Opinion
Civil Action 20-1305
05-29-2020
JAIME ACOSTA, Petitioner, v. DEREK OBERLANDER, SUPERINTENDENT SCI-FOREST, et al., Respondents.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
LYNNE A. SITARSKI UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is a pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 by Jaime Acosta (“Petitioner”), an individual currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution-Forest. This matter has been referred to me for a Report and Recommendation. For the following reasons, I respectfully recommend that the petition for habeas corpus be DENIED.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The Court has received the State Court Record (“SCR”) for Petitioner's underlying state court criminal case in both electronic and hard-copy format. I will cite documents contained in the SCR to their Bates Stamped Number Appendix as “A ___.” (ECF Nos. 7-2, 7-3, 7-4). The Court has also consulted the Berks County Court of Common Pleas criminal docket sheets in Commonwealth v. Acosta, No. CP-06-CR-0004038-2014, (Berks Cnty. Com. Pl.), available at https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/DocketSheets/CPReport.ashx?docketNumber=CP-06-CR-0004038-2014&dnh=u0N3%2bguC9vmTSKFG3yECng%3d%3d (last visited May 29, 2020) [hereinafter “Crim. Docket”].
On September 15, 2014, Petitioner was charged with thirty-nine counts of drug possession and trafficking, conspiracy, and illegal firearms possession for his participation in a drug trafficking organization. (A37-66; Crim. Docket at 1). On December 15, 2015, Petitioner entered an open guilty plea to seven counts. (A96-101). The signed plea document stated that Petitioner understood his total possible sentence was 137 years' imprisonment, and that because it was an open plea, the trial judge could sentence him to that total possible sentence. (A99). The signed plea document further indicated that Petitioner was “pleading guilty of [his] own free will to the offenses listed on page one because [he] committed them.” (Id.).
The trial court held a guilty plea colloquy and sentencing hearing. (N.T., Guilty Plea & Sentencing Hr'g, 12/15/15, A102-08). The court explained to Petitioner that his total possible sentence was 137 years' imprisonment because “[s]ince these are open pleas, I need to make sure that you understand the maximum penalties.” (Id. at 3:22-4:18). The court further explained to Petitioner that “[i]t's up to the Court” to determine his sentence, and Petitioner stated he understood. (Id. at 4:22-25). Petitioner stated that he understood his rights, applicable law, and the Commonwealth's burden of proof. (Id. at 5:1-20). He also testified that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. (Id. at 10:22-24).
The Commonwealth recited the facts supporting the charges; specifically, Petitioner's participation in a drug trafficking organization supplying methamphetamine, heroin, and marijuana, and possessing various firearms. (Id. at 5:23-9:17). The trial court explained to Petitioner the elements of his charges. (Id. at 10:2-17). Petitioner stated he understood the elements and that he had nothing to add or correct to the Commonwealth's recitation of the facts. (Id. at 10:18-21). Petitioner further testified that he was “pleading guilty to these offenses because [he] committed them.” (Id. at 11:11-13). The trial court concluded Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and accepted the plea. (Id. at 11:14-20).
The court proceeded to sentencing. (Id. at 11:22-24:23). Petitioner had a prior record score of 5, and the Commonwealth recommended a term of 15 to 35 years' incarceration. (Id. at 12:16-15:9). Petitioner's counsel proffered various mitigating circumstances justifying a lesser sentence, including Petitioner's age, family, work history, potentiality for rehabilitation, and acceptance of responsibility. (Id. at 15:13-17:4). The court sentenced Petitioner in accordance with the Commonwealth's recommendation, a term of 15 to 35 years' incarceration, explaining that the court had considered the sentencing guidelines, counsels' arguments, the nature of the offenses, and the facts supporting the offenses. The court concluded that a sentence of 15 to 35 years' incarceration was appropriate. (Id. at 19:4-21:5; Sentencing Order, A109-15).
