001). A group cannot be an enterprise, however, unless it exists independently from the racketeering activity in which it engages. It must have some sort of structure for making decisions and mechanisms for controlling and directing the affairs of the group on an on-going basis rather than an ad hoc basis. A conspiracy is not a RICO enterprise. Id.
Plaintiffs allege the following facts concerning the structure of the enterprise. The enterprise is an association in fact comprised of Jackson, Jackson Trust, Hallsworth, LB Land, and JDH Services. It is operated, managed and/or controlled by all of them. Defendant corporations, LB Land and JDH Services, adopted or approved the unlawful activities of Jackson and Hallsworth. The Jackson Trust is an alter-ego of Jackson created to protect assets of Jackson and to provide tax benefits. Boutin, as attorney for Jackson and Hallsworth, filed a mandamus action against Acro-Tech concerning shareholder access to corporate records. Boutin filed the action as part of an effort to direct and control the enterprise and its efforts to acquire control over Acro-Tech. Boutin's actions in representing defendants were a significant managerial act of control over the enterprise.
First Amended Complaint at 13 ¶ c; at 14 ¶ g; at 16 ¶¶ 52-54; at 20 ¶ 74, 77.
Plaintiffs also allege under the RICO conspiracy claim that Boutin used his legal skills to direct and control the efforts of the enterprise to acquire control over Acro-Tech and to evade a judgment entered in an FED action between the parties. He also directed and managed the affairs of the enterprise in its appearance before the courts and aided and abetted Jackson, Luann Jackson, LB Land, and Hallsworth in their efforts to remove Hall from control of Acro-Tech.
Plaintiffs contend that the inclusion of two corporations in the enterprise satisfies the requirement that the enterprise is an entity separate and apart from the pattern of racketeering activity in which it engages, relying on Chang v. Chen, 80 F.3d 1293 (9th Cir. 1996). Chang held that the involvement of a corporation which has an existence separate from its participation in the racketeering activity can satisfy the enterprise element's requirement of a separate structure. The court went on to find that although the corporation was named as a member of the enterprise, the complaint did not allege how the corporation was related to or participated in the alleged enterprise. Consequently, the court held that the complaint did not properly allege an enterprise. Id. at 1300-01.
Plaintiffs allege that Acro-Tech employed JDH Services to perform accounting services, giving JDH Services access to Acro-Tech's confidential business and financial information. LB Land was the landowner for the premises Acro-Tech leased, allowing LB Land to use the lease as a basis for FED litigation. This is adequate to meet the test under Chang for a separate entity.
Plaintiffs, however, do not sufficiently allege the structure of the enterprise or its mechanism for directing its affairs. It is not alleged whether decisions are consensual, with all members having an equal say, or whether there is a hierarchy within the enterprise. Plaintiffs allege that Boutin, who is not an alleged member of the enterprise, controls its affairs. I conclude that the enterprise is not adequately pleaded.
2. Predicate Acts
Plaintiffs allege predicate acts of mail fraud, wire fraud, extortion, Travel Act violations, and Interstate Transportation of Fraudulently Obtained Money violations. Defendants contend that the facts alleged do not constitute violations of these criminal statutes. Predicate acts must be conduct which is indictable. Howard v. America Online, Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 828 (2000); § 1961(1).
i. Mail and Wire Fraud
RICO actions alleging the predicate act of fraud must plead with particularity the time, place, and manner of each act of fraud, plus the role of each defendant in each scheme. Lancaster Community Hospital v. Antelope Valley Hospital District, 940 F.2d 397, 405 (9th Cir. 1991) (mail fraud), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1094 (1992). The complaint must allege what is false about a representation and why it is false. In re Glenfed, Inc. Securities Litigation, 42 F.3d 1541 (9th Cir. 1994) (Rule 9(b) requirements applied to federal securities claims).
To allege a violation of the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, a plaintiff must show: (1) defendants formed a scheme or artifice to defraud; (2) defendants used the United States mail or caused a use of the mail in furtherance of the scheme; and (3) defendants did so with the specific intent to deceive or defraud. Rothman v. Vedder Park Management, 912 F.2d 315, 316 (9th Cir. 1990).
The crime of wire fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 1343 has the same elements but substitutes use of the wires for use of the mail. United States v. Garlick, 240 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001).
After reviewing the first amended complaint, all of the allegations plaintiffs consider to be predicate acts of wire and mail fraud lack specificity as required under the case law. For example, in ¶ 38(j) and (k), plaintiffs allege:
By falsely communicating by wire and mail to Plaintiff Reggie Huff that John Hallsworth would review the company's books and papers and thereby inducing plaintiffs to trust and rely upon these representations to authorize Hallsworth to access the confidential books and records of Acro-Tech.
By executing fraudulent documents which were used and communicated through the U.S. mails in order to further the scheme to defraud Plaintiffs of their property interest in Acro-Tech.
