Eugene Theatre et al. v. Eugene et al., supra note 15, 194 Or. at 630, 243 P.2d at 1072. See, Acme Brick & Supply v. Dep't of Revenue, 133 Ill.App.3d 757, 478 N.E.2d 1380, 88 Ill.Dec. 654 (1985); Ford Motor Co. v. City of Seattle, supra note 15. See, also, McPheeter v. City of Auburn, 288 Ala. 286, 259 So.2d 833 (1972).
A court may properly take judicial notice of administrative rules and regulations. Acme Brick & Supply Co. v. Department of Revenue, 133 Ill.App.3d 757, 762 (1985). ¶ 31 In Sheahan, we addressed the ability of Sheahan, a retired police chief, to transfer service credits to the IMRF from two other pension funds.
See 5 ILCS 100/ 5-80(g) (West 2006). This court may take judicial notice of rules and regulations even when they are not part of the record on appeal. Acme Brick Supply Co. v. Department of Revenue, 133 Ill. App. 3d 757, 762 (1985). Thus, while Supreme Court Rule 342(a) (210 Ill. 2d R. 342(a)) does not provide for the inclusion in the appendix of such nonrecord material as rules and regulations, we do not find that the inclusion of the Illinois Administrative Code sections is improper, and we deny the motion to strike as it relates to this material.
Regardless, courts may take judicial notice of an agency's rules and regulations as matters of public record. Acme Brick Supply Co. v. Department of Revenue, 133 Ill. App.3d 757, 762, 478 N.E.2d 1380, 1384 (1985).
There is no question but that section 2-40 of the Retailers' Tax Act is designed to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of retailers by the collection of a retailer occupation tax in excess of that allowed on the property subject to tax. Both Adams v. Jewel Cos. (1976), 63 Ill.2d 336, 345, 348 N.E.2d 161, 166, and Acme Brick Supply Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 757, 765, 478 N.E.2d 1380, 1386, acknowledge the purpose. The revenue set forth on the truck rental agreements did not represent property subject to sales tax.
"Generally, a person to whom a statute may constitutionally be applied will not be permitted to challenge the statute on the ground that it could in another context be applied unconstitutionally to another party." ( People v. Holder (1983), 96 Ill.2d 444, 449, 451 N.E.2d 831; see also People v. Capitol News, Inc. (May 1990), Nos. 67480, 67481, 67482, 67483, cons., slip op. at 5; Rosewood Corp. v. Fisher (1970), 46 Ill.2d 249, 259, 263 N.E.2d 833; Acme Brick Supply Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 757, 766, 478 N.E.2d 1380.) We, therefore, decline to consider whether section 3-1001 operates in an unconstitutional manner in a hypothetical situation involving a trade-in in a nonretail transaction.
In spite of the defendant's apparent failure to produce the text of the regulations for the court to examine, and her failure to specifically invoke the applicable regulation, the trial court took judicial notice of it and did so simply on defense counsel's general representation as to its provisions. • 2, 3 A court may properly take judicial notice of administrative rules and regulations ( Acme Brick Supply Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 757, 762, 478 N.E.2d 1380) and can also take notice of facts which are capable of immediate and accurate demonstration by resort to easily accessible sources of indisputable authority. ( Vulcan Materials Co. v. Bee Construction (1983), 96 Ill.2d 159, 166, 449 N.E.2d 812; see Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 110, pars. 8-1001 through 1009.)
We need not address this argument, however, as respondents have no standing to raise an issue regarding the purported effect of section 162d on the rights of other persons not similarly situated. See Acme Brick Supply Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 757, 766, 478 N.E.2d 1380; see also Illinois Municipal League v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board (1986), 140 Ill. App.3d 592, 488 N.E.2d 1040. For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Lake County is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Rules of construction are used only for the purpose of resolving ambiguities. ( Acme Brick Supply Co. v. Department of Revenue (1985), 133 Ill. App.3d 757, 763.) In any event, the plain and obvious meaning of a statute may not be enlarged or restricted. (See Berwyn Lumber Co. v. Korshak (1966), 34 Ill.2d 320, 323.