Petitioner's counsel filed a post-sentence motion, which the court denied on December 22, 2015. (Crim. Docket at 22-23; Order, A122). On December 28, 2015, new counsel entered his appearance and filed supplemental post-sentence motions. (Crim. Docket at 23-24; A125-30). The court denied the motions on January 29, 2016. (Order, A142). Petitioner appealed to the Superior Court on February 25, 2016. (Notice of Appeal, A143). After various filings and rulings not relevant to this petition, on March 29, 2017, Petitioner, through his new counsel, withdrew the direct appeal. (Withdrawal of Appeal, A181).
Petitioner submitted various filings pro se, including a request that his attorney withdraw, and a PCRA Petition. (Crim. Docket at 25-27). The trial court sought to appoint new counsel for Petitioner, but new counsel was not appointed until March 2017. (Id.). As the Superior Court noted, “[b]ecause there were so many individuals involved in this drug-trafficking ring, many local attorneys were conflicted out of this case due to having represented a co-defendant.” Commonwealth v. Acosta, No. 326 MDA 2018, 2018 WL 4268861, at *1 n.2 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2018).
In April 2017, Petitioner was appointed new counsel, who filed a petition pursuant to Pennsylvania's Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541, et seq., on June 20, 2017. (Crim. Docket at 30; PCRA Petition, A185-95). Petitioner asserted his prior counsel was ineffective in connection with his guilty plea. (A189-95). Specifically, he contended his prior counsel led him to “reasonably expect” that he would be receive a term of 3 to 6 years' incarceration. (A193-95). He maintained his attorney “vastly misrepresented the possible outcome of sentencing to [Petitioner]” and that, had he been appropriately advised, he would have rejected the open plea on seven counts and proceeded to trial on the thirty-nine counts. (A192-95).
The PCRA Court held a hearing on October 10, 2017. (N.T., PCRA Hr'g, 10/10/17, A230-73). Petitioner testified that his prior counsel “told me, listen, I'm gonna try to get you three to six with time served - three to six years with time served credit.” (A240). Petitioner claimed his counsel did not explain an “open plea” to him, nor did counsel advise him of the sentencing guidelines, or the Commonwealth's recommendation. (A240-43). He testified that counsel gave him the false impression that he would receive a term of three so six years' imprisonment, and had he been informed otherwise, “I would have took my chances and rolled the dice.” (A244).
On cross-examination, Petitioner admitted that, at the time of his participation in the drug trafficking organization, he was “serving a five- to fifteen-year sentence” which was “for a single count of delivery of a controlled substance.” (A248). He stated that he nevertheless believed that he would receive “three to six [years] for seven counts of a 39-count Criminal Information knowing that [he] previously got five to fifteen years for a single count.” (A249). Petitioner also testified that the Commonwealth previously offered him a negotiated plea to “receive a five-year minimum, a five to twelve”, but that he declined that offer. (A257; see also A255-58). Petitioner's prior counsel also testified at the hearing. (A259-73). Counsel stated he could not recall if he told Petitioner that Petitioner could expect a sentence of three to six years. (A263). He further testified he would never promise a client that the court would impose a specific sentence in an open plea because the decision “is always [up to] the Court.” (A263-68).
On February 6, 2018, the PCRA Court denied the Petition, concluding that Petitioner failed to show his counsel was ineffective. (A297-309, PCRA Ct. Op.). The PCRA Court found Petitioner was not credible in his testimony that his prior counsel promised a three- to six-year term of imprisonment in exchange for his open guilty plea to seven counts. (Id.). The court explained that Petitioner's signed plea document and testimony during the guilty plea colloquy indicated that he understood he was entering an open plea, that it was up to the Court to determine his sentence, that his total possible sentence was 137 years' imprisonment. (A 306-07). The Court further noted Petitioner “stated on the record that he was pleading guilty because he committed the offenses.” (Id.). In light of the plea documents, Petitioner's testimony, and the facts and circumstances of the case, the court concluded Petitioner failed to show his counsel was ineffective. (A308-09).