This fails to allege the times, the roles of each defendant, what is false about the representation that Hallsworth would review the corporate books, which documents were fraudulent, and why they were fraudulent.
i. Extortion
The statute states:
Whoever in any way or degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity in commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in violation of this section shall be fined. . . .
Extortion is defined as "the obtaining of property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force, violence, or fear, or under color of official right." 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), (b)(2).
Plaintiffs allege that in January 1997, Jackson demanded that the Huffs surrender all but 3% of their Acro-Tech stock at less than market value or face a ruinous class action lawsuit which the Huffs and the corporation could not afford to defend. In April 1997, Jackson, Luann Jackson, and John Hallsworth demanded that plaintiffs purchase these defendants' stock at an inflated price or risk legal action. Jackson and Hallsworth threatened the Huffs with economic damage from the use of confidential business information gained by Hallsworth while working as an accountant for Acro-Tech. I consider these sufficient allegations for three predicate acts of extortion.
Plaintiffs also allege that Jackson threatened to destroy the value of Huff's patents. This does not adequately plead extortion because it does not allege the wrongful way in which the value of the patents would be destroyed. One way to destroy the value of a patent, by inventing something better, is not wrongful.
Defendants allegedly used their status as shareholders to threaten Acro-Tech board members that their personal assets were at risk from shareholder litigation. Although the substance of the extortion is adequately pled, I doubt that all seven defendants were involved. I will not consider this as a predicate act until plaintiffs specify which defendants engaged in the conduct.
On numerous occasions, Jackson and Hallsworth allegedly attempted to coerce plaintiffs into signing a promissory note on behalf of Acro-Tech to pay for the repurchase of shares from the Jackson Trust, with the note secured by all assets of Acro-Tech, including its patents. I will not consider this a predicate act until plaintiffs specify the coercion and approximate time frames. The coercion details are necessary to determine if there was extortion and the time frames are necessary when analyzing below if a pattern exists.
Plaintiffs also allege that Jackson and Hallsworth demanded in March 1997 that Reggie Huff meet with them and a board member. There is nothing wrongful about this conduct as alleged.
Jackson and Hallsworth allegedly made extortionate demands for improvements to the property leased to plaintiffs which plaintiffs did not owe under the terms of the lease. Plaintiffs must give specifics of what demands were made and why they were wrongful under the terms of the lease.
ii. Travel Act
Among other things, the Travel Act prohibits use of the mails or any facility of interstate commerce, including the telephone system, with the intent to promote, manage, establish, carry on, or facilitate the promotion, management, establishment, or carrying on, of certain unlawful activity, namely extortion as alleged by plaintiffs. 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3). None of the predicate acts of extortion which are sufficiently alleged, as explained above, allege that the mail or facilities of interstate commerce were involved. Thus, there are no predicate acts of violation of the Travel Act under the current allegations.
iv. Transportation of Stolen Money
The violation of the act prohibiting the transportation of stolen goods or money, as alleged by plaintiffs, states that whoever transports, transmits, or transfers in interstate commerce $5,000 or more of money, known to be stolen or taken by fraud, violates the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2314. Plaintiffs allege that money in excess of $5,000 obtained from a fraudulently obtained lease between Acro-Tech and LB Land was deposited in various banking institutions knowing that the money was obtained by fraud. Acro-Tech allegedly entered into a three-year lease with LB Land in reliance on representations from Jackson. No specifics are alleged on how the lease was fraudulently obtained. This predicate act is not sufficiently alleged.
3. Pattern
Defendants contend that plaintiffs do not adequately allege a pattern of racketeering activity because the actions do not give rise to the required continuity.
A pattern is at least two acts of racketeering activity within ten years of each other. Howard v. America Online, Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 828 (2000); 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). Although two acts are necessary, they are not sufficient to find a violation. A pattern requires a showing of a relationship between the predicates and of the threat of continuing activity. Id. at 746.
"Related conduct embraces criminal acts that have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics and are not isolated events." Id. at 749 (quoting H.J., Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co., 492 U.S. 229, 240, 109 S.Ct. 2893 (1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Having the same participants, by itself, is insufficient to establish relatedness. Id.
The continuity requirement requires a plaintiff to prove either "a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time ["i.e., closed-ended continuity], or "past conduct that by its nature projects into the future with a threat of repetition [i.e., open-ended continuity]" Id. at 750 (internal citations omitted). Predicate acts extending over a few months are not sufficiently continuous to meet the requirement for close-ended continuity. Id. Open-ended continuity is shown by predicate acts that specifically threaten repetition or become a "regular way of doing business." Id.
