Criminal contempt, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 401, provides a vehicle through which the Court may rectify contempt of its authority by fine or imprisonment Taking such necessary action is "regarded as — essential to ensuring that the Judiciary has a means to vindicate its own authority without complete dependence on the other Branches." ACLI Gov't Sec. Inc., v. Rhoades, 989 F. Supp. 462, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), quoting Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787, 795 (1987). To hold a party in criminal contempt, "the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that: (1) the court entered a reasonably specific order; (2) the defendants knew of that order; (3) the defendants violated that order; and (4) their violation was willful."
14, 2021); ACLI Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Rhoades, 989 F.Supp. 462, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (“Continued contempt of court is a public offense that undermines the efficiency, authority and purpose of the judicial branch.
A court's inherent power to hold a party in civil contempt may only be exercised when “(1) the order the party allegedly failed to comply with is clear and unambiguous, (2) the proof of noncompliance is clear and convincing, and (3) the party has not diligently attempted in a reasonable manner to comply.” D'Orange, 959 F.Supp. at 635 (citing N.Y. State Nat. Organization for Women v. Terry, 886 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990); EEOC v. Local 638, Local 28 of Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n., 753 F.2d 1172, 1178 (2d Cir. 1985), aff'd, 478 U.S. 421 (1986); Nudelman v. Siag, 1996 WL 451379, 2 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)). See also ACLI Government Securities v. Rhoades, 989 F.Supp. 462, 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Civil contempt is a severe remedy, and the standard is an objective one; “a party's subjective belief that [he] was complying with an order ordinarily will not insulate [him] from civil contempt if that belief was objectively unreasonable.”
Generally, the Court's authority to request a criminal investigation—which does not, in any event, extend to ordering one—is limited to conduct that directly affects the judicial process or court proceedings, such as contempt of court. See ACLI Gov't Sec., Inc. v. Rhoades, 989 F. Supp. 462, 467-68 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (discussing courts' ability to "request the appropriate prosecuting authority to prosecute contempt actions"), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1345 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(a)(2) ("The court must request that the contempt be prosecuted by an attorney for the government, unless the interest of justice requires the appointment of another attorney.
Moreover, defendant has not demanded an evidentiary hearing on these motions nor does it appear that there are any material issues of fact in dispute that would necessitate a hearing. See ACLI Government Securities, Inc. v. Rhoades, 989 F. Supp. 462, 466 n. 5 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd, 159 F.3d 1345 (2d Cir. 1998) ("Local Rule 83.9(b) only requires oral evidence to be taken when factual disputes exist as to the alleged contemnor's conduct."). C. The Standards Applicable to a Motion for Civil Contempt
Levin, 277 F.3d at 251. There is no absolute right to a hearing in the context of a motion for contempt. SEC v. Credit Bancorp, Ltd., No. 99 Civ. 11395 (RWS), 2000 WL 968010, *8 (S.D.N.Y. July 3, 2000) ("when there is no real factual dispute, then the court may proceed without an evidentiary hearing") (citing In re Grand Jury Proceeding (Doe), 13 F.3d 459 (1st Cir. 1994)); see also ACLI Gov't Securities, Inc. v. Rhoades, 989 F. Supp. 462, 466 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (deciding contempt motion based on affidavits and exhibits). The plaintiff has also moved to reopen the judgment without identifying any legal authority for doing so. If the plaintiff chooses to re-file, he shall set forth in an appropriate memorandum of law the legal authority under which he seeks to reopen the judgment.