Petitioner appealed to the Superior Court. Commonwealth v. Acosta, No. 326 MDA 2018, 2018 WL 4268861 (Pa. Super. Ct. Sept. 7, 2018). On September 7, 2018, the Superior Court affirmed the PCRA Court's denial. Id. at *2. The Superior Court found no errors and concluded the PCRA Court properly denied the claim. The Superior Court adopted the PCRA Court's opinion and “affirm[ed] the order of the PCRA court based upon the reasons stated therein.” Id. at *2 (citing PCRA Ct. Op., 2/6/18, at 5-13). Petitioner filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal, which the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied on April 18, 2019. (Crim. Docket at 33).
On February 24, 2020, Petitioner filed this pro se Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2). Petitioner raises two claims for relief, both asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. (Id. at pp. 7-11, 14-17). He contends his counsel was ineffective for: (1) “unlawfully inducing Petitioner to enter into a guilty plea based on a deal of three (3) to six (6) years of incarceration”; and (2) failing to file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Id.).
The Honorable Edward G. Smith referred this matter to me for a Report and Recommendation. (Order, ECF No. 4). The Commonwealth filed its Response on April 13, 2020. (Resp., ECF No. 7). Petitioner has not filed a Reply.
II. LEGAL STANDARDS
A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default
The AEDPA grants to persons in state or federal custody the right to file a petition in a federal court seeking the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Pursuant to the AEDPA:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that-
(A) the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State; or (B)(i) there is an absence of available State corrective process; or (ii) circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1). The exhaustion requirement is rooted in considerations of comity, to ensure that state courts have the initial opportunity to review federal constitutional challenges to state convictions. See Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 349 (1989); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518 (1982); Leyva v. Williams, 504 F.3d 357, 365 (3d Cir. 2007); Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 192 (3d Cir. 2000).
Respect for the state court system requires that the habeas petitioner demonstrate the claims in question have been “fairly presented to the state courts.” Castille, 489 U.S. at 351. To “fairly present” a claim, a petitioner must present its “factual and legal substance to the state courts in a manner that puts them on notice that a federal claim is being asserted.” McCandless v. Vaughn, 172 F.3d 225, 261 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Nara v. Frank, 488 F.3d 187, 197-98 (3d Cir. 2007) (recognizing that a claim is fairly presented when a petitioner presents the same factual and legal basis for the claim to the state courts). A state prisoner exhausts state remedies by giving the “state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 845 (1999). In Pennsylvania, one complete round includes presenting the federal claim through the Superior Court on direct or collateral review. See Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 233-34 (3d Cir. 2004). The habeas petitioner bears the burden of proving exhaustion of all state remedies. Boyd v. Waymart, 579 F.3d 330, 367 (3d Cir. 2009).
If a habeas petition contains unexhausted claims, the federal district court must ordinarily dismiss the petition without prejudice so that the petitioner can return to state court to exhaust his remedies. Slutzker v. Johnson, 393 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2004). However, if state law would clearly foreclose review of the claims, the exhaustion requirement is technically satisfied because there is an absence of state corrective process. See Carpenter v. Vaughn, 296 F.3d 138, 146 (3d Cir. 2002); Lines v. Larkin, 208 F.3d 153, 160 (3d Cir. 2000). The failure to properly present claims to the state court generally results in a procedural default. Lines, 208 F.3d at 165-66. The doctrine of procedural default bars federal habeas relief when a state court relies upon, or would rely upon, “‘a state law ground that is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment'” to foreclose review of the federal claim. Nolan v. Wynder, 363 Fed.Appx. 868, 871 (3d Cir. 2010) (not precedential) (quoting Beard v. Kindler, 668 U.S. 53, 53 (2009)); see also Taylor v. Horn, 504 F.3d 416, 427-28 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 730 (1991)).