Based on the analysis above, plaintiffs currently allege three predicate acts of extortion: (1) in Januaiy 1997, Jackson demanded that the Huffs surrender all but 3% of their stock at less than market value; (2) in April 1997, Jackson, Luann Jackson, and John Hallsworth demanded that plaintiffs purchase these defendants' stock at an inflated price; and (3) Jackson and Hallsworth threatened the Huffs with economic damage from the use of confidential business information gained by Hallsworth.
Plaintiffs generally allege that defendants are trying to acquire Acro-Tech for no compensation to gain control of its patents. The second predicate act, a demand to repurchase defendants' stock, is opposed to that purpose.
I am unable to say that the three predicates show open-ended continuity because the current situation of stock ownership and the value of the patents, such as when they expire, is not alleged. Thus, I have no way to determine if a scheme to gain control of the patents would likely continue into the future. I cannot say that the three predicates show close-ended continuity because the two which are tied to dates took place only three months apart. Consequently, plaintiffs have failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity.
In summary, the alleged violation of RICO § 1962f(c) is dismissed for failure to adequately plead an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering activity.
B. Section 1962(a) and (b) (Claim Two)
The second claim alleges violations of sections (a) and (b) of RICO:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b)It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.18 U.S.C. § 1962.
Defendants first contend that the arguments above also apply to this claim. This is not true concerning whether an enterprise is sufficiently alleged.
The "enterprise" referred to in subsections (a) and (b) is thus something acquired through the use of illegal activities or by money obtained from illegal activities. The enterprise in these subsections is the victim of unlawful activity....
By contrast, the "enterprise" in subsection (c) connotes generally the vehicle through which the unlawful pattern of racketeering activity is committed, rather than the victim of the activity.National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 510 U.S. 249, 259, 114 S.Ct. 798 (1994). Plaintiffs are correct that the enterprise referred to in this claim is Acro-Tech itself
The § 1962(a) and (b) claim fails because plaintiffs have not adequately alleged a pattern of racketeering activity. Moreover, none of the three remaining predicate acts allegedly resulted in control of Acro-Tech. Plaintiffs do not allege that they capitulated in any of the extortion. This is fatal to the § 1962(b) part of claim two. The § 1962(a) part of claim two also suffers from lack of any income being derived from the remaining predicate acts. The only income to defendants alleged by plaintiffs would be the rent, but none of the predicate acts concerning the rent were adequately pleaded. Claim Two is dismissed.
C. Section 1962(d) (Claim Three)
Defendants note that this conspiracy claim must fail because the substantive RICO claims are not adequately pleaded. Boutin also contends that plaintiffs do not adequately allege an agreement.
To establish a violation of section 1962(d) [conspiracy], Plaintiffs must allege either an agreement that is a substantive violation of RICO or that the defendants agreed to commit, or participated in, a violation of two predicate offenses." A § 1962(d) conspiracy claim cannot survive if the substantive claim does not state an action upon which relief could ever be granted. Howard v. America Online, Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 751 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 828 (2000).
Because the substantive RICO violations are being dismissed, the conspiracy claim must also be dismissed.
II. Oregon RICO
Oregon RICO, ORS 166.715 — 166.735, is modeled after the federal statute. Federal cases interpreting the federal statute are persuasive in interpreting the intent of the Oregon legislature. State v. Blossom, 88 Or. App. 75, 78-79, 744 P.2d 281 (1987), rev, denied, 305 Or. 22 (1988).
In Claim 4, plaintiffs allege a violation of ORS 166.720(3), which parallels § 1961(c). Consequently, Claim 4 is dismissed for insufficiently alleging an enterprise.
In Claim 5, plaintiffs allege a violation of ORS 166.720(2), which parallels § 1961(b). Claim 5 is dismissed for insufficiently alleging a pattern of racketeering activity.
Plaintiffs allege in Claim 6 a violation of ORS 166.720(4), which parallels § 1961(d), a RICO conspiracy. Claim 6 is dismissed for lack of a properly pleaded substantive Oregon RICO claim.
III. State Common Law Claims
A. Abuse of Process
An abuse of process is the "perversion of legal procedure to accomplish an ulterior purpose when the procedure is commenced in proper form and with probable cause." Kelly v. McBarron, 258 Or. 149, 154, 482 P.2d 187 (1971). The elements of abuse of process are: (1) an ulterior purpose; (2) a willful act in the use of process not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding; (3) injuries beyond those which are a common burden on parties to litigation; and (4) an actual arrest or a seizure of property.Larsen v. Credit Bureau, 279 Or. 405, 408, 568 P.2d 657 (1977); Clausen v. Carstens, 83 Or. App. 112, 118, 730 P.2d 604 (1986) (imposition of a receiver on spouse's business during a dissolution proceeding which caused immediate interference with the business and its income and credit is a special injury); Reynolds v. Given, 72 Or. App. 248, 256, 695 P.2d 946 (1985) (counterclaim in a replevin action for plaintiff to receive property awarded to defendant by probate court; plaintiff never had the property so it was not seized from her).