The requirements of “independence” and “adequacy” are distinct. Johnson v. Pinchak, 392 F.3d 551, 557-59 (3d Cir. 2004). State procedural grounds are not independent, and will not bar federal habeas relief, if the state law ground is so “interwoven with federal law” that it cannot be said to be independent of the merits of a petitioner's federal claims. Coleman, 501 U.S. at 739-40. A state rule is “adequate” for procedural default purposes if it is “firmly established and regularly followed.” Johnson v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 1802, 1804 (2016) (per curiam) (citation omitted). These requirements ensure that “federal review is not barred unless a habeas petitioner had fair notice of the need to follow the state procedural rule, ” Bronshtein v. Horn, 404 F.3d 700, 707 (3d Cir. 2005), and that “review is foreclosed by what may honestly be called ‘rules' . . . of general applicability[, ] rather than by whim or prejudice against a claim or claimant.” Id. at 708.
Like the exhaustion requirement, the doctrine of procedural default is grounded in principles of comity and federalism. As the Supreme Court has explained:
In the absence of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine in federal habeas, habeas petitioners would be able to avoid the exhaustion requirement by defaulting their federal claims in state court. The independent and adequate state ground doctrine ensures that the States' interest in correcting their own mistakes is respected in all federal habeas cases.Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 452-53 (2000).
Federal habeas review is not available to a petitioner whose constitutional claims have not been addressed on the merits by the state courts due to procedural default, unless such petitioner can demonstrate: (1) cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law; or (2) that failure to consider the claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Id. at 451; Coleman, 501 U.S. at 750. To demonstrate cause and prejudice, the petitioner must show some objective factor external to the defense that impeded counsel's efforts to comply with some state procedural rule. Slutzker, 393 F.3d at 381 (quoting Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986)). To demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice, a habeas petitioner must typically demonstrate actual innocence. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324-26 (1995).
B. Merits Review
The AEDPA increased the deference federal courts must give to the factual findings and legal determinations of the state courts. Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002); Werts, 228 F.3d at 196. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by the AEDPA, a petition for habeas corpus may be granted only if: (1) the state court's adjudication of the claim resulted in a decision contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of United States;” or (2) the adjudication resulted in a decision that was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). Factual issues determined by a state court are presumed to be correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and convincing evidence. Werts, 228 F.3d at 196 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)).
The Supreme Court has explained that, “[u]nder the ‘contrary to' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than [the Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); see also Hameen v. State of Delaware, 212 F.3d 226, 235 (3d Cir. 2000). “Under the ‘unreasonable application' clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 413. The “unreasonable application” inquiry requires the habeas court to “ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Hameen, 212 F.3d at 235 (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 388-89). “In further delineating the ‘unreasonable application of' component, the Supreme Court stressed that an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of such law and a federal habeas court may not grant relief unless that court determines that a state court's incorrect or erroneous application of clearly established federal law was also unreasonable.” Werts, 228 F.3d at 196 (citation omitted).
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner raises two claims that his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel was violated. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2, at 7-11, 14-17). He first asserts his counsel was ineffective because counsel allegedly led Petitioner to believe he would receive a lower sentence. (Id. at 7-11). He also contends counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, on the basis that it was involuntary. (Id. at 14-17). The Commonwealth responds that the Pennsylvania courts reasonably rejected Petitioner's Ground One, and that Petitioner's Ground Two is procedurally defaulted. (Resp., ECF No. 7-1, at 5-13). I will address Petitioner's asserted grounds for relief in turn. For the following reasons, I agree with the Commonwealth and respectfully recommend the Petition be denied.
A. Ground One: Ineffectiveness Related to Guilty Plea
In Petitioner's Ground One, he contends counsel was ineffective because counsel allegedly led him to expect that he would receive a lower sentence, three to six years' imprisonment, for his open guilty plea. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2, at 7-11). Petitioner asserts “trial counsel's advice to Petitioner that he could get him a three (3) to six (6) was erroneous which led Petitioner to accept an offer that did not exist.” (Id. at 9). Petitioner contends counsel was ineffective because “[t]rial counsel's offer was not realistic. Petitioner was pleading to seven (7) counts. This offer would have been a major deviation from the sentencing guidelines and [counsel] understood that.” (Id. at 9). The Commonwealth responds that the Pennsylvania courts reasonably denied this claim. (Resp., ECF No. 7-1, at 9-13).
A claim for ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court established the following two-pronged test to obtain habeas relief based on ineffectiveness:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the “counsel” guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.466 U.S. at 687. Because “it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable, ” a court must be “highly deferential” to counsel's performance and “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Id. at 689. To establish prejudice, “[t]he defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Strickland “applies to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). To prove prejudice, “the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill, 474 U.S. at 59. To prove this, a petitioner “must make more than a bare allegation . . . .” Rice v. Wynder, 346 Fed.Appx. 890, 893 (3d Cir. 2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
It is well settled that Strickland is “clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” Williams, 529 U.S. at 391. Thus, Petitioner is entitled to relief if the Pennsylvania court's rejection of his claims was: (1) “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, ” that clearly established law; or (2) “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
Here, the PCRA Court addressed Petitioner's ineffectiveness claim using Pennsylvania's three-pronged ineffectiveness test. (PCRA Ct. Op., 2/6/18, A300 (citing Commonwealth v. Blount, 647 A.2d 199, 203 (Pa. 1994))). The Third Circuit has explained the Pennsylvania ineffectiveness test is not contrary to the Strickland standard. See Werts, 228 F.3d at 204. Therefore, the state court did not apply a standard “contrary to” clearly established federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). Accordingly, habeas relief is only appropriate if Petitioner demonstrates the state court's decision was based on an unreasonable application of Strickland or involved an unreasonable determination of the facts. Id. § 2254(d)(1)-(2).
The Superior Court “adopt[ed] the PCRA court's opinion of February 6, 2018 as our own and affirm[ed] the order of the PCRA court based upon the reasons stated therein. See PCRA Court Opinion, 2/6/2018, at 5-13 (explaining, inter alia, that [Petitioner] was not credible in his testimony that trial counsel promised a three-to-six year sentence in exchange for [Petitioner's] pleading guilty).” Acosta, 2018 WL 4268861, at *2. Federal habeas courts review the “‘last reasoned decision' of the state courts in the AEDPA context.” Bond v. Beard, 539 F.3d 256, 289-90 (3d Cir. 2008). Accordingly, I will review the reasoning of the PCRA Court because it represents the last reasoned decision of the Pennsylvania Courts.
I conclude that the PCRA Court reasonably denied this claim, and I respectfully recommend relief on this ground be denied. First, the PCRA Court denied this claim because it credited Petitioner's signed plea documents and testimony at his guilty plea colloquy over his testimony at the PCRA level. (A297-309); see also Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977) (“Solemn declarations made in open court carry a strong presumption of verity.”); see also United States v. Blount, 940 F.Supp. 720, 738 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (“A defendant's sworn colloquy before [the] court is not something we take lightly.”). The court first explained that Petitioner's signed plea document showed he understood he was entering an open plea, that he faced a total possible sentence of 137 years' imprisonment, and that it was up to the judge to sentence him. (A302-03; see also A97-99). The court further noted at the guilty plea colloquy that Petitioner again admitted he understood he was entering an open plea, he understood the potential maximum penalty of a 137-year sentence, and he understood “[i]t's up to the Court” to determine his sentence. (A 305). The court lastly explained that Petitioner testified he was pleading guilty because he committed the offenses, not because of any alleged expected sentence. (A307). The court concluded:
Both the oral colloquy and the written Statement Accompanying Defendant's Request to Enter a Guilty Plea (hereinafter “Statement”) clearly demonstrated that [Petitioner] was entering an open plea of guilty to the seven charges listed above. It was made clear to him that there was no agreement as to what the sentence would be and that the Court could impose sentence as it deemed proper. [Petitioner] did not stop the plea proceeding as he had done in the past. He stated on the record that he was pleading guilty
because he committed the offenses. . . . Additionally, [Petitioner] must be bound by his statements of understanding and guilt; otherwise, the sanctity of guilty pleas will lose all worth and meaning.(A307-08).