Plaintiffs allege that the two FED actions and the mandamus proceeding for access to corporate records were brought to divert their resources into the defense of litigation claims, furthering defendants' goal of taking control of Acro-Tech. No arrest or seizure of property is pleaded. Plaintiffs distinguish Reynolds because it is also an action for replevin of property. Clausen was not, however. Its underlying case was a bitter dissolution proceeding in which the spouse's business was "seized" by the receiver. Moreover, the court reaffirmed this element in Lee v. Mitchell, 152 Or. App. 159, 179, 953 P.2d 414 (1998). Plaintiffs also do not plead any injuries beyond having to defend the actions. In Clausen the business collapsed. Finally, plaintiffs allege no willful act improper in the normal course of the proceedings.
The abuse of process claim is dismissed.
B. Interference with Business Relations
Defendants contend that plaintiffs do not allege interference with existing contracts or other business relationships Acro-Tech had with other parties. Defendants also contend that the allegations that defendants were trying to take over the business does not state a claim for this tort.
The elements of the torts of intentional interference with economic relations are: (1) the existence of a professional or business relationship; (2) intentional interference with the relationship; (3) by a third party; (4) accomplished through improper means or for an improper purpose; (5) a causal effect between the interference and damage to the economic relationship; and (6) damages. McGanty v. Staudenraus, 321 Or. 532, 535, 901 P.2d 841 (1995).
The only allegations I see that relate to any type of a relationship with a third party are those concerning some of defendants coercing two board members to resign. There are no allegations that these are economic relationships or of the damages caused by the resignations. this claim is dismissed.
C. Breach of Contract
Plaintiffs allege that the Jacksons, Jackson Trust, and LB Land breached the lease dated March 19, 1996, by interfering with plaintiffs' right to the quiet and peaceful enjoyment of the leased premises, by filing wrongful FED actions, and by seeking to impose repair costs incident to a potential termination of the lease which are unauthorized by the lease agreement. defendants contend that plaintiffs fail to allege interference with plaintiffs' use or occupation of the premises, as opposed to annoyance caused by defendants' actions, do not allege that the lease prohibits filing FED actions, and are talking about prospective conduct only concerning the repair costs, which is not a current breach of the lease.
Defendants' arguments are well taken. Plaintiffs acknowledge that they failed to allege that they were eventually forced from the premises. I also note that a contract can only be breached by a party to the contract. Likewise, damages for breach of contract are only suffered by a party to the contract or a third party beneficiary. Paragraph 15 alleges that Acro-Tech leased the premises from LB Land. Typically, these two parties are the only ones involved in a breach of the lease.
The breach of contract claim is dismissed.
IV. Leave to Replead
Defendants ask that the action be dismissed with prejudice because of the numerous previous cases between the parties. Although that is true, I intend to ignore the past history unless an event is relevant to a claim before me or a court ruling has preclusive effect. Neither of these affect whether repleading will be futile. Consequently, I will give plaintiffs a chance to replead the complaint to correct the problems discussed above.
I make a few other requests of plaintiffs. With this many parties in a case, it is hard to track which claims are alleged by and against which parties. I ask that plaintiffs keep their use of the generic terms "plaintiffs" and "defendants" to instances in which they apply to all plaintiffs or all defendants. Otherwise, list out the proper parties taking part in the conduct being alleged. In particular, in the title for each claim, list the defendants who are allegedly liable for the claim. Also remember that longer is not necessarily better. The first amended complaint contains a lot of redundant information, making it difficult to find the allegations which support a claim. For example, 15, 17, and 19 could have been combined into one much shorter paragraph while conveying the same information. Paragraphs 36, 38(d), and 38(f) appear to be talking about the same conduct. Paragraphs 20 and 21 are not relevant to any of the claims. The complaint should be streamlined before the additional required details are added.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff's motion to strike (#54) is granted. The analysis is based on the allegations in the complaint.
Defendant Boutin's motion to dismiss (#46), defendants Hallsworth and JDH Services, Inc.'s motions to dismiss (#48), and defendants Robert Jackson, Luann Jackson, The Robert K. Jackson Family Trust and LB Land, Inc.'s motion to dismiss (#50) are granted. Plaintiffs may file a second amended complaint within 20 days of the date of this opinion. Discovery will remain stayed until the court rules on any motions to dismiss the second amended complaint, or until defendants' time to respond to the second amended complaint passes, whichever is later.
Defendants Hallsworth and JDH Services, Inc.'s motion to dismiss or to stay or to enlarge time (#26) and defendants Robert and Luann Jackson, The Robert K. Jackson Family Trust ("Jackson Trust") and LB Land, Inc.'s motion to dismiss or to stay or to enlarge time (#24) are denied as moot.