The PCRA Court did not credit Petitioner's testimony that he only pled guilty because counsel allegedly led him to expect a sentence of three to six years' imprisonment; rather, the PCRA Court found that “[Petitioner] knew that he was entering an open plea, that the Court would determine his sentence, and that he faced the possibility of a substantially higher sentence than he received.” (A303). This weighing of credibility is afforded deference on habeas review, and Petitioner puts forth no evidence to disturb the PCRA Court's credibility determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e); Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983) (“[F]ederal habeas courts [have] no license to redetermine credibility of witnesses whose demeanor has been observed by the state trial court, but not by them.”); Arnold v. Superintendent SCI Frackville, 322 F.Supp.3d 621, 634 (E.D. Pa. 2018) (“On habeas review, a federal court must defer to state court factual and credibility determinations.”); see also (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2, at 7-11). Therefore, because the PCRA Court credited Petitioner's signed plea documents and guilty plea colloquy testimony over his PCRA hearing testimony, the court reasonably denied his ineffectiveness claim.
The PCRA Court also reasonably denied this claim because counsel will not be deemed ineffective for an inaccurate sentencing prediction when the court conducts a sufficient guilty plea colloquy. As the Third Circuit has explained, “we have long held that an erroneous sentencing prediction by counsel is not ineffective assistance of counsel where, as here, an adequate plea hearing was conducted.” United States v. Shedrick, 493 F.3d 292, 299 (3d Cir. 2007) (collecting cases). “[A]ll the law requires is that the defendant be informed of his/her exposure in pleading guilty. The law does not require that a defendant be given a reasonably accurate ‘best guess' as to what his/her sentence will be; nor could it, given the vagaries and variables of each defendant's circumstances and offending behavior.” United States v. Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485, 492 n.5 (3d Cir. 2001).
Here, the trial court held an “adequate plea hearing, ” Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 299, advising Petitioner he was entering an open plea, informing him of his maximum potential sentence, and explaining that it was up to the Court to impose his sentence. (A103-06). As the PCRA Court reasoned, “[i]t was made clear to [Petitioner] that there was no agreement as to what the sentence would be and that the Court could impose sentence as it deemed proper.” (A307). In accordance with the Third Circuit's pronouncement in Shedrick, “[t]his case falls well within well-established precedent: defense counsel's conjectures to his client about sentencing are irrelevant where the written plea agreement and in-court guilty plea colloquy clearly establish the defendant's maximum potential exposure and the sentencing court's discretion.” Shedrick, 493 F.3d at 299; see also United States v. Jones, 336 F.3d 245, 254 (3d Cir. 2003) (finding counsel not ineffective where defendant was advised in open court colloquy of potential maximum sentence and no other promises for his sentence); United States v. Mustafa, 238 F.3d 485, 492 (3d Cir. 2001) (“[A]ny alleged misrepresentations that [petitioner's] former counsel may have made regarding sentencing calculations were dispelled when [defendant] was informed in open court that there was no guarantee as to sentence, and that the court could sentence him to the maximum.”).
Therefore, I conclude the PCRA Court reasonably denied this ineffectiveness claim. The PCRA Court reasonably denied the claim based on its credibility determinations, and Petitioner does not put forth evidence to disturb those determinations. Moreover, the PCRA Court reasonably denied this claim because counsel will not be deemed ineffective for an inaccurate sentencing prediction where Petitioner is adequately informed in open court of his potential sentencing exposure and the court's sentencing discretion. Accordingly, I respectfully recommend relief on this ground be denied.
B. Ground Two: Ineffectiveness Related to Post-Sentence Motion
In Petitioner's Ground Two, he asserts his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2, at 14-17). The Commonwealth responds this claim is procedurally defaulted. (Resp., ECF No. 7-1, at 4-9). I agree with the Commonwealth and respectfully recommend this claim be denied.
As noted above, a petitioner must exhaust his federal constitutional claims in state court before raising them in a federal habeas petition. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Castille, 489 U.S. at 349; Rose, 455 U.S. at 518. A state prisoner exhausts state remedies by giving the “state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process, ” which in Pennsylvania includes through the Superior Court. O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845; Lambert, 387 F.3d at 233-34. The failure to properly present claims to the state court generally results in a procedural default. Lines, 208 F.3d at 165-66. A federal court is precluded from reviewing the merits of a procedurally defaulted claim if the state courts would rely on an independent and adequate state ground to foreclose review of the federal claim. Beard, 668 U.S. at 53.
Petitioner's claim of ineffectiveness for trial counsel's failure to file a post-sentence motion withdrawing his guilty plea is unexhausted. This claim was not presented to the Pennsylvania courts for “one complete round of the established appellate review process.” O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845; Lambert, 387 F.3d at 233-34. In his PCRA Petition and on appeal to the Superior Court, Petitioner presented one claim-his Ground One addressed supra-that his counsel was ineffective for allegedly informing Petitioner that he would receive a three- to six-year sentence for his open guilty plea. (Am. PCRA Pet., A185-95; N.T., PCRA Hr'g, 10/10/17, A233-36). Therefore, because Petitioner did not present his Ground Two claim to the Pennsylvania courts, the claim is unexhausted. The claim is also procedurally defaulted because Petitioner is barred by the PCRA one-year statute of limitations, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b), and Pennsylvania's waiver rule, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9544(b), from properly exhausting the claim in the state courts.
Petitioner acknowledges that his Ground Two is procedurally defaulted, but contends the procedural default is excused due to PCRA Counsel's alleged ineffectiveness under Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012). (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2, at 13-14 (citing Martinez, 566 U.S. 1)). I find that the procedural default is not excused under Martinez, and I respectfully recommend his request for relief on this basis be denied.
Martinez recognized a “narrow exception” to the general rule that attorney errors in collateral proceedings do not establish cause to excuse a procedural default, holding, “[i]nadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner's procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.” 566 U.S. at 9. The Third Circuit has provided that “‘[w]here state law requires a prisoner to raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel in a collateral proceeding, rather than on direct review, a procedural default on those claims will not bar their review by a federal habeas court if three conditions are met: (a) the default was caused by ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel or the absence of counsel (b) in the initial-review collateral proceeding (i.e., the first collateral proceeding in which the claim could be heard) and (c) the underlying claim of trial counsel ineffectiveness is ‘substantial.''” Preston v. Superintendent Graterford SCI, 902 F.3d 365, 376 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 124 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Martinez, 566 U.S. at 14)).
The procedural default is not excused under Martinez because the underlying ineffectiveness claim is not “substantial.” Id. The underlying claim is that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea because it was involuntary “due to the plea being unlawfully induced by trial counsel based on his bad advice.”(Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2, at 16). Petitioner's claim is not substantial for a few reasons. First, although he contends trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea, his appellate counsel did file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea. (A128-29). In that motion, he contended that he “did not knowingly and voluntarily enter a plea of guilty because he was advised by [trial] counsel that an open guilty plea would not result in a harsh sentence.” (A128). The court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea because it concluded, inter alia, Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (A142). Therefore, Petitioner's claim is not substantial because a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea was filed on his behalf.
I have analyzed this claim as a separate independent ground for relief; however, I note that his claim appears to be a layered variation of his Ground One addressed above. In Ground One, he directly asserts trial counsel was ineffective related to his plea. (Hab. Pet., ECF No. 2, at 7-11). In Ground Two, he indirectly puts forth the same contention, arguing ineffectiveness for failing to file a post-sentence motion alleging his guilty plea was involuntary due to counsel's ineffectiveness related to the plea. (Id. at 14-17). Boiled to their essence, they present the same issue; namely, ineffectiveness related to the plea.
Petitioner's trial counsel did file a post-sentence motion for reconsideration of sentence, which the court denied. (A122; Crim. Docket at 22).
Second, this claim is not substantial because, under Pennsylvania law for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas, Petitioner must have shown counsel's alleged ineffectiveness caused Petitioner to enter an unknowing, unintelligent, and involuntary plea; and, here, (1) Petitioner's counsel was not ineffective, and (2) Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Pennsylvania law provides, “[t]he standard for post-sentence withdrawal of guilty pleas dovetails with the arguable merit/prejudice requirements for relief based on a claim of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, . . . under which the defendant must show that counsel's deficient stewardship resulted in a manifest injustice, for example, by facilitating entry of an unknowing, involuntary, or unintelligent plea.” Commonwealth v. Kelley, 136 A.3d 1007, 1013 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017) (quoting Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 105 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (en banc)); see also Commonwealth v. Moser, 921 A.2d 526, 531 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (“Allegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea.”).
Here, as discussed supra, Petitioner's counsel was not ineffective in connection with Petitioner's plea. Therefore, this claim is not substantial because there was no proper reason for counsel to file a post-sentence motion to withdraw the plea on that basis. Werts v. Vaughn, 228 F.3d 178, 202 (3d Cir. 2000); Rouse v. Delbaso, No. 15-6308, 2016 WL 9448114, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2016) (“[T]he courts in this Circuit have determined that where it would be fruitless to challenge a guilty plea, counsel is not ineffective in failing to file post-sentence motions raising such a meritless claim.” (collecting cases)). Moreover, as the Pennsylvania Courts repeatedly found, Petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. (A104; A142; A162; A304). Indeed, the trial court explained “[d]uring the guilty plea colloquy, we specifically wanted to make sure that [Petitioner] entered into the plea knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. [Petitioner] testified that he was pleading guilty to the offenses because he committed them. He is bound by his admissions.” (A162). The PCRA Court explained, “Petitioner's statements to the Court made in connection with his guilty plea indicate that Petitioner's plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.” (A304). Simply put, Petitioner's claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea is not substantial because (1) such a motion was in fact filed, (2) his trial counsel was not ineffective related to the plea, and (3) his plea was knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. See, e.g., Rouse, 2016 WL 9448114, at *5 (“[Petitioner's] testimony during the plea colloquy with the trial court clearly establishes that his guilty plea was given voluntarily. Therefore, [Petitioner's] plea counsel was not ineffective in failing to challenge the voluntariness of his guilty plea in post-sentence motions.”); Christmas v. Walsh, No. 11-7390, 2012 WL 7005637, at *11 (E.D. Pa. July 25, 2012) (finding procedural default not excused on ineffectiveness claim for failing to file withdrawal motion because “Petitioner has failed to show a plausible basis for a motion to withdraw the guilty plea”).
Accordingly, I conclude the procedural default on Ground Two is not excused under Martinez. The underlying, procedurally defaulted ineffectiveness claim that his counsel failed to file post-sentence motion to withdraw his guilty plea is not substantial. The claim is not substantial because such a motion was in fact filed, there was no proper basis to withdraw his guilty plea, and because the guilty plea was entered knowing, intelligently, and voluntarily. Therefore, I conclude the procedural default is not excused and respectfully recommend relief on this Ground be denied.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully recommend that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be denied. I conclude the Pennsylvania Courts reasonably rejected Petitioner's Ground One. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)-(2). I also find that Petitioner's Ground Two is procedurally defaulted and no exceptions apply to excuse the procedural default.
Therefore, I respectfully make the following:
RECOMMENDATION
AND NOW this 29TH day of May, 2020, I RESPECTFULLY RECOMMEND that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED without an evidentiary hearing and without the issuance of a certificate of appealability.
Petitioner may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. See Local Civ. Rule 72.1. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.